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Abstract 
The post-Cold War era has seen a restructuring of the institutions of global governance 
and an intensification of international relations, to which one of the most important 
responses has been a reinvigoration of regionalism and region ali sati on. The proliferation 
of regionalism has led to increased relations between regional groups in different world 
regions, and the EU has been central to the development of this new interregional 
phenomenon. This thesis sets out to test the theory of interregionalism by looking at how 
the EU has strategically pursued interregionalism, and at how this has subsequently 
worked in practice. To best achieve this objective the thesis develops a more 
sophisticated framework of analysis; complex interregionalism. This framework allows 
for a detailed investigation of how the EU has simultaneously engaged in bilateral and 
interregional relations in Latin America. The thesis explores the tensions between 
interregionalism as a strategy and interregionalism in action, principally by drawing 
lessons from the EU's relations with Latin America, and Mercosur in particular. The 
most general foundation for this analysis is the study of International Political Economy 
(IPE), particularly the extensive literature on regional integration and the emerging 
literature that deals specifically with interregionalism. 
The thesis starts by presenting a comprehensive framework for analysis of interregional 
relations using the theory of interregionalism. The theory of interregionalism, ascribes a 
series of motivations and impacts that interregionalism. should exhibit, all of which are 
replicated in EU complex interregional strategy. The EU is found to have a consistent and 
coherent complex interregional strategy that it employs across three world regions: Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. The EU, notably the Commission, is pursuing an ambitious 
complex interregional strategy in each region that encompasses different levels of 
relations with different actors, but a strategy that always centers on the pursuit of pure 
interregionalism. Whilst the thesis details the EU's pursuit of this consistent complex 
interregional strategy with all three of the aforementioned world regions, it is the 
presence of the Andean Community, Central American Common Market and Mercosur in 
Latin America that marks the region out for deeper analysis. Complex interregional 
strategy in Latin America is applied consistently to all three regional integration vehicles, 
confirming the EU desire to pursue pure interregionalism, most notably with Mercosur. 
Analysis of EU relations with Mercosur reveals a core tension between strategy and 
action, notably that Commission strategy is not translated into action, as witnessed by the 
change towards bilateral relations with Brazil in 2007. 
The thesis finds that more important than the EU inability to translate strategy into action, 
is its inability to foster regional integration in its partners and encourage more coherent 
counterparts for the future pursuit of pure interregionalism. 
Key Words: Interregionalism, EU External Relations, EU-Latin American & EU- 
Mercosur relations, Regional Integration 
I 
Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION: THE EU AND COMPLEX INTERREGIONALISM: THE CASE 
OF LATIN AMERICA ........................................................................................... 1 
Research Questions ........................................................................................... 5 
0 Policy Research: Formulation versus Implementation of Strategy ............................................ 6 
0 Multi-Level, Multi-Causal Analysis 7 
Research Methods and Sources ....................................................................... 8 
Structure of the Thesis .................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER 1: INTERREGIONALISM IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
.................................................................................................... o ...................... 13 
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 13 
Context is 
0 International Relations Theory and Interregionalism ............................................................... 22 
Typology/Forms ................................................................................................ 26 
9 Transregional (bi-regional / mega-regional) ............................................................................... 30 
9 Hybrid Interregional (quasi-interregional) ................................................................................ 31 
0 Pure Interregional (group to group) ........................................................................................... 32 
Motivations ....................................................................................................... 36 
o Balancing and Bandwagoning ...................................................................................................... 36 
* Institutionalisation/Rationalisation ............................................................................................. 39 
0 Collective Identity Building .......................................................................................................... 
41 
Im pacts/Im pl ! cations ........................................................................................ 43 
ii 
0 Balancing and Bandwagoning ...................................................................................................... 44 
9 Institutionalisation/Rationalisation ............................................................................................. 45 
0 Collective Identity Building .......................................................................................................... 46 
Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 48 
CHAPTER 2: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INTER REGIONALISM .............. 56 
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 56 
Context .............................................................................................................. 59 
Mapping EU Trans/Interregiona I ism ............................................................... 66 
EU - Asia ............................................................................................................ 68 
o Mapping EU - Asia Trans/Interregionalism ............................................................................... 68 
9 Explaining EU - Asia TranstInterregionalism ............................................................................ 76 
9 Evaluating EU - Asia Trans/Interregionalism ............................................................................ 83 
EU - Africa ......................................................................................................... 89 
* Mapping EU - Africa Trans/Interregionalism ............................................................................ 89 
0 Explaining EU - Africa Trans/Interregionalism ........................................................................ 97 
o Evaluating EU - Africa Trans/Interregionalism ...................................................................... 102 
EU - Latin America .......................................................................................... 106 
Mapping EU - Latin America Trans/Interregionalism ............................................................ 106 
Explaining EU - Latin America TranstInterregionalism ........................................................ 113 
0 Evaluating EU - Latin America Trans/Interregionalism ........................................................ 117 
Comparative Evaluation of EU Trans/interregional ism ............................... 119 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 129 
III 
CHAPTER 3: EU COMPLEX INTER REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA ..... 135 
Introduction .................................................................................................... 135 
Context and History ....................................................................................... 138 
0 Relations: EC - Latin America from 1957 ................................................................................ 139 
Bilateralism ..................................................................................................... 148 
0 EU - Mexico ................................................................................................................................ 152 
9 EU - Chile .................................................................................................................................... 157 
0 EU - Brazil .................................................................................................................................. 162 
0 Bilateralism - Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 167 
Interregionalism .............................................................................................. 171 
0 EU - Central American Common Market (CACNI) ................................................................ 173 
0 EU - Andean Community (AC) ................................................................................................. 179 
9 EU - Mercosur ............................................................................................................................ 185 
* Interregionalism - Conclusions ................................................................................................. 192 
Trans regionalism ............................................................................................ 197 
0 EU - Rio Group ........................................................................................................................... 198 
0 EU - LAC Heads of State Summit ............................................................................................. 202 
9 Transregionalism - Conclusions ................................................................................................ 206 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 209 
CHAPTER 4: EU - MERCOSUR: COMPLEX INTERREGIONAL STRATEGY IN 
ACTION ............................................................................................................ 222 
Introduction .................................................................................................... 222 
EU-Mercosur: Towards Pure Interregionalism? .......................................... 225 
IV 
EU-Mercosur: Interinstitutional Agreement ............................................................................ 226 
0 EU-INfercosur: ENIIFCA ............................................................................................................. 228 
0 EU-Niercosur: EU Negotiating Mandate .................................................................................. 231 
Negotiating EU-Mercosur Interregionallsm .................................................. 235 
EU-Mercosur Interregionalism: Unfinished Business ................................. 243 
* Asymmetrical Trade and Agriculture: Multi-level, Nfulti-causal ........................................... 248 
0 International Context: IFTAA and WTO .................................................................................. 255 
0 Regional Integration - Towards Counterpart Coherence ....................................................... 263 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 271 
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 280 
* Empirical Evidence: Research Questions ................................................................................. 282 
e EU-LA Complex Interregionalism and EU-Mercosur Interregional ism ............................... 285 
0 Context/Types/ýAlotivations/Impacts ......................................................................................... 289 
0 Future of Complex Interregionalism ......................................................................................... 297 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................. 301 
1. Primary Sources ......................................................................................... 301 
* European Union Official Documents ........................................................................................ 301 
0 EU Speeches ................................................................................................................................. 303 
0 EU-Asia ........................................................................................................................................ 304 
0 EU-Africa ..................................................................................................................................... 305 
0 EU-Latin America ....................................................................................................................... 305 
9 Other Official Documents .......................................................................................................... 308 
2. Interviews .................................................................................................... 308 
V 
0 European Commission ................................................................................................................ 308 
0 Other ............................................................................................................................................ 309 
3. Secondary Sources .................................................................................... 309 
0 Books and Articles ...................................................................................................................... 309 
0 Newspapers& Press ................................................................................................................... 328 
* Internet Sources .......................................................................................................................... 329 
APPENDICES .................................................................................................. 330 
0 Appendix 1: Regional Integration in the World ....................................................................... 330 
0 Appendix 2: Classifications of Transregionalism and Interregionalism ................................ 337 
Appendix 3: Interregional Flow Chart ..................................................................................... 339 
0 Appendix 4: Indicative list of Regional Trade Agreements in Latin America ...................... 340 
0 Appendix 5: EU - Latin America Trade Statistics ................................................................... 341 
9 Appendix 6: EU - Latin American Regional Integration Schemes: Key Details .................. 353 
vi 
List of Abbreviations 
AC Coniunidad Andina de Naciones (Community of Andean 
Nations) 
ACP Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (Group of countries) 
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
AIDCO EuropeAid Cooperation Office 
ALADI Asociacion. Latinoamericana de Integracion (Latin American Integration 
Association) 
ALALC Asociaci6n Latinoatnericana de Libre Cornercio (Latin American Free 
Trade Association) 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
ASENI Asia-Europe Meeting 
AU African Union 
BCC Biregional Cooperation Council 
BCIE Banco Centroamericano de Integraci6n Econ61nica (Central- 
American Bank for Economic Integration) 
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty 
BNC Biregional Negotiations Committee 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China 
CACM Central American Common Market 
CAF Corporaci6n Andina de Fomento (Andean Development 
Corporation) 
CAFTA Central American Free Trade Association (US) 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market 
CBI Confederation of British Industry 
CCP Common Commercial Policy 
CCT Common Customs Tariff 
CENIAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
CET Common External Tariff 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
COMESA Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
COMESSA Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
CSN Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones (South American 
Community of Nations) 
DC Developed Country 
DDA Doha Development Agenda (WTO) 
DG Directorate General 
DG RELEX Directorate General for External Affairs (European Commission) 
DSM Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
EBA Everything But Arms Initiative 
EC European Communities (pre 1992) 
ECIP European Community Investment Partners (ECIP) 
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EIB European Investment Bank 
Vil 
ENIIFCA EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement 
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement 
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy 
EU European Union (post 1992) 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas 
G20 Group of 20 (developing countries negotiating within WTO) 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GSP Generalised System of Preferences 
IADB/IDB Inter-American Development Bank 
IGC Intergovernmental Conference 
IRELA Institute of European-Latin American Relations 
INIF International Monetary Fund 
IPE International Political Economy 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
is Import Substitution 
jCC Joint Cooperation Committee 
LA Latin America 
LAC Latin America & Caribbean 
LDC Least Developed Country 
NIEBF Mercosur-EU Business Forum 
Nfercosur Afercado Comdn del Sur (Common Market of the South) 
NIS Member State 
NAF'1PA North America Free Trade Agreement 
NGO, Non-Governmental Organisation 
NTB Non-Tariff Barrier 
OAS Organisation of American States 
ODA Official Development Aid 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement 
RIA Regional Integration Agreement 
RTA Regional Trade Agreement 
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
SACU Southern Africa Customs Union 
SADC Southern African Development Cooperation 
SICA Sistema de la Integraci6n Centroamericana (System for Central- 
American Integration) 
SOM Senior Officials Meeting 
SPS Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary 
TPA Trade Promotion Authority (US) 
TRIPS Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (WTO) 
UN United Nations 
us United States of America 
NVAENIU West Africa Economic and Monetary Union 
NVTO World Trade Organization 
Vill 
Key Definitions 
Bilateralism 
Bilateralism is a relationship between two state actors from any world region. It 
is the oldest and most frequent relationship between states in the modern world. 
Interregionalism 
Interregionalism is a relationship between two regional groups in two different 
world regions, such as one in Europe and one in Latin America e. g. EU- 
Mercosur. 
Interregionalism is a comprehensive relationship that covers trade, political and 
cooperation pillars through frequent interaction at all official levels. 
Transregionalism is a relationship between regional and state actors from any 
number of world regions, usually two. 
Transregionalism has wide membership and deals with high-level strategic 
thinking via a summit driven process. 
Complex Interregionalism 
Complex Interregionalism relates specifically to the result of the EU policy of 
differentiation implemented in the 1990s. It reflects the EU strategic pursuit of 
simultaneous relationships within a region at bilateral, interregional and 
transregional levels, notably with Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
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"Failure on ourpart to engage in this wider economic co-operation may well result its 
important econonzic regions developing a regulatoryframework which will potentially 
hurt the Union's interests" 
(Commission Communication 'Free Trade Areas: An Appraisal' 1995: Art 7) 
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Introduction: The EU and Complex Interrepionalism: the case 
of Latin America 
The post Cold War world has been one of restructuring global governance and 
increasingly complex international relations. There have been and continue to be 
structural realignments in international relations which ensure the constant evolution of a 
form of new world order. An important development within this changing environment 
has been a large shift from geopolitics towards geoeconornics as the focus of 
international interactions. This development can be largely attributed to the increasing 
international commercial competition instigated by the advance of globalisation, which in 
turn has played a role in the rebirth and reinvigoration of regionallsation and regionalism. 
This new geoeconomic and regional context has given rise to the increased use of "so 
power" (Nye 1990), as both trade and commercial policies have becorne increasingly 
powerful tools to manage international relations in the global environment. The 
importance of the trend was highlighted by the World Bank dedicating their 2004 annual 
report to an analysis of Regional Trading and Preferential Trading Agreements'. The 
report notes that "the pi-olifei-ation oj'i-egional trade agi-eenients (RTAs) isjUntlanzentallY 
altei-ing the woi-ld ti-ade landscape" (2004: 1). There has been a corollary tendency to 
institutionalise, not only trade and commercial relations, but also political and 
cooperation relations into all-encompassing relationships, expanding existing ties and 
creating new ones, into wide-ranging economic, political and developmental agreements. 
Almost every World Trade Organisation (WTO) member state 2 is currently a member of 
at least one RTA, and many more are expected to be signed in the coming years. Indeed 
the World Bank suggests that "nearlY all counti-ies belong to at least one RTA " (2004: 
1 PTA is a term that includes free trade agreements (FFA), common markets (CM), customs unions (CU) 
and single markets (SM). WTO convention terms them Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), but PTA has 
also become a valid and frequently used term in recent years 
2 150 at the time of writing in June 2007 (\ý \ý accessed 19 June 2007) 
29), continuing that only twelve countries are recorded as not active participants 3. It is not 
simply the sheer volume of RTAs, Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTA) that is important, but the role they are taking in global governance, 
both individually and through their interaction. The necessity to adapt to the new 
economic, political, commercial and social realities of the last two decades has given rise 
to new models of, and new levels of, international relations. There are now many levels 
of complex international relations to analyse and evaluate, one of which is a recent and 
important development: interregionalism. 
Interregional relations are formal agreements between two regional entities in different 
world regions. Interregional agreements can cover trade, political, cooperation, 
development and many other areas 4, usually all within a defined institutional structure. 
Such a development in international relations has an element of logical progression to it, 
as regionalisation has progressed to regionalism, so the interaction of these regional 
entities has led to interregionalism in the 1990s as part of the trend to expand external 
relations. Within the context of globalisation, increasing the necessity of global networks 
and contacts, interregional developments were indeed to some extent inevitable, 
especially as coherent regional actors appeared around the globe. 
Globalisation and regionalism have spawned many questions in international relations, in 
areas as diverse as identity building, actorness, regional entity formation, soft power 
versus hard power, legalisation, economic development, the role of new levels of 
relations in the existing international context and their role in global governance. The 
traditional Bhagwati question of "stumbling blocks or building blocs" (1991: 77) in 
reference to the ambiguous relationship between regionalism and multilateralism is in 
itself becoming inherently more complicated by the inter-relations of RTAs and Customs 
Unions (CU) with other RTAs and CUs, moving towards more widespread 
interregionalism. The Bhagwati dictum could indeed now be applied to interregional ism 
3 Those 12 countries are; American Samoa, Bermuda, Channel Islands, Guam, Isle of Man, Monaco, 
Mongolia, N. Marianna Islands, Palau, Puerto Rico, Timor-Leste and the Virgin Islands (World Bank 2004: 
53) 
4 In varying combinations according to circumstances 
2 
itself, in regard to its role between regionalism and multilateral ism. The advent of 
interregionalism as a level of international relations, between these two established 
spheres, and the exact forms that it has taken, has become an important area of research. 
Aggarwal and Fogarty suggest that it is "the emerging face of the international political 
econonýy" (2004: 207), an idea they develop further, even enquiring; 
"With global institutions facing an uncertain future, could various types of 
interregionalism - the pursuit offormalised intergovernmental relations with respect to 
commercial relationships across distinct regions - emerge as a next best strategy for 
states and firms to pursue trade liberalisation? And will pure interregionalism - the 
formation of ties between two distinctfiree trade areas or customs unions - become the 
predominantform of trade organisation in the global economy as the world increasingly 
divides up into regional groupings? " (2004: 1) 
Whilst there is an element of inevitability inherent in interregionalism, there is also a 
crucial element of strategic support and dissemination by the European Union (EU). The 
EU has systematically supported regional integration and simultaneously promoted 
interregionalism as a mechanism for its external relations. This EU strategic support has 
made the EU, without question, the most active interregional entity, credited by many 
commentators with having actually developed the concept. Malamud notes that the 
"consolidation of European unity since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, 
along with the contemporary mushrooming of integrating regions all around the world, 
illustrate a significant new phenomenon" (2003b: 53). The significant phenomenon to 
which Malamud refers is interregionalism, spreading both due to its inevitability and the 
strategic support of the EU. The EU has cultivated a number of interregional relationships 
around the globe and has signed interregional agreements that have subsequently been 
considered to be benchmark agreements in the field. Indeed the drive of the EU in this 
direction was highlighted by the Draft European Constitution, which stated that the EU's 
international role should be "guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the 
principles that have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement" (European 
Convention 2003, Title V, Chap. 1, Art. 111-193). The strategic drive of the EU for other 
3 
countries to embrace regionalism, and then subsequently interact interregionally has led 
to a field of study in this EU approach to international relations and global governance. 
The EU regionalist project is compared to the domination and unilateral super-power 
approach of the United States of America (US). These two so-called 'models' are seen to 
be in competition as viable alternatives of global governance, which makes understanding 
interregionalism crucial to understanding the potential of the regionalist drive. This idea 
is articulated by Hettne when he says that "the emerging structure of interregional 
arrangements that follows from a process of global regionalisation, and is consciously 
cultivated by the EQ, constitutes a possible world order which differs from Par 
Americana" (2003: 1). The EU plays a fundamental role in every aspect of 
interregionalism given its central position in promoting and practicing current 
interregionalism, as well as in fostering and encouraging its future potential. As the 
Chaire Mercosur 2002-3 Annual Report notes; "the way the European Union will define 
its own international identity will largely determine its ability to shape the international 
order" (2004: 11). Interregionalism, is an attempt by the EU to define and reinforce its 
own international identity and shape the international order, a strategy that adheres to the 
suggestion of Moravcsik, who proposed that the EU "would do better to invest its 
political and budgetary capital in a distinctive complement to it (military power). 
European civilian power, if wielded shrewdly and more coherently, could be an effective 
and credible instrument of modem European statecraft" (quoted in Vasconcelos 2003: 3- 
4). Interregional ism is one such attempt by the EU to form its own international identity 
and influence the international order, forming the lynchpin of a regionalist theory of 
global governance. 
The EU has fostered its most advanced interregional relations with Latin America, East 
Asia and Africa, but it also has forms of limited interregional relations with the South 
Mediterranean, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Of all the EU's external relations 
those with Latin America provide the most topical and comprehensive model of 
developing international relations with interregionalism at the core. The Latin American, 
African and Asian regions has developed their own specific interregional relationships 
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with the EU, with idiosyncrasies taking account of their specific nature and of the needs 
of their interaction. Whilst EU relations with East Asia have been subject to the most in- 
depth study and reflection5 it is the set of interregional relationships that the EU has 
developed with Latin America that has taken the most advanced steps in the last ten years. 
It is due to this that EU relations with Latin America represent an ideal case study for the 
operation of interregionalism in practice. A deeper analysis of EU interregional relations 
with Latin America reveals the world's single most ambitious and important interregional 
relationship, that between the EU and Mercosur. The EU-Mercosur relationship was the 
first interregional relationship to aspire to an Association Agreement covering political, 
cooperation and trade pillars, making it the cutting edge of the theory and practice of 
interregionalism. Since Mercosur was created in 1991 the EU has offered every form of 
support open to it to try and nurture a solid regional entity with which it could engage in 
interregional relations. The EU has thus maintained very close relations with Mercosur, 
officially aiming to establish an interregional Association Agreement since the signing, in 
1995, of the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Co-operation Agreement (EMIFCA). 
This relationship, which has still not achieved the level of interregional Association 
Agreement, is crucial to a comprehensive understanding of the EU strategy of 
interregionalism, how interregional ism works in practice with Mercosur and within Latin 
America, and also to a wider understanding of the future potential of interregionalism as 
a general concept. 
Research Ouestions 
This thesis will be based on a multi-level analysis of the EU's strategic use of 
interregionalism in its external relations. The investigation will be guided by the 
following specific research questions: 
1. What exactly is interregionalism, and what does it offer international relations that 
other levels of relations do not? 
5 This is in the most part because they were the first interregional relations to be developed 
5 
2. How has the EU's strategy of interregionalism manifested itself across the globe? 
3. How does the EU's strategic interregional approach to Latin America work in practice? 
4. Are there any tensions between the EU interregional strategy for Afercosur and EU - 
Afercosur interregionalism in action? 
These four specific research questions are designed to focus the multi-level analysis into 
distinct and progressive areas of study. The thrust of the research questions is to ascertain 
the theory and reality of the EU's strategic use of interregionalism in the international 
arena, hence the first two chapters build the analytical and conceptual background before 
chapters three and four undertake more specific empirical analysis. 
Policy Research: Formulation versus Implementation of Strategv 
The overriding objective of this thesis is to analyse the EU's strategic use of 
inteffegionalism, thus it will have to evaluate both policy formulation and its subsequent 
implementation. In this sense the thesis aims to contribute to both academic and policy 
debates surrounding interregionalism and the EU's external relations. In order to provide 
value-added in policy research it is crucial to obtain information from policy-makers so 
as to get the full picture behind, and around, published strategic policy papers. Such 
access to policy makers in the Commission and Counci 16 is invaluable for gaining insight 
into the motivations and strategic implications in EU policy documents towards Latin 
America and Mercosur for example. Having established the theoretical basis and 
potential for inteffegionalism it will be essential to present a thorough understanding of 
the policy formulation process for EU interregional relations in general and in specific 
regions, such as Latin America. The thesis will need to identify the EU's main 
interregional objectives, which will allow it to proceed to an evaluation of these 
objectives by assessing how the EU interregional strategy has been implemented in Latin 
America and Mercosur, and with what results. It will be important to assess how the EU 
6 The European Parliament is not mentioned as it does not have formal powers over the elaboration and 
implementation of EU external relations 
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sets out its objectives for interregionalism on paper and then how it attempts to 
implement these objectives, and finally to evaluate the results of these two processes. 
In chapter two, the EU's interregional activity will be studied across the three main 
regions with which the EU has interregional relations. This will lead, in chapter three, to 
a deeper analysis of EU interregional activity in Latin America, which will in turn lead, 
in chapter four, to an analysis of the EU's interregional activity with Mercosur. By 
proceeding in this way the thesis will present a key distinction between strategic 
formulation and implementation, which will frame the general scope of the overall 
analysis. 
Multi-Level, Nfulti-Causal Analysis 
From the mid-1990s the EU has engaged in a multi-level approach to its external 
relations across the globe which gives rise to the need for a multi-level approach to 
evaluate them. This is encapsulated in the words of Chris Patten, the 1994-2004 External 
Relations Commissioner, when he said of relations with Asia; "given the sprawling 
variety of Asia, it is absurd to think of a monolithic EU-Asia relationship: a single 
approach equally valid across the whole region" (2002c: 2). This multi-level approach 
was also adopted for Latin America, "in a significant shift of policy, the EU decided to 
move towards somefonn of associated status with Mexico, Chile and Mercosur. Hitherto 
associated status had been reservedfor those states that eitherfor historical reasons (ex- 
colonial states of the Lome Conventions) or political reasons (the near abroad of East 
and South Europe) had been considered of top foreign policy priority status for the EU" 
(Peterson & Sjursen 1998: 161). In essence the EU's interregional strategy is part of its 
overall multi-level approach to its external relations, and it will be evaluated as such. The 
empirical work in chapters three and four will discern any strategic policy or 
implementation differences between the different levels of interaction that the EU has 
with the region at bilateral, interregional and transregional levels. Obviously the different 
levels of relations are unavoidably related, and the advent of a strategic drive towards 
interregionalism will impact on all levels of relations. Multi-causal analysis will also be 
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needed to provide a thorough investigation of multi-level relations, as there is not one 
dominant hypothesis to explain any aspect of interregionalism. 
Research Methods and Sources 
This section addresses the sources of this thesis as well as the methodological approach 
that it has adopted in tackling the research questions outlined above. The first chapter is a 
thorough literature review of the concept of interregionalism, which has combined the 
relevant aspects of the theories of international relations and regionalism with the more 
specific literature on interregionalism itself. Despite the fact that interregionalism is a 
relatively new concept it does have a small, dedicated and increasing literature attached 
to it. From these key literary sources the main aspects of the theory of interregionalism 
are analysed. Given the focus of the work on the EU's strategic use of interregionalism an 
important section of the first chapter is dedicated to the main theoretical motivations and 
impacts of interregionalism, as they provide a solid underpinning for the later analysis. 
Chapters two, three and four, as they are more EU-specific and empirical in nature, use a 
wider net of primary and secondary sources of information. In order to assess the EUs 
strategic interregional objectives the investigation of primary sources is invaluable, thus 
Commission strategic documents, press releases, speeches, and other written sources are 
the basis for a majority of the analysis in these chapters. Not only are documents from the 
Commission key, so too are those from the Council and the European Parliament, as well 
as the various documents emanating from interregional meetings such as EU-Mercosur 
Ministerials. 
In the case of the Commission the key documents that form the basis of the investigation 
of EU interregional objectives are its strategic documents which it has issued from the 
mid-1990s. These documents set out, in succinct fashion, the EU's strategic objectives, 
priorities and aims, as well as the mechanisms for implementation. It has issued these at 
different levels, from the broad sub-continental level (Latin America), to the regional 
level (Mercosur) as well as the bilateral level (Brazil) which makes comparison between 
levels of relations more straight forward. 
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To supplement and add further value this thesis also relies on interviews and policy 
networking to fill gaps, provide between the lines analysis and supply detail that is not 
available in published form. Interviews have been a regular qualitative research method 
of this investigation, performed as and when needs and questions arose. The author 
targeted not only the most relevant policy officials, whose knowledge and experience of 
the issues at hand was second to none, but also other informed and important 
stakeholders in the EU interregional process. The most productive interview method was 
semi-structured interviews based around a set of loose questions that were mailed to 
interviewees in advance. Such a methodology usually provided for a more open and 
constructive dialogue. Interviews of this nature provided invaluable information for the 
empirical work of chapters three and four, especially for the work on EU-Mercosur 
negotiations. All interviews were undertaken on the understanding of total interviewee 
confidentiality, which prompted the inevitable decision to withhold all interviewee names 
from this thesis. 
Interviews were carried out almost exclusively in Brussels and covered mainly the 
European Commission, mostly officials from DG Trade, DG External Relations and DG 
Agriculture. These interviews were supplemented by additional ones with Business 
Organisations strongly invested in the interregional process, such as BusinessEurope. For 
all the interviews undertaken there was a short telephone follow up to clarify any 
outstanding issues and also to address any questions that occurred after reflection. In 
many cases this way of proceeding led to a continued informal contact which moved onto 
e-mail. In this way it was possible to answer individual questions as and when they arose. 
The author found Commission officials to be very willing to engage in a critical analysis 
of EU strategy, often in uncompromising terms on a, 'it does not leave this room' basis, 
all of which has provided value-added to the thesis. Being able to interact with policy 
makers on an informal basis allowed the author to tap their perspectives of the issues 
under investigation and gain the benefit of their experience (often tempered by hindsight). 
Information from interviews, and their follow-ups, was also bolstered by the author's 
significant policy network contacts in Brussels and in Latin America. These contacts 
have provided a stream of information and insight throughout the work on the thesis. 
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Overall the thesis rests on a combination of research methods, the principal one of which 
has been the verification and deepening of primary and secondary source analysis by 
interviews. Primary and secondary source analysis has provided the conceptual and 
theoretical underpinnings, present most noticeably in chapter one, but these have been 
supplemented in later chapters by interview material to bolster empirical work. The thesis 
has thus used a multi-source analysis to furnish the most apt information for each chapter. 
Structure of the Thesis 
To analyse the development, formulation and implementation of EU interregional 
strategy this thesis is divided into four distinct chapters. Broadly speaking the first two 
chapters present the framework for empirical analysis by providing a strong conceptual 
and theoretical foundation, which chapters three and four then make use of in their case- 
study analyses. 
Chapter one reviews the existing IPE and interregional literature to discern the exact 
theoretical place and form of interregionalism. The general political economy context of 
interregionalism relates to how nation states have, over time, used many measures and 
strategies to promote, control, regulate and manage international relations and trade. The 
first sections of the chapter explain the context and then the typology of interregionalism, 
based on the work of interregional specialists such as Rbland, Hettne and HUnggi. These 
authors have started to classify and examine interregionalism, identifying key 
motivations as well as the main outputs and implications, all of which are related in the 
course of the chapter. The identification of i nterregi onal ism's exact nature, forms, drivers, 
impacts and implications sets the base for an analysis of EU interregional strategies 
across the globe. 
Chapter two is devoted to an analysis of the EU and interregionalism, specifically asking 
how the EU has strategically promoted inteffegionalism. The criteria and structure 
employed to analyse inteffegionalism in chapter one are applied to the EU and 
interregionalism to determine the key aspects of this specific relationship. Chapter two 
starts by mapping the prevalence of EU inteffegionalism around the globe, finding that it 
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is concentrated in three specific world regions; Asia, Africa and Latin America. Each of 
these regions is then examined in turn, looking at the Commission's strategic objectives, 
the mechanisms deployed to implement these strategies, partner motivations and the 
results attained in each region. Chapter two discovers that Latin America is the EU's 
most active interregional partner, with a neatly structured relationship that encompasses 
all levels of relations from bilateral to transregional, something that the thesis terms 
complex interregionalism. 
Chapter three investigates the picture of complex interregionalism that the EU has with 
Latin America. The chapter addresses the three main levels of relations between the two 
partners; bilateral, interregional and transregional. Such a multi-level analysis is 
undertaken from the perspective of investigating interregionalism and how it meshes with 
other levels of relations. The chapter also aims to assess the two different facets of EU 
interregionalism. that arose in chapter two; interregionalism as a strategy and 
interregionalism in action. The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of complex 
interregionalism. in action in Latin America. One of the main elements to arise from the 
study of complex interregionalism. is the importance of the EU-Mercosur relationship, 
which is very much the flagship interregional relationship in the world and the best 
example of the EU pursuit of pure interregionalism. 
Chapter four investigates EU-Mercosur interregionalism in detail, by analysing the exact 
strategies that the EU has for relations with Mercosur, how it has gone about putting them 
into place, and what the results have been. The chapter addresses the three pillar 
agreement approach combining economic, political and development elements that have 
formed negotiations between the two partners. The main focus rests on the trade pillar as 
it is the most contentious and still unfinished aspect of negotiations. By examining the 
details of EU-Mercosur interregionalism certain key elements come to the fore, elements 
that also have an important bearing for interregionalism in general. The most significant 
of these concerns regional integration and specifically the difference between the 
envisaged aims of the EU, and the reality of Mercosur regional integration. 
The conclusion begins by reviewing the empirical findingsof all of the chapters, with a 
specific focus on the development between the conclusions to the theoretical and strategic 
chapters, one and two, and those of the empirical case-study chapters, three and four. The 
concept of complex interregionalism, as developed in chapter three, adds to the 
understanding of interregionalism, as a multi-level phenomenon. The review suggests, 
however, that there is a great difference between the theory of complex interregional ism 
and the reality of complex interregionalism, in action as witnessed in Latin America, and 
especially Mercosur. The conclusion endorses the sentiments of Aggarwal and Fogarty 
(2004: 1) that interregionalism has the potential to become the next best strategy for 
international relations outside of the multilateral arena, especially pure interregionalism, 
on the basis of potential, but it provides solid empirical backing that suggests that this 
potential is not being realised, and that in many cases it will not be realised. 
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Chapter 1: Interreizionalism in the Global Political Economv 
Introduction 
The trend of interregionalism can originally be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s 
(Regelsberger in Edwards & Regelsberger 1990: 5), when there were the first 
interregional manifestations, so-called bilateral interregionalism or bi-regionalism, which 
was created due to the first proliferation of regional entities in their various forms. The 
EC, itself created in 1957, started to interact more consciously with other regional entities 
and regions in the 1970s, such as the EU-Arab Dialogue (1974), cooperation with the 
Mediterranean region (1977) and the Lomd convention signed with ACP countries (1975). 
This early version of interregionalism was a crude form of basic region to region contact 
conducted principally by the EC with partner regions as part of its Cold War hub and 
spoke relations strategy. There has, in essence, always been some form of 
interregionalism, which at its most basic was a form of inevitable regularised contact 
between two regions. However, over time, as regions have become better defined, as 
regional groups have developed more actorness qualities and as interregionalism has been 
used as a strategy in itself, its occurrence and use has spread far and wide. 
Both the inevitability and strategic perspectives of two world regions interacting 
necessitate improved structures, defined fora and overarching aims and objectives, all of 
which have given shape to interregionalism. in its different guises. Interregionalism. as it is 
currently understood, is a more recent and expanding phenomenon in international 
relations, and one that has elicited much comment and evaluation. The increase in 
interregional relations noted since the 1990S7 has given the phenomenon added topical 
significance and led Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004: 238) to the conclusion that 
"understanding the drivingforces behind interregionalism is likely to become a crucial 
7 See Appendix I for an indicative list of regional integration vehicles in the world 
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theoretical and policy concern ". This desire to understand interregionalism and all its 
potential motivations, forms, contents, impacts and implications is the leitmotif of this 
chapter. 
As identified in the introduction the key research question associated with current 
interregionalism is to ascertain its exact nature and principal implications. The aim of this 
chapter is to understand this rising trend of interregionalism by situating it in the relevant 
context and literature. Interregionalism will be taken more as a static concept in this 
chapter, as opposed to a dynamic strategic concept that will be covered in chapter two, 
but it will not ignore this important facet. To structure such a comprehensive analysis this 
chapter will be separated into four sections relating to the key questions that 
interregionalism poses for international relations and academic enquiry. The first section 
will set the theoretical context within which an analysis of interregionalism can take 
place, explaining its exact position and importance in international relations theory. The 
second section will address a typology of interregionalism as well as the different forms 
that it has taken. This will lead into an analysis of firstly the motivaýions behind and 
sustaining interregionalism, and secondly of the impacts and implications of its existence 
and use. This will lead to a conclusion in which interregionalism can be situated in the 
major schools of international relations and also within its own branch of academic 
literature. 
As Rifland has observed, "studies on interregional relations constitute a novel area of 
research in the field of international politics" (2002a: 1), and it has been a research area 
that has grown rapidly in the last decade. Interregionalism is not only a new concept, but 
also one that does not subscribe to one single school of international relations. From this 
basis it is understandable that there is currently no common and accepted definition and 
explanation of the interregional phenomenon and that there is debate over a large number 
of issues surrounding the study of interregionalism, all things that this chapter will 
address. 
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. 
Context 
The general political economy context of interregionalism relates to how nation states 
have, over time, used many measures and strategies to promote, control, regulate and 
manage international relations and trade. To situate interregionalism it is necessary to 
understand the context and environment within which it exists and operates. As was 
noted in the introduction the overriding environment of interregionalism is that of 
globalisation and global governance structures and of the responses to changing 
international relations and circumstances. Interregionalism is even more specifically 
related to a sub-division of this wider global debate, that of regionalism as a response to 
globalisation. In many senses this is the inevitability argument for interregionalism, 
because as a concept its "rise must be linked to the proliferation of regional 
organisations under the auspices of what since the 1980s is known as New Regionalism. 
Their existence reflects the fact that these regional organisations are increasingly 
interacting" (Rfiland 2002d: 3). 
Regionalism has been an important development of recent decades, within the ever- 
changing structures of global governance, and has spawned a large debate about its 
ambiguous relationship with multilateralism. The Bhagwati question noted in the 
introduction, "building block or stumbling bloc" (Bhagwati 1991: 77), remains 
unanswered. Despite the continuing lack of consensus on the impact and role of 
regionalism the WTO reports that, in part because of slow progress in the Doha Round, 
"between January 2004 and February 2005 alone 43 RTAs have been notified to the 
IUO, making this the most prolific RTA period in history" (2005: 1). They further 
comment that "RTAs are a major and perhaps irreversible feature of today's multilateral 
trading system" (idem). 
It is into these two crucial debates, globalisation and global governance and regionalism 
and multilateral ism, that interregionalism is situated, often as a potential middle ground. 
These two closely linked developments have created an environment and situation in 
which interregionalism has been able to flourish. The growth of globalisation, and efforts 
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at global governance, have led to international limitations and frustrations in terms of 
content and action that have meant that interregionalism has been given the opening and 
incentives it needed. As the current WTO Doha Round continues at its slow pace and 
RTAs flourish, interregionalism could find itself thrust even more into the spotlight. 
Added to this has been the growth in coherent regional organisations, which have become 
increasingly capable and willing to engage in external relations. 
Interregional ism clearly occupies an important space within the globalisation and global 
governance field of study and it is therefore important to understand the context of 
globalisation and the key issues that it has brought to international relations. To help 
situate interregionalism it is useful to consider two questions about globalisation; firstly 
the type of order that globalisation is creating, and secondly the issue of whether 
globalisation and regionalism are complementary or not8 . These two key questions relate 
to the two key areas in which inteffegionalism has a (perceived) role to play. The global 
debate will be addressed first and then the regional and multilateral issue will be analysed 
as a sub-division of this wider globalisation debate. 
it has been argued that globalisation has intensified conflict and fragmentation (RUland 
2002d: 2) as periphery areas get involved in outcast scenarios from which they struggle to 
reinsert themselves, for which "Clash of Civilisations" (Huntington 1993) is the extreme, 
and most quoted, example. This view suggests that globalisation is not producing a stable 
order. The other side of the debate advances the idea that globalisation has facilitated 
international institution building and cooperation and is contributing to a more stable 
regulated world order. There is a general debate about globalisation and its power to re- 
order or fragment, in which Reinecke contends that the current state of global governance 
resembles at best "a loose set of cross-national policy patchworks, conspicuous for their 
missing links and unnecessary overlaps" (1998: 10). Within the fragmentation logic 
interregionalism is attempting to address the problem of missing links by creating a new 
level of relations. Within the re-ordering logic, that of constructive institution building 
and cooperation, interregionalism appears as a new level of international relations born 
8 For more a detailed look at these two questions in relation to interregionalism see Hettne (2003 & 2004) 
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out of globalising necessity. Accepting either interpretation it is clear that the advance of 
globalisation has created a need for more intermediaries and controls on its processes, 
and that interregional ism can play an influential role. 
Interregionalism is thus an important element as a potential level of control, negotiation, 
institutionalisation, contact, action and mediation. Globalisation has affected, and 
continues to affect, different world regions in different ways, requinng differing actions. 
Relations at an interregional level facilitate negotiation, discussion, resolution and 
apprehension of issues that globalisation induces. Interregionalism can thus be seen as an 
important development in the debate on the order that globalisation is creating, as a level 
of interaction formed to divest further order in the global system. The need to address 
globalisation leads into the second contextual setting of interregionalism, that of 
regionalism. Regionalism has already been noted to have been one of many reactions to 
globalisation, and the one that lies at the very origin of interregionalism itself. 
The trend of 'new regionalism' in the 1980s is directly linked to the current wave of 
interregionalism and it is of great theoretical and contextual relevance, as 
interregionalism is anchored in the advance of regionalism and its theory. This section 
will only deal with the so called 'new regionalism' and not the regionalism of the 1960s, 
closed regionalism, from which it is very different9. The first wave of regionalism in the 
1950s and 1960s was a much more inward looking wave that sought shelter from the 
outside world, not integration into it, but nonetheless inspired projects in Latin America, 
Asia, Africa and the Arab world such that many current regional projects stem from this 
first era. Regionalism in the 1980s and onwards has been much more closely linked to 
economic liberalisation and global commercial competition, making it more externally 
focused in the search for new partners and markets. The increasing number of regional 
organisations, all with more intent, desire and capability to engage in external relations is 
what has given birth to interregionalism. As regionalism has expanded and deepened 
interregionalism has become almost inevitable in the sense that these new international 
9 For more information on the differences between the two regionalisms see Burfisher, Robinson & 
Thierfelder (2003) and Devlin & Estevadeordal (2001) 
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actors would want, and need, to interact. As Doctor suggests "it was onlY in the In mid- 
1990s that states began to consider engaging with other regions as an (flective means o V 
applYing open regionalism strategies to a wider area so (is to manage economic and 
security challenges. from beyond the region " (2007: 283). 
Given the birth of interregionalism in regionalism it is important to briefly assess the 
motivations and principal characteristics of regionalism, as these will help underpin ail 
understanding of interregionalism. There are varied perspectives oil, motivations for, and 
explanations of regionalism and its benefits and drawbacks for members and the 
multilateral system as a whole. It is not the intention of this section to enter this large 
debatelo, but simply to draw on the most important recognised points to help understand 
the motivations of interregional ism. Of the principal motivations for actor participation in 
regionalism those highlighted by the World Bank (2000) will be taken as a basis. 
Although the motivations behind regionalism are manifold, the six specific ones cited 
below can be taken to be primary for actors across the broad spectrum of regional 
projects. 
Firstly the desire to pool resources and sovereignty is an important motivation, to 
enhance possible projects and actions that would be better suited (or indeed only possible) 
on a regional scale, such projects as infrastructure for example. Secondly security has 
been a key issue for regional projects, from the European Economic Community to 
Mercosur, as grouping together enhances internal security by drawing members 
together''. By uniting together a region can also help consolidate against extra-regional 
threats. Thirdly strategic bargaining power is a major motivation for smaller states in 
undertaking a regional venture. By pooling together, as in point one, they are able to 
increase their visibility, their potential market and their attractiveness for partner regions. 
Through this combination of factors they are able to increase their strategic bargaining 
power, although maximum bargaining power depends on many subsequent factors such 
10 For an introduction to this debate see World Bank (2000), Winters (1996), Vamvakidis (1998), Telo 
(2001), Switky (2000) and Schiff & Winters (1998b) 
" The Schuman Declaration of 1950, for example, states that the aim: "The solidarit ,v 
in production thits 
established will make it plain that an "v war 
between France and German , )- 
becomes not nierel ,v withinkable, but materially impossible " (lit t p: //curopa. eu/abc/s y inbo I s/9-j nay/dec i cn. hI m, accessed I August 2007) 
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as their ability to maintain one external voice and coherent positions. The fourth point 
concerns increased cooperation and trust, which has been an important motivation for 
regional integration as previously aggressive neighbours have sought to move closer 
together. The fifth factor is closely linked to economic, political and democratic changes 
that have occurred in many developing countries during the last decades, because as they 
have joined together regionally and agreed to certain rules and norms, domestic 
governments have been able to lock-in policies, which increases the costs and difficulties 
associated with going back on the agreed commitments. Finally the core activity of 
regionalism concerns preferential trade liberalisation and the belief that larger markets 
bring economies of scale and increased internal (and external) competition. 
It is clear that this mixture of motivations and contextual explanations of regionalism has 
an important bearing on the international environment within which interregionalism 
operates. The trend towards regionalism, based on the above-mentioned criteria, as a 
response to the challenges of globalisation, has created regional groupings with 
increasing actorness, intent and motivation to interact internationally. 
A regional project, once initiated, can follow either supranational or cooperative 
intergovernmental routes depending on the states involved. Regional projects can at their 
simplest be declarations of mutual intent, or move to the more committed level of binding 
agreements, the most common of which is a trade agreement. From this stage there are 
steps of regional integration that move from Free Trade Area through to Customs Union 
(common external tariff), Common Market (free movement of labour and capital) and 
Economic Union (harmonised monetary and fiscal policy), or even to full Political Union. 
Irrespective of their organisational design and institutional capacity regional entities have 
increased their actorness and presence in the international environment, although the 
extent to which they have enhanced their actorness is important. It is on this external 
aspect of regionalism that interregionalism has been built, as regionalism is a process that 
is fashioned in the way it relates to the outside world. 
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It is important to highlight that regionalism is no longer simply an inter-state activity but 
a multidimensional phenomenon involving non-state actors such as business fora, NGOs 
and wider civil society groups. These factors will be seen in relation to interregionalism, 
especially in the empirical analyses that follow in chapters three and four, where civil 
society has a crucial role to play in regionalism and interregional ism alike. The more 
integrated (further along the integration scheme outlined above) a region the more 
coherent and able an actor it has the potential to be 12 . 
The fact that regional entities have started to act and become actors in their own right, 
developing external relations with nation states, regional groups, international 
organisations and specific companies and corporations, is a crucial dynamic for 
inteffegionalism. The very nature of the globalising international environment since the 
1990s has made every actor realise that it has to think and act globally, interacting at all 
levels of international relations with other countries in the world to advance their interests. 
The slowdown in multilateral negotiations has also had an important impact on regional 
integration as actors look to accrue economic advantages and preferences outside the 
multilateral arena. Regional groups are constantly evolving actors, deepening, widening 
and mutating in response to circumstances. This ability to change as actors is what Hettne 
(1993) calls 'regionness', which is attributable to five key factors. A region is first and 
foremost a geographic space which is, secondly, organised by social groups who come to 
depend on each other to some degree. Thirdly there is the more formal region which 
exists as an international grouping, usually organised and comprising those states in the 
region that wish to join. The region develops, finally, into a community as the regional 
organisation is able to promote convergence in the region. This final region is more 
structured, able to make decisions and act coherently and consistently. 
From this increasingly externally orientated regional basis, within a world of 
institutionalization and rules, there has been an almost inevitable move towards relations 
that are more region to region in nature and based on cooperation. In the regionally based 
world that is developing there is, in Hettne's view, a necessity to have "an inter- 
12 The importance of actomess is addressed in more detail in due course 
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civilisation dialogue on the level of the macroregions" (2003: 8). Due to their origin in 
regionalism interregional relations are also subject to the same debate about the 
complementarity or ambiguity between multilateralism and regionalism. This is an 
important point to consider as RUland notes "globalisation hasfacilitated the emergence 
of a multilayered system of global governance which is built on regional organisations" 
(2002c: 2). It is clear that from this regional basis interregionalism automatically takes on 
an important role in the ambiguity between regionalism and multilateralism. 
Globalisation and regionalism have clearly created a space and the opportunity for some 
form of interregionalism to occur. Having elucidated this global and regional context of 
interregionalism, and its potential as a middle ground between the two, it is important to 
underline three essential pre-requisites that are crucial for the expansion and survival of 
interregionalism (Aggarwal & Fogarty 2004: 208). These factors will, over time, shape 
the exact type and nature that inteffegionalism will take, as well as underpinning its 
current existence. The first factor relates to the continuing desire to integrate the world 
economy, something that is perhaps currently taken for granted but that is in reality much 
more fragile than it would appear. Secondly the continued uncertainty over the viability 
of the multilateral system is an important factor for interregionalism, because if 
multilateralism were fully functional there would be less need, or space, for 
interregionalism. Finally there needs to be continued support for the idea of 
institutionalised, stable and rule-bound international relations as has been the trend in the 
last few decades. These three conditions currently exist, but there is no guarantee for how 
long they will continue to hold sway. These three factors also help explain why there are 
currently many different types and forms of inteffegionalism, because as the relative 
weights and balances of these factors change for individual actors so too do the merits 
and drawbacks of interregionalism, something that manifests itself in the types of 
interregionalism encountered. 
From an overview of the main contexts of interregionalism it is apparent that it has 
emerged as an important middle ground between the regional and multilateral levels of 
international relations as part of a wider search for new structures of global governance. 
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The role and potential of interregionalism is seen to be particularly acute when 
considering the recent slowdown in multilateral trade negotiations and the proliferation in 
increasingly coherent externally focused regional integration entities. Within this 
environment there has been a noted trend to expand PTA activity to such a point that a 
situation has arisen that has been termed a "spaghetti bowl" (Bhagwati, Greenaway & 
Panagariya 1998), one of confusion at the many overlapping agreements. Given WTO 
predictions for continued growth in PTA signings it is a safe assumption that this will 
only lead to an increasingly complicated situation. The creation of overlapping and 
potentially conflicting obligations in trade agreements, with different rules of origin, 
market access commitments and schedules is not leading to a more transparent global 
system. Within this context regionalism can play a role to subsume bilateral agreements 
and create pockets of conformity and coherence and from this interregional ism has even 
more potential to simplify and enhance clarity in international relations. 
International Relations Theory and Interregional ism 
Interregionalism. needs to be explained in the context of the literature on international 
relations because it is important to analyse how the existing perspectives on international 
relations relate to interregionalism, and how they have sought to explain it. Each school 
of thought presents its own idiosyncratic views, which has subsequent implications for 
the study of interregionalism. No one school of thought is singularly able to explain and 
understand interregionalism, hence why there is not one coherent view of the concept and 
a need to employ a multi-causal framework for analysis. 
As Hdnggi notes; 'for many years, the theoretical discourse in international relations 
has focused on the two powerful schools of thought, realism and liberal-institutionalism " 
(2000: 8). He goes on to add that "in recent years, however, both traditional schools 
were challenged by a new theoretical perspective - social constructivism " (idem. ). It is 
principally from these three main theoretical approaches to international relations that 
interregionalism can be apprehended. Interregional ism has posed challenges for these 
established international relations theories, but in combination they raise important 
questions for further investigation about this new level of relations. 
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The overriding perceptions of the rise of' interregionalism have ran ed frorn realist views 9 
of rival regionalism (Hettne 2003) and balancing games (Hinggi 2000: 8, RUland 200. 2 a: 
3-5, Rifland 2002c: 3-4) to liberal institutional views of cooperation to manage complex- 
interdependence (RUland 2002c: 4-7, Hdnggi 2000: 8-9). To this the social constructivist 
theorists would add identity formation through interregional interaction (Rifland 2002c: 
8-9. Hettne 2004: 5, Reiterer 2004. Richards & Kirkpatrick 1999: 691 ). Clearly the three 
different schools offer very different perspectives of interregionalisin which highlights 
the flexible nature of the concept, being subject to so many different interpretations 
simultaneously. This flexibility gives rise to differing types and forms of I nterregional i sill 
used in different circumstances to achieve different aims. The need for the three rmkjor 
schools of international relations also reflects the fact that interregionalism needs to be 
understood as much as a strategy as an existing level of international relations. A brief 
analysis of the main contributions of each of the three main theories will highlight all of 
these different perspectives' 3. 
Realism 14 has dominated international politics since World War 11, but the emergence of 
complex interdependence in the 1970s challenged its dominion. For realists the main 
actors in international relations are states due to their legal sovereignty, which implies 
that there is no higher actor that can compel them to act. According to this argument 
states try to maximise their benefits, using diplomacy and force, to balance out relations. 
For realists there is a division between high politics (military and security) and low 
politics (economics and social affairs). Neo-realism deals with structure in the 
international political system and its subsequent impact on the system itself. The Cold 
War period was one of strong bipolar structure in international relations, but since its end 
the structure of these relations has moved towards multipolarity (Burchill et al., 2001: 70- 
99). For realists interregional relations are viewed in terms of power, being a main device 
of actors to maintain equilibrium amongst themselves and periphery regions and actors. 
Interregional relations are simply alliances of regional actors with and against other 
13 For further information on theories of international relations see littp: //www. irtlicoi-y. coll 
14 For more detail on the relationship between Realism and Multilateralism see Cox (1997) 
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regions, as and when needs arise. Realism views interregional relations as part of the 
wider struggle for power, be it political, economic, developmental, regulatory or other. 
Perhaps the most important part of this realist perspective of interregionalism relates to 
mercantilism 15 and the primacy of economic and commercial interests, also known as 
commercialism. In this view interregionalism is simply a strategy of economic advance, 
competition and domination. This theory stresses the primacy of economic and 
commercial power and that interregionalism could be seen as a mechanism to ensure 
commercial advantages and preferences as and when circumstances permit and require it 
to do so. This would suggest that interregionalism is driven by internal sectoral interests, 
be they free trade or protection orientated. 
For liberal institutional i sts cooperation is the key to international relations (HUnggi 2000: 
8-9), as Rilland describes; "Liberals view institutionalization as a key to mitigate the 
anarchical character of international relations, to minimize the incidence of violent 
conflict and to enhance the welfare of peoples. Cooperation intensifies the flow of 
information between actors, builds trust and enhances the predictability of actors' 
behaviour. By creating norms and rules designed to guide state actions, cooperation has 
a legalizing effect on international relations. Institution building is thus considered an 
important prerequisite for a peaceful international order" (2002c: 5). In this system 
effective dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) are crucial to the overall success of 
cooperation, as are the presence of multiple channels for dialogue and discussion 
(Burchill et al., 2001: 29-65). From this perspective interregional relations are an 
important institutional layer in the international environment to enhance institutional 
density through the growth in subsidiary institutions such as summits, ministerial 
meetings, senior officials meetings and expert groups. Interregionalism is a manifestation 
of a need to institutionalise at a new level of international relations in light of the 
expansion of regionalism and globalisation. 
15 Mercantilism was essentially first devised as a collection of policies to keep the state prosperous, which 
in the 1600s related to bullionism - the collection of precious metals such as gold 
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Finally constructivism 16 is a more social and cultural perspective that has come to 
prominence since the end of the Cold War. Constructivists argue that the materialistic 
assumptions that underlie rationalism do not explain rapid post Cold War changes. 
Reality, for them, is constructed by beliefs and behaviour, and the spread of ideas that 
take form and subsequently become norms. The focus is on critical historical junctures 
from which new institutional arrangements, norms, ideas and identities emerge, and also 
on interactions between structures (Burchill et aL, 2001: 209-228). Constructivists argue 
that interregionalism is the result of past experience and interactions and is a 
manifestation of beliefs and norms, as reality is built over time. This predominantly 
relates to interregionalism through the notion of identity creation and development, 
something that it is crucial for interregional relations because acting on an interregional 
level encourages actors to intensify intraregional relations and thus enhance regionness. 
Interregionalism. and regionalism are thus mutually reinforcing. 
From an overview of the three main theories of international relations, and their 
perspectives on interregionalism, it is clear that one alone does not provide an exhaustive 
analytical framework. An adequate framework for analysis requires elements from all 
three schools, the main elements of which can be taken to be as follows; from 
realism/neorealism - the promotion of power balancing that suggests interregionalism is 
about balancing power and gaining power advantages in international relations. This is 
seen to be most apt in relation to purely commercial motivations, suggesting 
interregionalism is a strategy to expand and dominate new markets. From the liberal and 
institutionalist interpretation the need to institutional i se international relations and 
develop cooperation is the main framework for interregionalism. Finally constructivism 
maintains that interregionalism is a manifestation of the search for, and attempts to, 
create and develop identities on the behalf of regional organisations and actors. 
Overall these three lines of argument cover the main strands of academic literature 
related to interregional ism. They offer three rich and diverse alternative theoretical 
frameworks for interregionalism, which in conjunction are able to provide a multi-causal 
16 For an overview of Social Constructivism see Ruggie 1998 
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framework that can be used to analyse interregional relations as both a state of affairs and 
as a strategy. This framework remains in the main theoretical and the extent to which it 
actually serves to explain and understand interregionalism will only be seen over time 
and through detailed empirical work, such as this thesis. Trying to establish the balance 
between the differing frameworks in explaining interregionalism is something that is 
central to this thesis. RUIand notes that "in the absence of in-depth empirical research the 
functions of inter- and transregionalfora have been theoretically deduced or been based 
on accidental evidence" (2002a: 3). 
Having elucidated the general context of interregionalism in the global political economy, 
and also the main frameworks for analysis from the three main schools of international 
relations theory, it is now necessary to advance the analysis of interregionalism by 
looking at the types and forms of interregionalism that have arisen, and are arising. 
Tvvoloufflorms 
To initiate an evaluation of existing forms and types of interregionalism it is necessary to 
sketch some basics of the international environment and order within which they operate. 
it must be recognised that interregionalism itself is one of a plethora of levels of 
international relations and it is necessary to understand, discern, and evaluate the 
hierarchy of levels. 
Within the evolution of a multipolar world order, and globalisation, there are widely 
accepted to be five levels of international external relations and policy making; global, 
inteffegional/transregional/cross-regional, regional, sub-regional and bilateral actor to 
actor (Aggarwal & Fogarty 2004: 2-4). These levels correspond to the choices that actors 
have in undertaking their external relations, predominantly their economic and political 
relations. They have to decide with whom to interact, at what level and in what way. 
Actors use many differing measures and combinations of the above to promote or control 
trade flows, commercial interactions, political and other relations. Each of these levels, in 
turn, varies according to membership, aims, content and structure, to such an extent that 
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two relationships are rarely the same. The explosion in regional integration entities and 
PTAs due to the external focus of international relations from the 1990s onwards, as 
noted in the introduction, has meant that actors have increasingly been innovative in their 
choice of levels for interaction. 
When considering the level of interaction there are certain criteria that need to be taken 
into account. Firstly there is membership coverage, which can be bilateral, minilateral or 
multilateral. This highlights that at each level the number of participants that can be 
involved in a relationship or action can be very different. In turn the implications of the 
size of membership on the relationship are important, in areas such as objectives, 
institutions and capacity for action. A further criterion is the scope of the issues covered, 
which can be deemed to be narrow or broad. Narrow coverage could for example be a 
sectoral agreement such as covering automobiles, and broad would be represented by an 
agreement such as the WTO undertaking that covers a vast array of issues. Finally there 
is the geographic dispersion of members which can be concentrated or dispersed across 
and between regions (Aggarwal & Fogarty 2004: 24). 
Overall these combined elements represent a crude picture of the environment within 
which interregionalism operates. It is clear that actors have a myriad of options at their 
disposal in international relations not only in terms of who they wish to interact with, but 
also on what they wish to interact, and with what level of institutionalisation to manage 
the interaction. Interregionalism has to be understood and apprehended as one of these 
many available strategic options. It is also clear that while interregionalism is defined 
quite tightly in terms of level, membership and geographic dispersion (interregional, 
minilateral, concentrated in two regions) there is no implicit content, coverage or form 
that can be assumed. Acknowledging that interregionalism has spread rapidly in the last 
decades affirms that it is a key strategic choice within this myriad context of options. It 
subsequently becomes important to understand the specific forms and types that this level 
of international relations takes. 
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Hettne outlines three main defining regions of importance for interregionalism; Core, 
Intermediary and Periphery (2003: 5). The core regions are Europe, North America and 
East Asia, intermediary regions are South East Asia and South America, and periphery 
regions are Africa, South Asia and the Middle East (2003: 7-8). For Hettne the definition 
of a region is important for interregionalism as it is closely linked to the concept of 
triadization - the increasing domination of US-EU-East Asia relations as the central core 
of globalisation (idem. ). Both Hettne (2003: 5) and Rifland (2002a: 2) make reference to 
the importance of triadization, even suggesting that interregionalism "is in thefirst place 
a Triadic phenomenon" (Rfiland 2002a: 2). They contend that one of the effects of 
globalisation has been to create three core poles of commercial activity and interaction, 
the so-called triad. It is further suggested that this triad is central to the global economy 
and that the most important commercial connections are between these three regions, and 
subsequently between them and other periphery regions. As Chen notes, in 2003 the three 
poles of the world economy produced 82.2% of world Gross National Income (GNI). 
Their share of world merchandise export and import was 77.1% and 74.9% respectively 
(2005: 1-2). Such a situation leads to a competition for position within the triad as well as 
competition between triad members for control over other world regions. 
Interregionalism was first and foremost used in triad relations, and subsequently spilt 
over into intermediary relations. This can be seen through the fact that APEC was 
initiated in 1989, a development that prompted the EU to deepen existing relations with 
ASEAN and to create ASEM in 1994. From these initial triadic interregional 
relationships others were created in the intermediary and periphery regions, where they 
have now become more numerous. 
Also important for defining the types of interregionalisin encountered are the three 
accepted forms of contemporary capitalism that have a bearing on international relations, 
each of which corresponds to one of the regions of the triad; unregulated (US), 
administered (Asia) and social capitalism (EU) (Hettne 2003: 5). The issue of the type of 
capitalism is important in terms of the types of interregionalism that are likely to occur 
between different regions, because different forms of capitalism imply different 
governance structures and compatibility. This factor is very important in shaping the 
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structure and content of relations between regions because as the three dominant regions 
extend their interregional relations into intermediary and periphery regions they will use a 
model of interregionalism based on their form of capitalism. These key issues of type of 
region and type of capitalism have an important bearing on interregional relations and the 
exact forms that they will take, especially when interregionalism is used as a strategy, 
something chapter two will clarify. Each region, associated as it is with a different type of 
capitalism, will have a different model of interregional relations in accordance with its 
own beliefs, norms, practices and current institutions. 
Having detern-dned this broad context for the types of interregionalism that are likely to 
occur it is possible to now focus on the main types of interregionalism that have formed. 
As stated in the previous section each interregional relationship has different 
characteristics determined by its circumstances. The typology of interregionalism relates 
first and foremost to the actors involved, and this membership criterion is analysed in 
detail here as it represents the most challenging and dynamic characteristic of 
interregionalism, and the one subjected to the most literary review. Subsequently there 
are further classification criteria which need to be applied to ascertain a more accurate 
picture of the exact type of interregionalism. Whilst accepting that interregionalism 
relates to the connections between two regions, important differences between types of 
connection have developed. 
From the basic definition of interregionalism as two or more regions interacting, it has 
become possible to differentiate between different types of interregional ism. The 
literature specifically devoted to the study of interregionalism has to date identified three 
main types of interregionalism. Wiland (2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 
2002d), Hettne (2003) and Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004), amongst other authors, have all 
in their own way discussed these three types of interregionalism. This section, however, 
will be based on the three definitions advanced by Hdnggi (2000) given the expanded 
theoretical work he has devoted to the specific analysis of these types. 
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Transregional (bi-regional / mega. regi onal)17 
This level of interregionalism is the most recent development of the three identified types. 
These relations were instigated predominantly within (and by) the triad, but they have 
since spread to other world regions (Hanggi 2000: 5). The crucial distinction from the 
basic understanding of interregionalism already formed is that membership in 
transregional fora is wider and less geographically constrained. Transregional relations 
relate to two broad regions interacting (it is possible to have members from more than 
two regions involved), whether that be as nation states or a mixture of nation states and 
regional groups. These fora. all share important characteristics in that they have regular 
meetings and joint initiatives and projects, despite high membership numbers in some 
cases. APEC is the only one, to date, to have developed some form of independent 
infrastructure and institutions, although most transregional entities require some form of 
organisational infrastructure, such as a secretariat. Transregional fora are mostly 
concerned with dialogue and cooperation, especially in economic, political and 
development areas, although in certain cases, notably where the EU is involved, there can 
be wider issue coverage. Due to the diversity of these fora concrete action is limited, but 
they serve as meeting points, networking and information centers. There are multiple 
statements of intent and joint declarations, but there is little direct mutual action. The 
relevance of these fora is more in terms of networks and contacts, information sharing 
and cooperative consultation. 
Transregional relations have a diffuse membership which does not necessarily reflect a 
region or area, something that has caused debate in the nascent interregional literature, 
given that their lack of exact definition makes them very difficult to categorise. Roland 
wonders if "transregionalism is an adequate term to define fora such as ASEM, APEC, 
the ARF and IOR-ARC" asking indeed if they "really constitute the same type of 
forum? " (2002d: 4). There is not only intense debate over their definition and its 
limitations, but also about their content. To add to the confusion different authors have 
17 Appendix 2 lists the major examples of transregionalism 
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used different definitions for transregionalism, further complicating the matter's. Whilst 
there may be a conceptual problem with the exact definition of transregional fora it will 
become clear that the term applies to a specific set of relationships that are not strictly 
interregional or multilateral. Transregionalism should be understood as a type of umbrella 
forum where two, or more, regions meet to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. This 
may, as RUland suggests, encompass a number of fora that have divergent aims, 
structures and outputs, but they would all, nonetheless, be covered by this definition. 
Hybrid Interregional (guasi-interregional)" 
The classification of hybrid interregionalism concerns relations between two regional 
entities from differing world regions, where one of the partners is a customs union. 
Whilst Hdnggi extends this to "relations between regional groupings and single powers 
in other world regions" (2000: 7), which gives hybrid interregionalism a very wide net, 
this thesis will only consider relations between regional groups for the sake of clarity and 
purity. Almost inevitably regional groups will have to interact with individual states and 
in cases where the state in question is a regional power these relations, according to 
Hdnggi (idem. ), approach interregional status, such as the EU having relations with China 
or the US for example. Given that this is such a broad brush definition on the behalf of 
Hanggi (idem. ) this thesis when it makes reference to hybrid interregionalism will only 
be making reference to the interaction of regional groups, and not that of a regional group 
with a single state 20 . Hybrid interregional relations are built on regular high level 
meetings that lead to joint projects and initiatives. The focus of meetings and interaction 
is from information exchange and cooperation towards the signing of interregional 
agreements, although for this to happen the second partner has to enhance its regional 
integration to customs union. 
18 Hdnggi (2000: 11) talks of 'mega-regional' relations in reference to APEC and Rubiolo (2002) entitles 
her work focused on Latin America as 'Biregionalism' 
19 Appendix 2 lists the major examples of hybrid interregionalism 
20 In Chapters two and three relations between the EU and major regional powers will be referred to as 
bilateral relations 
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Pure Interredonal (2roun to eroun)21 
The third, and final, type of interregionalism occurs between two coherent and distinct 
regional groups, in two different world regions, where both are at least customs unions. 
Reference to Appendix two reveals this type of interregionalism to be relatively limited, 
which is to be expected given the low number of coherent CUs able to participate in 
interregional relations. Despite the flourishing of regionalism since the 1990s very few 
regional integration projects have achieved the status of customs union, which is 
something that should gradually change with time as projects deepen and strengthen, 
making a shift from hybrid to pure interregional relations a possibility. 
Pure interregional relations are easier to define in detail as they revolve around only two 
actors, and in this sense they resemble bilateral relations. The key distinction of being a 
customs union is crucial in the sense that from this level of integration onwards a regional 
entity has gained a much more coherent personality and is able to act as one in external 
negotiations and also subsequently implement any agreed upon actions. Pure 
interregional relations are built on regular high level meetings that lead to joint projects 
and initiatives. The focus of meetings and interaction is from information exchange and 
cooperation towards the signing of interregional agreements. All of this increases the 
density of a pure interregional relationship and gives it more of an institutional structure 
to support the dialogue and negotiations. 
The three types of interregionalism are clearly distinct and different, as they serve 
differing sets of actors with differing venues to discuss and negotiate a wide-range of 
issues. Given the larger number of members and the diversity of their interests 
transregionalism tends to be a more ad-hoc summit driven process that strives towards 
information sharing, dialogue and cooperation. Hybrid and pure interregionalisin. were 
easier to define because they involve regions in a much more defined sense, through 
regional integration entities, with the only difference between the two being whether both 
partners have achieved integration to the level of customs union or not. Given the 
21 Appendix 2 lists the major examples of pure interregionalism 
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presence of only two actors these levels of relations tend to be based on more regular 
meetings of officials, at all levels, with in many cases parallel civil society input. The 
agendas of the hybrid and pure interregional relations can be more specific and directly 
related to participant interests, making tangible outputs more likely. 
The three different types of interregionalism elucidated above form what Hdnggi has 
termed "interregional relations in the wider sense" (quoted in RUland 2002a: 2). It is 
these three types of interregionalism which this thesis will address. All of the three levels 
of inteffegionalism operate simultaneously as fora for meetings, summits, cooperation, 
agreements, negotiations, institutionalisation, as well as also representing different 
strategic options for actors. This again highlights the fact that interregionalism is as much 
a level of relations born out of increased regional integration as it is a strategy to pursue 
and react to. It is possible to put the key variables involved in the definition of an 
interregional relationship into diagrammatic form, as follows: 
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Figure I- I Criteria for Interregional Permitions 
Actors from Different World Regions 
Many actors from 2 Number of Actors 
State of Integration World Regions 
Criteria for differentlation 
Regional Actors 2 Regional Iý 
Customs Unions 
Transregionalism Hybrid 
Pure 
Interregionalism Interregionalism 
Level of Institutionalisation (High-Low) 
Rules (Binding-Non-Binding) 
Rules (Wide range-Narrow range) 
Scope (Wide-Narrow) 
Nature of Partners 
Source: Own creation/adapted from Aggarwal & Fogarty 2004: Chapter I 
This visual representation highlights the main criteria for the typology of an interregional 
relationship. The figure shows the three types of interregionalism that have been 
discussed in this chapter, with both the criteria for definitions as well as subsequent 
criteria that shape all interregional relations. 
The top line addresses the membership of interregional fora, and how differing types and 
numbers of actors leads to the creation of different interregional relationships. The 
bottom line addresses the key differentiating factors for an interregional relationship that 
have been identified. Firstly there is the level of institutionalisation that a relationship 
develops, as each specific relationship will require institutional support. All types of 
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interregionalism develop some form of institutionalisation and it ranges from defined 
autonomous individual institutions to loose organisational structures such as virtual or 
rotating secretariats. The next two issues concern rules, firstly in the sense that they 
determine how binding agreements are to be, and secondly how wide the rules coverage 
is. These two issues are closely linked to the strength and depth of the relationship, as the 
rules of the relationship, and the existence and form of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) are very important determining characteristics. Strong rules enforced by a DSM 
reveal strong long-term commitment, whereas weak and difficult to enforce rules reveal a 
lack of desire to comn-dt and a lack of motivation in longer-term relations. The next issue 
is the scope of the relationship, which relates to the breadth of policy areas and initiatives 
that the relationship entails. There may be a very narrow focus on one area to the 
exclusion of all others, or there rnýight be an attempt to broach multiple areas. The issue of 
scope brings into focus the balance of a relationship as it might be heavily weighted to 
one area, such as trade for example. The final point in the figure relates to the nature of 
the partners who are interacting, as this has a decisive impact on the relationship. This 
includes factors such as partner symmetry and counterpart coherence (Aggarwal & 
Fogarty 2004: 16). Symmetry relates to the extent to which partners have equal weight 
and standing in the areas that form part of the relationship, which is best understood 
through the notion of trade symmetry which defines how suited the two partners are to 
engage in trade negotiations. Finally the idea of counterpart coherence relates to notions 
of actorness of regional entities, based on the state of regional integration, in the case of 
both hybrid and pure interregionalism. 
This section has identified the three main types of interregionalism that exist in 
international relations, explaining how the three types are defined and also the main 
criteria that are used to differentiate them. Each of these three types has arisen and 
evolved for specific and idiosyncratic reasons, something that this thesis will address in 
more detail in the empirical chapters. Having identified the main types of 
interregionalism. that currently exist it is now important to address the motivations behind 
interregionalism. 
35 
Motivations 
Understanding the reasons why, and the ways in which, actors enter into and sustain 
interregionalism is vitally important. Determining the motivations behind the initiation, 
expansion and adaptation of interregionalism, has been the subject of keen academic and 
practical interest. The emerging literature in this area makes reference to the 'functions' 
of interregionalism (ROland, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, Ilettne, 2003 and Hdnggi, 
2000) which have been distinguished and documented. This chapter will highlight the 
main findings of the academic literature, but will do so in a slightly different manner. 
instead of listing the functions of interregionalism in one section, this chapter will 
separate the analysis into two sections, firstly an assessment of the motivations and 
secondly an evaluation of the impacts and implications. This novel approach will be 
employed because the word 'function' can be misleading and not entirely representative 
of what it is describing. The demarcation between motivations and impacts is not often 
made when discussing the 'functions' of interregionalism. and although the two sections 
will relate to the same concepts, they will separate between two fundamentally different 
areas. Such a distinction will allow a clearer understanding of interregionalism, and its 
appearance as a level of international relations, and as a strategy for external relations. 
As was noted in the context section of this chapter three main analyses of interregional 
relations have come to prominence. The perspective of each of these theories on the 
motivations of interregionalism will be approached here. 
Balancing and Bandwagoning 
This realist concept was predominantly used in international relations in terms of power 
balancing, principally in relation to military power, but in the post Cold War world its use 
has diversified. Power is now perceived not only in military but increasingly in economic 
and institutional terms (Rifland 2002c: 3). Balancing thus has to be understood in power, 
commercial and institutional terms, and all three will be addressed as motivations behind 
interregionalism. 
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Regional actors and nation states work in an environment of balancing, acting to maintain 
equilibrium or create leverage. New regionalism, in itself, is an example of balancing as 
regional groupings represent a response to multilateral and global developments as an 
attempt to increase presence and visibility. It follows from regionalism being viewed as a 
balancing phenomenon that interregionalism is also perceived as one. The key motivation 
is to balance out a threat (real or perceived) from another region, or country, such as by 
building a relationship to stop the advance of a competitor for example. For Hettne the 
foundation of this is within the triad as "relations within the Triad are rather tense, due 
to power balance concerns" (2003: 9), of which interregionalism is simply one of many 
balancing tools. In this view the core regions form relations with intermediate and 
periphery regions as part of a balancing game with other core regions. Simultaneously the 
intermediary and periphery regions place themselves in relations with members of the 
triad to increase their own position relative to other competing intermediary and 
periphery regions. This is encapsulated by RUland, when he notes that "non-Triadic 
interregionalism may be instrumentalised by peripheral regions to adjust to the dynamics 
and changing power equation within the Triad" (2002a: 4). 
Power balancing is thus now increasingly linked to mercantilist ideas of commercial 
advance and competition as well as control over international institutions (Roland 2002c: 
3). In this view balancing is for purely commercial reasons, to gain extra preferences, to 
protect from preference erosion and to open new markets. It must be made clear that the 
most important balancing motivation, noted in the literature, concerns commercial 
balancing, as actors try to gain economic advantages and leverages that their competitors 
do not have. 
22 Closely linked to balancing is the concept of bandwagoning ,a related realist concept 
which describes the joining of regional or interregional initiatives so as not to be left out, 
or behind. In relation to regionalism this has been termed "domino regionalism" 
22 Concept advanced by Walt (1987), although RUland notes that "inter and transregional relations do not 
support Stephen Walt's assertion that bandwagoning is a more common reaction of actors to changing 
power equations than balancing, there are nevertheless cases where bandwagoning has occurred" (2002a: 
5) 
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(Baldwin 1993), and with a slight extension could become domino interregionalism. It is 
contended that actors in the international arena are sensitive and aware of developments 
and will not risk being left out for fear of losing their voice, prestige, market access or 
power. Balancing and bandwagoning are closely related concepts and can be related to 
interregionalism through the words of RUland, when he notes that "inter and 
transregional fora may be regarded as pragmatic and flexible coalitions of regional 
players directed against others which are activated when need arises " (2002a: 4). 
Whilst commercial balancing is, for realists, widely accepted as the most important 
motivation of interregionalism, there is a further type of balancing of importance. 
Institutional balancing, from the liberal-institutional school, relates to power, but power 
of, and in, institutions. The key element here is control, or influence, over international 
organisations where international rules, norms and conduct are decided (Roland 2002a: 4). 
international organisations have developed a pivotal role in international relations and are 
the scenes of power struggles. As with power balancing the key element for institutional 
balancing is triad positioning and the subsequent readjustments intermediary regions 
make to change the dynamics of their relations. It is also true that in some cases 
institutional balancing can serve commercial power balancing in the extent to which the 
institutions advance purely commercial interests. By balancing institutions actors are able 
to balance access, information, coordination and potential for future action as well as use 
institutions to promote their norms and standards. Like power balancing, institutional 
balancing is a pragmatic and flexible coalition of regional actors directed, activated and 
used when needed with and against each other. 
Balancing and bandwagoning are the key explanatory motivations advanced in the realist 
literature on interregionalism. It is also important to highlight the strategic nature of both 
of these motivations, as both are clear strategic options for actors to use. 
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Instittitionalisation/Rationalisation 
The principal dynamic of interregionalism suggested by the institutionalist school of 
international relations is the need, and drive, to create institutions, summits, dialogues 
and some form of general coordinated policy to advance and stabilise international 
relations. As HUnggi notes, "liberal institutionalist approaches would highlight the need 
for cooperative efforts in order to manage complex interdependence on all interregional 
level" (2000: 8-9). Creating institutions to manage relations allows for greater contact, 
inter-linkages, trust and cooperation, and contributes to stability in international relations. 
Institution building is a process of progressive institutionalisation of international 
relations and interregionalism is seen as a logical extension of this trend. Interregional 
relations reflect the need to build a level of institutions between regional actors, and 
between them and the multilateral level. In this view interregionalism is born out of the 
need for institutions and institutionalisation to administer and regulate relations at this 
new level. Institution building and creation is a very important element for an 
interregional relationship, especially with regard to things such as dispute settlement and 
stability. 
Institutionalisation is a tool to lock-in a relationship and set rules of conduct which both 
sides have to ratify and adhere to. There also has to be a clear and concise set of rules that 
lead to a smooth and transparent relationship, based on a mutual recognition of the agreed 
rules. Institutions subsequently administer and evolve these codified relationships, thus 
taking on an important role in international affairs. The motivation to lock in 
relationships and institutionalise them is the key dynamic of this institutional view of 
interregionalism. 
By combining both the realist and liberal institutionalist visions it is possible to evoke a 
further potential motivation behind interregionalism, that of rival interregionalism. This, 
being a logical extension from rival regionalism (Van Scherpenberg & Thiel 2000), is 
where the main interregional actors use interregionalism to "export their values and 
concepts of order to other regions" (RUland 2002a: 4). Interregionalism becomes an 
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institutional mechanism to export values, ideals and ideas. This proposal purports that by 
exporting their own institutions, values and norms each region is able to gain control of 
intermediary regions, to the detriment of other triad members. This motivation is 
particularly important for this thesis as it reveals a further potential strategic use of 
interregionalism. 
An additional motivation of interregionalism is rationalising, which arises from the fact 
that multilateral organisations are clearly over-burdened and have been functioning at an 
ever slower pace (Rilland 2002a: 7). The GATTIWTO is a good example; Kennedy 
Round three years, Tokyo Round six years, Uruguay Round eight years. This slowdown 
only serves to reduce efficiency and legitimacy and also spurs members to solve issues at 
other levels. Global multilateral organisations, like the WTO, have had to deal with 
increasing numbers of countries, actors, complex issues and interests, which has 
inevitably led to slowdowns. Accordingly this dynamic, essentially a liberal- 
institutionalist (governance) approach, assigns interregionalism with a role in helping 
rationalise international relations by acting as a sort of "clearing house" (Rilland 2002a: 
7). 
The rationalising idea is expressed in two different ways, firstly that of a "multilateral 
enhancer" (Dent 2001) which stipulates that interregionalism is lost in a firmer more 
committed multilateral arena. A multilateral enhancer defers to the interests and 
competences of multi lateralism, according to which inteffegionalism's prime purpose 
would be to fit alongside multilateral organisations as one of many support mechanisms 
working to strengthen and bolster it. Dent (2001) also details the reverse idea of a 
"multilateral distracter" which is a mechanism to bypass multilateralism by creating its 
own regime space within which a specific set of regionalised norms, regulations and rules 
are only in partial compliance with multilateralism. In this light interregionalism would 
become a zone of retreat when multilateralism slows. There is clearly an important 
distinction between creating a support mechanism and an entirely new regime space 
within which to interact. It will be important to assess the exact status of interregionalism. 
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The essential element of the rationalising argument is that interregional agreements can 
act as filters or supports for global organisations as and when needed. Of all the 
motivations for interregionalism this one remains the most theoretically derived and the 
one with the least empirical support in the academic literature. 
One further motivation, closely related to ration ali sati on, fits into this section; that of 
agenda-setting (Rifland 2002a: 8). This explanation for interregionalism suggests that it 
serves to set global agendas, acting as a platform to build broad based coalitions in global 
fora. This suggests that creating a level of region to region dialogue allows certain policy 
areas and items to be subject to broad agreement and consensus, which can then be taken 
to the multilateral stage. Political dialogue is an important part of interregionalism and 
serves to build consensus and common positions, with the possibility of coordinating 
these positions for multilateral institutions. Much like rationalising, the agenda-setting 
motivation of interregionalism is very much theoretically derived. 
Collective Identity Building 
The third major motivation for interregionalism is drawn from constructivism. and 
stipulates that the way regional organisations act and develop has an impact on other 
regions and their policy choices, not least in terms of their regionalism. The main thrust 
of this motivation is that interregionalism has been used to help solidify existing regional 
identities and groups, as well as to create and enforce new ones. Rfiland suggests that 
"interregionalism may stimulate regional identity-building" (2002d: 10). There is debate 
as to whether this is in fact a motivation of interregionalism or an impact of its presence, 
and in essence it can be viewed as being both depending on the relationship and actors 
considered. The crux of the issue is whether interregionalism is considered as a state of 
affairs or as a strategy, as for the former collective identity building is an impact, and for 
the latter it is a motivation. For this reason collective identity building will be explored 
both here and in the next section, separating as best possible what can be deemed to be 
motivations and impacts. 
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In terms of a direct motivation of interregionalism, both Gilson (1998), and Hdnggi (1999) 
have referred to the phenomenon of regionalism through interregionalism. This is the 
strategic pursuit of, and enforcement of, regionalism in world regions through the use of 
interregional relations. Support for regionalism in another world region can simply be 
through the act of interregional relations, but may also be through more material support 
such as financial aid, training, cooperation and assistance. In this sense interregionalism 
can be seen as a deliberate strategic attempt to strengthen regional integration around the 
world. Thus for collective identity building to be considered as a motivation there have to 
be actors strategically and actively using interregional relations to deliberately foster 
regionalism in partner regions. This practice represents a virtuous circle in the sense that 
interregionalism enhances regionalism, which in turn strengthens interregionalism. This 
particular issue will be explored in greater detail in chapter two in the analysis of EU 
interregionalism. 
The potential motivations of interregionalism put forward in this section, thus far, have 
concentrated on what would be termed outside-in approaches. It is also very important to 
mention the relatively less used approach of inside-out analysis. Some authors (Aggarwal 
& Fogarty 2004, Faust 2002) have specifically used this form of analysis to determine the 
motivations of interregional relations. As yet this approach remains confined to single 
actor and single relationship studies and needs to be expanded before allowing wider 
assumptions and comparisons. This approach revolves around key internal variables that 
have the potential to determine interregional approaches, types, forms, contents and 
impacts. Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004: 7) put forward a number of internal variables. 
They specify interest group influence as a key determinant motivation of interregionalism, 
with the main struggle between free trade and protection lobbies. They also suggest there 
is an important motivating role of the central organs of government, which in their 
analysis is specifically of the EU. This approach will be used in an analysis of EU 
relations with Mercosur in Chapter four, at which point it will be expanded upon given 
that it is a more idiosyncratic framework for analysis. 
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The global political economy perspective of the motivations of interregionalism has 
highlighted the importance of the rationale and growth of regionalism. The attributes and 
motivations behind the new wave of regionalism were noted to be an important direct 
motivation for interregionalism. There are three principal motivations of interregionalism 
as expressed by the main international relations theories. Firstly realists argue that 
interregionalism is motivated by balancing (commercial, political and institutional) and 
bandwagoning, as actors attempt to advance their interests and curtail the advance of their 
competitors. Liberal institutionalism highlights interregional ism's main motivation as 
being a drive to create institutions to enhance international stability and relations. In this 
theory institutions are needed in international relations and interregionalism has been 
created to fill an institutional need and void. Institutionalism also advances the 
motivations of rationalising and agenda-setting, whereby interregionalism is able to filter 
multilateral relations and set their agendas. Finally constructivism puts forward collective 
identity creation as a motivation for interregionalism, whereby regional actors are using 
interregionalism to enhance their own and others regional cohesion and actorness. 
This section has highlighted the principal and most widely advanced motivations of 
interregionalism. To fully understand interregionalism it is necessary to incorporate 
elements of all the aforementioned motivations, as each specific relationship will result 
from differing combinations of the above, all of which will change through time. 
Interregionalism, and its different perceived motivations, entails differing impacts and 
implications on individual and regional actors as well as on international relations in 
general, something the next section will address. 
Impacts/Implications 
The focus of this section is on the impacts and implications of interregionalism on 
specific actors, on parties to interregional relationships and on the broader global arena. 
The impacts and implications will be analysed through the same perspective as the 
motivations and thus split into the three core areas of balancing, institutionalisation and 
collective identity building. 
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To fully grasp the impacts and implications of interregionalism, it is necessary to outline 
the different ways in which it can have an impact. First and foremost it has been 
understood as an outcome of the evolution of regionalism and the global environment, in 
that the proliferation of regional actors led to a situation where their interaction had 
become necessary. From this interregionalism, as a multifaceted concept, can be 
essentially understood as either a static level of international relations or as a dynamic 
strategy for external relations. Both of these understandings are valid and will be present 
to varying degrees in all interregional relationships, something that needs to be 
determined on a case by case basis. Interregional ism can be approached, understood and 
analysed from either of the above perspectives and both are important when assessing the 
perceived impacts of interregionalism. 
Balancing and Bandwagoning 
Balancing and bandwagoning are clear cut motivations of interregionalism as opposed to 
impacts of it, but nonetheless it is worth assessing the implications of these two 
motivations. It is necessary to assess on a case by case basis whether the creation of a 
new interregional relationship is motivated by the prior creation of another such 
relationship, and if there is thus evidence of balancing or bandwagoning. If it is assumed 
that either balancing or bandwagoning have been the main motivations of interregional 
relations then it must be recognised that this entails important consequences in terms of 
impacts and implications. If either of these two motivations dominates then 
institutionalisation becomes a mere secondary process and collective identity building a 
side-effect. Balancing is inherently short-term in nature, as actors adjust to ever-evolving 
circumstances, making interregionalism an unstable phenomenon. Alliances are given up, 
changed or adapted as situations necessitate, which makes the creation of rigid strong 
institutions a costly and unprofitable activity. As RUland notes "if balancing is a key 
function of inter and transregional relations ... this may explain why most inter and 
transregional fora have so far opted for soft institutionalisation " (2002a: 5). Balancing 
has little long-term need for deep institutionalisation, because as the circumstances 
surrounding interregional relations change there is no desire to be encumbered by costly 
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institutional investments. Low levels of institutionalisation would also persist because as 
power and interest equations change there may be a necessity for multiple memberships 
of international organisations, which makes it in many actors' interests to maintain such 
low levels of institutionalisation. 
Institutional isationfRationalisation 
Institution building is an important motivation of interregionalism with equally as 
important impacts and implications, albeit in need of further empirical backing. 
Institutions form part of every interregional relationship, but their form, strength, aims 
and shape differ according to the main motivations of the relationship. In this sense 
institutions are a direct implication of every interregional relationship and an omnipresent 
impact. 
The last section noted that if balancing were to be considered the main motivation for 
interregionalism then institutions would be weak and secondary, altering according to 
needs and circumstances. As Lake (1999) has pointed out, the relationship between 
opportunity costs and governance costs is more important than institutionalisation per se, 
so if the governance cost of remaining within a relationship outweighs the cost arising 
from leaving the relationship then the temptation will simply be to leave. The opposite of 
this situation would be where institutional isati on was the main motivation, in which case 
institutions would be robust and long-term. 
Aggarwal's work (1998) on bargaining and nesting is an important area to consider 
within the institutionalisation of interregionalism. When new institutions are created they 
must reconcile with existing ones, they must fit in with the current status quo as they 
need to be nested in hierarchical fashion. Any regime or institution is built to regulate an 
activity or activities, and if a new institution is to be created it is important to know if it 
will be nested or have parallel connections. A prime example from the trade sphere is that 
when new regional groupings are created they need to nest within GATT Article 24, or be 
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consistent with it, resulting in their positioning between national and multilateral levels 23 . 
It is also clear from this that the role of multilateral enhancer is a more stable position 
than that of multilateral distracter. 
A further impact of every interregional relationship would be expected to occur in the 
realms of rationalisation and agenda-setting, which were noted in the previous section to 
have been minor motivations. The creation of so many interregional relationships has the 
potential to have important rationalisation and agenda-setting impacts on notably the 
global system. In terms of rationalisation an increased number of coherent regional 
entities will reduce the number of actors at a discussion or negotiating table. Such a 
scenario will also create new agenda items because regional actors will have different 
needs and desires to single state actors. In this sense two potential impacts of 
interregionalism, are of a reduced number of global actors and also a shift in agenda items 
to reflect the changing nature of the actors. Both of these impacts clearly depend on the 
number of coherent regional entities engaging in interregionalism, entities capable of 
replacing their member states in international relations. As such both of these potential 
impacts remain largely theoretical - something this thesis hopes to shed light on. 
Collective Identity Buildin 
Collective identity was seen to be a potentially important motivation of interregionalism 
if used as a coherent strategy to enhance regionalism. Collective identity creation and 
development can also be considered an impact of interregionalism, either as a result of 
direct strategy, or simply as a result of the overall process of interregionalism. 
The ability to act at the interregional level requires greater intra-regional activity in terms 
of coordination and common position creation. There is good theoretical reason to 
assume that a positive spill over effect of interregionalism would be to increase intra- 
regional dialogue, action, institution and identity building. The impact of interregionalism 
23 GATT itself had to be modified to allow for the EEC to come into existence, the loophole that has since 
allowed regionalism to nest within the existing system 
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is to create a need to unify regional positions and then implement decisions taken at the 
interregional level, which in itself requires greater internal cohesion, dialogue and 
exchange of information. 
Interregional ism also helps to promote a strong sense of 'self' and 'region' which would 
otherwise not have been promoted. In recently formed regional groups interregional 
relations can help stimulate a specific and separate identity. Interregional ism is seen to be 
furthering the creation of collective identity and regional identity, by helping a region 
define its interests and what differentiates it from others, on which it can then build a 
'self'. It seems to be the case that through the process of interregionalism collective 
identity will be enhanced, developed and expanded in some way. 
One specific element of collective identity building is worthy of extended mention, that 
of actorness. An impact of interregionalism would be to help develop actorness on a 
regional scale, where actorness is defined as being identifiable and distinguishable from 
other entities through presence, coherence, autonomy and structure, leading to the 
development of aims and objectives and a means to achieve them. An actor must be able 
to make decisions, implement them and then monitor and evaluate their effects. 
Actorness is a powerful tool in international relations and interregional relations because 
the more coherent an actor is the more their position of strength in terms of capability and 
capacity, as weak actors will lack the ability to agree and execute actions. Actorness will 
also determine relationship potential as weak actors will only ever be able to sign up to 
soft institutionalisation and lower level relations with little common action and agreement. 
Bretherton and Vogler (1999) suggest five requirements for actorness; commitment to 
shared values, ability to formulate coherent policies, capacity to undertake international 
negotiation, access to policy instruments and legitimacy of decision process. The more 
these five elements are present the more there will be coherent actorness and hence 
ability to engage in interregionalism. Actorness can be achieved through a variety of 
internal means, including through inter-goverrimental cooperation if one strong state 
dominates. Collective identity building and actorness development are significant impacts 
of interregionalism with an important bearing on the future of interregionalism - the 
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more actorness regional entities are able to assume the more interregionalism will 
proliferate in a robust and long-lasting fashion. If interregionalism is used as a strategy its 
main motivation is to have a lasting and important impact on regional integration. In this 
case the actor carrying out the strategy can be termed an "extenzalfederator" (Hdnggi 
2000: 2), through which the impact on fostering regional development is much greater. 
Interregionalism. is an established and expanding level of international relations and an 
important external relations strategy, and as such necessarily has an impact on, and 
implications for, international relations and individual actors. This section has highlighted 
the extent to which motivations and impacts are separate but interlinked categories, and 
that the impacts of interregionalism will depend to a large extent on the motivations 
behind the actions. In this sense the use of interregionalism. as a strategy is a vitally 
important motivation to understand given that it is predominantly used as such, and that it 
will have a specific set of impacts and implications. 
Conclusions 
The four sections 24 on interregionalism have aimed to give an overview and analysis of 
its context, typology, motivations and impacts, in answer to the initial research question 
posed of interregionalism - 'What exactly is interregionalism, and what does it offer 
international relations that other levels of relations do not? ' Whilst interregionalism has 
been given differing definitions, together they help form a specific picture that this 
chapter has endeavored to reveal. For Roloff interregionalism is a "process of deepening 
political, economic and societal interaction between international regions" which has 
both state actor and external influences (quoted in Doctor 2007: 287). Roland is more 
detailed when he defines interregionalism as; 
24 Appendix 3 graphically depicts the four principal areas of interregionalism in an 'Interregional Flow 
Chart' 
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'(group to group dialogue with more or less regular meetings centering on the exchange 
of infonnation and cooperation (projects) in specific policy fields (trade and investment, 
environment, crime prevention). It is based on a low level of institutionalisation " (RUland 
2002d: 3). 
The appearance and expansion of interregionalism relates to the processes of 
globalisation and regionalism, with the latter as part of a wider response to the former. 
The birth of interregionalism in regionalism was noted to be particularly important 
because as more formal macro and micro-regions have appeared they have assumed 
stronger actorness qualities and a willingness to engage in external relations, hence 
interregionalism has prospered. HUnggi concludes that "the causal factors of 
interregionalism, and of regionalism alike, are the ongoing processes of globalisation 
and regionalisation" (2000: 13). Whilst this origin in regionalism is crucial, 
interregionalism needs to be separated from regionalism, which Gilson says has been 
"regarded simply as a stepping-stone or body of resistance to globalization" (S6derbau rn 
& Langenhove 2005: 257). Interregionalism is an important new level of interaction that 
needs to be considered in its own right. 
Interregionalism is part of an evolving and dynamic system of international relations, 
born in, and driven by, relations between the triad through which it is exported to 
intermediary and periphery regions. Interregionalism has developed as a more formal and 
institutionalised relationship between regional actors which will have longer term 
consequences for global order. Current interregionalism is thus a synthesis of 
commercially motivated globalism and politically driven regionalism and is a long term 
trend which Hettne describes as a "non-linear and uncertain (trend) which will include 
setbacks and the outcome of which we can not know" (2004: 9). 
Interregionalism is seen to have arisen not only as a level of relations, but also as a 
strategy for international relations, both of which are important. Inteffegionalism, in 
whichever form it manifests itself has elements of both given that it will have to start in 
strategic form and be implemented as a level of relations with institutions. Whilst, these 
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two aspects of interregionalism are important, and need to be understood separately as 
well as together, the use of interregionalism as a strategy is the most important aspect of 
interregional ism to consider as it is the one that determines all the subsequent 
characteristics of interregionalism. It is from the strategic objectives that interregionalism 
is formulated, employed and implemented which leads to the series of impacts that it has 
on individual actors, regions and the global system. 
From the differing circumstances, motivations and understandings of interregionalism 
certain different types of interregionalism have arisen which manifest themselves in 
manifold ways. Much controversy surrounds the theoretical underpinnings of 
interregionalism which are deemed to lack empirical backing. S6derbaum, Stalgren and 
Langenhove conclude that "although interregionalisin is no novelty, it still needs to find 
its place in the research field" (2005: 377). It is also notable that there is also a lack of 
comparative empirical work to bolster the basic interregional theory. 
The current mass of interregional relations, whilst all part of the same trend, manifest 
large differences, perform different roles, and offer different visions of the future. The 
three main types of interregionalism were analysed, and transregionalism was noted to be 
the latest development in the interregional trend, yet the most difficult to assess and 
evaluate. Transregionalism was seen to be a relationship between regional and state 
actors from any number of world regions, usually two, with wide membership and 
dealing with high-level strategic thinking. Hybrid interregionalism was noted to be the 
most predominant type of interregionalism because it is a relationship between two 
regional groups in two different world regions, where only one partner is a customs union. 
Pure interregionalism, the relationship between two customs unions in two different 
world regions, was considered to be the type of interregionalism with the most to offer as 
a robust level of international relations given the likely actorness levels. Although there 
has been a recent increase in transregionalism there is no clear indication of which long- 
term direction the overall interregional trend is taking, but the plethora of regional entities 
that are developing around the world does point to an increased use of interregionalism in 
some form. 
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Consensus emerged from the literature that there are three main motivations behind 
interregionalism; balancing and bandwagoning, institutionalisation and collective identity 
building. Interregional literature, based on empirical studies to date, suggests that 
balancing and bandwagoning are the principal motivations for interregionalism. Roland 
notes that balancing is the "least controversial" (2002d: 7) motivation. This implies that 
interregionalism is a policy strategy that actors employ in their external relations. This 
applies equally to power, commercial and institution balancing, all of which have been 
noted to occur. Power and commercial balancing and bandwagoning are pragmatic and 
flexible international strategies to advance a position in the international environment. 
They are important responses to political and economic allegiances within the wider 
international arena, but as with any allegiance or alliance they can be easily discarded or 
substituted when no longer needed. 
Other motivations are attributed differing roles by differing schools of thought. 
Institutionalisation is seen to be the most important process of interregionalism, a process 
born out of balancing needs. Because of the perceived dominance of balancing as a 
motivation it becomes necessary to consider the other potential motivations as largely 
impacts and implications. The notable exception to this is the strategic motivation to 
foster regionalism through interregionalism, and this strategic use of interregionalism to 
create, enhance and impose regionalism on world regions forms part of the rival 
interregionalism motivation. The use of interregionalism as a strategy in international 
relations is a theme that will be continued in the next chapter on EU interregionalism, as 
references to a strategic use and rival interregionalism pertain directly to the EU. It 
becomes clear that the most important factor to understand is that the key motivation for 
interregionalism is different for each actor and each relationship. Despite that fact that the 
literature, to date, has accorded relatively more weight to balancing does not imply its 
existence or primacy for all actors or all relationships, nor does it imply its lasting 
domination. 
In terms of the other perceived motivations, assuming the current predominance of 
balancing, it must be noted that rationalising has been largely theoretically deduced. At 
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the "Interregionalism in Inteniational Relations" (1101and 2002a) conference in 2002 
there was found to be only scant evidence of rationalising actually occurring leading to 
calls that; "more systemic research is utterly needed" (RUland 2002a: 8). Faust suggests 
that interregional relations were merely second-best solutions for key international states, 
given that interregionalism succeeds only where multilateralism fails or slows (quoted in 
ROland 2002a: 7). Although little evidence has, as yet, come to light there is consensus 
that rationalisation requires further empirical investigation, as there appears to be solid 
potential for it to actually play a role. It must also be noted that whilst, for the moment, 
interregional relationships rarely go beyond multilateral commitments, working within its 
auspices, the multilateral slowdown does grant great potential for rationalising to increase 
as a motivation for interregional ism, albeit on more of a distracter scale than as an 
enhancer. As agenda-setting is so closely related to rationalising, and equally as 
theoretical, it has also proved to be controversial and without sufficient empirical backing. 
Agenda setting (although relatively under-researched) is noted to be very rare and not of 
the order expected, with interregional relationships showing little enthusiasm for 
coordinated attempts to set multilateral agendas. Interregional ism does, however, provide 
a convenient platform for coalition building from where global issues can strongly be 
lobbied for. 
When considering the impacts and implications of interregionalism. it is necessary to take 
heed of the previous paragraphs on the motivations, where balancing and bandwagoning 
have been noted to hold primacy. Interregional ism is thus impacting international 
relations by its presence and spread, as all actors have to take notice of developments. 
Actors have to balance their external relations and bandwagon in response to activities of 
other actors. From this impact it becomes the case that institution building has been weak 
and not of the order expected by liberal-institutionalists. If the primacy of balancing is 
assumed then it explains the predominance of 'soft-institutionalisation' (RUland 2002a: 6). 
The inherently short-term and flexible nature of balancing implies that alliances are 
changed as and when needs arise. This results in institutionalisation simply referring to a 
new level of policy making, as a process of interregionalism. It might be added that the 
current low levels of institutionalisation only pertain to the present global context, which 
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might in the future change in ways that encourage greater institutionalisation. It is not 
inconceivable that balancing could require greater institutional isati on at some point in the 
future. 
Collective identity building has already been addressed as an important strategic 
motivation of interregionalism, within the rival interregionalism argument. 
Interregionalism necessarily impacts on collective identity building and actorness. 
Through the use of interregionalism as a strategy regional actors have to act with greater 
coherence thus creating incentives and needs for greater internal cohesion. If it is argued 
that a key motivation behind interregionalism is the fostering of regionalism the impacts 
on regional actors can be assumed to be even greater. If they are obtaining financial and 
technical assistance for regional initiatives then they are certainly increasing their 
actorness, regionness and ability to interact in interregional dialogues and international 
relations as a whole. The impact of interregionalism on collective identity building 
becomes importantly self-serving. 
As interregional relations are so often soft and flexible in nature, as well as largely non- 
binding, their ability to represent a really strong building block for global governance and 
a middle ground between regional and multilateral levels of international relations has 
been questioned. A level of international relations driven and motivated by commercial 
balancing is inherently unstable and also subject to the volatility that balancing entails. 
Even with institution building as a process and impact, do the interregional institutions 
really strengthen the regional organisations involved in interregionalism? The fact that 
inteffegionalism is built on soft law and soft institutionalisation gives rise to fears over 
the long-term prospects for its success and has prompted the labels of "sunshine 
cooperation" and a ': fair weather" phenomenon (RUland 2002a: 6), good whilst times 
permit but unlikely to survive in rougher circumstances. This is a criticism that has yet to 
be adequately dispelled and one that will only be answered with time. Despite these 
short-comings, the visible scepticism and lack of empirical support for key motivations 
and impacts of interregionalism, there remains great potential for it to play a role in 
international relations well into the future, and represent a strong building block in global 
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governance. Interregional ism can also serve as an important entry point for civil society, 
which is an essential pre-requisite to building lasting regional integration and 
international relationships. Political dialogue alone, if enhanced, can create more 
transparency in policy development and positioning which in turn enhances predictability 
for negotiations in global fora. Whilst interregional relations run the risk at times of being 
too superficial and adding too little genuine content resulting in suggestions they are 
symbolic gestures without any meaningful intent and consequences for the global 
environment, Hdnggi concludes that "interregionalisin appears to have become a lasting 
feature of the inteniational system. It nzay be expected that a wide array offorms and 
types of interregionalism will continue to coexist, thereby further enriching (and 
complicating) the emerging multilayered system of global govemance" (2000: 13). 
interregional ism is certainly now established as one of the myriad policy and strategic 
options open to regional groups. 
S6derbaum, Stalgren and Langenhove (2005: 378-9) outline what they consider as the 
five key research questions for the future of interregionalism, of which three are of 
specific interest to this thesis; 1) the need for more detailed research on why and how the 
EU promotes interregionalism; 2) an assessment of interregionalism in its own right and 
not as part of regionalism; 3) an analysis into what interregionalism is doing for 
multilateralism and for global governance. This concurs with Ruland, who rinds that the 
current state of research on interregionalism falls short of the needed mark, when he says 
that "despite a growing number of studies on inter- and transregionalfora a reasonably 
precise assessment of their contribution to global governance is still elusive" (2002d: 12). 
This thesis aims to make its contribution by analysing two specific aspects of the 
interregional debate. Firstly, the focus to date of interregional analysis has been heavily 
biased towards inteffegionalism as a state of affairs and as a level of relations, as opposed 
to a strategy, and this thesis intends to examine the tension that exists between these two 
approaches by analysing the EU strategic use of interregionalism. Secondly, 
interregionalism tends to only be dealt with in isolation as a level of relations, whereas it 
needs to be addressed as part of a wider strategy of international engagement, something 
that this thesis will also address. Chapter two will thus focus on these two key elements 
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in an analysis of EU interregionalism through the second research question; 'How has the 
EU's strategy of interregionalism manifested itself across the globe? ' 
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Chapter 2: The European Union and Interre0onalism 
Introduction 
Whilst the first chapter concentrated on the general phenomenon of interregionalism the 
focus of the work now shifts to the more specific case of interregionalism and the EU, 
notably to how the EU has pursued an interregional strategy. As mentioned in the 
introduction, and as noted in the last chapter, the EU has widespread and multiple 
external relations, but this chapter will focus specifically on EU interregionalism, placing 
it both within the context of wider EU external relations strategy and also that of general 
interregionalism. 
The EU has embraced interregional dialogue and action for over thirty years as part of its 
external relations strategy, and continues to develop and deepen its usage far and wide. 
EU interregional relations have also expanded to cover, not only more regions and 
countries, but also more issues and interests. In the introduction the main research 
question related to the EU and interregionalism, and the basis for this chapter's analysis, 
was: 'How has the EU's strategy of interregionalism manifested itself across the globe? ' 
This chapter will thus seek to explain exactly what the EU has done to promote a strategy 
of interregionalism, the type of interregionalism it has pursued and where it has done this. 
It is also worth recalling one of the key research questions highlighted by S6derbaum, 
Stalgren and Langenhove in their recent analysis of interregionalism: "more detailed 
research is needed on why and how the EU promotes interregionalism (and the reasons 
why it does not)" (2005: 378-9). This chapter will address all of these valid and 
complementary research questions by evaluating EU interregionalism, enabling 
conclusions to be made about a general class of EU interregional relations. 
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This chapter will evaluate EU interregional strategy by means of a comparative analysis 
of the EU's main interregional relationships; with Asia, Africa and Latin America. The 
25 
principal reason for this, as can be noted from the last chapter , is that the EU has 
concentrated interregional activity in these three regions. Within Asia the EU has had 
long-standing interregional relations with both ASEAN and ASEM, and moreover, given 
the increasing economic importance of the region, the EU has made it a priority. EU 
relations with Africa have always shown some form of interregionalism, from original 
EU-ACP relations through to the current negotiations for Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs). Finally interregional relations with Latin America are extensive and 
active, as the EU interacts through the EU-LAC Heads of State Summit and with 
Mercosur, CACM and the Andean Community. Indeed Latin America is the most prolific 
region for EU interregionalism. In keeping with the classification of triad and periphery 
regions proposed by Hettne (2003), the EU's three principal interregional relations are 
with periphery regions. 
Having briefly explained which regions will be analysed it is important to address the 
ones that will not be analysed. There are three main world regions that have not been 
covered; North America, Eastern Europe/Mediterranean and the Middle East. The most 
obvious region that is not included is that of North America, for the simple reason that 
EU relations with North America can not be termed interregional in any sense. Relations 
are purely bilateral, e. g. EU-US and EU-Mexico, and the only regional entity in the 
region, NAFTA, is a Free Trade Agreement that in no way aspires to its own external 
relations. The EU in North America has no natural interregional partner, and given US 
dominance in the region the EU has little chance of creating one. In the Mediterranean 
region the EU has a complex set of relations, those encompassed within the EU 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Euromed Group. There are elements of interregionalism 
about these relations, especially the EU-MED dialogue known as the Barcelona Process, 
which would qualify as a hybrid interregional relation. As this is the only manifestation 
of interregionalism. that the EU has in the region this chapter will not cover it, because the 
focus is more specifically on the type of interregional strategy that the EU applies to a 
25 See also Appendices I&2 
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region as a whole, and not simply to one single interregional relationship. It is a similar 
picture for relations with Central and Eastern Europe, where the EU has intense relations 
through the Neighbourhood Policy, but not with any groups that could lead to 
interregionalism. The EU does have an interregional relationship within the Middle East, 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council, which was started in 1989 with a Cooperation 
Agreement, but for the same reason as with the EU-Med relations this chapter will not 
cover it. The EU has not sought, or been able, to extend its interregional strategy to all 
world regions, and as Sbderbaum, Stalgren and Langenhove suggest; "there are strategic 
reasonsfor not pursuing interregionalism everywhere" (2005: 373). 
For reasons of coherence this chapter will follow a similar structure to that adopted in 
Chapter one, albeit with slight, but important, modifications. The first section will thus 
address the specific context of EU interregional strategy. The second section will address 
the typology of EU interregionalism across the three world regions with which the EU 
interacts inteffegionally, and draw some preliminary conclusions. The chapter will then 
address the three main interregional dialogues that the EU has with Asia, Africa and 
Latin America in turn. Within each of these self-contained sections the first element will 
be an analysis of the evolution of the interregional relationship, with a specific focus on 
the stated principles and strategy of the EU. The subsequent sections will look at the 
motivations behind and within the specific relationship and then the impacts of the 
relationship - with a focus on the EU, the partner region and the global system. Such a 
structure will allow a more solid grasp of EU interregional strategy, how it is expounded, 
how it has been pursued and translated into action and what it has delivered in concrete 
terms. This holistic and individual approach to the EU's key interregional relationships 
will drive forward the overall analysis of interregional ism, taking it from the general 
approach in chapter one, and forming a more refined analytical framework for chapter 
three. This chapter will thus form key questions about EU interregionalism that the in- 
depth analysis of EU-Latin American relations, in chapter three, will take forward. 
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Context 
The general context of interregionalism, as discerned in Chapter one, was essentially 
within the global i zation/regional i sm debate. This section will address the position of 
interregionalisni within the more specific context of the EU and its external relations 
strategies and options. It was noted that as multilateral Institutions, crucially the WTO, 
have slowed in their efficiency and delivery of results, the search for other channels to 
conduct relations has led many states towards RTAs. Within this evolving external 
environment, which the EU tries to shape and react to, the EU has important strategic 
policy options. An integral part of its response, for the last thirty years, has been to resort, 
if possible, to interregionalism. This embracing of interregionalism is part of a constant 
reviewing and restructuring of the EU's dealings with third parties. Despite the change of 
channels or forum over time, the airns and objectives of EU external relations have 
remained broadly constant, as Romano Prodi noted (www. ec. europa. eu, accessed 12 
November 2005): 
"To expand and deepen relations with other countries and regions, the EU holds regular 
summit meetings with its main partners like the United States, Japan, Canada and, more 
recently, Russia and India, as well as regional dialogues with countries in the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. Although these relationships 
focused mainly on trade issues tit the beginning, they have expanded over the years to 
cover investment, economic cooperation, finance, energy, science wid technology and 
environmental protection as well as political matters such as the global war on terror, 
international crime and drug trafficking, and human rights. - 
This quotation starts to touch on the extent, both in terms of issue scope and geographical 
coverage, as well the levels of interaction, of EU external relations. It is from these 
parameters that the debate concerning the EU's role in global affairs 26 takes shape. EU L, 
external relations are very important, not just for the EU but also for their partners and 
the world system, and the EU has constantly evolved its external relations according to 
26The debate covers such issues as intentions and desires, impacts and implications, expectations and 
capacity, rhetoric and actions, structures and mechanisms, strategies and hierarchies etc 
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circumstances and needs. The objectives of EU external action differ markedly, for 
example from steering countries and regions towards more democracy, sounder economic 
policies, sensible defense spending, respect for minorities, sustainable development, 
peaceful settlement of ethnic disputes, to plain commercial interests (Interview 5). The 
table below is an indicative introduction to the levels at which the EU can, and has, 
engaged in external relations with third parties: 
Figure 2- 1 EU Strategic Policy Options 
Strategic Option Example 
Multilateral WTO, UN, Criminal Court of Justice 
Plurilateral NVTO Government Procurement Agreement 
Continental EU-LAC, EU-Mrica, ASENI 
Regional EU-Rio Group 
Sub-regional EU-Mercosur, EU-ASEAN, EU-GCC, 
--lo. EU-CACNI . 4- 
Bilateral Non-reciprocal: GSP (EBA) 
Reciprocal: FrAs, Customs Unions, 
Cooperation Agreements 
Unilateral EU-Ievel independent action 
Source: Glania G. & Matthes J. 2005\Own Creation 
This indicative table represents a picture of the strategic options that the EU has for 
interacting with third parties across the trade, political, cooperation and development/aid 
agendas. Each level offers the EU separate tools for achieving differing goals, and at each 
level the EU has distinct powers and capabilities (both internal and external) which is 
why it uses a combination of all the options. At the head of the table is the multilateral 
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level, exemplified by the WTO which is a rule based organisation that binds its one 
hundred and fifty members 27 into trade rules. The WTO represents all that is positive in 
mu Iti lateral ism as it is able to bind one hundred and fifty countries into reducing 
protection and increasing world trade. The WTO also encapsulates sorne of' the negative 
features of mu Iti lateral i sin because as membership has grown the issues covered have 
proliferated and its ability to act has slowed dramatically. Whilst the multilateral level is 
the EU's preferred level of interaction, given the large potential gains and the similarity 
ofthe rules-based institutions, it is not the only level at which the EU interacts. 
The second option is the plurilateral level, at which a large number IN ot I countries 
undertake a joint agreement. An example is the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement which was signed by twenty eight countries in 1994. This level of relations is 
used mostly for sectoral initiatives, within wider multilateral fora where not all mernbers 
want to lock-in a policy. The next three levels in the table represent transregionalism and 
interregionalism. They reflect the three levels analysed in the last chapter, 
continental/sub-continental, regional and sub-regional. Of all the policy options in the 
table these three levels are the most recent additions. 
Finally the table presents bilateralism and unilateralism as policy options. Bilateralism 
has two distinct categories; reciprocal and non-reciprocal. The latter is exemplified by the 
GSP system, initiated by the EU in 1971, which allows developing countries unilateral, 
non-contractual and non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU market. The EU also has 
the option of using reciprocal bilateral agreements with countries that are able to 
reciprocate. The thesis will take an analysis of bilateralism into more detail, alongside the 
pursuit of interregionalism, in later chapters. EU reciprocal bilateral relations would 
usually be in the form of an FTA, such as EU-Chile, EU-South Africa and EU-Mexico 
although it can also be through a Customs Union where there is an alignment of external 
tariffs, for example EU-Turkey. Finally there is the possibility of a Common Economic 
Area, such as with the European Economic Area, where there is an additional alignment 
27 150 at the time of writing in June 2(X)7 (www. %Ato. or, -,, accessed 19 June 2007) 29 Smaller than the number ofWTO mernbers but larger than most inter and transregional relations 
61 
level, exemplified by the WTO which is a rule based organisation that binds its one 
27 - hundred and fifty members into trade rules. The WTO represents all that is positive in 
multilateralism as it is able to bind one hundred and fifty countries into reducing 
protection and increasing world trade. The WTO also encapsulates sorne of' the negative 
features of mu Iti lateral i sm because as membership has grown the issues covered have 
proliferated and its ability to act has slowed drarnatically. Whilst the multilateral level is 
the EU's preferred level of interaction, given the large potential gains and the similarity 4- 
of the rules-based institutions, it is not the only level at which the ELI interacts. 
The second option is the plurilateral level, at which a large number 28 of countries 
undertake a joint agreement. An example is the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement which was signed by twenty eight countries in 1994. This level of relations is 
used mostly for sectoral initiatives, within wider multilateral fora where not all members 
want to lock-in a policy. The next three levels in the table represent transregionalism and 
interregionalism. They reflect the three levels analysed in the last chapter, 
continental/sub-continental, regional and sub-regional. Of all the policy options in the 
table these three levels are the most recent additions. 
Finally the table presents bilateralism and unilateralism as policy options. Bilateralism 
has two distinct categories; reciprocal and non-reciprocal. The latter is exemplified by the 
GSP system, initiated by the EU in 1971, which allows developing countries unilateral, 
non-contractual and non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU market. The EU also has 
the option of using reciprocal bilateral agreements with countries that are able to 
reciprocate. The thesis will take an analysis of bilateralism into more detail, alongside the 
pursuit of interregionalism, in later chapters. EU reciprocal bilateral relations would 
usually be in the form of an FTA, such as EU-Chile, EU-South Africa and EU-Mexico 
although it can also be through a Customs Union where there is an alignment of external 
tariffs, for example EU-Turkey. Finally there is the possibility of a Common Economic 
Area, such as with the European Economic Area, where there is an additional alignment 
27 150 at the time of writing in June 2(X)7 (www. wto. org, accessed 19 June 2007) 28 Smaller than the number ofWTO members but larger than most inter and transregional relations 
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of rules and technical standards. The last strategic option open to the EU is to act 
unilaterally, which happens mostly in the economic realm - specifically with regard to 
tariffs. Overall the figure presents the broad spectrum of strategic options open to the EU 
in external relations, as well as simultaneously situating interregionalism as one of many 
other options. 
All of these levels have been used, in varying combinations, by the EU to address 
different issues at various times. One of the great theoretical appeals of interregionalism 
is the fact that it does not directly interfere with the other strategic options, offering in 
fact an effective framework within which many of the other strategic options can nest. 
The previous quote by Romano Prodi reveals how every level of external relations has 
expanded to cover more issues outside of the trade realm. Guy Verhofstadt, then Belgian 
Prime Minister and President of the European Council, took the interregional possibility 
to its most logical conclusion, suggesting the G8 system be replaced by a more 
interregional system: "we need to create a forum where the leading continental 
partnerships can all speak on an equalfooting: the EU, the African Union, the Common 
Market of the South (Mercosur), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) etc" (S6derbaum & Langenhove: 
250). 
The appeal for partner regions of entering into interregional dialogue specifically with the 
EU, whilst varying from region to region, has been primarily the ample reward of the EU 
being the largest donor of aid in the world, an important world political player and a 
dynamic market of 455 million consumers with whom to trade. As EU external relations 
have expanded and deepened new mechanisms and frameworks to deal with them have 
been sought. Interregional ism "has turned out to be one of the most attractive 
frameworks for both the EU and third countries to meet their respective foreign policy 
interests" (Regelsberger & Alecu de Flers 2005: 317). Indeed the concept of 
interregionalism fits very aptly into the EU's vision of international relations given its 
status as the world's largest regional grouping. Whilst noting this interregional trend and 
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development it is important to underline that the EU has always maintained a strong and 
firin commitment to mu Iti lateral ism, which it reiterates is its prime channel for relations 
"Em-ope's appi-oach to intei-national i-elations is taking shape. We have chosen the pal/I 
ofinultilatei-alism, not unilatei-alism. We want to use the. 10rce of* itleas anel persullsioll, 
not coeivion. We have moveil a long way fi-om the "i-easons of' State - aml. 11-om the 
i-ealpolitik that we ourselves inventetl. Om- concept ofpowei- is the power oft-ldes. We 
i-ý ect the ulea q' going it alone oi- the absence q' am, fivinework o' rýlýrence. JIe 
(www. ec. eurol2a. eu, accessed 27 January 2006) 
"Weftice major challenges like managing globalisation to our advantage, tlý ýnding our fe 
position in the world in thefiwe qfincreasing international competition, and securing the 
current rule-based, multilateral international order jor the juture" (Benita Ferrero- 
WaIdner 2006a: 1) 
-Without being exclusive, oi- ruling out bilatend initiatives, I believe it is right jor 
Europe l sfirst loYalty in trade policy to be to the WTO and success oj'the Dolia round. 
We have a projiOund commitment to its success. We have shown again and again - 
without recognition - that ive w-e prepai-ed to paY to keel) the multilateral sYstem on 
track " (Peter Mandelson 2006a: 2) 
This vision of the EU's approach to international relations, whilst underlining the 
primacy of multi lateralism, does not in any way contradict the advance of 
interregionalism. It simply implies that multilateral principles underpin interregionalism, 
which is obliged to operate within its confines and parameters 
29. This multilateral 
approach is indeed very amenable to interregionalism, suggesting "power of' rilles " and 
"fi-aniework (ýfrefýrence" as key issues, and Commissioner Mandelson makes specific 
mention of not being "exclusive". It also leaves open the possibility of developing 
different strategies for different needs. Indeed whilst proclaiming multilateralism above 
29 This cffectivelY equates to the nesting that Aggarwal has invcstigated. For more on this subject see 
Aggarwal 1998 
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all else the EU has undergone an impressive expansion of its interregional rclations. It is, C- 
however, clear that the EU has multi lateral i sni, and all its implied principles, at the core 
of its external relations. Indeed this view is one that is often reiterated by key 
Commission officials in their speeches, as noted above by current Commissioners 
Ferrero-Waidner and Mandelson. 
Interregional ism is thus consistent with both the EUs global/rnu Iti lateral commitments 
and its regional basis and ambitions. Whilst maintaining multilateralism as a priority, EU 
external relations have developed in such a way that it has becorne common to note the 
EU exporting its so-called 'regional model'. Romano Prodi. whilst President of the 
Commission, suggested that: "The Union should lwomote across the world its inotlel. lor 
managing relations between countries. For the countries around its, we are lwol)osing a 
Neighbourhood Policy, which seeks to evend to the whole qfEuroj)e the model qfpeace, 
(lemocracy and prosI)eritY that are the hallmarks (? /' the Unioti" (www. ec. europa. eu, 
accessed 27 February 2006). This model, that Prodi suggests might be exported, is one 
that is now being used in relations across the globe and is the basis of the EU 
interregional strategy. This strategic export of regionalism was confirmed by various 
Commission interviewees who all expressed this very same sentiment (Interviews 1,2,5 
& 7). In a different speech Prodi advocated that "Europe can onlY play a leading role on 
the world stage if it is able to qlfýr a robust political proposal a more ýh ective and 
democratic international architecture" (www. ec. europa. eu, accessed 27 February 2006). 
Finally Pascal Larny in 2000, whilst EU Trade Commissioner, said that one of the keys to 
EU external relations was "creating institutions of global governance that can mediate as 
well as mitigate" (www. ec. curopa. eu, accessed 27 February 2006). These quotes reveal 
quite clearly the basis on which the EU has expanded its interregional strategy, as it has 
been seeking a viable model through which to export its own values, rules, norms - in 
short its own model of regional integration. Interregional ism has proved to be the most 
suited vehicle through which to do this. 
Just as crucial is the fact that interregionalism builds on inherent EU strengths and 
unrivalled experience, as it is based on regionalism. The EU is the world leader in it's 
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interaction between partners based on dialogue and negotiation in multiple areas, 
underpinned by rule-based outcornes and it is clear that interregionalism is a concept that 
fits extremely well with the EU, and one that has been adopted in a very enthusiastic 
manner. Interregionalism plays to EU strengths at a variety of' different levels, but most 
importantly at both institutional and normative levels, that is to say it fits the EU's 
conception of itself. In addition to these factors the interregional framework offers the EU 
the possibility of dealing with its partners in a more efficient manner. The efficiency C- 
factor should not be under-estirnated, as the EU has to deal with every country in the 
world. The explicit and implicit support for regionalism that sterns from increased 
interregionalism is something that the WTO also supports, as is clear frorn the November 
2001 declaration of the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, "regional ti-atle agi-eements 
can play all impoi-tant i-ole ill pi-onioting the libei-alization antl exImnsion ofti-atle an(I ill 
fostei-ing develolmient" (www. wto. org, accessed 25 March 2005). Interregional 1 sm is 
thus theoretically compatible with the current systern of global governance, the EU's own 
identity and strengths and also the multilateral arena -a positive and powerful 
combination. 
The EU has always been a dynamic force in international relations and more recently in 
transregional and interregional relations. The EU has widely been credited with having 
developed the concept of interregionalism in its international relations with Latin 
America, East Asia, and Africa. Even if the EU is not fully responsible for having 
actually developed interregionalism per se, it is certainly, now, the most active 
interregional actor and proponent. "The impot-tance of the EU in this Iwocess can not he 
ovei-state(I. In niany ways conteinpoiai*y intet-i-egionalisin is ti-igget-ed an(I pi-onioted bY 
the EU" (Sbderbaum, Stalgren & Langenhove 2005: 377). Edwards and Regelsberger 
note the growth of EU interregional dialogue in the mid-1970s with the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue and cooperation with the ACP Group, which was followed later by agreements 
with Mediterranean countries (1990: 4). The extension of this new approach to Asia was 
in the form of EU-ASEAN relations and their cooperation agreement in 1980 - which is 
widely taken to be the forerunner of modern day EU interregional relations. European 
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regional and interregional designs have often been, I'Or better or worse, copied the world 
over. 
MaDDini! EU Trans/Interrei! ionalism 
As identified in the last sections the ELI is involved in a large number of' interregional L- Cl 
dialogues. Not only does it have interregional relations with differing regions of' the 
world, but it also has two or more simultaneous interregional dialogues within the same 
region, notably in the reerions to be analysed in this chapter, Asia, Africa and Latin 4- 
America. Also mentioned in the last section, each interregional dialogue is a specific 
relationship born out of specific circumstances to serve specific purposes, which has 
given rise to many differing results. In the interest of l'Urthering the understanding of' 
interregionalism it is necessary to rnap the main interregional relationships of the EU: 
Figure 2- 2 Main Transregionall& Interregional Relationships of the Etj30 
Transregional: 
ASEM (1994) 
Europe - Latin America Summit (1999) 
EU - Africa Summit (2000) 
Hybrid Interregional: 
EU - ASEAN (1980) 
EU - GCC (1989) 
EU - SAARC (1994) 
EU - SADC (1994) 
EU - MED (1995) 
EU - Rio Group (1999) 
Pure Interrepional: 
EU - CACM (1993) 
EU - Mercosur (1995) 
EU - CAN (1996) 
Source: ()%ý n Crcation adaptcd from %\ \\ \\. cc. cLiroj)ilXLl WCCC. ',, SCd I Deccniber 2007) 
I(I For a more detailed list ofall Transregional, Hybrid Interregional and Pure Interregional relationships see 
Appendix 2 
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The figure above outlines all the interregional relations in which the EU is currently 
engaged. From this, which shows only the start date of relationships, the geographical 
regions concerned and the type of relationship, it is possible to advance some preliminary 
observations about EU interregionalism. 
In terms of the start date, two things stand out clearly - the first is that EU 
interregionalism expanded mostly from the mid-1990s, which highlights that 
interregionalism is still a relatively new phenomenon. The second factor related to the 
start date is that amongst the types of relations transregional were formed later than the 
others. They were created after the pure or hybrid interregional relations in their region. 
This creation of transregional relations, in all cases within regions already having other 
interregional relations, is a theme that requires further investigation as part of the overall 
interregional trend. This later emergence of transregional alongside interregional relations 
poses the question of whether they replace them or serve different aims and functions. 
The geographical coverage reveals that three regions predominate in the interregional 
trend; Asia, Africa and Latin America. These three regions all have pure or hybrid 
interregionalism and transregionalism simultaneously, and it was seen that the majority of 
relations are currently hybrid interregional. This fact is purely related to the EU's partners, 
and their respective levels of regional integration. If pure interregionalism were an 
overall objective, it would be expected that the EU would encourage its regional partners 
to advance their own integration to the point of becoming customs unions, thus allowing 
relations to be reclassified as pure interregional. The EU's pure interregional relations are 
all focused in Latin America due to the presence of three customs unions in that region. 
Transregional relations only deal with three regions; Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Whilst this list of EU interregional relations reveals their geographical coverage, their 
start date and their typology, it does not account for their aims and objectives or their 
content and structure. It is possible to see the extent of EU interregionalism but it does 
not help answer the question of what the EU is trying to do and how it is trying to do it. 
In terms of EU strategy it appears clear that the EU has chosen to employ 
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interregionalism in three 'distant' world regions using a combination of hoth t- 
transregionalism and interregionalism. Given the preliminary observations that it was 
possible to make frorn the above figure, the next section will concentrate on the three key 
regions with which the EU has wide-ranging and multiple interregional relations. It will 
focus on a comparative analysis of Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
EU - Asia 
Mapping EU - Asia Trans/Interreizionalism 
Figure 2- 3 EU - Asia Trans/interregionalism 
EU relations with the Asian region are often considered as the genuine forerunners of the 
interregional movement, and have been viewed as blueprints for further EU 
interregionalism, as RUland notes; "ASEAN-EU relations have been speaMeading this 
novel trend" (2001: 4). Analysis of EU interregional objectives and intentions with the 
Asian region will necessarily focus on how the EU carne to be interacting with the main 
constituent elements of the table above, namely ASEM, ASEAN and SAARC. It is, 
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SoUrcc: Own Creation adapted from %\ \ý \\. CC. CLl I 01M. CLI (iICCeSSCd I Dcccmhcr 2007) 
however, already interesting to note that the two largest and most powerful states, 
economically and politically, in the Asia region, whilst both being involved in at least one 
of the interregional fora 31 , have specific bilateral dIZ1101ILies. strategic partnerships. This 
fact immediately reveals that the EU is willing to deal bilaterally ifthe partner merits the 
special attention. This strategic choice also suggests that bilateralism is the ELJ's 
favoured policy option for partners of a certain economic and political size, leaving 
interregionalism as a mechanism to rationalise and operate relations with several 
secondary partners at once. This theme of' the EU's preference for strategic bilateral 
relations with key nations in the three regions under analysis will be expanded upon 
further, in due course, as it occurs in all three regions. 
EU interregional strategy in the region can be traced specifically back to relations with 
ASEAN, which started in 1978 (http: //www. eL, i-oL, ýll-I. eLi. iiit/1, acts/6 3 12 en. litni, 
accessed 19 November 2006). The initiative of EU-ASEAN relations was that of Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher, then German Foreign Minister and Claude Cheysson, then European 
Commissioner, and was an ambitious one as, in the words of Regelsberger & Alecu de 
Flers, they "wishetl to promote (it) (is a new moclel fi)r both a consistent Euroj)ean 
pi-eign policY and the fliture of' the intei-national system - (2005: 322). The EU was 
establishing contact with ASEAN as an existing regional grouping in 1978, contact that 
evolved into a cooperation agreement in 1980 (http: //www. ascansec. orR/150l. htiii, 
accessed 19 November 2006). Of the nine Articles in this very first interregional 
agreement, the first two concern commercial issues, the third econornic cooperation, the 
fourth development cooperation and the fifth the creation of a Joint Cooperation 
Committee (JCC). The EU and ASEAN wanted primarily to increase and promote mutual 
trade, and to monitor this they set up the JCC to assess progress as well as establishing 
that ministerial meetings were to take place every two years. 
From the 1980 Agreement it was some tirne until the next interregional developments, 
which came with the first explicit Asia region strategy in 1994, when the Commission 
published its Communication entitled "Towat-ds a New Asia Sti-ategy" (European 
Commission 1994b). This strategic docurnent outlines four "overall objectives" with 
" China within ASEM, India within SAARC 
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Asia, as part of the key idea of modernizing EU relations with the region, as being to 
"strengthen the Union's economic presence in Asia", to "widen and deepen its political 
and economic relations with the countries in Asia", to "promote economic development " 
and finally to "contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the 
rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms " (I 994b: 2). The 
focus, as with the ASEAN cooperation agreement, is firmly on commercial and economic 
elements, although political criteria have been added in this Communication. The 
insertion of democracy and human rights are important to underline because they are 
representative of the EU's gradual placement of normative values in agreements. To 
achieve these aims the EU noted certain key priorities which were to "strengthen the 
Union's bilateral relations with individual countries and regions in Asia", to "raise the 
profile of Europe in Asia", to "support efforts by Asian countries to cooperate at the 
regional and subregional level such as the ASEAN regional forum", to encourage Asian 
states to play "a more active role in multilateral actions", to foster an open and 
conducive EU-Asian business environment, to help Asian countries integrate into the 
"market-based world trading system" and finally to "contribute to sustainable 
development" (1994b: 2-3). At this stage the EU was clearly trying to increase its 
contacts at all levels and on a variety of issues, most notably in trade and commercial 
terms. It notes that "the EUs strategies will also cover relations with regional groupings 
such as the ASEAN and SAARC" (1994b: 11) and that ASEAN is recognized as a 
"cornerstone of dialogue with the region" (1994b: 12). The strategy paper also makes 
reference to certain other key facets of EU aims, such as, "dialogue of equals", 
"maintenance of an open rule-based world trade system", "clear consultation and 
dialogue" even going so far as to note that "a consensus approach ... willfeed into inter- 
regional initiatives and smooth the path for work undertaken at the multilateral level" 
(I 994b: 11). 
In 1996 the Commission published a Communication entitled "Creating a New Dynamic 
in EU-ASE4N Relations" (I 996c) which continued the importance accorded to ASEAN 
in the 1994 document. It was also, in effect, the first Commission strategy paper dealing 
specifically with ASEAN, and the first strategy for the group since the EU-ASEAN 
cooperation agreement of 1980. This strategic document announced that "relations 
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between ASEAN an(I the Community have changed i-mlicaffi, since thesigning ofthe / 980 
Agi-eement. In 1980 out- i-elations svei-e con(lucte(l on a (lonoi-recilfient basis. IMaY we 
have a i-elationshil) which is characterised by balanceil it-ade, the t1eveloInnent of 
I. nvestment an(I gi-eatei- economic co-olwi-ation. Pie scoln, antl ol)jectives of out- /9HO 
agi-eement are limitetl- (1996: 8). The docurnent proposed a new co-operation agreement, 
to update the 1980 agreement and redress the changed relationship, but this was not 
ratified by the Council, leading to an impasse in the relationship with ASEAN. 
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This impasse, and other reasons , gave rise to the creation, in 1996, of the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM). ASEM had a much wider membership than the EU-ASEAN 
relationship, hence its classification as transregional. The first meeting was held in 
Bangkok in 1996 where the three pillars of the relationship were outlined - political, 
economic and cultural/intellectual. ASEM, according to the EU website, represents an 
"i0ol-nial pi-ocess 0j, dialogue tilld cool)ei-ation 
(http: //europa. eu. int/comm/exteriial re latio n s/ase ni/ase inprocess/bac k oprocess. lit m, 
accessed I December 2006). This is echoed in the key characteristics that the EU 
. 
/0 attributes to the process; "its in ' i-nialiti, -its illillti(lillielisi, oll(iliti,... its emphasis oil equal 
Pailnei's (http: //europa. eu. iiiUcoiiiiii/externLil relations/aseni/IntrN, accessed I 
December 2006). The aims enunciated in the original Bangkok meeting stressed sharing 
concerns, common visions, peace and stability, econornic and social development, 
strengthening the Asia-Europe relationship and maintaining dialogue. In terms of how to 
follow up from the first ASEM meeting the Chairman's Statement declared that "intel- 
sessional activities ai-e necessat-%, although they need not be institlitionalised" (1996: 1). 
ASEM thus became a summit driven relationship with Heads of State gathering every 
two years. It also has an important ministerial level, notably finance, foreign and 
economic ministers, who meet on an annual basis. There is also a third level, that of 
senior officials who also meet on an annual basis for discussions. Also of importance, 
was the creation, in 1996, of the Asia Europe Business Forum (AEBF), a strategic 
creation to get an integrated business body to represent interests, input into the policy 
process and perform networking. It was the first open channel in interregionalism for the 
Q These reasons will be discussed in more detail in the next section 
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participation of civil society, albeit a rather limited opening". The process can be 
represented as follows: 
Figure 2- 4 ASEM Structure 
The ASENI Structure 
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Source: httLi: //www. tiii. ort-, /aseni-ol'tdocs/strtictLire. ii(it'(acccsscd I June 2(X)7) 
13 This was the first direct and specific civil society channel. although sections of civil society had 
previously been involved in relations through their influence on various actors 
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ASEM rapidly becarne the driving force in relations with Asia, which can be witnessed ill 
the publication, in 1997, of the Commission Working Document entitled -M-Ioritie, v antl 
Pei-. V)ectives . 
1()i- the ASEM Pi-ocess" (European Commission 1997). This document 
refers to the fact that the ASEM process has got "oll'to ii i-linning stal-t- and brings 
attention to the fact that "the ASEM pi-ocess can not be seen (is a substitute. 101- othei- 
bilatel-al antl midtilateral. fol-a linking Asiti an(I Eiii-ol)e. ASEMshoidtl 
as (i catalYst 1()i- achieving mutual im(let-staneling antl enhancetl awareness throligh 
tlialogue". It then highlights the strength of ASEM as being ill its "inlOrmal natiii-e, its 
Iii, ýli-lei-elp(ii-ti*(, i'l)titioii antl its iiii(Iti-(Iii? ieiisioiitilit_N, " (1997: 2). 
The EU made it clear that the ASEM was a valuable tool for strategically overseeing 
relations with Asia as a whole, and that ASEM would not substitute more detailed 
regional relations. As part of this strategy the EU published an updated Asian Strategy, in 
2001, called "Eut-ope an(I Asia: A Sti-ategic Fi-ainewot-k-fior Enhancetl Partnerships- 
(European Commission 2001). This new updated framework aimed for a "balancetl 
sti-ategic apj? i-oach foi- its relations with Asia in the coming tlecatle " (2001: 5) through 
six key dimensions that it identified as: 
"strengthening EU engagement with Asia in the political and securio, fieltis, 
strengthening EU-Asia two-waY trade and investment relations in both directions, 
contributing effectiveh, to reduce poverty in the region, lielping promote the spread of 
democracy, good governance and the rule of' law across the region: in turn building 
global partnei-ships with key Asian partners (in combating global challenges as well as in 
inteniational organisations), and promoting jUrther the awareness between the two 
regions - (http: //europa. eu. inUcoiiiiii/extei-iial relations/asia/news/ipOl-1238 en. hti-n, 
accessed 2 November 2006). 
It is quickly possible to note the similarity to the objectives of the 1994 strategy, although 
the primacy of the commercial/economic angle seems to have been diluted by increased C- 
security and development issues. The increasing message of previous Communications, 
that diversification was needed in relations, was made explicit by the then Commissioner 
for External Relations, Chris Patten, when he noted that it was crucial to "recognise the 
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essential diversity of Asia and the Asia-Pacific region " and that the focus should be on 
"carrying forward our dialogue and co-operation with individual countries, regional 
groupings, such as ASEAN, and in the inter-regional dialogue it? the Asia-Europe 
Meeting process" (idem. ). 
The strategy towards Asia focused on overall priority areas for action 34 to be driven 
through all levels, but mostly through the ASEM channel. It was also based on the need 
to differentiate and take forward other issues at bilateral and sub-regional levels 
according to needs and capacities. The Communication made the new EU strategies for 
Asia's subregions, as distinct from the region itself, the new keys to success. It actually 
separated them into South Asia (SAARC), Southeast Asia (ASEAN), Northeast Asia and 
Australasia. The Communication acknowledges that "in contrast to the EU's relations 
with Latin America or with the Mediterranean or ACP countries, there is no one inter- 
regional forum in which Europe and Asia interact" (2001: 25). As a consequence of the 
2001 strategic direction the Commission published, in 2003, its 'New Partnership with 
South East Asia' for its relations with ASEAN. This document aimed to "revitalise" 
relations with ASEAN through six key areas; supporting regional stability, human rights, 
democratic principles and good governance, justice and home affairs issues, regional 
trade and investment, poverty reduction and finally in intensifying specific area dialogue 
and cooperation. The foundations for relations with ASEAN are noted to be "stronger 
common interests - economic, political and security", as well as being based on "values 
and features shared by the two regions" (2003: 6). Of note is one of the "key 
components" of the 2003 Communication, the creation of TREATI -a framework for 
dialogue and regulatory cooperation with ASEAN countries to enhance trade relations 
(2003: 3-4). The TREATI framework is based on bilateral initiatives, allowing the EU 
and individual ASEAN partner countries to deepen cooperation in mutually beneficial 
trade areas, thus strengthening bilateralism within inteffegionalism. 
3' Such as peace and security, mutual trade and investment, poverty reduction, democracy, good 
governance and rule of law, partnerships and alliances on global issues and promotion of mutual awareness 
and knowledge 
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Finally, in the July 2003 publication entitled "New Partnership ivith South East Asia " the 
European Commission announced a more flexible approach towards ASEAN. This new 
approach more explicitly opened the door to the possibility ot'decpci- bilateral agreements 
with ASEAN member countries. The objective ot'this was to advance relations with key 
members of ASEAN, as part of a drive to update relations with the region which were 
still governed by the 1980 EU-ASEAN agreement. The emphasis on the regional level 
had not been removed but the EU was now explicitly stating its willingness to advance 
through other channels should the need arise. Then external relations Commissioner, 
Chris Patten, emphasised that "to(IaY's Communication sets out afle-vible strategy. for 
deel)er co-oj)eration with i"(1il'i(lual countries withill (I regional fi-anielvork'', 
(ht tp: //ec. eLi ropa. c u/e xtern al re I ati on s/asi a/new s/i p03-96 1. ht rn, accessed 2 November 
2006). This was a move towards creating a new structure for relations, one with a more 
bilateral focus, but importantly within an overall regional approach. The maintenance of a 
regional framework is in order to keep coherence between agreements and also to avoid 
any issues that might hinder the development ot'EU-ASEAN relations. 
It is important to note that as yet in the analysis of EU interregional strategy in Asia 
detailed mention has not been made of SAARC, which appears in the figure at the start of 
the section. This is because the EU has not put together a detailed strategy paper 35 for 
SAARC, or its region - South Asia, as proposed by the 2001 Communication. The EU 
does meet with SAARC and is involved in helping with their integration process, but it is 
noteworthy that the EU has important bilateral agreements with the key member states of 
36 SAARC, primarily with India . 
SAARC has existed since 1985 but the EU has chosen 
not to deepen its relations with it. Both sides have, however, "tiffirmetl interest ill 
strengthening links" (http: //europii-eu. iiit/coiiiiii/extei-iiýil re lations/saarc/intro/i ndex. ht ill, 
accessed 2 November 2006). The EU has explained this lack of further cooperation with 
SAARC as being down to their lack of integration (Interview 1). 
;ý As ol'31 July 2007 the Commission had not presented a Strategy Paper 
'6 EU relations with India arc based on the 1994 third Generation Cooperation Agreement. The 
Commission is currently working on upgrading relations with India to a Strategic Partnership 
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EU strategy towards Asia has shown marked flexibility as the EU has tried various 
approaches to deal with the region. Overall the two key elements of ELJ interregional 
strategy in Asia are ASEM and EU-ASEAN. In these two relationships the EU has 
cornplementary frameworks for relations with Asia. The EU strategy has shown certain 
tendencies, or key features, which can be suniniarlsed as follows: 
Figure 2- 5 Key Features of EU - Asia Trans/interregionalism 
1. Emphasis on diversified relations - especially from mid- 1990s 
2. Transregional relations through ASEM do not cover the entire region 
3. Agreements all carefully couched in multilateralism 
4. Increasing inclusion of normative values e. g. democracy and good governance, 
but these are always subservient to economic aims 
5. Transregional relationship created after interregional relationship, to serve 
different needs 
6. Relations with regional groups axed mostly towards economic liberalisation 
7. Use of 'partner' creation and enhancement as well as interaction with existing 
partners. EU helped regional groups 
8. Trade the core of all relations 
9. Low institutionalisation of all relations in Asia, with flexibility as a key issue 
10. Relations driven by Summits, ministerial, ambassadorial and senior official 
levels 
11. Development of a three pillar approach: Economic, Political, Cooperation 
12. Evolution to a notion of balanced relations with a partner 
13. Willingness to negotiate/cooperate bilaterally with special partner states 
14. Move towards enhancing bilateral relations, but if possible within an 
interregional framework 
Sourcc: Own Crcalion 
Explaining EU - Asia Trans/interregionalism 
The first section of this chapter noted that EU interregional relations have been present in 
Asia for longer than in any other region, and also that Asia was the first region to develop 
a transregional relationship with the EU, in tandem with its interregional relationship. 
This section will address the motivations that have led the EU and Asia to interact as they 
have on trans- and interregional levels, principally by analysing official EU documents, 
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interregional agreements and Commission speeches. EU motivations and their 
manifestation in EU strategy will form the key element to this section because the EU is 
the dominant partner in the relationship, and as such is the one that establishes contact, 
builds the agreements and relationships as well as inputting the instruments and 
institutional support. It will, however, remain important to analyse the motivations of the 
Asian region in accepting, or declining, to pursue interregional relations with the EU. 
It seems very clear, from the literature, actions, agreements, analysis and context that the 
main EU motivation for relations with Asia, be it through ASEAN or ASEM has been 
economic, a desire on the behalf of the EU to increase trade and investment with Asia. 
"There is one clear core objective to guide the future development of EU-Asia relations 
into the coming decade: we mustfocus on strengthening the EU's political and economic 
presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing 
global weight of an enlarged EU" (European Commission 2001: 15). A core element in 
the commercial drive, or business engagement in Asia, has always stemmed from the 
European business community. As Hdnggi, who identifies EU-Asian relations as the 
"weak side" or "missing link" within the Triad notes; "the transnational business 
community took thefirst step in calling attention to the weakness of the Asia-Europe side 
of the new triangle" (1999: 61). The EU has primarily sought to engage Asia 
commercially, driven by key business interests. As part of this strategic economic drive, 
since the mid-1990s onwards, the EU has shown a willingness to alter the channels it uses 
to engage its partners in Asia. 
EU-ASEAN was the first interregional relationship between the EU and Asia, as well as 
one of the EU's very first group to group relations. From the very beginning the focus 
was firmly on trade and commercial cooperation, which was visible in the original 
cooperation framework that prioritised trade cooperation, economic cooperation and 
development cooperation. Despite the wide-ranging potential, and years of existence, 
EU-ASEAN cooperation has failed to establish a special relationship between the 
partners, as the wording of the agreement and subsequent ministerial meetings have 
remained vague, representing mere expressions of intent and general principles, and not 
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concrete actions. Despite EU offers and suggestions, explicit and implicit, ASEAN has 
never really advanced as a regional integration vehicle, making it a difficult partner to 
deal with on a group economic and commercial basis. Discussions thus became limited to 
political spheres and expressions of intent. There was a business boom between the two 
regions through the 1980s and 1990s, but it was more attributable to other factors than to 
interregional or transregional relations. 
Relations with ASEAN were also complicated by different governance styles and 
different cultural perceptions of institutions and business dealings. Emphasis by the EU 
on human rights and good governance has also been subject to reservations from ASEAN 
members and the issue of Myanmar often proved divisive. This has led to Roland saying 
that "the conditionalities introduced by the EU. _facilitated what has been called the 
'Asianisation of Asia' by developing an own set of cooperation principles based on Asia 
values, known as the ASEAN way" (2002c: 8). One of these "ASEAN values", referred to 
by Roland, is that of low institutionalisation with the result that EU-ASEAN relations 
have marked low institutionalisation, a situation which is also due to EU reluctance to 
lock-in a relationship. 
ASEAN was also motivated by economic considerations in relations with the EU, as 
Robles notes; "ASEAN countries tended to believe that relations with a regional 
organisation in Europe offered opportunities to induce European firms to consider 
Southeast Asia as a profitable region for investment, as compared to the ACP or Latin 
America" (2004: 100). Robles goes on to note that ASEAN made early efforts to 
consolidate some form of firms networking for this very economic purpose, but that in 
the 1980s the EU neglected these advances. What Robles is highlighting is that the 
principal ASEAN motivation in relations with EU was economic balancing to try and 
position itself better vis-a-vis other EU partner regions. 
Attempts to revise EU-ASEAN economic and commercial relations, by attempting to 
negotiate a new Co-operation Agreement proved unsuccessful due to political objections. 
Pelkmans notes that "this decision was never implemented because the East Timor issue 
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led Portugal to veto a negotiation mandate from the Council to the Commission" (1997: 
52). Forster, in similar vein, adds that "though there was willingness oil both sides to 
expand the Agreement into cooperation, and consensus was reached on the technical 
details, the EU's increased priority given to the human rights agenda proved to be all 
insurmountable obstacle ... The human rights abuses in East Timor and a massacre there 
in November 1991 further soured the relationship; Portugal (bolstered by the European 
Parliament) led EU opposition to renewing the 1980 Agreement" (1999: 749). It is 
surprising to see that the human rights agenda was put before the commercial agenda, but 
it is an important trend noted in relations with Asia 37 that human rights and democracy 
clauses over time became standard parts of an agreement. In 1995 the European 
Commission published a document entitled "Inclusion of respect for democratic 
principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries " 
(1995b), which is testimony to the importance of normative values in the EU's external 
relations. It is clear that different values have had a direct impact on the relationship, 
even to the extent of motivating ASEAN to develop its own values. 
Because EU-ASEAN relations had stalled the EU moved to create a new framework for 
relations with Asia. This was achieved through the establishment of ASEM, as it was 
seen to offer "the way out of a deadlocked and rather stale relationship with ASEAN", 
(Forster 1999: 752) and simultaneously a new mechanism for EU commercial 
engagement in Asia. Before looking in more detail at the motivations behind ASEM it is 
useful to address the 'New Asia Strategy' of 1994 because it predates ASEM by two 
years. 
According to Richards and Kirkpatrick, "as for the fast growing economy and the huge 
market of the Asian region, the EU's Asian policy started to change at the beginning of 
the 1990s when a more positive and proactive Look East policy was adopted, placing 
Asian markets near the centre of the EU's new strategy for globalising its economy and 
its view of international relations" (1999: 689-690). The 'New Asia Strategy' was an 
explicit response by the EU to Asia's economic growth and also to the creation of APEC 
37 See Figure 2-5, point 4 
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by the US in 1993, which is further evidence of the EU's economic balancing and 
bandwagoning motivations. APEC involved cooperation between the United States and 
twenty eight countries around the Pacific Rim excluding, of course, the EU from these 
enhanced relations with the booming Asian region. The EU was explicit in its rationale at 
the time stating that "the rise of Asia is dramatically changing the world balance of 
economic power .. the European Union needs therefore to accord Asia a higher priority 
that? is at present the case ... and to strengthen the Union's economic presence it? Asia in 
order to maintain the Union's leading role in the world economy" (1994: 1-2). In the 
1994 document, the overview of relations with Asia section draws attention to the fact 
that "the main thrust of the present andfuture policy in Asia is related to economic 
matters" (1994: 2). 
A further development, spurred by slowing ASEAN relations and a need to balance and 
bandwagon in economic relations with Asia, was the novelty that the EU would downsize 
relations to the most appropriate level, hence a more bilateral policy if warranted. The EU 
states that this is a "priority" and that there is a need to "strengthen the Union's bilateral 
relations with individual countries and regions in Asia" (1994: 2). This harks back to the 
initial table outlining relations with the Asia region that immediately highlighted the key 
bilateral relationships in the region, something this statement reinforces. The EU had 
already developed key bilateral relations with the main players, but it was now opening 
the door to bilateral relations with other Asia nations, should circumstances require it. 
The fact that the EU was reacting to US initiatives in the region is also an important fact 
to reiterate as it is an important motivation. From an Asian perspective both APEC and 
relations with the EU made economic sense as the region sought to increase its already 
booming exports and integrate further into the global economy. APEC and relations with 
the EU offered the Asian region an opportunity to deal with its two main world partners, 
in such a way as to balance their own external relations. 
ASEM, created in 1996, was a fundamental part of the EU's Asian interregional strategy. 
It is a transregional relationship with wider membership than ASEAN, and was created 
when EU-ASEAN relations had reached an impasse. The main reason the EU proposed 
the creation of a transregional relationship was because there were no other regional 
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groups in Asia and it still wanted a region-wide forum. Given that EU-ASEAN relations 
were faltering it is no surprise that soon after inception it "increasingly absorbed the 
ASEAN-EU biregional dialogue" (RUland: 2001). This is an important phenomenon of 
transregional superseding the interregional, in this case motivated by economic balancing 
considerations. Due to the impasse in EU-ASEAN relations, the EU sought to find 
another channel through which to conduct relations with the Asian region, and it chose to 
do this through ASEM. The new forum was able to not only absorb EU-ASEAN relations, 
but also expand them to new members and keep overall momentum in EU-Asian 
relations. RUland considers that "ASEM was a response to APEC and the increasing 
economic dominance of Japan and the United States over the East Asian growth region" 
(2002: 3). The EU itself puts this view forward in its 1995 Communication 'Free Trade 
Areas: An Appraisal' when it says: 
"Failure on our part to engage in this wider economic co-operation may well result in 
important economic regions developing a regulatory framework which will potentially 
hurt the Union's interests. The example ofAPEC illustrates this point particularly well. If 
the countries of East Asia, were, as a result of regulatory co-operation within APEC, to 
align their regulatory systems practices to those of the United States, this would place the 
EU at a competitive disadvantage" (1995: Art. 7). 
In a sense ASEM was more than just balancing by the EU, it was actually, given that it 
was trying to counter APEC, bandwagoning. The EU was compelled to react to the US 
initiatives in the Asia region and hence bandwagon, that is create an entity with which it 
could itself interact with the world's most economically dynamic region. 
Whilst ASEM effectively absorbed EU-ASEAN relations for a time, the aim was not to 
duplicate or relegate EU-ASEAN relations (Interview 5). The functions that EU-ASEAN 
had been ascribed were transferred to ASEM, which is seen as complementary to both 
interregional and multilateral levels, being an institutional off-shoot of interregionalism. 
The EU viewed it as a key balancing forum to give it a new better equipped foothold in 
the region. Given the nature of the forum it was never searching for an FTA between the 
partners, as the Asian side was too disparate, so it was more of a forum for discussion and 
81 
negotiation of other issues. From an Asian perspective ASEM was a better tool to curtail 
US influence in the region and it also balanced EU and US initiatives to revitalise the 
transatlantic dialogue in the mid 1990s. ASEAN itself also saw ASEM as useful to 
counter EU interaction with Mercosur, SADC, Mexico and South Africa (Interview 5). 
An evaluation of the motivations of the two partners in ASEM is very similar to that of 
EU-ASEAN, with balancing and bandwagoning predominant, as well as a preoccupation 
38 
with commercial issues. Whilst ASEM envisages more than just commercial activities , 
it has failed to provide any tangible rationalising or agenda-setting evidence (Ruland 
2001a, 2001c, 2002a). 
Overall it is seemingly clear from the context of EU-ASEAN and ASEM that the EU's 
motivations, as well as those of ASEAN and the Asia side of ASEM, have mostly been 
economic and commercial. Within this, it is possible to specify that the motivations have 
been economic balancing and bandwagoning as the EU, ASEAN and ASEM have tried to 
gain advantages or not lose ground to competitors in important economic partner regions, 
notably the US. The EU has strategically used interregionalism and transregionalism to 
try and achieve these balancing and bandwagoning aims. EU attempts to export its values 
and institutional approach were both firmly rebuffed by its Asian partners. Within this 
seemingly clear-cut appraisal of why the EU has used interregionalism and 
transregionalism with the Asian regions, note needs to be made of the human rights and 
democracy clauses that are so prevalent in EU external relations. Human rights is the 
issue that stalled relations with ASEAN, and is an issue that remains high on the agenda 
of relations with Asia even today (Gilson 2005: 308). It is also important to stress the 
issue of regional integration, which is built into all EU strategy papers, Communications 
and agreements. The EU motivation for this is relatively clear-cut, which the EU itself 
justifies as an inclusion based on simple economic rationale of helping countries develop 
their regional integration and thus accrue all the benefits associated with such a move 
(Interview 5). More implicit is the fact that the EU would prefer to deal with one coherent 
38 This is in contrast to APEC. the other transregional relationship in the region, which has a much narrower 
trade focus 
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regional partner than a group of countries. It is also obvious that if a partner follows the 
path of regional integration this puts the EU in a privileged position, as the world's most 
advanced regional grouping, which in many ways legitimizes the EU's own existence. 
This EU motivation was not, however, well received in Asia where regional integration 
was conceived in a very different way to the 'European model' (Reiterer 2005: 2). At no 
point could it be said that there was any Asian motivation in interregional relations with 
the EU to bolster its own regional integration. Despite this setback for the EU this section 
has highlighted how EU interregional strategy has in effect been a mechanism to turn 
interregional theory into practice. 
Evaluating EU - Asia TransfInterregionalism 
This final section of the analysis of EU-Asia interregionalism will evaluate the 
implications of EU-Asia transregionalism and interregionalism. These implications come 
as direct consequences of the combination of EU strategy and motivations with those of 
its Asian partners, which reveals the differences between the rhetoric and reality of the 
relationship. This section will thus address the general implications of EU-Asia trans- and 
interregionalism and how they have evolved. It will look specifically at the implications 
for the partners themselves, although this will focus mostly on Asia as, due to the EU's 
dominant position, it is the region to be more heavily impacted. Finally the section will 
address the implications that EU-Asia interregionalism has had for the international arena. 
From the conclusions of the first two sections of this analysis on EU-Asia 
interregionalism it is clear that economic interest has been key in the EU's strategic 
approach and motivations towards Asia, as well as for Asia towards the EU. This driving 
force has been couched in the EU's attempts to harness all the potential of interregional 
theory in its strategy. As a result of this driving force behind relations, the organisation of 
interaction has been flexible in structure and ever changing in nature, following an ad-hoc 
development process. Because EU-ASEAN and ASEM are motivated by economic 
balancing and bandwagoning this explains the reduced incentive to deepen and 
institutionalise relations. As circumstances have changed the EU has changed channels, 
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diversifying, as it has done by creating a transregional relationship to effectively replace a 
non-functional interregional one and also by opening the door to more bilateral 
relationships. 
Concrete relations are mostly only concerned with commercial issues and transactions, 
despite rhetoric and agreements suggesting wider scope. A further implication of the 
economic drive has been that actual content and follow through actions from the 
relationships have been minimal outside of the economic realm. The disengagement in, 
and low profile of, the AEBF is testimony to this failure to ensure follow through and 
concrete actions (Interview 3). Set up as a business engagement mechanism to consult 
and harness industry views, the forum delivered strong messages which did not lead to 
results. AEBF ran out of steam without any results to show for its work, making it hard to 
sustain engagement (Interview 9). 
EU-Asian relations are often vaunted for their flexibility, as the ASEAN secretariat 
points out when it says; "the EU has adopted a practical andflexible approach ill 
implementing the Cooperation Agreement. Changes have been inadefroyn time to time to 
rýflect ASEAN's concerns and priorities ill time with ASEAN's own growth, progress and 
development" (http: //www. aseansec. org/5612. htm, accessed 17 July 2007). A distinction 
does, however, need to be drawn between flexibility and instability. Flexibility in a 
relationship is very important to allow evolution and room for maneuver as long as this 
comes from a solid and committed basis. Instability comes when, in the name of 
flexibility, the level of lock-in and commitment is so low as to put the entire relationship 
into question. EU-ASEAN relations ultimately proved too flexible and unable to take 
difficult decisions, so whilst its declarations and statements might have aspired to great 
progress, it was not able to deliver. Regelsberger and Alecu de Flers conclude, for EU- 
ASEAN, that "since 1996 i-elations seem to have lost something of their status as a 
model" (2005: 332). 
As a direct consequence of the EU-ASEAN impasse, and also the creation of APEC, 
ASEM presented a different picture. It is based on even more informal institutional i sed 
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meetings of Heads of State and forms a strategic umbrella for all levels of contact with 
the region, economic, political and military, with the aim of creating links at all 
networking levels. ASEM is very innovative in the social and business linking arenas, 
through cooperation and tangible interregional networks and has an infrastructure on 
which to rely. The EU had learnt many of the lessons of relations with ASEAN and had 
sought a new approach to commercial relations and issues of EU presence in the region. 
A further implication of economic balancing and bandwagoning is that both relationships 
have had short-term and 'light' natures, which simultaneously means that longer-term 
direction and strategy have been lacking. 
EU strategy towards ASEAN and ASEM through trans- and interregionalism holds great 
potential in theory, but both levels have been weak on concrete and tangible results. Both 
relationships had, and have, the potential to fulfill all the roles ascribed to 
interregionalism as outlined in EU strategy, but have simply not done so. The move from 
interregional to transregional is important in this respect because transregional fora are 
less likely to be able to effectively perform all the roles of interregionalism given their 
wider membership, different aims and more flexible nature. Transregionalism is very 
much an umbrella that gives strategic direction, not concrete action. ASEM and EU- 
ASEAN's inability to help in the Asian crisis of 1997 has also brought criticism that 
undermined the concept of interregionalism (RUland 2002c: 6). 
Deemed to be even more undermining is the total lack of transparent and democratic 
functioning of these particular interregional fora. Interregional parliamentary, social and 
NGO fora are underdeveloped and poorly linked to mainstream interregional relations 
(RUland 2002c: 6). Having noted that relations have been poor on results due to the 
economic balancing motivation it is hard to see how solid civil society engagement can 
be sustained. The example of AEBF is testimony to a potentially interested portion of 
civil society simply losing interest in a weak and intangible process. Also of importance, 
due to the economic balancing and bandwagoning motivation and the reliance on 
flexibility, the EU has been able to move to 'Strategic Partnerships' with its key allies in 
the region. It appears to be the case that if interregionalism fails to deliver what the EU 
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wants, or external economic circumstances, notably pressure from the US dictate, then 
the EU will consider bilateral relations. With the interregional level, EU-ASEAN, no 
longer progressing and ASEM dealing with overall strategic direction, there was a 
pressing need to address concrete economic issues, and the only channel open to the EU 
was through bilateral relations. The EU's strategic drive in Asia went from 
interregionalism to transregionalism as vehicles to manage relations, and then finally 
towards bilateralism. with key partners. 
An important implication of EU interregional overtures towards Asia has been the 
defining of 'Asian Values'- as opposed to 'European Values'. The so-called 'Asian Way' 
or 'Asian Values' is one of relationship building without formal institutions, whereas the 
EU favours institution building. The 'Asian Way' promotes flexibility, consensus, 
personalism, pragmatism, intergovernmental ism and thus non-interference in internal 
affairs of partners (RUland 2002c: 8). Through attempts to interact with the EU, and in 
the face of EU methods and practices, Asian partners have been forced to define 
themselves more clearly and concisely, thus impacting on their collective identity 
building. Also through closer relations with the EU, there have been important prestige 
enhancing effects within and outside the region as recognition has strengthened 
legitimacy and increased internal cohesion. The EU has overtly and covertly acted as an 
"external federator" in EU-ASEAN relations through the use of a conception of 
development that has forced the recipients to develop projects on a regional scale, 
enhancing cooperation and coordination. The EU has sought to influence ASEAN 
integration both explicitly, through technical help and assistance, but also more 
importantly implicitly by simply interacting with ASEAN. The 'Asian Way' is, to some 
extent, a rejection by ASEAN of the EU influence over its regional integration and a 
major blow to the self-serving nature of interregionalism based on regionalism. 
The implications of EU-Asia interregionalism for the EU have been various. As these 
relations have been noted to be the forerunners of the EUs interregional relations they 
have formed the basis of all the EU's other interregional and transregional relations. 
Rifland notes this when he says "the cooperation agreement became a model for 
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additional interregional relationships initiated by the EC" (2001a: 14). All other EU 
interregional and transregional relations have been based on EU-Asia experience, as the 
EU has advanced along the interregional learning curve. This has meant that agreements 
have been replicated, structures copied and ideas exported to other regions of the world, 
such as business fora. The lessons that the EU has learnt from its interregional dealings 
with Asia, which it has taken into its other relationships, has been without doubt the most 
important implication for the EU in EU-Asia interregionalism. The EU has had to adapt 
to partner capacity and ability in its external relations, and hence adjust its external 
policies accordingly, as it did by creating ASEM after ASEAN. Through interacting with 
ASEAN the EU has also gained valuable interregional negotiating skills and know-how. 
Another implication of the relationship for the EU has come through the partner 
resistance to regional integration and the partner inability, and lack of willingness, to act 
and define itself as one region. As interregional ism with the Asian region has slowed and 
failed to produce the desired results, the EU has been forced to alter its strategies for 
engaging the region. Through the economic balancing and bandwagoning motivations the 
EU has had to find alternative channels through which to interact, which has meant 
opening the door to increased bilateralism. 
in terms of the global system, the principal implications of EU-Asian interregionalism 
relate to the interaction between two major world regions, two of the three components of 
the global triad. Firstly, as EU-Asia trans/interregionalism has been predominantly 
motivated by balancing and bandwagoning there has been an impact on global economic 
balancing and bandwagoning. As the EU has tried to balance and bandwagon its relations 
with Asia, principally in relation to US overtures towards the region, the US has itself 
responded. Also important is the impact that the Asian desire to balance has had, not only 
on the US, but also on other EU partner regions such as Latin America and Africa. 
Increased EU-Asia activity has spurred these regions to seek to intensify their own 
relations with the EU. This all forms part of the strategic international environment where 
actors are constantly vying for advantage and openings hence EU-Asia interregionalism 
has played, and continues to play, a part in this environment. As EU-Asia relations have 
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not been heavily institutionaliscd there has been no noticeable impact on olobal L- 
governance structures or mechanisms. The lack of concerted joint positions and 
consultation has also led to a lack of impacts in the field of' 
'joint 
activity In the 
multilateral arena. 
The second rmkjor impact on the global system relates to the impact that EU-ASEAN 
relations has had on ASEAN and to some extent EU, actorness. To a large extent 
interaction with the EU has helped ASEAN create itself as an international actor, albeit 
not in the EU's image. As Rbland notes, EU-ASEAN relations "helpetl both 
ol-ganisations develop actoi-ness ("'(I gain sti-lictiti-e as intei-national pla. vei-s " (200 1 a: 16). 
ASEAN has become an important international actor with its own expanding network of 
external relations and FTAs. The ASEAN website section on external relations reveals 
that it has relations with thirteen countries and groups, aside from the EU 
(http: //www. aseaiisec. org/4918. htiii, accessed 17 July 2007). 
EU-Asia interregionalism has had important implications for the EU, the Asian region 
and the international system, although clearly not as many as interregional theory and EU 
interregional strategy would expect. The EU strategy of i riterregional 1 sill in Asia has 
proved very difficult to implement and execute, especially in the key EU area of regional 
integration. This lack of desire for EU-type regional integration on behalf of the Asian 
region, notably ASEAN, has itself had important implications for both partners and the 
international systern. Having first analysed EU-Asia interregional ism due to its 'model' 
status the next region to be considered will be Africa, with whom the EU has equally 
long-standing group-group relations. 
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EU - Africa 
Mapping EU - Africa Trans/interregionalism 
Figure 2- 6 EU - Africa Trans/Interregionalism 
Transreqional 
EU - Africa Summit 
EU - ACP 
Interregional II EPAs I 
EU - SADC EU - ECOWAS 
Key Bilateral I South Africa 
SOUrcc: own Creation frOln WW\A,. CC. CLII-Olld. CLI (accessed I December 2(X)7) 
The figure above gives an overview of EU relations with Africa, simplifying what is the 
most complex set of relations the EU has with another world region. The first complexity 
that becomes apparent from the above table relates to the exact region under 
consideration here in this section. Whilst the term Africa will rernain, principally because 
the two transregional relationships cover the entire continent, it will not be the entirety of 
Africa that is covered at interregional and bilateral levels. For these sections only sub- 
Saharan Africa is considered because North Africa has its own specific relationships with 
the EU, ones that have different structures and different airns, Eurorned and the 
Neighbourhood Strategy. Because of North Africa's geographical proximity to the EU it 
is dealt with differently, hence both the Euromed relationship and North Africa's 
involvement in the Neighborhood Strategy will not be considered in this section. 
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The figure shows EU-African relations to have two transregional dialogues and three 
principal interregional dialogues. As was noted in the Asia section, the ELJ also has a key 
bilateral relationship, again with the largest economy in the region - in this case South 
Africa. This reinforces the view that the EU will negotiate bilaterally with the key 
economies. 
Historically Regelsberger and Alecu de Flers trace interregionalism's nascent 
manifestations back to EU - ACP relations and the Yaound6 agreements of 1963 
onwards. These first interregional, group to group. efforts were dedicated to 
i nsti tutional i sing the EU's historical links with former colonies in Africa and the 
Caribbean and were not "the exj)i-ession (ýf a genuine Ew-opeanfioi-eign policy tiesign" 
(2005: 321). The efforts were, as S6derbaum, Stalgren and Langenhove suggest "onA, 
hinitecl i-elations" (2005: 365), by which they rnean that the relationship was the 
institutionalisation of a donor-recipient relationship concerned with aid and development. 
The EU had, however, through these agreements created a group with whom to interact, 
albeit to institutionalise cooperation. Africa was only one part of this wider group, which 
interacted with the EU, with no specific group or forum of its own at the time. 
The EU was trying to group countries by their past relationship with its Member States, 
and also by their level of development so as to facilitate cooperation with them through 
one mechanism. This cooperation and contact was extended in 1975 to the ACP through 
the first Lom6 Convention. It was a privileged relationship in which ACP countries were 
able to export primary products to the EU without granting reciprocal access. This first 
relationship was "hailed as an innovative arrangement fi)r the conduct of North-South 
relations, and the management ofpolitical dialogue among countries with an evreme 
asymmetrical distribution of powei" (Farrell 2005b: 267). This first Lom6 accord 
asserted "complete equality between partners " and aimed to "establish a new model jor 
relations between developed and developing States" (http: //www. acpsec. or , accessed 
17 July 2007). This first Convention was a non-reciprocal agreement based on trade 
preferences for ACP states which aimed at "close and continuing co-operation ... trade 
co-operation ... 
developing cooperation and trade among the ACP states" 
(http: //www. acpsec-org, accessed 17 July 2007). This basic Lome agreement also put into 
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place a very advanced institutional structure, with multiple committees, a secretariat and 
a dispute settlement mechanism. The Convention has evolved over the years, with four 
further agreements coming into force. They all gave the ACP grouping increasing legal 
status and personality as well as giving a group dimension to ACP country interactions. 
The permanent structure was reinforced and adapted, and relations remained heavily 
institutionalised. The Lomd Conventions provided the EU with a single conduit for 
relations with Africa, as part of the wider ACP group. Whilst economic development was 
the basis of the Lom6 Conventions they also provided a forum for increased dialogue and 
discussion (Farrell 2005b). 
In June 2000 the Lomd Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement 39. This new 
agreement was quite a radical departure from the past, and quite a change in strategy 
from the EU. EU-Africa relations had stagnated somewhat in the 1990s, accused by some 
of "collective clientelism" (Farrell 2005b: 268), and also dropped down the order of EU 
external relations priorities. The new agreement was foreseen by the EU in its 1996 
Green Paper on EU-ACP relations which recognised that the Lomd Conventions were not 
WTO-compliant (breaching MFN status) thus requiring a change in the relationship, and 
hence in strategy by the EU. The most interesting elements in the new agreement, from 
an interregional strategy perspective, are the propositions for regional integration of ACP 
regions, namely that the EU proposed to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with created, enhanced and existing regional groups. These new EPAs would be 
reciprocal and have to comply with GATT Article XXIV40. 
The EU split the ACP into six regions: Central Africa, West Africa, Eastern & Southern 
Africa and Indian Ocean, Southern African Development Community, Pacific Region 
and Caribbean region. The new agreement was also in the form of five pillars: political 
dialogue, participation of civil society, poverty reduction, financial cooperation, 
economic and trade cooperation. The agreement notes, in Article 1, that the "Objectives 
of the Partnership" are for "sustainable development" for which "the partnership shall 
39 By this time the ACP had 77 member countries 
40 This meant that they would have to cover 90% of trade and enter into force over a period of 10 years 
91 
Ivol'ide a collerent Sitl)lýol-t. f)-(iiiieit, oi-k. f'ot- the develolmient swategies adolned by each 
ACP Stale" (http: //www. acpsec. or,,,, accessed 27 July 2006). Article 2 on the 
"Fundamental Pi-incij)les" states the fourth principle to be "diffil-entiation and '. 
je 
I-egionalisatioll: (, Ool)ei, (Itl . oil tit-l-tingellients and 1)1-101-ities S/11111 val-Y accol-ding to a 
ptianet-'s level oftlevelopment, its needs, its I)eifioi-inance and its long-tei-in development 
sti'ategy. Pat-ticidat- emphasis shall be placed oil the i-egion(d diniension " Odern. ). The 
EU is currently negotiating the EPAs with the six groups that it identified, as non- 
reciprocal trade preferences expired on I January 2008. Also of key interest the Green 
Paper explicitly stated that negotiating bilateral agreements was possible with "Ivilling 
single ACP counti-ies which ai-e outside tiny i-egional integiwtion Iwocess and ai-e lat-ge 
and capable enough, and pi-ovided that political contlitions ai-e right "( 1996d: 66). The 
EU also made specific reference to "diflýi-entiation undet- a single. 111nneivoi-k- (idern), 
highlighting the flexible nature of its strategy. The EU was stating that it would consider 
dealing bilaterally with the few states large enough (economically and politically) to do 
so, and that for the others it would interact with newly created or existing regional groups. 
The Cotonou Agreement currently serves as a broad umbrella, of sorts, for relations with 
ACP mernbers. In the diagram at the start of the section it is placed as between 
interregional and transregional for the African region because of its wide membership 
and wide-ranging activities. The EU has, however, initiated a more specific umbrella 
relationship with Africa via its relationship with the African Union (AU). The AU was 
created in 2000 with its own wide-ranging aims designed to promote African integration 
and cooperation. In a letter of support frorn the European Commission, President Prodi 
noted "by its veq natui-e the European Commission understands the common vision and 
values that will guide the A U" and that the EU was willing "to develop and strengthen its 
political dialogue with A. 1rica as a whole 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/developnient/Geo. graphical/RegionsCountries/EUAfrica en. cfm, 
accessed 27 July 2006). Further to this the EU offered institutional support to the whole 
AU project. Mr. Theodorakis, acting Director-General to the South African Heads of 
Mission of EU, noted that "with the establishment qfthe African Union ... we 
have indeed 
a stronger partner to talk to and more concrete programmes to discuss ". Indeed in 
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surnmarising why the EU continued to invest such political capital and will in the AU Mr 
Theodorakis noted: 
"Deepening supranational Integration is a necessit, jor A. 11-1ca. Strong, solid regional 
organisations are the best response to cope with the globalisation and inarginalization 
process. With a renewed capacity and lessfinancial constraints, the AU can become the 
motor of Aftica's integration and the continent's voice to the rest (? f the worhl" 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/developiiient/Geoýl,, raphical/Re(, lioiisCouiitri-es/EUAfrlcýi en. cI'm, 
accessed 27 July 2006). 
The EU established its relations with the AU after the first Africa-Europe Summit in 
200041 , an event which 
had witnessed the first occasion that all African and European 
leaders had met together in a specific and tailor-made foruni. The Cairo declaration that 
accompanied the Summit opened with the view that: 
"Over the centuries, ties have existed between A i-ica and Europe, which have led to j/ 
many areas of co-operation, covering political, economic, social, as we/I (is cultural and 
linguistic domains. These have developed oil the basis of shared values (ýfstrengthening 
representative and participatot?, democracY, respect fi)r hunian rights and fundamental 
fteedoms, the rule (ýf law, good governance, pluralism, international peace and security, 
political stability and confidence aniong nations. In the light of the current rapid 
globalisation trend, we are determined to strengthen this co-operation in our mutual 
interest and make it more beneficial to the two regions " 
(http: //europa-eu. int/comni/clevelopiiient/body/eu africa/docs/cairo declai-ation en. pdf#z 
oom= 100, accessed 27 July 2006). 
The first page of the declaration continues with: "We sti-ess the impol-tance of regional 
economic co-operation and integration as an efficient strategyfor the ortlei-1), and co- 
coortfinated development of the African continent. We recognise the important 
interrelation between political stabilio,, peace and securitY on one hantl and regional 
4' This was organised with the AU's predecessor the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
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integration on the other" (idem. ). There was an important role for regional integration in 
Africa as "regional integration can be an important step towards beneficial participation 
in the world economy" (idem. ). This statement was consistent with the approach being 
advocated in the Cotonou Agreement with the EPAs, although the question of whose 
model of integration is an important one. 
The Summit created an institutional structure through which to manage and coordinate 
relations, based on Heads of State summits, ministerial meetings and senior official 
meetingS42 . The EU stressed that relations should 
be in smaller groups, allow for more 
flexible and ad-hoc groupings and also involve more NGO and civil society input. Whilst 
the planned second Summit, in 2003, did not take place, due to political problems 
surrounding Zimbabwe, EU relations with Africa continued through regular contact with 
the AU. Transregional relations are thus conducted through the AU although the Africa- 
Europe Summit offers a further possibility should certain issues be resolved. 
As the Cotonou Agreement foresaw the break-up of the ACP group and the creation of 
regional groups that the EU could negotiate EPAs with, the EU has focused on the AU 
for its over-arching and political discussions. This strategic choice of negotiating with 
regional groups is represented for Africa in the table, at the start of the section, by 
ECOWAS and SADC at the interregional level. The interregional part of this table will 
soon swell to include all four African groups with which the EU will conclude EPAS43. 
The groups that the EU is interacting with in Africa44 are West Africa (ECOWAS and 
Mauritania), Central Africa (CEMAC and Sdo Tome), East South Africa and Southern 
Africa (SADC). 
For this thesis, however, only SADC and ECOWAS, as they are Africa's two most 
advanced regional groups, pre-existing, and also the longest serving partners of the EU, 
will be assessed. 
42 As relations are not as advanced as with the Asian region there 
is, as yet, no infrastructure chart to refer 
to 
43 All relations will be pure interregional as through EPAs the EU necessitates customs unions as partners 
44 Only one of these technically pre-existed as a regional group - SADC. For both ECOWAS and CEMAC 
the EU used existing groups as a basis, and with the East 
South African region it simply created a group 
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The EU engaged in relations with SADC in 1994, making this the main interregional 
relationship that the EU has within the African region. Relations are based on regular 
meetings and pro ects L- j that cover trade and 
development, security, environment and other 
cooperation measures typical of the EU's sub-regional strategy in Africa. This 
relationship itself airns at 'Weej)et- i-egion(d economic coolwi-ation antl intep-ation on the 
basis qf balance, equity (III(/ benelit 
(http: //europa. eu. i nUcoiiiiii/developiiieiiUbody/i-e,,, ioii/docs/r7-eii. pdf#zooiii= 100, 
accessed 27 July 2006). It is important to note that SADC is one of the six groups from 
the split ACP group. The second regional group with which the EU has had previous sub- 
regional contact is ECOWAS. The EU is also negotiating an EPA with ECOWAS and as 
Pascal Lamy put it at the opening of negotiations in 2003, "the main ob ect*ve (? 1'an L- jI 
Economic Pat-fliet-shil) Agreement is .... vIII)I)oi-ting the ci-eation (#*a real i-egional market 
mid organil-ing its intei-action with the i'est Of' the wol-W " 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/archives/coiiiiiiission 1999 2004/laiiiy/speeches-articies/splai94 en 
. 
htrn, accessed 27 July 2006). 
Also of key strategic importance, as noted from the figure at the start of the section, is the 
bilateral relationship that the EU has with South Africa. Indeed in 1999 the EU signed the 
'Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation' (TDCA) with South Africa 45 . 
Through the signing of this agreement the EU made clear its choice to cement relations 
with its main economic and political partner in the region on a bilateral level. This 
development was foreseen by the 1996 Green Paper and also by developments towards 
bilateralism in EU interregional strategy in Asia. As soon as the EU had decided to 
dismantle the Lom6 framework and reinvent relations with Africa, it duly opened 
bilateral F-fA talks with South Africa. This was not without its complications as South 
Africa was part of the South African Customs Union (SACU) along with Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. It is also interesting to note that at the time the US was 
not in the process of looking to sign an F-FA with South Africa, only opening its 
negotiations with SACU in 2002. In June 2006 the Commission proposed enhancing 
relations with South Africa even further, to a Strategic Partnership whereby cooperation 
This Agreement carne into forcc I January 2WO 
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would be stepped up to a higher level. Indeed EU Commissioner for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, said: 
"Ettrope anel South Africa both agree on many international issites. Together we promote, 
fin- instance, peace, gooel governance antl regional integration through the A. Iricall U111oll. 
This strategic partnership between the EU an(I South Africa will allow its to work even 
more closely together tit regional, continental an(I global levels to support A. Irica meet its 
tievelopment goals " 
(http: //europa. eu. inUrapid/liressRelezise,, Actioii. do'? refereiicc=IP/06/869&1'oriiiýit=HTM L 
&aged=O&language=EN, accessed 30 July 2007). 
This move to bilateral relations with South Africa went against the EU strategy of 
regional integration that the EU was embarking on in Africa, but remains Consistent with 
the EU's strategic policy of signing bilateral agreements with important partners. It is 
also possible to note that there are the same key elements of interregional theory in the 
Commission official's quote above, but in this case in relation to bilateral relations. This 
fact shows that Commission goals and ambitions in its external relations are quite similar 
irrespective of the strategy used, be it interregional or bilateral. 
This section on interregionalism in Africa has noted the diversification of relations over 
the last ten years. From a single highly institutionalised relationship that was concerned 
principally with economic aid and that included Africa with other regions of the world, 
the EU has moved towards a very different approach. The EU has focused its strategy on 
regional integration, citing WTO conformity, in splitting the ACP group into smaller 
regional entities with which to conclude EPAs. The emphasis of the EPAs is on both 
regional integration and economics. At the same time the EU has forged links with Africa 
through the AU, but on a more over-arching and political level. Finally the EU has shown 
a strategic willingness to pick off the key partner in the region and deal bilaterally with 
them. The key features of the EU's trans- and interregional strategy can be surninarised in 
the figure below: 
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Figure 2- 7 Key Features of EU - Africa Trans/Interregionalism 
1. Emphasis on diversified relations -especially from mid-1990s 
2. Move from institutional i sed to less institutional i sed relations 
3. Relationships bedded within rules of multilateralism 
4. Increasing inclusion of normative values as aims e. g. democracy, good 
governance 
5. Partner creation common - especially for economic relations 
6. Very strong emphasis/support/pushing of regional integration 
7. Original 'partner' and some subsequent regional groups created by EU 
8. Trade and development the core of relations 
9. Transregional relationship created after interregional relationships - to serve 
different needs 
10. Driven by Summits, ministerial, ambassadorial and senior official levels 
11. Willingness to negotiate/cooperate bilaterally with special partner states 
Sourcc: Own Crcation 
Explaining EU - Africa Trans/Interregionalism 
The motivations behind EU interregionalism in Africa can principally be determined by 
analysing the shift in relations from those with the ACP group, hence not just Africa but a 
4 
wider group, to the creation of the EPA s ", and also specific relations with the AU. Both 
EU - Africa specific trans- and interregionalism are relatively late developments. It is 
also true, as noted in the last section, that interregional relations between the EU and 
Africa are somewhat more difficult to assess given the complicated and multifaceted 
nature of the issues at stake, and the countries involved. 
The first interregional relationship that the EU developed, that included Africa, was 
through the ACP grouping via the Yaound6, Lom6, and then Cotonou Agreements. This 
relationship was not specific to Africa as it included Caribbean and Pacific countries too. 
Hurt surm-narised that "the two YaowW Conventions were essentiallY a continuation of 
post-colonial relations" (2003: 161), of which the main discernable aim was to govern 
Four of the EPAs concern African regions 
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commercial relations. Farrell noted that, "the earlier phase of EU-Africa relations was 
initiated because certain member states wished to retain fortnal links with jonner 
colonial dependencies in order to ensure continued access to raw materials and natural 
resources, and to protect economic investments already made" (2005b: 265). These were 
trade and aid agreements and they moved to a form of institutionalised European support 
for preferential treatment of ACP countries. 
This early partnership with the EU was. characterised by the EU granting non-reciprocal 
benefits for ACP trade. The EU also promoted programs such as the STABEX system, 
which stabilized export receipts on agricultural products, as part of an active development 
agenda. To administer these agreements there was a need for a strong and rigid 
institutional structure which gave the relations a robust nature. Through time, and with 
renegotiations, the EU added many more elements to the agreements, in areas such as 
human rights, democracy, environmental protection and women's rights. These extended 
agreements developed a wide and broad structure that retained the essence of a 
'partnership'. Farrell suggests that "cooperation is necessary and desirable not merely in 
the pursuit of self-interest but as part of a wider agenda for peace, justice and equality, 
where power and politics are supplanted by an institutional framework to support 
dialogue and enhance the achievement of core values, including democracy and the rule 
of law" (2005b: 264). In essence the EU had created a mixed structure for long term 
dialogue and cooperation based essentially on soft power, and not on ad-hoc coalitions. 
These agreements were motivated by an EU desire to institutional i se longer term 
relations with ex-colonies. It needs to be noted that the relationship between the EU and 
the ACP grouping was always extremely asymmetrical, such that the EU was the driving 
force in relations. Through this large grouping the EU had rationalised its external 
relations with a significant number of ex-colonies and other developing countries. The 
EU created a partner, of sorts, with which it could deal in one forum. It subsequently 
started to use this forum to export its own values to its partner, such as democracy and the 
rule of law as noted by Farrell (idem. ). 
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From a specifically African perspective the agreements offered trade and aid provisions 
that were crucial to their economies. The EU is the main trade partner of African 
members of the ACP group, and as such access to its market was paramount for many 
members. The structured ACP agreements gave African exporters programmes, support 
and longer term security. ACP countries wanted to ensure that their preferences and 
access to EU markets was better than that of non-ACP member regions such as Latin 
America and Asia. The ACP forum also allowed them a privileged position for political 
discourse with the EU. Whilst the relationship might have been asymmetrical in power 
terms, ACP countries did have a lot to gain from it, and once initiated, their interests 
turned as much towards defending acquired rights and preferences, as to gaining new 
ones. They wanted to ensure that they retained special access to their key export market, 
ahead of competitors, as well as maintaining aid flows and political access. 
In the 1990s the EU-ACP relationship stagnated, as it became less of an EU priority. 
Then, after external pressure, the EU Green Paper on EU-ACP relations in 1996 
recognised that the ACP agreements were not in compliance with WTO rules. As a 
response to this the EU initiated the Cotonou Agreement, dropping non-reciprocity and 
proposing regional integration among several ACP groups. This EU move effectively 
undid the ACP as a group, replacing it with a much neater regional approach. Regional 
integration has always been supported and advocated by the EU in its relations with the 
ACP, but now it became the focal point of a new differentiated EU approach. Having 
dissected the large group, with which it had interacted, the EU was now motivated by 
reciprocal interaction with a number of smaller groups. The EU explicitly and actively 
sought to encourage regional integration in African regions, but as Hurt notes; "the 
history of regional integration projects within the ACP group, especially in Africa, is one 
of consistent failure to achieve meaningful integration and development" (2003: 173). 
This highlights the size of the task facing the EU, especially given the fact that they have 
to be signed within such a short time frame. 
The EU motivations for fostering regional integration in the African region are overt and 
clear, but they have come under increasing scrutiny and comment, most of which has not 
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been positive. ActionAid has suggested that EPAs are "narrow free trade agreements 
that seek to force open the markets of ACP countries to European goods and services" 
(2005: 7). This duality of regional integration and market access is at the very core of EU 
African relations and as such forms the backbone of EU policy towards the region. From 
an EU perspective the message is one of nesting within VVTO criteria of reciprocity, 
which is not widely accepted by African partners. Farrell echoes this view saying "EU 
policy towards Africa is strongly realist in tone" (2005: 279). It would, however, be 
short-sighted to overlook the political motivations of EU actions in Africa as Hurt notes, 
the EU has "a desire to influence and shape the political systems and policies of ACP 
states ... the EPAs ... represent a noticeable shift towards a more overt and politicized 
relationship" (2003: 174). 
From an African perspective it is important to maintain relations with the EU, and to try 
and preserve as much 'special' advantage as is possible under a reciprocal agreement. 
Their key motivation is based purely on a need to stay as close to the EU as possible. 
Even bearing this in mind many African governments have voiced concerns over the 
EPA process, voicing a difference of opinion over the true nature and benefits of EPAs. 
In Hurt's opinion "these are externally imposed (groups) and do not in most cases 
correspond to existing regional organisations. This may weaken the control ACP states 
have over their own integration process" (2003: 173). The EU priority for regional 
integration is not aimed at coherent or even pre-existing groups, which highlights the 
difficulties involved for African countries in trying to artificially integrate with 
neighbours to cement relations with the EU. Given the inherent asymmetry in the 
relationship between Africa and the EU the interregionalism that is being created is 
exclusively down to the motivations of the EU, and its insistence on dealing with regional 
groups. Even where there are existing regional groupings their levels of integration and 
coherence often leave a lot to be desired, hence the EU, whilst slightly altering the 
groupings themselves, is also pushing their integration agendas well beyond anything that 
existed before. As Ravenhill notes 'few ACP governments perceived significant benefit 
in the EU proposals - it was more a matter of having to accept an unpalatable 
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alternativejOrced on thein bY the power asYninietries in the relationship" (2002: 17). 
ActionAid has been more critical in their analysis of EU motivations towards regional 
integration, suggesting that "the cmiliguration (#' the regional groupings has causetl 
signýficant strain on the ACP antl has threatenetl existing regional proJects. Furthermore, 
ciii-i-ent plans inean anY tiecision to protect a particular sector ofthe econoniYftoinjidl- 
scale liberalisation must be taken (it the regional level " (2005: 15). 
EU interaction with the AU, on the other hand, is that of interaction with a genuine 
African organisation. EU motivation was clearly stated by Mr. Theodorakis when he 
noted that the AU had the potential to speak with one voice for Africa. The African 
Union has an extended institutional structure consisting of a pan-African Parliament, 
Commission, Council of Ministers, Permanent Representatives Committee, Court of 
Justice, Peace and Security Council and Financial Institutions. Its long term aim is a form 
of United States of Africa, through political integration, and it aims to build this via 
existing regional structures (www. africa-union. org , accessed 12 November 2005). It is 
clear to see how and where the EU can, and would wish to help with this ambitious 
project. 
In terms of rationalizing its external relations and finding a forum for discussion of 
transregional issues, relations with the AU offer an umbrella organisation much like 
ASEM in relations with Asia. Because the ACP was no longer a viable forum and EPA 
negotiations deal with sub-regions only, the AU offered a pan-African grouping with 
which to interact. The EU had originally created the Europe-Africa Summit, in 2000, to 
serve this purpose, but the creation and presence of the AU meant that it could be 
complemented. The EU motivation in relations with the AU has thus been to support the 
nascent institution in any way open to it so as to help the AU establish itself as a serious 
and important forum for African affairs, and hence a partner for the EU. On the reverse 
side AU motivation for relations with the EU are equally clear. It is an opportunity to 
enhance dialogue with the region's largest trading, investment, aid and political partner 
on a wide range of issues. The institutional support from the EU is very important as the 
organisation seeks to establish itself. Also the very fact of having a dialogue with the EU 
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forces the AU to develop, as well as having important prestige enhancing effects, so both 
EU and AU motivations combine very well for transregionalism to flourish between the 
EU and Africa. 
Evaluating EU - Africa Trans/Interregi onal ism 
This section will address the implications of EU-Africa interregionalism principally for 
Africa, but also for the EU itself, and finally for the global system. Whilst the EU-ACP 
relationship needs to be classified as a form of hybrid trans/interregionalism due to its 
very idiosyncratic structure and aims, this section will concentrate mostly on the Africa 
specific developments that came with the differentiation of EU policy in the 1990s, and 
the creation of EPAs. The development of "EU-Africa relations [has] long been 
characterised by an institutional framework for cooperation" (Farrell 2005: 265), and 
those between the EU and the ACP witnessed important changes. Of particular note is 
that through adaptation of the original Georgetown Agreement, most notably in 1992, the 
ACP group attempted to harmonise its own voice in negotiations with the EU. This 
promoted dialogue amongst ACP members as they aimed to attain greater solidarity and 
mutual understanding. These advances came as explicit, and implicit, outcomes of EU 
motivations in relations with the ACP as a group. 
Relations between the EU and the ACP became increasingly complex as the issues at 
stake multiplied. ACP exporters had been vying for EU market share with other world 
regions, many becoming dependent on their tariff advantages. This issue spilled over 
from EU external relations into the WTO arena as ACP countries fought tariff erosion 
under WTO dispute settlements. A renegotiation of their preferential access has 
extremely important implications for relations between the EU and Africa, for ACP 
countries' econon-des and also within the auspices of the WTO. The implications of the 
EU-ACP interregional relationship have been important for Africa, but it is without doubt 
the change in EU policy in the 1990s, towards EPAs and the AU, that has had the most 
striking implications for Africa. 
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EPA negotiations have proved to be very controversial, creating one immediate 
implication which is the increased role of civil society and dialogue in EU-Africa 
interregionalism. The move to EPAs has engaged political elites, industry and 
increasingly wider civil society in a way never seen before. ActionAid has criticised the 
process as "deeply flawed by the imbalance in political power and negotiating capacity 
between unequal partners. Overall, democracy is weakened by an approach that seeks to 
prevent African, Caribbean and Pacific governments from choosing their own 
development strategies" (2005: 9). In suggesting that the EPA process has reduced 
democracy in African countries ActionAid touches on a key implication of EU-Africa 
interregionalism, that of regional integration. The implication of, what was essentially, 
the EU's choice of partner groups in Africa once the ACP group was be broken up, is 
extremely important on many levels for all African nations, now and into the future. 
Both SADC and ECOWAS were existing regional groups, but the other two African 
groups were not fully coherent pre-existing entities, and are thus having to take on new 
countries to be able to negotiate with the EU. All groups have faced the issue of 
increasing their own levels of integration and institutional capacity to be able to negotiate. 
The debate about EPAs and regional integration has been extremely complex and this 
section can not address directly, or sufficiently, such a large debate. If, however, as EPA 
negotiations advance and the regional groups take shape, then a crucial implication of EU 
interregional policy in Africa will have been to create new, stronger and deeper regional 
organisations. Whilst primarily created to interact with the EU, these groups will 
subsequently be able to interact with other external actors. This is an important 
implication not only for themselves and the African regions, but also for the global 
system. The creation of the EPAs is in stark contrast to Asia's rejection of regional 
integration, highlighting the importance of the power balance in EU relations with 
partners. In the case where power asymmetry favours the EU the most it has been able to 
implement its strategy of regional integration. 
Before an EPA can be finalised with the EU the regional grouping will have to advance 
its own integration through consensus. The group would also, in essence, need to become 
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a customs union and have an effective internal free trade area. EPAs, however, have a 
further important implication which is that "the EU has established the channels through 
which it can convey its values, priorities and even special interests " (Farrell 2005: 270- 1). 
Given the EU influence in the formation and creation of the EPAs with African groups, 
they will necessarily carry more EU values, norms, practices and standards than would 
otherwise have been the case. Whether an implication of this would be greater regional 
peace and prosperity remains to be seen. All EU interregional agreements with African 
nations have also had wide agendas which over time have come to include democracy, 
the rule of law, good governance and human rights. There have, however, been no 
discernable impacts of the addition of these clauses. 
Having noted the important political and economic implications of EU interregionalism 
for Africa, principally through the vehicle of regional integration that the EU has used, a 
final mention needs to be reserved for relations with the AU. The transregional level of 
relations has been a novel forum for all Heads of State of Africa and Europe to dialogue. 
The support the EU has given, and is giving, to the AU is important as it tries to get off 
its feet as an organisation. The EU gives the AU an important external partner with whom 
to interact and thus help define and organise itself. Overall EU support for, and 
interaction with, the AU has helped bolster it as an organisation which in turn impacts of 
the AU's relations with all third parties and also its own presence and operation within 
Africa. 
The main implications of relations with Africa for the EU are related mostly to how the 
EU had to differentiate its relations with the region in the 1990s. The EU faced 
challenges to the ACP regime, the impact of which was felt directly within the EU, 
forcing it to make significant changes to the way it approached and dealt with Africa. The 
EU, in creating a new strategy for Africa, had the problem of trying to deal with a 
continent at a vastly different stage of development from itself, with the implied 
asymmetry of power this has brought, all within the confines of WTO rules. Given the 
EU's historical links with the continent and heavy political relations the task was not easy, 
especially given the EU priority to rationalise its external relations. 
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Further implications for the EU of its relations with Africa relate principally to the WTO. 
Firstly the EU has had to nest its relations with the ACP within the WTO framework, and 
secondly it has had to deal with a number of WTO dispute settlement cases with African 
countries over commodity based issues, both of which have required changes within EU 
strategy and implementation. These changes have necessitated a considerable rethink of 
EU relations with Africa and the new strategy towards the regions, with EPAs at the core, 
has been the strategic response. 
EU-African trans/interregionalism has had some impact for US-African and Asia-African 
relations, although not on an important scale. For the US Africa is relatively low in its 
external relations priorities, except for aid donations and commodities so EU strategy has 
had little impact. Likewise Asian relations with Africa have not been noticeably impacted 
by the EU's Africa strategy, although China has employed a far more direct and offensive 
strategy of its own, linked to certain key commodities, but this appears to be independent 
of EU activities in the region. 
The EU's interregional and transregional strategy towards Africa has been very much the 
same as that used for Asia. In many areas it has had the same problems of 
implementation and resistance from African regional 
- 
groups, such as rationalising and 
agenda-setting. The one difference that stands out is Africa's inability to resist EU 
regional integration strategy, despite unrest and dissenting voices, which has led to the 
creation of four EPA regional groups. Asia, on the other hand, rejected the EU 'model' of 
regional integration in favour of its own methods and based on its own values. 
in terms of the global system EU-African interregionalism has had some very important 
implications. These were touched upon in the section on the main implications for Africa 
when regional integration was discussed and relate to the consequences of the creation of 
EPAs as solid regional groupings. This will affect not only the EU-Africa landscape, but 
also the intra-African landscape and the global environment. If the regional groupings 
prove to be robust enough to interact meaningfully with the EU then they will seek to 
interact with each other and the wider global environment, which will be an important 
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impact. A further important element to note is that changing EU-Mrica relations have I- I- 
had implications for other regions of the world that compete with African nations for EU 
market share. 
EU - Latin America 
Mapping EU - Latin America Trans/Interregionalism 
Figure 2- 8 EU - Latin America Trans/Interregionalism 
Transre-qional EU - LAC 
EU - Rio G nu p 
Interre-Wonal 
EU - Mercosur EU - AC 
EU - CACM 
Key Bilateral Mexico Brazil Chile 
Source: Own Crcation from \ý ýý ý\. cc. curopaxu (accesscd I Deccnibcr 2(X)7) 
This section will look at EU - Latin American relations, although this will be analysed in 
more detail in the next chapter. It will draw out the key interregional elements of relations 
between the EU and Latin Arnerica, and highlight the structures in place to achieve the 
interregional ainis. The table above highlights the extent and nature of trans/interregional 
activity in Latin America, with one key transregional relationship and four interregional 
ones. It also shows, as with Asia and Africa, key bilateral relationships, in this case with 
Mexico, Brazil and Chile. An interesting difference between this and EU relations with 
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Asia and Africa is that the EU does not have the most advanced bilateral relations in the 
region with the most influential country, Brazil. In Latin America the most advanced 
relationship is that with Chile. 
It was not until 1994 that the EU decided to address Latin America strategically 47 with its 
'Basic Document on relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean' 
which greatly redefined relations (Council 1994c). The EU proposed an original approach 
towards the region, with a noted emphasis on sub-regions and specific countries such as 
Mercosur, Mexico and Chile. "In a significant shift of policy, the EU decided to move 
towards some form of associated status with Mexico, Chile and Mercosur. Hitherto 
associated status had been reservedfor those states that eitherfor historical reasons (ex- 
colonial states of the Lome Conventions) or political reasons (the near abroad of East 
and South Europe) had been considered of top foreign policy priority status for tile EV 
(Peterson & Sjursen 1998: 161). This move towards associated status with Latin 
American groups and countries was part of a wider EU drive to deepen many of its 
external relations around the world, as witnessed in Asia and Africa. 
The 1994 document spelt out that relations between the EU and Latin America already 
took place at three key levels; Sub-continental - Rio Group, Sub-regional - San Josd and 
Bilateral - Mexico and Chile (Council 1994c: 3). These distinctions between levels were 
always present in EU relations with world regions, as seen in Asia and Africa, but they 
were much more developed in the case of Latin America. An important element of this is 
that EU relations in Latin America were based on existing regional and sub-regional 
groups, which was not the case in Asia and Africa. The 1994 report went on to note that 
"needless to say a Union strategy aimed at strengthening relations with Mercosur, 
Mexico and other Latin American regions cannot be seen as an alternative to tile 
dialogue with the Rio Group. It should instead be considered as a means of deepening 
and extending that dialogue, within which the Community's interests demand that it 
recognise and take account of regional specificities" (1994c: 4). Whilst the EU was 
47 The reasons why the EU did not approach Latin America in a strategic fashion until this date will be 
explained in the historical section of the next chapter 
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calling for diversification in its relations with Latin America, at this specific point in time 
the EU was focusing on the Rio Group as the main conduit for relations with the region, 
acting as an umbrella over all the relations with Rio Group members. The Rio Group had 
formed in 1986 as a high level political forum to discuss key regional issues in Latin 
America and the EU started political dialogue with the Rio Group in 1990 through the 
Declaration of Rome. The basis of relations was an annual ministerial meeting to discuss 
common issues of interest. Political relations were also active via Interparliamentary 
meetings, since 1974, and also through the San Josd dialogue that started in 1984. 
In 1995 the Commission published its Communication 'The European Community and 
Latin America: The Present Situation and Prospects for Closer Partnership 1996-2000' 
(Commission 1995d). Through this document the Commission set out, in much clearer 
terms, its objectives for relations with Latin America. The document explicitly stated that 
"the Union must also have a presence in the world's emerging regions, of which Latin 
America is one" (Commission 1995d: 4). The timing of this Communication has a close 
link to the Commission's 'New Asia Strategy', which was published in 1994 
(Commission 1994b), reinforcing its attempts to engage the world's emerging regions. To 
increase its presence in Latin America the EU dissects the region group by group and 
country by country to state its objectives and aims for the future, under the title of "a 
regional and country-based approach to relations between two regions" (Commission 
1995b: 9). It then singles out Mercosur (need to sign an interregional agreement), Mexico 
(more formal contractual relationship) and Chile (broader relations). Under the heading 
d'suggested strategy" the EU then outlines the need for an "approach that is not only 
tailored to the various regional institutions but consolidates the overall dialogue (Rio 
Group) andfacilitates the subcontinent's increasing integration" (Commission 1995b: 
12). The EU then specifies that this approach will be "regional (Andean countries, 
Central America, Mercosur) or country-based (Mexico, Chile) " (idem: 12). The priority 
aims of this flexible new approach were gauged as being; institutional support, 
democracy, combating poverty, improving international competitiveness and trade 
cooperation. It is also important to note how the EU was tailoring its approach to the 
existing institutional structures in place in the region, whilst simultaneously weighting 
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importance to partners, an approach that shows the full weight of the EU strategy of 
differentiation. 
The EU had already signed a Cooperation Agreement with the Andean Pact in 1983 and 
with CACM in 1985. It had also negotiated a framework Cooperation Agreement with 
Chile in 1990 and Mexico in 1991. Cooperation with CACM evolved to a second 
generation framework cooperation agreement in 1993 and with the Andeans to a third 
generation framework agreement in 1993. The EU also had an inter-institutional 
agreement with Mercosur from 1992 and an interregional cooperation framework 
agreement with them from 1995. These agreements all held a broadly similar structure in 
that they were based on regular meetings at the highest level, by ministerial meetings and 
senior officials meetings. The aims of the agreements were for regular political dialogue, 
closer consultation on multilateral issues, co-ordination in relevant organisations and 
joint international initiatives. All the agreements also had increasingly important trade 
aspects. 
In essence the EU was emphasizing what it had already started -a differentiated 
approach to the region, based on and because of, existing entities in the region. As an 
example the Framework Agreement on Cooperation of 1993 48 with the Andean Pact 
noted a "mutual interest in the establishment of cooperation in a number of sectors, and 
in particular those of economic cooperation, trade cooperation and development 
cooperation " and also the aim to "consolidate, deepen and diversify relations" (1998: 1). 
It also highlighted "their mutual wish to encourage the development of regional 
organisations aimed at promoting economic growth and social progress" (idem. ). The 
first ten Articles of the agreement are comprised of solely commercial and trade issues, 
before then moving into areas for joint cooperation, within which article 26 concerns 
"Regional Integration and Cooperation" specifically (1998: 8). 
48 Due to lengthy ratification procedures the Cooperation Agreement did not come into force until April 
1998 
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In 1999 the Commission published a further strategy document for Latin America entitled 
'A new European Union - Latin America partnership on the eve of the 21" century' 
(Commission 1999), which aimed to continue the work of the 1995 document. This later 
document highlighted the three pillars of relations with Latin America as 
political/strategic, economic/trade and cooperation. The aims of the EU in these three 
areas were (respectively) to "establish a mutually advantageous strategic partnership", 
"integration ... into the global economy" and finally to "maritnize the impact of 
Community resources" (1999: 4). These three pillars were by now standard EU practice 
in creating comprehensive agreements, and they were employed across all levels of EU 
relations with Latin America. The 1999 strategy document strengthened the commitment 
to the three-level approach of the 1995 document by again directly addressing each 
region and country in turn. Of the "challenges of the 21s' century" faced by Latin 
America the EU highlighted: democracy, distribution of wealth, integration into the 
world economy and increased regional integration (1999: 7). From the basis of past 
cooperation and the identified future challenges, the EU outlined its options for the future. 
it suggested first and foremost a "Strategic Partnership" to "promote the international 
system founded on the principles of multilateralism" and also to "promote shared 
values" (1999: 8). To achieve these aims the EU confirmed the intent to interact at three 
distinct levels - the regional (Rio Group), the subregional (Mercosur, CACM and Andean 
Community) and the bilateral (Mexico and Chile). The EU outlined the underlying aims 
of such a strategy; "Internationally the EU has political and economic objectives (peace, 
security, democracy, sustainable development, market stability etc) that are much easier 
to attain with partners capable of implementing joint solutions to shared problems ... Latin 
America is such a partner" (1999: 12). In Latin America the EU did not need to create 
partners, but it recognised the need to help them further their integration to develop into 
more coherent and solid partners. 
In the latest strategy document to address Latin America, 'A Stronger Partnership 
between the European Union and Latin America', published in December 2005, the 
Commission took its strategy further forward (2005c). The document was expressly 
intended to "strengthen the partnership between the EU and Latin America" (2005c: 3) 
Ito 
along the lines of the previous strategy documents. The document feels the necessity to 
explain that "the association with Latin America is not merely a matter offact but is also 
vitalfor the interests of both regions, for both the present and thefiaure " (2005c: 4). The 
Commission spells out its intentions to continue its path of interacting with all countries 
in the region, preferably through regional integration bodies. It again reiterated a desire to 
"have genuine political dialogues which increase the influence of both regions oil the 
international scene" (2005c: 5) which it suggested be on issues of common interest, and 
specifically in the UN. In many senses the 2005 document was a continuation of the 1995 
and 1999 ones in the increasing emphasis it placed on differentiation. New areas such as 
interaction via sectoral dialogues are complemented by the EU recognition of the South 
American Community of Nations, going so far as to note "the Commission would like to 
discuss with the Latin American partners the advisability of a regional integration 
strategyfor the whole of Latin America" (2005c: 14). Whilst adding new areas and new 
suggestions, the document also showed proof of a re-evaluation and rationalization of the 
EU's external relations, particularly in the political field, in which it suggests 
"conducting a needs-based political dialogue ... (on) a restricted number of subjects" 
(2005c: 9). The change to a needs-based approach for political dialogue is an important 
step for the EU to have made as it is a break with the past desire to only interact at the 
regional level. This move is witnessed again in the document, in a novel section entitled 
"Reflecting the specific role of certain actors in the region" (2005: 17) in which the EU 
outlined the need, and desire, to strengthen their bilateral dialogue, principally with 
Brazil, stating; "The Commission proposes setting up specific political dialogues with 
certain countries in the region which play a particular role, and adjusting its cooperation 
activities accordingly" (2005: 17). This direction was confirmed in 2007 when the 
Commission published 'Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership' in which the 
Commission outlined that "Brazil has become an increasingly significant global player 
and emerged as a key interlocutor for the EU. However, until recently EU-Brazil 
dialogue has not been sufficiently exploited and carried out mainly through EU- 
Mercosur dialogue" (2007: 2). This development is a direct consequence of the inability 
of the EU and Mercosur to sign an interregional Association Agreement, an issue that 
will be taken up in more detail in the next chapters. 
III 
The 2005 Latin American strategy document addressed trade relations with the usual 
reference to "consolitlating the muffilateral ti-atling sYstcm " (2005: 11 ) whilst bolstering 
existing agreements and looking to conclude more free trade agreements. Drugs, 
dernocracy, civil society, aid, sustainable development and cooperation all take oil . 111 
increasingly important role. The EU signaled its continued support for regional 
inteuration in the region through the on-going dialogues with Mercosur, the Andean 
Community and the Central American Common Market. 
The EU identified the key levels at which it wanted to interact, and stated very specific 
objectives for these individual relationships. One important element of relations with 
Latin America that was not foreseen in the earlier strategy documents (but addressed 
explicitly in the 2005 document) was the transregional development. In 1999, the first 
Summit between Heads of State and Government between the EU and LAC was initiated 
in Rio de Janeiro. This latest forum was to show high level support for EU-LAC 
developments, aiming to "foster political, economic an(I cultural understancling between 
the two regions ill ortler to develol) a strategic I)artnershil) " 
(http: //europa. eu. inUcoi-niii/external relations/1 a/rio/su rn 06 99. htm, accessed 12 
February 2006). The specific aims stated at Rio were to "reb? loirce political 
(lialogue ... preset-ve 
democracY... sti*engthen the multilateral sYstem ... promote 
libercilisation qftrade" (idem. ). It is a high level dialogue that sets overarching objectives 
and initiatives for the two region's relations. The topics of discussion are those that 
already form the basis of sub-regional and bilateral dialogue, but through a region-wide 
forum the EU is trying to further instill these ideas. The Summit has taken place every 
two years since its inception, whilst the bi-regional group of senior officials has met on a 
more regular basis to oversee implementation of Summit initiatives. The Summits have 
become the launch pad for horizontal programs as well as for further initiatives at the 
sub-regional level, making the EU-LAC transregional process an important element of 
relations with Latin America. 
In its relations with Latin America the EU has had a balanced and relatively linear 
strategic approach as relations have developed quite clearly over time, the crux of which 
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has been the EU's desire to interact with existing regional groups, he they political or 
regional integration orientated. It has also chosen to interact bilaterally in the case of the 
two countries not belonging to any sub-regional agreement, Mexico and Chile, and also 
with Brazil in the political realm, reflecting the lack of progress with Mercosur. The EU 
has also created an over-arching trail sregi onal dialogue to discuss horizontal issues and 
, subjects, having switched from relations with the Rio Group to the wider LAC grouping. 
Through this differentiated approach the EU has built up a comprehensive set of relations 
at the interregional level, the main features of which are outlined in the figure below: 
Figure 2- 9 Key Elements of EU - Latin America Trans/Interregionallism 
1. Emphasis on diversified relations - especially from mid- I 990s 
2. Interregional relations always with existing groups - regional integration given 
heavy support 
3. All relationships within rules of multilateralism 
4. Increasing inclusion of normative values as aims e. g. democracy, good 
governance 
5. Relations with regional groups axed mostly towards economic liberalisation 
6. Created a new transregional partner 
7. Transregionalism much wider and broader issue coverage 
8. Transregional relationship created after interregional relationships - to serve 
different needs 
9. Use of a three pillar approach - Economic, Political, Cooperation 
10. Evolution to notion of balanced relations with a partner 
11. All levels driven by Summits, ministerial, ambassadorial and senior official 
levels 
12. Willingness to negotiate/cooperate bilaterally with special partner states when 
required 
Source: Own Creation 
Explaining EU - Latin America Trans/Interregionalism 
The EU has had long-standing relations with Latin America, but its strategy towards the 
region has only been clearly delineated for just over a decade. This section, like those for 
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Asia and Africa, will first consider EU motivations and then Latin American motivations 
in interregional cooperation. 
The EU's main strategic interregional drive in relations with Latin America came in the 
1990s as the first strategy document for the region as a whole was issued in 1994. Indeed 
the choice of that particular year was not without significance, as it was the year in which 
NAFFA came into effect, and also the year when the Summit of the Americas decided to 
advance with the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). It was also the year in which 
the EU published its 'New Asia Strategy' and the year before its publication on 'Free 
Trade Areas: An Appraisal'. The EU was aware of the potential of the emerging Latin 
American economy and also of the activity of its competitors, especially the US, which 
was made clear in the 1994 document. The events of 1994, mostly the US pressure, 
provided the EU with a final push to upgrade its relations with Mexico, Chile and 
Mercosur. At this stage the EU had relations with the three regional groupings in Latin 
America, as well as with the Rio Group, all of which were enhanced in the 1990s. It was, 
however, the bilateral relationships that received the initial importance, especially the one 
with Mexico. 
The EU lost significant market share in Mexico 49 after NAFrA came into effect, and as a 
consequence relations with Mexico became priority. The EU initiated negotiations with 
Mexico for a FTA that were completed in 2000. In a similar vein negotiations with Chile 
led to an FTA being signed in 2002 (months before the US signed a FrA with Chile). US 
activity was clearly the most important motivation for EU action with both Mexico and 
Chile. These cases highlight the overall EU tendency to be prone to reacting to US 
strategy in Latin America, mainly so as not to lose strategic ground and market share. 
It is not only at the bilateral level that this EU economic balancing and bandwagoning 
motivation is witnessed, because the fluctuations of negotiations between the FTAA and 
EU-Mercosur are also closely linked. As FTAA negotiations have speeded up, or slowed 
down, EU negotiations with Mercosur have followed suit, such that since FTAA talks 
49 The EU primarily lost market share to the US 
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have been derailed EU-Mercosur talks have not been able to capitalize. Whilst US 
activity in Latin America is the main motivation for the EU action, especially at the 
bilateral level, there are other motivations. 
One key supplementary motivation to the principally economic bandwagoning 
motivation is that of support for regional integration. Latin America is currently home to 
three well anchored regional integration initiatives that were born of local circumstances. 
The EU has advanced relations with all three; Mercosur, CACM and the Andean 
Community. A major EU strategic drive in these three relationships has always been 
strong support for regional integration at all levels, be it technical or institutional. Also by 
interacting, and obliging partner interaction at the interregional level, the EU has been 
forcing Latin American regional integration vehicles to solidify their positions. In this 
sense the motivation to spur and foster regional integration in Latin America, through 
interregional cooperation, has been an important EU driver in its strategic thinking and 
operations. It is equally important to note that unlike Africa and Asia, Latin America has 
encouraged the EU strategy on regional integration as it has sought to solidify its own 
regional integration. 
There is also a further important EU motivation, again linked to regional integration, but 
this time to an internal EU issue. An EU motivation in relations with Latin America was 
an attempt to produce a coherent policy for an area in which it did not have any 
overwhelming interests as part of its new global strategy. It is also important to note that 
Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986 and that their influence" impacted heavily on 
relations with Latin America. This internal dynamic, demand even, is a clear and 
important motivation for EU interaction with the region as both Spain and Portugal 
sought to increase relations with their former colonies. Both countries saw good 
opportunities to increase their influence within the EU and with the Latin American 
region through enhanced cooperation. Various commentators have also suggested that the 
EU stepped up its relations with Latin America in the 1990s in order to consolidate its 
50 Spanish and Portuguese influence on EU policy towards Latin America has come almost exclusively 
through the Council, although over time also through the Commission and Parliament 
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foreign policy capabilities and produce a more successful example of a unified position 
(Bessa-Rodrigues 1999, Barahona de Brito 2000). 
In terms of Latin Arnerica's motivations for interregional relations with the EU, the 
rapprochement to the EU has often been reflected as these countries' "tratlition of' 
seeking some extei-nal counteiii, eight to the ovei-whelining pi-esence of' theit- noi-thei-ii 
neighbout" that Laurence Whitehead (1999: 54) has observed. There is solid logic and 
econornic rationale behind this as the US and the EU are Latin America's two biggest 
economic and political partners hence its two most important allies. Interaction with the 
EU is certainly motivated by a Latin American desire to counter US strength in the region, 
a motivation that is also present in EU-Asian relations but sornewhat lacking in EU- 
African relations. This idea is best encapsulated in Valladdo's telenovela rnetaphor: "Two 
joi-eign gentlemen court the beaiitýfiil Latina (Latin Aniei-ica). One, the Eiii-opean, is an 
ohl i-ich gentleman, cultui-ed, polite and (? f delicate niannei-s, but a little slow and hesitant. 
The other, the Ainei-ican, is a Young billionaii-e, bi-ave and adventiti-ous, but lacking in 
niannei-s, and lie can be at times hat-sh antl even bi-ittal in his ways" (1999: 6). Valladdo 
continues that the belle Latina, however, has limited possibilities for manoeuvre and 
lacks the autonomy and strength to use the US-EU rivalry to her full advantage. She 
maintains, however, a position that seeks to prolong the triangular relationship, deepening 
co-operation with each partner but without reaching a situation where it may have to 
choose between one and the other ( 1999: 29). 
Latin America has thus been manipulating EU interest in the region for its own balancing 
motivations. It must be said, however, that In trade and investment terms the EU is much 
more important for Latin America than vice-versa. For Latin American countries, the EU 
is either their first, or second, trade and investment partner 51 . From a trade perspective 
one issue is very clear, that Latin America is interested in engaging with the EU to better 
the access of its main exports into the EU market: agricultural goods. The main export of 
many Latin American countries, especially the Mercosur countries, is agricultural goods 
" For more detail on the trade and investment relationships between the EU and Latin American countries 
see http: //cc. curopa. cu/coiiinVtrade/iSSLIcý, /bilatcral/i-cuioiis/lac/indcx en-hun. or Appendix 5 
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and given that the EU, as one of their major markets, is highly protectionist in this area 
negotiating with them bilaterally is an inviting possibility. 
Latin American motivations in engaging with the EU have been quite clear. Firstly Latin 
America has sought to off-set US influence in the region to diversify its external relations, 
and secondly it has sought to maintain, if not increase, its access to the important EU 
market, especially for agricultural goods. Thus Europe became an important strategic 
option for Latin America, and as Valladdo's (1999) metaphor captures, an important 
triangle was created. The US was no longer the assertive hegemonic power in the 1990s, 
but the EU was not willing to assume its global role and take a lead in the region. The 
motivation that Doctor ascribes to Mercosur is equally applicable to other regional groups 
in Latin America; "political actors saw interregionalism as a means of mitigating the 
impact of market liberalisation, enhancing the potential benefits of integration into 
global production networks ameliorating intra-regional tensions and supporting 
consolidation" (2007: 292). 
Overall EU-Latin American relations can be summarised as arising from both "a joint 
EU-Latin American interest in counterbalancing, to some degree, the strong US influence 
in the region, including the pressure to establish a pan-American free trade area" 
(Regelsberger & Alecu de Hers 2005: 333) and from an EU interest in interacting with, 
and strengthening existing regional groupings. As with Asia and Africa EU motivations 
in Latin America have been couched in a much wider and more ambitious strategy, one 
that attempts to reproduce all the potential of interregional theory as discussed in chapter 
one. 
Evaluating EU - Latin America Trans/Interregionalism 
The implications of interregionalism between Latin America and the EU, as with Africa 
and Asia, are closely linked to the motivations behind the relationships. In the case of the 
EU and Latin America the key motivation of both partners is that of economic balancing 
and bandwagoning, and both to counter US presence. This principal motivation has 
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meant that interregional relations have remained flexible, witnessed equally through 
important bilateral agreements being signed with Mexico and Chile due to parallel US 
negotations for FrAs. 
EU reluctance to take the upper-hand in relations in the region, and hence the pattern of 
the EU reacting to US strategy has led Torrent to note that there have been "successive 
tides of agreements" and he feels "this wouldjustify the criticism directed at experts and 
officials on both sides o the Atlanticfor triumphalisin in presenting each agreement as tf 
4'a decisive new step in relations "... As nearly always the excess of political rhetoric only 
generates frustration" (2001: 8). As a consequence of the flexible and relatively non- 
commital approach of the EU all interregional agreements lack clear content and precise 
economic/trade commitments. This leads Torrent to the conclusion that for interregional 
relations "EU relations with Latin America are practically meaningless" (idem. ). Whilst 
there is some validity in this conclusion, certainly not for the bilateral agreements signed 
with Chile and Mexico which are concrete FTAs, EU interregionalism in Latin America 
has had other important implications for the region. 
EU interaction with the region increased greatly, especially with the regional bodies 
which have been very much a special focus of EU strategy, witnessed by the EU holding 
joint ministerial meetings, from the mid-1990s onwards, on an annual basis with 
Mercosur and the Andean Community. This interaction has, in both explicit and implicit 
ways, impacted on Latin American regional integration. The EU has provided funding, 
support, technical assistance, training, institutional support and advice on regional 
integration issues for all Latin American initiatives. The ability to interact and negotiate 
with the EU had thus enhanced regional groups. These same factors have also meant that 
Latin American countries and groups have had increased leverage in their dealings with 
the US. 
The implications of interregional relations with Latin America for the EU have also been 
associated to balancing issues. The EU has differentiated its approach over time in 
relation to its changing internal capacity and resources as well as the external 
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circumstances, such as US activity in the region. The EU has also gained valuable 
experience of regional integration through its dealings with Latin American groups, 
especially given that Mercosur is the most advanced regional group with which the EU 
has negotiated (Interview 5). The experience that the EU has gained from negotiating 
with Mercosur in particular has proved to be very beneficial to the EU's overall 
experience of negotiating in an interregional capacity and something that has had 
spillover effects to other EU negotiations (idem. ). 
Finally, the implications for the global system relate to the fact that bolstered Latin 
American regional groups have become increasingly active and important world players, 
notably Mercosur. The two main regional groups, Mercosur and the AC, have both 
considerably increased their levels of regional integration since they started interacting 
with the EU, and have both increased their intra and extra-regional links as regional 
groups. As with Asia and Africa, all agreements signed with Latin American countries 
and groups have had impacts on relations with other countries in the world as preferences 
have been eroded or gained. 
What has been apparent, endorsing the findings of the analysis of EU relations with Asia 
and Africa, has been the fact that there have been no impacts and implications of EU 
interregional strategy in the areas of agenda-setting and rationalising. Equally as sparse 
has been evidence of institutionalisation, issues that will now be addressed in a 
comparative evaluation of EU trans/interregionalism. 
Comparative Evaluation of EU Trans/Interregionalism 
The preceding analysis has looked at the three principal regions with which the EU has 
interregional relations, notably Asia, Africa and Latin America, to assess the aims of, 
strategies for and mechanisms involved in EU interregionalism. This section will draw 
together the key elements and most salient points in a comparative analysis. This will be 
structured such that firstly some general points about interregional ism will be made 
before strategy, motivations and implications of interregionalism are all addressed in turn. 
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Firstly, through the preceding analysis, it Is possible to expand on tile (inief'rame of' EU 
interregionalism. The historical development of EU interregionalism can be summarized 
as follows: 
Figure 2- 10 Historical Development of EU Trans/Interregionalism 
agreements - I" generation 
1978-1990s Interregionafism expansion and development - existing partners - 
cooperation agreements -2 nd and 3'd generation 
Mid-1990s Height of Interregionalism - created and existing partners - interregional framework cooperation agreements/4h generation agreements - key term 
'diversification/differentiation' 
Transregionalism - newly created and existing partners - initiation of new 
transregional fora 
Source: own Creation 
The first point to highlight is related to the timing of interregionalism, where it is clear 
that the 1990s were the most active period, the period of so-called 'differentiation'. The 
concept of differentiation permeated all EU strategy documents, across all regions. From 
this point onwards existing relations with regional groups were updated, reinforced, or in 
the case of Africa, created. The objective of differentiation was to allow the EU to 
progress at different speeds and different levels with differing partners according to needs 
and circumstances, but all within one overall framework. Indeed 1994 can be identified 
as a key year for interregionalism as the EU produced a New Asia Strategy and a first 
Strategy document for Latin America, both of which were based on diversification and 
multi-pronged approaches. 
The second preliminary observation to make concerns the types of EU interre-ionalism. 
Transregionalism evolved after interregionalism and is a wider membership based forum. 
It has different aims, goals, structures and objectives and it needs to be seen, treated and 
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analysed as such. It has been noted that in all regions transregionalism plays a 
complementary role to that of interregionalism, acting as a kind of umbrella for relations 
with an entire region under which sub-regional and bilateral relations exist. The 
transregional forum offers a different dialogue between whole regions. Whilst there is a 
difference in membership and role, transregionalism serves to reinforce interregional ism, 
by emphasizing the same messages and overseeing developments in the respective 
regions. 
Having addressed these two general remarks about EU trans/interregionalism it is 
possible to move on to compare the EU's strategies of interregionalism across regions, as 
analysed in the first sections of the three regional investigations. The key conclusions that 
can be drawn from such an analysis are as follows: 
Ainis/Objectives - The aims and objectives of all EU trans/interregional activity have 
followed a very similar (if not identical) pattern across regions. Early agreements aimed 
at cooperation in mostly economic areas, since when there has been a progression in the 
aims of the agreements such that now all agreements have comprehensive aims. The most 
important development in this field has been the extension into political objectives, as all 
agreements now aspire to closer political cooperation. This has resulted in agreements 
covering a wide range of issues such as sustainable development, political, economic, and 
cultural stability, poverty alleviation, insertion into the world economy, consolidation of 
democracy, good governance, respect of multilateralism and human rights. In this sense 
the stated aims of all forms of interregionalism are extremely ambitious and wide-ranging. 
As Farrell notes, the EU has inserted what have been termed its "core values" (2005: 264) 
into all agreements and "since 1995 a human rights clause is standardfor all EU treaties 
with third countries" (2005: 275). Agreements have also moved towards 'partnerships' 
based on reciprocity and mutual understanding and benefit. Aside from this development, 
the main aims of the agreements have remained focused on trade/economic relations and 
on enhancing regional integration. The drive of the EU towards economic cooperation is 
the leitmotif of relations and is seen as such in the agreements. In a similar vein, at the 
regional level, EU support for regional integration comes to the fore as a prime strategic 
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aim of relations. The EU, in replicating interregional theory, has also set strategic 
objectives for agenda-setting, rationalising and institutionalisation. 
Structure/institutions - The structural/institutional pattern has been very standard 
across the EU's interregional relations as the EU has consistently chosen soft institutions 
and flexibility. The only heavily institutionalised relationship was with Africa, through 
the Lomd and Cotonou Agreements, but these are being replaced by the notably more 
flexible and less institutionalised EPAs and relations with the AU. The EU has preferred 
a three tiered approach to managing relations, by having Heads of State meet at least once 
every two years, ministers more regularly and senior officials even more often. Each 
relationship has a form of 'cooperation council' at ministerial level with oversight of 
relations. This council is assisted by a Joint Cooperation Council and sub-committees. 
The structure is made to be flexible and not very institutionalised, which enables relations 
to slow and speed up on an ad-hoc basis. Whilst emphasizing these key flexible facets it 
must be noted that the structures are ones that are also designed for long-term dialogue 
and cooperation, meaning that they are not simply ad-hoc structures. They are also 
structures that serve political, economic and cooperation needs as and when required. 
This makes the agreements political channels as well as negotiating channels. 
Agreement Structure/Balance - The pattern for the structure and balance of agreements 
has been homogeneous across regions as all interregional agreements have become based 
on a three-pillar approach, reflecting the comprehensive aims of the agreements. These 
pillars are political/strategic, economic/trade and cooperation. 'Me three pillars in all 
agreements across regions have similar aims and objectives, and all show a heavy balance 
axed towards the econon-dc/trade pillar, both in content and design. The political pillar is 
very similar in aims and content across agreements, whilst the cooperation pillar differs 
notably in content depending on the level of development of the partner region. The 
content of the economic pillar is a key difference as it is negotiated on a partner by 
partner basis. 
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Partner Region/Regional Integration - This is without doubt one of the most 
interesting and important elements of the EU's trans/inteffegional approach to 
international relations. The EU has sought, specifically through interregionalism, to 
interact not only with existing regional groups but also to create new ones, notably 
through the African EPAs. Farrell finds that "regional integration has become a major 
plank of EU external relations policy" (2005: 265) and by this she is referring to the 
explicit support for, and reference to, regional integration in all the interregional and 
transregional strategy documents and agreements. Regional integration is unambiguously 
supported for both hybrid and pure interregional relations. It is logical that if the EU is 
trying to interact more, as part of its differentiation policy, with sub-regional partners, 
that it needs to help solidify and support sub-regions to strengthen its partners. The main 
impediment, in all cases, to more solid and meaningful interregional relations is the EU's 
partner regions, so the EU is concentrating on 'helping' its partners. Thus all agreements 
with sub-regional groups across all regions contain explicit reference to regional 
integration as an aim and priority. Not content with simply aiming for regional 
integration, the EU strategies and agreements provide for financial, technical and 
institutional support as the EU offers its resources, services and experience. A further 
finding of relevance related to regional integration was partner region's reactions to EU 
strategy in this area. Latin America was the only region to openly solicit regional 
integration support, Asia refused regional integration overtures and Africa appears to 
have accepted EU strategy more through lack of alternatives than free choice. These 
reactions have obviously impacted on EU interregional strategy and its implications. 
Overall these above points have highlighted the key strategic features that are noticeable 
across EU interregional agreements in terms of their aims, strategy and structures. Having 
looked at these key strategic features it is now important to comparatively analyse the 
motivations for interregionalism across regions. 
Motivations - The economic balancing and bandwagoning motivation has been very 
explicit in the specific analyses of the three regions, and by far the most important 
motivation. It has to varying degrees been a prime, if not the principal, motivation for the 
123 
EU as well as for both Asia and Latin America as access to markets, defence of 
preferential access and competition with key international competitors have all been 
significant motivations within this economic balancing and bandwagoning. In many 
senses it is a form of soft balancing that has prevailed as a motivation for both the EU and 
its partner regions, as both have strived to increase their relative and absolute economic 
power. Interregional ism is an especially good tool for the EU to leverage its relative 
economic power which "is particularly evident in the EU's competition with the USA 
and Japan" (S6derbaum, Stalgren & Langenhove 2005: 374). The preceding sections 
highlighted specific EU reaction to US projects such as APEC which spurred ASEM, and 
the FTAA which spurred closer ties with Mexico and Mercosur. The high economic 
content of agreements is also testimony to this key motivation. It is interesting to note 
that in the case of Africa there does not seem to have been a great deal of balancing by 
either the EU or its partner regions given the predominance of the EU in the region 
already, and the lack of an Asian or US presence 52 . 
Whilst noting the primacy of the economic balancing motivation on behalf of all actors 
involved in interregionalism it does not fully explain, in itself, some of the key features 
identified in the three regional analyses. It is possible to identify further important 
motivations that transcend both the context and specifics of the region by region 
developments. The first important motivation reflects the constructivist concept of 
identity through regional integration. "Interregionalism creates and legitimizes regional 
actors, including, perhaps most significantly, the EU" (S6derbaum, Stalgren & 
Langenhove 2005: 373). Given the EU's own regional nature and global ambitions, it has 
been supportive of regional integration, of institution building, rules, norms and 
procedures that it itself is built on as this helps export its own model53. Interregionalism, 
as a concept, plays to EU strengths, where institutional and commercial power is the key 
to promoting its own values and institutional forms abroad. The EU has tried to work 
within the institutional system, as identified by Aggarwal in his analysis of institutional 
52 This statement was valid for Africa when the EU started the EPA process. Recent activity by China, in 
articular, in the African region has been of a direct competitive nature to which the EU is now responding ý' 
The EU has been supportive of all of these, but within the confines of multilateralism. The EU has 
always stated its primary adherence to multilateralism 
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games (1998), to better its own position. In a world of increased regionalism, that the EU 
has inspired and promoted, there is an element of inevitability about the EU pursuing 
interregionalism. As Regelsberger and Alecu de Flers say of the EU's interregional 
dialogues; "the relations of the EU and its member states with other groups of states are 
not an accidental development. They are a direct result of EU construction proper and 
Europe's own posture as a regional organisation. Therefore the logic of inter-regional 
cooperation derives froin the successful European model" (2005: 319). The EU has seen 
interregionalism as a means of promoting its own version of international relations, an 
equal partner association model, as a counterpoint to the more direct US 
commercial/military model. This explains why regional integration is at the very core of 
EU interregional strategy. 
The EU has tried to support and promote regional integration in all three of the regions 
studied in this chapter, both implicitly and explicitly. This can be seen as a self-serving 
justification for interregionalism which forms a virtuous circle. Interregionalism is able to 
feed back on itself, and over time unite regions and spurs them onto further regional 
measures. This enhances the regionalist theory of a world of regions, a part of the EU's 
own world view, along the lines of the EU itself. Manners calls this "meta-regionalism" 
in which the EU engages "in interregional diplomacy which implicitly and explicitly 
promotes mimetism (regional replication) in places such as Southeast Asia (ASEAN), 
southern Africa (SADC) and South America (Mercosur) " (quoted in Aggarwal & Fogarty 
2004: 19). The EU seeks to project itself onto the five world continents, putting itself at 
the forefront of new economic, social and political organisation. This idea also comes 
under the name of "extra-regional echoing" as coined by Zimmerling (quoted in Hdnggi 
2000: 2), when the EU prototype of regionalism serves other areas of the world as a 
model. The values then championed by the EU will filter into other nascent, emerging 
and developed regional projects, as they are based on the EU model. Such a strategy by 
the EU could also reflect a search for institutional isomorphism, as Steinberg suggests 
"imperial powers have attempted to impose - by conquest or coercion - some element of 
institutional isomorphism on subject territories" (2006: 1). As the EU is seen to be 
successful in its regional policies there will be an effect of simulation and emulation. 
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The EU regional integration model has been notably rejected by Asian partners, accepted 
to an extent by Latin American ones, and is currently being implemented by African ones. 
This reveals the extent to which partner political and economic power can hinder or 
restrain EU institutional isomorphism. The importance of the recognised external 
influence on regionalism, "external cogency" (Nye 1968) or "external federators" 
(coined by Schwarz H-P in Lehmbruch, Von Beyne & Fetscher 1971), is a widely 
accepted factor in regionalism literature. Seen in these terms the EU is now practicing 
positive external cogency on regional groupings, which in some cases it has actually set 
up itself. 
It is clear that the EU has used interregionalism to foster and strengthen regionalism, 
through a solid and coherent strategy. It has sought to build collective identities and 
reinforce its own identity whilst balancing out international relations. The impact on the 
EU itself is something that should not be overlooked as Regelsberger and Alecu de Hers 
conclude: "in principle interregional cooperation has worked towards greater 
consistency between the various pillars of the EU's external relations and has iniproved 
the EU's profile as a collective actor" (2005: 339). It is also clear that the EU has sought 
to reproduce regionalism the world over, based on its model, such that its management of 
its external relations would be rationalised and simplified. It is important for the EU to be 
perceived and accepted as a coherent global actor assuming its role in global affairs, and 
it has had to create a coherent and coordinated foreign policy to better do this. Whilst 
regional integration represents a clear EU motivation for interregionalism it can not be 
said to have been as important for the three regions studied in this chapter. The Asian 
region has in no way solicited support for regional integration which has been an 
important factor behind EU differentiation towards bilateralism in the region. Africa has 
had little success with regional integration, but given power asymmetries and indirect 
gains has had to accept EU regional integration support. Latin America is perhaps the 
only region to have itself used regional integration as a motivation behind 
interregionalism as nascent regional groups sought support and help, although the types 
and forms of regional integration have not replicated the EU mode154. 
54 The issue of regional integration in Latin America will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter 4 
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The EU has engaged in an explicit strategic attempt to increase its 'presence, as it is 
referred to in the strategy documents, which is linked to EU identity and actorness. This 
has been backed by internal moves to increase actorness in foreign relations through the 
CFSP, because to maintain a global role the EU has to have the internal powers that allow 
it to act and interact better. Sbderbaum, Stalgren and Langenhove find the Commission, 
especially, imbued with a "striking self-confidence" with regard to the EU becoming a 
global actor and exporting regionalism. They go on to add that the EU is exporting the 
"reality of the EU to a world hungry for its presence" (2005: 37 1). This is echoed by 
interviews with Commission officials who all take the export of regionalism as a positive 
and desirable outcome for EU partner regions (Interviews I& 5). 
The above motivations link directly to a further EU motivation, in that through regional 
integration and actorness the EU has been seen as trying to enforce its values on other 
regions. The birth of conditionality, added to the existing relationships as they evolved, to 
include compliance with democratic and environmental values, is testimony to this trend 
of exporting values which represents a classical type of Nye soft power. When the EC 
became the EU there were important changes in its objectives such that 'European 
values' including human rights, fundamental rights, rule of democracy and law and 
environmental issues all became cornerstones of foreign policy initiatives. Farrell argues 
that in Africa "the EU has established the channels through which it can convey its 
values, priorities and even special interests" (2005: page 270-1), which makes 
interregionalism as much a means as an end. Interregional ism helps establish EU norms 
and practices the world over and emphasises the role of the EU as a "normative power" 
(Manners 2002). All of these new issues and concerns on the EU negotiating table have 
only served to impede relations with counterpart regions, something noted in particular in 
relations with Asia (Forster 2001). 
One final important comparative finding is that EU interregionalism always has an 
important political pillar, as one of its three pillars. This is because the EU has been 
trying to bring its political power and channels into line with its economic power and 
channels. As this process of realignment has advanced internally within the EU, an 
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external manifestation has been through interregionalism. Political dialogue has thus been 
a constant EU motivation across regions, as the EU has made explicit reference to 
political cooperation with the aim of coordination not only within the relationship but 
also across other international fora. It is also true that political motivations behind 
interregionalism have been at play for all EU partner regions due mainly to prestige 
enhancing effects, but to a much lesser motivational degree than for the EU. 
Implications - The greatest implications of interregionalism have, at all times, been for 
partner regions. This is because in all cases the partner region is weaker than the EU and 
hence more economically and politically dependent. The asymmetrical relationships have 
thus entailed greater implications for partners. There has been an immediate implication 
of the partner size, coherence and overall strength in that "the stronger the counterpart, 
the more concessions are given by the EV (S6derbaum, Stalgren & Langenhove 2005: 
377) which explains many of the differences between the agreements with different 
regions of the world. From this it is possible to highlight that the impacts of EU 
interregional strategy have been greatest for Africa, then for Latin America and finally 
for Asia. This is mostly due to the respective economic power of the three regions and 
their ability to resist EU interregional strategy. 
The implications for partner regions revolve mostly around their need to interact with the 
EU as a group, and the impact this has on their group identity and level of integration. 
There is an obvious impact on the partner region as it is forced to make more decisions as 
a group, something that interaction with the EU requires. The EU also finances and helps 
with their regional integration so enhancing any potential impact on the groups in 
question. This implication, whilst primarily one for the group itself is also important for 
the global arena as certain regions increase their actorness and presence. 
The next key implication to address is that of institutionalisation. Due to the dominance 
of the balancing motivation, interregionalism has tended not to be heavily 
institutionalised and remain relatively flexible. Noting a lack of institutionalisation and 
greater flexibility it is possible to go so far as to say that interregionalism has, as yet, had 
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few concrete implications. The institutions it has created are weak, the agreements 
incomplete and all the declarations are relatively vacuous and often not followed up. This 
does not mean that they are not useful, as the continued faith the EU has shown in them 
testifies. The key is that they hold promise, and as such act as potential springboards. 
Having noted the clear EU interest in promoting regional integration it has been 
mentioned that across the three regions this promotion has been received very differently. 
In Asia there has not been an uptake of EU ideas, indeed it has spurred the creation of 
specific 'Asian values' in contrast to 'EU values. Despite the non-acceptance of the EU 
model the East Asian region has continued to integrate at its pace and according to its 
needs, such that "the EastAsian regional setfacts itseVinto being" (Gilson 2005: 16). 
From the basis of these separate comparative analyses it is now possible to draw overall 
conclusions about the general class of EU interregionalism 
Conclusion 
In answer to the specific research question asked of EU interregionalism in the 
introduction; 'how has the EU's strategy of interregionalisin manifested itself across the 
globe? ' this chapter has detailed and analysed the widespread use of interregionalism by 
the EU in its external relations. As S6derbaurn, Stalgren and Langenhove conclude 
"there has been an increasing emphasis on interregionalism as a guiding principle for 
the EU'sJoreign policies and external relations " (2005: 366). Regelsberger and Alecu de 
Flers conclude that it has "helped the EU and its Member States to pursue their stated 
objective of becoming a global power in international relations" (2005: 338). 
The use of interregionalism is a relatively new phenomenon that has been seen to be an 
important strategic element of EU external relations, part of its drive to assume a position 
as a global actor. Its use has been noted to be strongest in Latin America, Africa and Asia. 
This chapter has also highlighted the fact that interregionalism, as pointed out in chapter 
one, is only one channel of interaction amongst many others, as the EU has such a variety 
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of relations with such a variety of actors around the globe. Transregionalisin has been 
shown to have increased in importance and bilateralism has been shown to remain a 
lowest corm-non denominator, and at tirnes a crucial channel for interaction. It was 
possible to identify certain stages in EU interregional development, with the rnid 1990s 
being the ignition period for the majority of EU interregional strategy. The clear pattern 
in the way interregionalism has developed has been one of differentiation, such that 
interregionalism will continue to offer an avenue for negotiation and discussion, but as 
one tool amongst others as part of a wider strategy. 
Despite the multiplicity of agreements in which the EU is currently involved, and the 
emphasis placed on differentiation, certain common key characteristics of EU 
interregionalism can be noted: 
Figure 2- 11 Key Characteristics of EU Trans/] nterremionalism 
1. The EU has purposefully and forcefully promoted regionalism. It has acted and 
tries to act as an 'external federator' and incorporates support for regionalism in 
interregional agreements 
2. EU interregional relations are characterised by low level institutionalisation 
3. Commercial and trade considerations are almost always the most important 
4. over time all interregional dialogues have expanded to cover more areas, 
notably areas such as human rights, environmental protection and democracy 
(though as yet most of this remains paper and theoretical with no enforcement or 
follow-up procedures) 
5. EU interregional relations have over time tended towards a pillar formation with 
divided areas of activity, commercial, political, aid and development 
6. EU interregional relations tend to have the same structures of contact and 
dialogue 
7. The EU uses both transregional and interregional relations but prefers 
interregional (pure), this latter being more content driven and active than the 
former 
Sourcc: own Crcation 
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It is useful to take these key characteristics and analyse them against the motivations and 
implications of interregionalism derived in the last chapter. Doing this reveals two broad 
categories of conclusion, the first concerning interregionalism as a state of affairs, and the 
second as a strategy with wider implications. 
In the first case EU interregionalism has shown a marked balancing and bandwagoning 
motivation leading to criticisms of opportunistic behaviour and a general lack of long- 
term strategy and coherence. The low level of institutionalisation and binding rules in EU 
interregionalism is a consequence of the primacy of this function. The next most 
important finding about interregionalism as a state of affairs is that EU interregionalism 
has actively sought to build collective identities in a form compatible with EU 
regionalism. This drive, by the EU, has also served to help it define its own self and its 
own role in international relations. After balancing and bandwagoning collective identity 
building has been the second most fulfilled function of EU interregionalism. 
The agenda widening and pillar structure, even if heavily weighted towards the 
commercial pillar, has caused increased problems and friction between the EU and 
partner regions. The need to correctly evaluate counterpart interests and desires in 
interregional relations has to be balanced by an approach tailored to each region. The 
reasons for a lack of institutionalisation between the EU and ASEAN are not the same as 
the reasons for a lack of institutionalisation between the EU and Mercosur. 
Interregionalism. is not a doctrine but a strategy, a flexible tailor made strategy 
(S6derbaum, Stalgren & Langenhove 2005: 373). The goal is to develop the EU as a 
global actor - interregionalism is one strategy amongst others to do so. This chapter has 
highlighted that interregionalism, based on a model of differentiation, co-exists with 
other levels of relations, notably the transregional and bilateral. Differentiation has led in 
many senses towards a new model of relations between the EU and a partner region. 
In relation to the other motivations and implications of interregionalism outlined in the 
first chapter this chapter has been unable to come to any firm conclusions. The ability of 
EU interregional relations to rationalise has been partly witnessed, although the lack of 
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coherent and strong partners has meant that the EU has been obliged to differentiate and 
continue relations at all levels, not just the interregional. The multiple interregional 
relations that the EU currently has certainly provides ample potential for rationalising to 
occur, but this will depend entirely on partner regions being able to interact as strong 
single actors. Regelsberger and Alecu de Flers conclude that "while it may help ill the 
definition of collective principles and negotiation positions in internationalfora, it is less 
suited to conduct crisis managenzent operations in concrete situations" (2005: 338). 
Agenda setting likewise has not had sufficient analysis in this chapter to come to the fore. 
The attempts to set agendas is clear in EU strategy papers as the EU has consistently 
sought political alignment on shared values in multilateral fora, but there has been scant 
evidence in practice of this happening. All of these factors will only come to light in a 
more in-depth analysis of specific interregional relations, which will be undertaken in the 
next two chapters. 
The second broad conclusion concerns the existence of interregionalism. as a strategy, as 
a clear and defined EU external relations strategy. This has arisen as an important finding 
of the analysis in this chapter. Whilst noting the EU drive towards differentiation, which 
implies interregionalism, tailored to local circumstances, there are certain overriding 
strategic objectives that underpin all interregionalism. The most important of these is 
support for regional integration, although the EU has also strategically aimed for 
rationalising, agenda-setting and institutionalisation. This chapter has revealed that there 
is a tension between these two sets of conclusions, between interregionalism. as an 
isolated strategy and interregionalism as a state of affairs when implemented within a 
specific region and context. This has led, for example, to the stark differences in uptake 
from partner regions of regional integration help from the EU. These tensions between 
the strategic aims and drive of EU interregionalism. and the actual state of affairs of an 
interregional relationship are key findings about EU interregional ism. 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in reference to interregionalism, said in 1990 "the path of 
dialogue and economic cooperation embarked upon by the EC ill a spirit of true 
partnership is proving to be the path of the future" (Edwards & Rcgclsbcrgcr: vii-viii). 
132 
Although this vision still holds true today, the path needs to show more consistency 
between strategy and reality. The overriding view of EU interregional interactions is 
summarised by Wand when he says "EU involvement in inter- and transregionalfora is 
Ynarked by balancing " (2002c: 9), which is not a complete reflection of EU strategic aims, 
but of the actual state of affairs of interregionalism. This importance attached to 
balancing has meant that interregionalism, in which the EU has been involved, has 
manifested marked soft institutionalisation with little evidence of other functions, such as 
rationalising, agenda-setting and crisis management. RUland goes on to conclude that 
"dialogues established by the EU definitely have the potential to becolne important 
intennediaries of a multilayered system of global governance with global institutions, 
regional organisations and the nation state as nodal points" (idem. ). But, as has been 
made clear, this will not be possible in their current weakly institutional ised and fragile 
form because relationships built out of balancing necessity do not have good long-term 
prospects. 
In terms of what sort of interregional ism the EU is pursuing, this chapter has revealed a 
picture of EU interregionalism that could be termed 'complex interregionalism'. This 
term encapsulates the tension between the fact that EU interregionalism is a strategy that 
is implemented in different regions according to local circumstances, according to a set of 
core aims and with a standard model in an attempt to achieve similar outcomes. EU 
interregionalism is applied at different levels and speeds, but simultaneously and 
according to a broadly similar and evolving model. Given that interregionalism has 
evolved in a context of differentiation, this has created region by region examples of 
complex interregionalism whereby interregionalism as a strategy has to be implemented. 
This means that it has to interact, enhance and remain consistent with transregionalism 
and bilateralism. The EU emphasis on differentiation, through which it has changed its 
strategies over time in line with needs and circumstances, is part of a strategy and 
structure that has been built to be inherently flexible. This chapter, by looking 
predominantly at interregional ism, has demonstrated a picture of EU complex 
interregionalism tailored to circumstances and partners, as set out in its own strategies. 
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From this general level of EU interregionalism it is clear that to fully understand 
interregionalism there is a need to deepen and enhance the analysis, as certain key 
questions remain: 
Figure 2- 12 Key Questions for Complex Interregionalism 
1. How does EU complex interregional ism work in practice - and how does this fit 
with other levels of relations? 
2. Is EU complex interregionalism coherent and complementary within a given 
region? 
3. How does differentiation, as practiced by the EU, impact on interregionalism? 
4. How close is interregionalism to fulfilling its potential functions in the region 
with the most advanced interregional relations? 
5. What are the principal reasons for interregional relations not fullfilling all the 
theoretic functions ascribed to them? 
These key questions aim to take the analysis of interregionalism to a new level in the 
sense that they seek to situate it within the specific regional context of complex 
interregionalism, that is to see how strategy operates in practise. To address these 
questions it will be necessary to study the region with which the EU has the most 
advanced interregional relations, which is Latin America. 
This chapter has shown that EU interregional relations with Latin America are its most 
advanced, with clearly defined pre-existing sub-regions, an umbrella transregional forum 
and important strategic bilateral relations. The questions above that have arisen in this 
chapter, address what sort of interregionalism the EU is pursuing in Latin America as a 
whole. The concentration in the next chapter will thus be on describing how complex 
interregional ism works in practice, with a focus on how the EU implements its 
interregional strategy with all actors in the region so as to understand the tension between 
the two. 
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Chapter 3: EU Complex Interregionalism in Latin America 
i 
Introduction 
The last chapter developed a picture of EU complex interregionalism, an interregional 
strategy tailored to specific circumstances and partners, as a part of wider strategic policy 
options. It took the level of macro-regions for analysis, to draw pertinent conclusions 
about EU interregionalism. in general terms. This chapter will take the study of EU 
interregionalism one step further, by focusing on the analysis of EU complex 
interregional ism in action in one specific region. The most logical choice of region is that 
of Latin America because, as chapter two illustrated, it is the region with which the EU 
has the most advanced interregional relations in terms of depth, coverage, scope, and also 
potential. It is also the region with which the EU has developed the most sophisticated, 
and clearest, example of complex interregionalism, with distinct interacting levels. The 
fact that the EU interacts with Latin America at very distinct levels, via very distinct pre- 
existing groups and fora, makes it an ideal case-study for the dynamics and processes of 
interregional strategy in action. Commissioner Mandelson noted in a speech in Brazil in 
September 2006 that "more fundamentally there is no region in the world with whom we 
have so much affinity of culture, shared history and commerce" (2006: 6), and it is these 
shared attributes that in turn translate into a complex and rich array of relations. 
Chapter two painted the model of relations that the EU has with Latin America, and 
outlined the basic details of the relationship. This chapter will take the analysis further by 
looking at the process and implementation of complex interregionalism. The basis of this 
will be the questions formed at the end of chapter two, with the priority being in 
understanding the tension between EU interregional strategy and the actual 
implementation and state of affairs of interregionalism. within the wider context of other 
relations with the region. This chapter will thus address the research question posed in the 
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Introduction concerning EU interregionalism with Latin America; 'How does the EU's 
strategic interregional approach to Latin America work- in practice? ' 
In 2002 the editorial of the periodical America Economia posed the question; "Europa 
ocupa o espaco? " (2002: 13) in reference to the EU's activities in Latin America in 
relation to those of the US. This chapter will address how exactly the EU has strategically 
attempted to 'occupy' this space with complex interregionalism and what the results have 
been. A further motivation behind analYsing complex interregionalism is to frame exactly 
what it is, what it does, how it does it and what the results of the strategy are. Within this 
there will be an important element of trying to ascertain the status of rationalising, agenda 
setting and institutionalisation within complex interregional ism in Latin America, as 
these were not discerned at the macro-level in chapter two. This chapter will also provide 
more insight into the roles of balancing, bandwagoning and collective identity building, 
but again with the focus being on their implications through implementation. 
This chapter will address the three key levels at which the EU interacts with Latin 
America, as identified in the last chapter's analysis of EU strategic documents relating to 
Latin America; the bilateral, the interregional and the transregional. Whilst the latter two 
levels have, to date, been the focus of the analysis, it will be important to address 
bilateral 55 relations in this chapter, which will allow a more thorough and comprehensive 
understanding of complex interregionalism. To guide this analysis the following key 
questions will be used: 
55 In this thesis 'bilateral' is understood as EU - specific individual Latin American country 
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Figure 3- 1 EU - Latin American Complex Interregionalism Research Questions 
1. What is the history and context of the relationship? 
2. What are the EU's stated purposes, strategic objectives and approach to 
relationship? 
3. What were the dynamics in the evolution of the relationship? 
4. How are the objectives and dynamics translated into action - what is the 
form/structure/institutionalisation of the relationship? 
Once the relationship has formed, how does it operate (rhetoric/reality)? 
6. What are the main outputs from the relationship? 
7. In concrete terms what are the main functions of each relationship (and level 
relations)? 
The outcome of this chapter will describe how complex interre-ionalisin works in 
practice, with a focus on the dynamics and processes that Implement the outlined and 
stated strategies. It will detail and analyse the exact forms, structures, contents, processes, 
negotiations, management structures, institutions and outputs of the various levels and 
relationships between the EU and Latin America, which will in turn allow for further key 
questions of interregionalism to be directly addressed to EU-Mercosur in the next chapter. 
The last chapter outlined the map of EU relations with Latin Arnerica 5t, , as a static 
snapshot of relations in 2006. To be more meaningful it needs to be placed historically 
and have the overall multi-level context and interactions explained. Each of the key 
component relationships within each of the three levels will be analysed to help forin 
specific conclusions on each level of relations, which will in turn help an understanding 
of how the levels interact and coincide. Before addressing the three principal levels of 
interaction between the EU and Latin America in such detail, the chapter will firstly trace 
relations from pre-1957 to the modern day. This will advance chronologically and focus 
56Figure 2-8 
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on the EU strategic approach to Latin America as an entity in itself. This section will 
synthesize the key elements in the relationship as it has progressed and evolved towards a 
more interregional emphasis, setting the important historical context for a more detailed 
analysis. 
Context and History 
To fully understand, and situate, the complex interregionalism, that now exists between 
the EU and Latin America it is important to trace the evolution of their relationship from 
its beginnings. The story of relations between Latin America and Europe is that of the so- 
called 'discovery' of Latin America by Europeans followed by subsequent periods of 
colonization, prosperity, dependence and independence, nationalism, democracy, alliance 
and finally strategic partnership. This long road has seen over five centuries of political, 
cultural and trade links, which equates to one of the world's oldest bi-regional 
relationships. The fluctuations in the relationship have been enormous depending on the 
times, circumstances and interests involved, creating an ever-changing partnership 
(Rubiolo 2002). Reference to this shared history is a constant feature of current day EU - 
Latin American relations, something that frequently leads to their qualification as being 
'natural allies' or 'partners'. As EU External Relations Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner 
noted; "our relations are based on long-standing historical and cultural ties and shared 
values ... 
In short, Europe and Latin America are natural partners" (2005: 1). The focus 
of this thesis is on EU, not European, relations with Latin America and as such a detailed 
analysis starts at the inception of the European project in 1957. This choice obviously 
cuts out over four and a half centuries of relations between Europe and Latin America, 
those in which the two continents forged their close relations. Whilst a longer analysis of 
these relations is outside the remit of this work, a short section is still needed to sketch 
the contex 07. 
57 A more detailed historical analysis is available by Bulmer-Thomas (1994), on Latin American History, or 
by Rubiolo (2002), on EU-Latin American relations 
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The advent of relations was when Spain arrived in 58 Latin America in 1492, soon to be 
followed by Portugal. From this point onward important European roots were planted in 
the region, ones that prevail today. European penetration was not just by the Spanish and 
Portuguese, who were politically dominant in the region, as the British became important 
in economic and trading terms (Rubiolo 2002: 2-3). The next major phase in European - 
Latin American relations was that of the struggles for independence between 1820 and 
1850, after which the first major rapprochement of the two regions took place, mostly in 
the deepening of economic ties. European political, economic, cultural and social 
domination in the region gradually waned and from the end of World War I (WWI) the 
US arose as the undisputed hegemonic power in the Americas, and the main source of 
finance and investment. The Cold War, more than ever before, brought US political, 
ideological, military and economic influence into the region, which became very much 
the US's own 'backyard' over which it granted itself special rights (Rubiolo 2002: 19). 
The role of the US in Latin America is now a crucial factor in EU relations with the 
region, a factor that this chapter will evaluate. 
Relations: EC - Latin America from 1957 
A major event that had a significant impact on European relations with Latin America 
was the formation of the European Economic Community (EC) in 1957. The nascent EC 
had to deal with a diverse Latin American region which had strong historical links with 
Europe, but that was firmly within the economic and political grip of the US. This event 
was to signal the start of a new era in relations, which up until 1957 had been on a 
country-to-country bilateral basis. At inception the EC's principal external focus was on 
Africa, Greece and Turkey. From this situation, as Mower explains, the relationship with 
Latin America had "to bear a burden of neglect, frustrations, and missed opportunities" 
(1982: 37). Between 1958 and 1963 the EC issued a 'Memo of Intention' to Latin 
American governments wherein the EC declared itself to be seeking "close relations and 
cooperation with Latin America" (Mower 1982: 37). Latin American governments were 
not convinced by these actions on behalf of the Europeans and issued statements that 
58 Also termed 'discovered' (Rubiolo: 6) 
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revealed that it felt the EC was launching a "near war on Latin American export 
perspectives" (Mower 1982: 38). It is no stretch of the imagination to understand that 
dexport perspectives' referred to agricultural products, which is indeed still an issue in 
relations today. 
in the period between 1963 and 1967 the EC moved to enhance its relations with Africa, 
which further disadvantaged, and frustrated, Latin America. Due to this rising frustration 
two sets of talks were held between the EC and Latin America, which led to the EC 
requesting that Latin America submit a list of all exports that it felt were being 
disadvantaged. Thus the 'Latin American Memorandum of 1966' was issued, setting 
forward a wide-range of objectives, proposing a comprehensive interregional economic 
policy with a joint commission to oversee activities. The EC Council did not act on the 
Memorandum and relations sank to a low-ebb between 1967 and 1970. Whilst this joint 
commission idea was rejected, Mower suggests that "the establishment of effective 
institutional links between the two regions has been made difficult by the hybrid nature of 
the Latin American side" (1982: 55). Again it was Latin America that acted in the face of 
the tension, issuing the Buenos Aires Declaration, which called for renewed contacts 
between the two regions. This time the EC was responsive and in June 1971 issued a 
statement highlighting the importance it attached to relations with Latin America, 
proposing semi-annual talks at the ambassadorial level. Relations also advanced 
economically with the signing of non-preferential trade agreements between the EC and 
Argentina in 1971, Uruguay in 1973, Brazil in 1973 and Mexico in 1975. 
In the 1970s relations increased in different areas, but nonetheless remained dominated 
by trade considerations. In addition to the non-preferential agreements it signed, the EC 
also initiated sectoral agreements on textiles, handicrafts, silk and cotton. The rise of the 
EC market for Latin America drew the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) to conclude, in 1977, that "the Community has played the most 
important role in balancing and diversifting Latin America's trade relations" (Mower 
1982: 39). Despite the dynamism of the relationship in trade terms it is interesting to note 
the low place Latin America held in terms of access to EU markets. Between 1958 and 
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1978 the Latin American share of EC markets declined from 11% to 5% (Mower 1982: 
39). Whilst EC regional interests, and the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) that 
the EC developed in the 1970s, did not seem favourable for Latin America, the EC did 
increase its aid flows to the region through this decade. In 1976-7 seven EC states also 
joined the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) which was greeted by the IADB as 
"explicit recognition of EC's growing desire to become a participant in Latin American 
development and of its recognition of Latin America's 1) growing importance as a factor 
in the world economy, 2) growing influence in the decision-inaking councils of the global 
economic system and 3) great value as a market of the exports of Europe" (Mower 1982: 
46). 
Relations between Latin American and the EC at the end of the 1970s were a patchwork 
of links and agreements spanning bilateral, regional and sub-continental frameworks. 
This period relates to the first of three phases in EC - Latin American relations as 
identified by Barahona de Brito (1999: 1-2). This phase was brought about essentially 
through the interplay of EC external priorities that focused mostly on ex-colonies and the 
near neighbourhood, and Latin America's disparate and changing circumstances. 
importantly, in 1975, Latin America initiated its first attempt at regional integration 59 
through the Latin American Economic System (SELA)60 . Amongst the aims of SELA 
was that of providing a mechanism to negotiate with third countries. The EC responded 
to this development by "emphasising the Community's preference for all 
interorganizational approach to the management of relations with Latin America" 
(Mower 1982: 56). Alongside the semi-annual dialogue started in 1971, Parliamentary 
cooperation also started between the European Parliament and Latin American 
legislatures in 1979. Aside from these two institutional frameworks relations were 
conducted via official visits and regular bilateral contacts. Trade agreements entailed the 
creation of Joint Committees, such as the one created with Brazil in their 1973 agreement. 
59 This initiative was at the regional level and not the sub-regional level, which had already seen regional 
integration schemes initiated 
60 For more information see: http: //www. sela. ord 
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Democratisation in Latin America was a key factor in external relations, as a pre- 
condition to entry into the multilateral world. The peace process began in South America 
in the 1980s as Peru returned to democracy in 1980, Argentina in 1983, Uruguay in 1984, 
Brazil in 1985, Paraguay in 1989 and Chile in 1990. In the 1980s political dialogue was 
the most important facet of relations, as increasingly they were based on a shared respect 
of, and vision for, democracy with most of Latin America using Europe as their ideal. 
Since the militarised 1970s the pre-cursor to the European Parliament was vociferous in 
its condemnation of military rule in Latin America. The first Europe-Latin American 
Parliamentary conference was held in 1974, and every two years subsequently, and has 
remained an important main channel for political dialogue. Support for democracy 
became very important to Latin America at this time, and has subsequently remained 
important to relations between the two regions. The support given by the EC in the 1970s 
and 1980s was a building block for the future. It is interesting to note that, given the 
political instability and lack of democracy in the 1970s, the focus of relations had shifted 
from states to political parties - mostly, as Rubiolo notes, the Social Democrats (2002: 
24). 
The Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s was an important turning point in the history 
of the region. One of the key consequences of the changes brought about in Latin 
America in the 1980s, for this thesis, was a total reorientation of Latin American external 
relations. Until that point its development and focus had all been internal, but the debt 
crisis forced a huge change of policy. Import substitution (IS) was simply no longer 
viable as a long term policy in an international and multilateral world, so policy 
orientations started to move slowly towards more open and liberal regimes with 
expansive views of external relations. Modifying their development strategies indirectly 
altered their foreign policy and hence bi-regional relations. Through these turbulent times 
internal conditions in Latin America changed drastically making relations with the EC 
entirely different. The effort to externalise meant that regional and sub-regional initiatives 
also started to reorganise and gain in coherence, and new-found democratic consolidation 
gave stability and a common denominator to relations. 
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The so-called 'first' wave of regionalism in LA had started in the 1960s using the IS L_ 
model, but as the model stagnated so too did these early re-gional Lgroupings. As Latin 
America opened up to the external world a 'second' wave of regionalism spread through 
the region as the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) replaced the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1980-l"'. the Andean Group restructured 
in 1987 with the Quito Protocol and Mercosur was created in 1991. This new geo- 
political situation is the basis on which current EU-LA relations are built, and oil which 
current relations started to take shape. At this time multilateralisin was flourishing and 
under the ALADI umbrella many partial scope agreements were signed within LA. There 
was a sudden consciousness of the need to formulate and build external relations. Given 
prior EC misgivings about the "hybt-id nature" (Mower 1982: 55) of Latin Arnerica and 
having already emphasised an EC preference for more rational interregional relations, 
developments in LA were ripe for the EC to capitalise on. 
Whilst EC responsiveness to the challenges, opportunities and requests of a changing 
Latin America had been, at best, relatively slow a further key development was to heavily 
influence EC-LA relations(2 . The 
incorporation of Spain and Portugal into the EC in 1986 
was a major event for relations between the two regions. Latin America initially feared 
this move, but it proved to be positive for them in many ways (Rubiolo 2002: 29). 
Crucially, awareness of Latin America was raised as both European countries expressed 
the desire to deepen ties with LA. In 1986 a Spanish proposal at the European Council, at 
The Hague, to strengthen relations with Latin America and support the peace initiative of 
3 the Contadora Group" , was accepted. Already due to Spanish backing, prior to their EC 
membership, the Central American peace process had been supported in 1994 in Costa 
Rica at the first San Jos6 conference (Rubiolo 2002: 29). 
Spain had quickly become aware of the possibility of using Latin America as an 
instrument to improve its own position within the EC, essentially because it had a special 
61 For more information see: www. aladi. org/ 
62 The start ofthe second of Barahona dc Brito's phases in EC - Latin American relations (2000) 
(, I The Contadora Group was an initiative launched by Colombia, Mexico. Panama and Venezuela, in 1983, 
to deal with the military conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala that were, at that time. 
threatening to dcstabilise the whole region 
143 
cultural and lingual affinity with Latin America that took its foreign policy beyond mere 
commercial and trade considerations. On this basis it proposed the idea of an lbero- 
American forum, which resulted in the first lbero-American Summit in Guadalajara, 
Mexico, in 1991 (Rubiolo 2002: 30). The lbero-American Summit is principally a forum 
for political harmonisation on matters concerning the Latin American region, and for 
discussion of regional issues. The Summit has been held every year since it started in 
Mexico in 199164. It must be noted that whilst there were positive benefits for Latin 
America from Iberian EC membership, their inclusion was not viewed as positive by all 
commentators, with Grabendorff suggesting "Latin America's previous experience of the 
Community's geographical enlargement has not been wholly positive. The adhesion of 
Spain and Portugal did win the region a favourable and direct voice ...... but on a 
practical level it spelled a loss of Latin America exports to the EC .. as the CAP was 
extended to Iberia" (1992: 220). The issue of the CAP and Latin America is one that 
continues to overshadow relations almost twenty years later, and will be dealt with in 
greater detail when addressing EU-Mercosur relations and their attempts to negotiate 
agriculture. Another important creation of the 1980s, in Latin America, was that of the 
Rio Group, in 1986, as a genuinely regional forum for high-level political dialogue. The 
EC was not slow in seeing the potential to use this group as a partner for discussion and 
relations, hence Rio Group - EC dialogue started in 1990. 
This move towards more political dialogue represented a change of emphasis that was to 
continue through the 1990s and beyond. As important as this change was, the main 
emphasis of relations wa§ no longer on political cooperation but on trade and economic 
issues. Grabendorff concluded that in the 1990s "the EC has made great efforts to 
improve the biregional economic agenda in all itsfacets. However, trade links remain the 
most important aspect of EC-Latin American economic relations" (1992: 225). Latin 
America was a much more interesting economic prospect to the EC in the 1960s than it 
was in the 1970s and 1980s due to the combination of military regimes and IS models. 
The EC remained the main source of ODA while the US and Japan reduced their aid to 
64 Thereafter in Spain (1992), Brazil (1993), Colombia (1994), Argentina (1995), Chile (1996), Venezuela 
(1997), Portugal (1998), Cuba (1999), Panama (2000), Peru (2001), Dominican Republic (2002), Bolivia 
(2003), Costa Rica (2004), Spain (2005) and Uruguay (2006) 
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the region (Rubiolo 2002: 42). Latin America needed differentiated cooperation as its 
regions had different needs. European resources in LA changed drastically from 1990 
onwards as several specific and directed programs, under the economic cooperation 
banner, were started: AL-INVEST in 1994 aiming to protect EU FDI in the region and 
promote technology transfer, strategic alliances and joint-ventures between EU-LA. 
Eurocentres were also created in LA to increase contacts between regions. ALURE was 
started in 1996, to provide support for energy system niodernisation and to promote 
regional energy integration. SYNERGY was created to support environmentally friendly 
energy policies, in essence to compliment ALURE. ALFA was started in 1994, to aid 
cooperation and exchanges in scientific, academic and technological sectors through 
academic exchanges. Finally URB-AL was established to create permanent networks 
between European and LA cities (www. ec. europa. eu, accessed 27 May 2007). 
In the mid-1990s the EU overtook the US as the main investor of FDI in the region, 
prompting B. Jones to comment that "five hundi-edyears ajier the conquistadors stomped 
through Latin America, the SI)anish are back, this time looking ftw legitimate 1wolit 
instead qfpluntler, and theY are snal)ping up maJor stakes in local coi-I)orations and 
grabbing market share " (www. eurunion. org, accessed 12 January 2005). Growth in Latin 
America in the 1990s coupled with a variety of other factors such as enhanced stability 
and security in the region and the large-scale deregulation and privatisation offered prime 
incentives for trade and investment in the region. EU (the EC had by now become the EU) 
investment in the region represented 15% of its total FD1 outflows, with Spain at the 
forefront (idem. ). Whilst the EU does not have direct powers over investment it was 
through this investment drive that a large business voice mobilised for a more secure 
trading relationship. 
It was in the midst of the 1990s that EU relations with Latin America really took shape, 
and for the first time in an explicit strategy document, the 1994 'Basic Document on 
relations between the EU and Latin Arnerica and the Caribbean'. This document greatly 
redefined relations between the EU and Latin Arnerica as a whole. The Commission 
proposed, and the Council endorsed, an original approach towards the region, with a 
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noted emphasis on sub-regions and specific countries such as Mexico, Clifle, and 
Mercosur. "In a slgnýficant shýft ofpolicy, the Ell (lecidetl to move towmWs some. fol-In of 
associate(I Status with Wvico' Chile antl Meivosur. Hithet-to associated status hatl been 
ivsel-ve(ljol- those states that eithei-jor histot-ical I-easons (e_v-colonial states ofthe Lonlý 
Conventions) ol- political i*easolls (the new- abi-owl qfEast mul South Europe) ha(l been 
consitlei-etl (ýftop, 101*eign policYlviol'iO, stati(sjoi- the EU " (Peterson & SjUrsen: 16 1 
The potential of the emerging Latin American economics and competition with the 
United States provided a final impetus for the EU to upgrade its relations with Mexico, 
Chile and Mercosur. The timing of the EU's strategic docurnent is not without 
as discussed in the last chapter. 1994 was in many senses the start of' 
complex interregionalism between the EU and Latin America. As Matthews notes, "the 
e, vistence (#'so many regional organisations with overtal)jfing objectives has createtl a 
complex web (#'initiatives anel institutions, which nitikes it (IiI iciiItft)r the region to. yeak .. 
j 
wl'th a iinýfied voice ... the prolijýrcition ofregional organisations has hatl an inij)act on 
the EU's aly)roach, res"Itillq in (lifferent tyl? es q relationships with tlýlferent countries or 
gt-()Ilps of countries" (2006: 2). This is specific reference to what chapter two termed 
complex interregionalism. 
It is important to briefly highlight the trade aspect of relations between the two partner 
regions, sornething that has been mentioned in the preceding analysis, and something that 
will be important for the forthcoming analysis"5. In LA Brazil is the EU's main economic 
partner, but in global terms Brazil is the EU's 14 1h most important trading partner. Put 
together Mercosur is the EU's II th largest trading partner and the Andean Community the 
29th. In LA relations with the EU have a much more solid and enticing foundation as the 
EU is their first ranked investor and their second ranked trading partner 66 , as well as the 
main provider of development assistance in the region (www. trade. ec. europa. eu , 
accessed 31 July 2007). 
6' For more detail see Appendix 5: EU - Latin America Trade Statistics 
66 It is the first ranked for South America, notably for Mercosur 
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Overall it is clear that there is substantial potential for relations between the two regions, 
based not only on a shared history and culture, but also oil the economic and political 
aspirations of both partners. Both the EU and LA see the relationship as important for 
advancing many facets of their international and global agendas. This section, oil the 
history and context of the Europe/EC/EU - LA relationship has highlighted the important 
contextual elements that will be needed to better understand. and analyse, current EU 
complex interregionalism with the region. They have revealed the historical, economic, 
political and wider strategic context within which current relations take place, 
complementing the analysis of EU-Latin America in Chapter two. The key elements can 
be summarised as follows: 
Figure 3- 2 EU - Latin America Key Historical Elements 
1. The EU and Latin America have a long common history - mainly through Spain 
and Portugal, hence the importance of their incorporation into the EC in 1986 
2. Latin America has never been a priority relationship for the EU - leading to a 
certain lethargy and lack of innovation in relations 
3. The EU has always been quick to support regional and 
developments 
4. The US, since WWII, has been the main external power in the region 
In trade terms relations are asymmetrical and much more important for Lat 
America than for the EU 
Source: Own Creation 
From the context and history the chapter will now turn to the first of the three levels to be 
analysed, bilateralism. 
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Bilateralism 
The first level of relations between the EU and Latin Arnerica to be analysed is that of' 
bilateral relations. The reason for taking this level first is that it is the oldest form of' 
relations, the one from which all relations have essentially evolved, as well as being the 
one that continues to co-exist alongside all other levels of relations. Indeed the majority 
of international relations still occur on a bilateral level, and such agreements are the first 
tier of the trade policy pyramid, and an obvious channel through which to interact with a 
partner. This bilateral strategy, or policy option, is a key economic and political tool that 
is comparatively simple to use and negotiate. Chapter two revealed that bilateralism was 
an important level of relations in all three regions studied, so further analysis in Latin 
America will help address the need to understand how bilateralism and interregionalism 
compete and co-exist. 
In their discussion of EU trade policy options Glania and Matthes consider that "the EU 
has a cei-tain incentive to conclude bilateral agi-eements " (2005: 76) based on tariff, non- 
tariff, trade-diverting and political economy motivations. They note that this is 
particularly the case where there are trade-diverting implications from other countries 
trade agreements, and also in areas where the EU can bilaterally advance further than 
WTO obligations. Bilateralism is also the level of relations that underpins all others, as 
Euractiv. com noted on the 13 September 2006; "after the suspension of the WTO Dolia 
negotiations, the Commission looks readi, to /-ý o jocits its connnei-cial strategy on bilatei-al 
free trade agi-eements so as to catch up with the US and Japan " (www. euractiv. com, 
accessed 13 September 2006). This is a strategy that is echoed by BusinessEurope, who 
has urged the EU to develop its bilateral agenda, saying "whenever a trading fival signs 
a deal it puts European Business at a disadvantage. We cannot allow that to happen " 
(idem. ). This relative economic motivation behind bilateralism is in keeping with the 
analysis of the motivations of interregional ism. In essence the motivation is the same, but 
the entity with which the EU is interacting is different. It is obviously easier to interact 
with an individual state than with a regional grouping, but what is Important is that the 
EU has a stated preference to deal with groups. 
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An analysis of any potential friction between these two core factors, (lie economic 
balancing rationale that might lead to bilateralism and the EU desire to interact with 
groups, will underpin this section on EU bilateral interactions in Latin America. The EU 
does have key bilateral relations within the region, and as with all its bilateral agreements 
the world over, they are all nested within the umbrella of' international rules and 
regirnes"'. It will be important to understand how, when and why bilateralism is used in 
Latin America and how this meshes with both interregional strategy and interregional 
practice in the region. 
Within Latin Arnerica there has been a proliferation of bilateral agreements, although to a 
certain extent this has only been a reflection of the simultaneous worldwide phenomenon 
of FTAs in the 1990s. All countries in LA are party to at least one comprehensive 
bilateral agreement", with most being party to many more. The main ob jectives of such 
agreements are mostly market access and liberalisation, although some cover other issues 
(www. sice. oas. org/tradc/, accessed 20 December 2006). Bilateral relations and 
agreements are crucial trade policy options for Latin American countries, representing a 
fundamental economic real itY69 . The two non-regionally aligned countries, Chile and 
Mexico, are the most prolific bilateral agreement proponents in the region, and the only 
two with bilateral agreements in force with the EU. 
The lack of bilateral agreements that the EU has with Latin American countries is 
because there have not been sufficient balancing, trading or political incentives and 
because the EU has favoured the sub-regional approach. Whilst not as developed as 
relations with Chile and Mexico the EU does have several developed institutional 
bilateral relationships with Latin American countries, as can be seen in the table below; 
67 Most importantly within the confines of the WTO 
6" The term 'Bilateral Agreement' covers a vast number of differing instruments, differing in aims, forms, 
structures, content etc. 
" For an Indicative List of FTAs in force in Latin America see Appendix 4 
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Figure 3- 3 EU Bilateral Relations with Latin American Countries 
Brazil Strategic Partnership 
Framework Co-operation Agreement 
2007 
1992 
Argentina Framework Trade and Economic Co- 
operation Agreement 
1990 
Paraguay Framework Co-operation Agreement 1991 
Uruguay Framework Co-operation Agreement 1992 
Chi le Association Agreement 2002 
Colombia Regional levels / GSP 
Ecuador Regional levels / GSP 
Peru Regional levels / GSP 
Venezuela Regional levels / GSP 
Bolivia Regional levels / GSP 
Costa Rica Regional levels / GSP 
El Salvador Regional levels / GSP 
Guatemala Regional levels / GSP 
Honduras Regional levels / GSP 
Nicaragua Regional levels / GSP 
Panama Framework Agreement on Financial, 
Technical and Economic Co-operation 
Regional levels 
GSP 
1999 
Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Co-operation 
and Co-operation Agreement 
1997 
Source: Own Creation from www. cc. curopa. cu (accessed I December 2007) 
This table highlights a number of important points. The key finding is that the EU 
predominantly deals with Latin American countries at the regional level, and only in 
specific circumstances does it interact bilaterally. The two most advanced bilateral 
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relationships are with Mexico and Chile, as these two countries do not belong to any 
regional grouping, effectively putting them at the top of the EU preferential pyramid 
within the region. The fact that they head the EU hierarchy in the region would suggest 
that they are the two most important partners for the EU, something that trade statistics 
and political reality contradict. A further important element to highlight is the submission 
by the Commission, in 2007, of a proposed Strategic Partnership with Brazil. The EU is 
trying to redress a perceived political weakness in its relations with the region through an 
enhanced dialogue with Brazil, and not advance towards relations such as those that it has 
with Mexico and Chile. It does again reveal the lowest common denominator role of 
bilateral relations, as the EU had tried to conduct political relations with Brazil through 
Mercosur. 
After EC inception in 1957 LA did not rank highly on its foreign policy radar, despite 
their attempts to increase their visibility collectively and individually (Mower 1982). The 
internal economic and political problems that the region was experiencing were such that 
bilateral relations were not a plausible and enticing option for the EC. It is also the case 
that from an early date the EC had a preference to deal with regions and sub-regions, as 
opposed to individual countries, something that would always weigh against the EC 
initiating bilateral relations within the Latin American region. This is seen through the 
EC signing third generation co-operation agreements with Argentina in 1990, Uruguay in 
1991 and with Brazil and Paraguay in 1992, none of which have been updated since 70 due 
to EU - Mercosur negotiations for an Interregional Association Agreement. Whilst these 
individual agreements have not been updated it does not mean relations have not 
continued bilaterally, as there are still Joint Committee meetings for cooperation and 
other issues of mutual interest. 
70 The Strategic Partnership is an updated relationship but with a purely political focus, and not a global 
bilateral approach. The Strategic Partnership Communication from the Commission states that "Brazil is 
central to the success of the EU-Mercosur negotiations, an EU priority strategic objective ... the EU 
remains committed to consolidating a solid political and economic relation with Mercosur as a block" 
(2007: 2) 
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This section will now analyse in detail the three key bilateral relationships that the EU 
has with Latin America. Firstly it will consider the two non-regionally aligned countries, 
Mexico and Chile, because they both have extensive bilateral Association Agreements 
with the EU. These relations take on extra significance because the agreements form 
important precursors for what the EU is trying to achieve interregionally in Latin 
America, as Dominguez notes, "both agreements tire significant jor the EU-Ltitin 
American relationshil) due to two chiýf retisons: a) they tire thefirst conywehensive - 
political, economic and co-opertition - tigreenients with countries in the region antl b) 
thev set a precedent f6r fitture agreements with other countries or groul) ofcountries in 
the region " (2006: 1 ). The final bilateral relationship to be given special attention will be 
that with Brazil. It will be important to analyse bilateral relations between the EU and the 
largest country in the region in light of the fact that the main vehicle for relations between 
the EU and Brazil has been Mercosur. The Commission Communication of May 2007 
has altered this balance, and it will be important to assess this development. The very 
reasons for the EU to feel the need to specifically update its relations with Brazil outside 
of the Mercosur forum are obviously important for interregionalism. Understanding what 
exactly this strategic partnership entails, why the Commission deems it necessary and 
what its impact on the interregional level of relations will be, are all vital questions. The 
main thrust of this section on bilateralism will be to understand how it fits within 
complex interregionalism. 
EU - Mexico 
As already noted Mexico is not part of any Latin American regional integration project, 
although it does have observer status within certain fora. Mexico comes second only to 
Chile in the region for the number of FIFAs it has signed, as it also chose to take the FTA 
path to global economic insertion. Without a doubt the most important of all these is the 
one signed with the US and Canada in 1994; NAFTA. The US is Mexico's most 
important trading and political partner; Mexico is currently the fourth largest trading 
partner of the us 
(http: //trade. ec. europa. eu/doclib/docs/2006/septeinber/tradoc -1 
13418. pd and 
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http: //trade. cc. cLii-opýi. eLi/(Ioclib/clocs/2006/septeiiihei-/ti-ýt(loc 1 13465.1)(11, accessed 31 
July 2007). Mexico has also signed important FrAs with Colombia and Venezuela 
(1990). Bolivia (1994), Chile (1998), Israel (2000), Japan (2004), Bra/il (2002) and 
Panama (1985) (http: //cti-c.,,, icc. oas. oi-,,, /Aý,, i-eciiietitý,. ASI", accessed 31 July 2007). 
Mexico signed an Association Agreement, the 'Global A-reernent'. with tile FT In 1997, 
and in so doing becarne the first Latin American country to sion a bilateral Association 
Agreement with the EU. 
The EU and Mexico have had institutionalised relations since 1978 when they signed 11 
co-operation agreement. This was replaced by a further agreement 111 1991 and ultimately 
by the Global Agreement that was signed in Brussels on 8 December 1997, and which 
came into force on I October 2001. Bilateral relations with Mexico have always been, 
and remain, the most important level at which the two partners interact. Current relations 
are hence governed by the 1997 Agreement, the main aspects of which will be outlined ill 
this section. The figure below illustrates the rnap of relations that the EU currently has 
with Mexico: 
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Figure 3- 4 Structure of EU - Nlexico Relations 
EU - Mexico 
Trade/Econ Political Co-operation 
Clobal Agreement 
Signed 1997 Horizontal Country 
Entry into force 2000 Programmes Strategy Paper 
Free Trade in 
Goods and 
Services 
Dispute 
Settlement 
Mechanism 
-J oi nt Coti nci I 
- WTO Compliant 
Joint Committee 
Sub-Committees 
- Issue and area 
speci l'i c committees 
Joint Council 
Estahlished by 
Global Agreemem 
Ministerial lc\el 
As and when 
Joint Committee 
TO assist Joint 
Council 
Senior Civil Ser,, ant 
level 
Annually/Rotating 
EU- Mlexico Summit 
Every 2 years - EU- 
LAC Summits 
President 
Cornmission/Council 
President Mexico 
EU- Mexico Joint 
Parliamentary 
Committee 
- Every 2 years - EU- 
LAC Summits 
4"' May 2005 
3"' Mar 2003 
""" May 2002 
1" Feb 2001 
5 Oct 2005 
4"' NoN 2004 
3`1 No% 2003 
Ild Oct 2002 
1" Oct 2001 
3'd May 2006 
nd Nlaý 2004 
1" INIaN 2002 
, nd Feh 2006 
1" Sep 2005 
Source: Own Creation 
frOln WWIA'. CC. CLIr0j)a. CU (accessed I December 2(X)7) 
The Global Agreement is the lynchpin of relations as it covers the three key pillars of 
economic, political and co-operation relations. The Agreement sets out a flexible but 
nonetheless institutional ised structure to manage relations. The highest level meetings are 
the EU-Mexico summits for Heads of State that are held every two years, in the margins 
of the EU-LAC Summits. These meetings give high-level Political guidance and impetus 
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to relations. The key decision-making body is the Joint Council which is at ministerial 
level. This Council meets as and when one or both partners indicate a willingness, which 
allows flexibility and an ad-hoc nature. The preparatory work of the Council is performed 
by the Joint Committee, which is made up of Senior Civil Servants. The Committee is 
itself structured with specific sub-committees to analyse key areas, and it meets on a 
rotating annual basis (Interview 13). Finally there is a Joint Parliamentary Committee that, 
like the EU-Mexico Summit meets every two years in the margins of the EU-LAC 
Summits. The overall structure combines the annual meetings of Senior Civil Servants, 
the ad-hoc ministerial meetings and the two-yearly meetings of Heads of States and 
Parliamentarians. On a day-to-day functional basis there is frequent interaction between 
EU and Mexican civil servants dealing with more immediate issues and questions. On the 
EU side there is an EU-Mexico Trade Coordinator within DG Trade who oversees 
relations as a whole in the trade field (Interview 13). 
The reasons why Mexico was the first country in the Western hemisphere with who the 
EU signed a comprehensive FrA are relatively straightforward from both the Mexican 
and EU perspectives. The EU, in its own literature, notes that the Agreement "testifies to 
the closeness and maturity of relations between the EU and Mexico. It reflects not only 
the country's rise to prominence on the international scene but the existence of common 
interests and shared values, particularly as regards democracy and human rights" 
(Commission 2005d: 48). A more conventional analysis indicates that the main 
motivation for the EU was economic bandwagoning, and for Mexico economic balancing. 
The EU and Mexico were driven by trade considerations, both linked to the US. In 1994 
the EU made clear its intentions to differentiate its approach towards Latin America, with 
special provisions for deepening relations with Mexico. This was because in 1994 
NAFTA came into effect and EU market share started to suffer in MexiC07 1, as well as 
being the year in which the Summit of the Americas decided to advance with FrAA talks. 
Not only was the EU losing trade to the US in Mexico as a direct consequence of 
" it must be noted that relatively speaking Mexico was not a major trading partner of the EU in the 1990s 
with on average 0.3% EU trade directed there, and with the EU representing about 15% of Mexican trade 
before NAFrA took effect (Commission 1999: 17) 
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NAFIrA but it was also facing the prospect of' deepening ITI'AA discussions. EU 
motivation was pure economic bandwagoning on the back of[IS strategy In the region. 
For Mexico an agreement with the EU offered the opportunity of"diversil'yl jig its external 
trade away from a heavy reliance on the US, and also a further opportunity to deepen its 
own econornic and trade modernisation. It is worth noting that Mexico was able to 
negotiate with the EU from a position ot'relative strength given that NAFrA had Arcady 
come into effect, underlining the main Mexican motivation ofeconomic balancing. 
The Global Agreement is a wide-ranging three pillar agreement 1-1 that governs all aspects 
of relations between the EU and Mexico. In the trade pillar the agreement covers the bulk 
of their interactions and also provides a specific dispute-settlernent mechanism. Issues, 
questions or disputes all have strong institutional channels and contacts to go through, 
making bilateral trade relations robust. Between 2001 and 2006 trade between Mexico 
and the EU grew by 40%, EU exports to Mexico increased 30% and Mexican exports to 
the EU increased by 19% (Dominguez 2006). In the political field the Agreement 
provides for structured and ad-hoc high-level dialogue on issues of' common interest and 
concern. The democratic clause and the European Initiative on Democracy and Human 
Rights have been important political elements that the Agreement has brought (Interview 
13). As Mexico also belongs to the two transregional EU - Latin American groups. the 
Rio Group and the EU-LAC Summits there is further opportunity to address common 
political concerns through these regional fora. Finally the co-operation pillar 
complements the interactions that the EU and Mexico have through the EU's horizontal L_ 
LAC programmes and country strategy papers. The Agreement has helped foster 
increased cooperation in a number of fields, notably in the environmental area, with a 
financial envelope of C56.2rn for the period 2002-6 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/external relations/iiiexico/iiitro/iiidex. htiii, accessed 31 July 2007). 
overall the agreement covers the inain areas of their interaction in a comprehensive and 
flexible structure. 
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EU - Chile 
Chile is the second, and most recent, country in Latin America to have signed a 
comprehensive Association Agreement with the EU, and as such represents the most 
advanced relationship that the EU has with any Latin American entity. Like Mexico, 
Chile adopted an FTA approach to global insertion as opposed to a regional approach, 
and also underwent accelerated free market reforms making it open and amenable to free 
trade agreements with external countries. Chile has the most extensive web of FrAs of 
any Latin American country, indeed of almost any country in the world. 
The EU signed a third generation agreement with Chile in 1990, which marked the 
official restart of bilateral relations between the two countries as military rule ended that 
same year. This first agreement was replaced in 1996 by an agreement strengthening co- 
operation in all areas, and above all providing for the establishment of a political and 
economic Association Agreement involving the complete liberalisation of trade. These 
negotiations began in April 2000 and were completed in November 2002 after ten formal 
negotiation rounds, resulting in a 1437 page Association Agreement that is extremely 
Comprehensive, covering political, trade and cooperation relations and which came into 
force in March 2005 The current institutional structure of relations is summarised in the 
table below; 
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Figure 3- 5 Structure of EU - Chile Relations 
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Source: Own Creation from www. cc. curopa. eu (accessed I December 2007) 
Institutionally EU relations with Chile are essentially the same, but more robust, than 
those the EU has with Mexico. The EU-Chile Summit for Heads of State provides high- 
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level political guidance and support every two years, meeting in the wings of the EU- 
LAC Summits. The Association Council, at ministerial level, is the highest decision 
making body and it meets on an ad-hoc, needs defined, basis. The Association Committee 
is the preparatory body for the Association Council and is staffed by Senior Civil 
Servants, meeting once a year on a rotating basis. This Committee is aided by sub- 
committees in specific fields. There is also an Association Parliamentary Committee and 
a Joint Consultative Committee, the latter of which is an important innovation from the 
Agreement with Mexico. It is a channel for dialogue between the Economic and Social 
Committee of the EU and its Chilean counterparts, hence a greater avenue for civil 
society engagement. 
The motivation for such a comprehensive agreement between two geographically and 
economically distant entities is relatively straightforward. Chile's association ties with 
Mercosur were the initial factor propelling negotiations, because it was assumed that 
Chile would join Mercosur and hence partake in an EU - Mercosur agreement. Once it 
became clear that Chile was not going to join Mercosur as a full-member the option of 
signing a similar agreement, given that the Commission had the mandate from Council, 
was open. This option of concluding an agreement with Chile was pursued, and proved to 
be comparatively easier than negotiations with Mercosur given its liberal open economy, 
foreign investor friendly regime, non-traditional agriculture and less developed industrial 
base (Grugel 2002a: 10). Business in the EU did not actively lobby for a FTA specifically 
with Chile. The priority for them was in actively pursuing the interlinked negotiation of a 
FTA with Mercosur through the Mercosur-Europe Business Forum (MEBF), to which 
Chile was originally linked (Interviews 3& 4). 
Of the EU Member States Spain, Italy, Germany and Portugal were the most interested 
given their direct business links to Chile (Interview 15). The only major risk to the 
Agreement came from the UK's threat to veto the Commission's negotiating mandate in 
retaliation for the EU's ban on British 
beef as a consequence of the BSE crisis. There was 
also one Chilean export sector that was 
in strong competition with EU production: wines. 
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7bis issue was resolved when Chile agreed to drop 'reserva' and 'chateau' descriptions 
from its wines, and to sell them as 'New World wines' (Grugel 2002a: 11). 
overall the trade provisions are very liberalisation orientated, especially in sectors such 
as services and investment where the Agreement is firmly WTO+. EU motivation seems 
to have been mostly the desire to use its negotiating mandate as issued by the Council, 
knowing that negotiations could be concluded relatively painlessly and quickly. It is also 
possible to cite one further reason for EU interest in Chile, that being the fact that the 
creation of NAFTA, and the resulting 64 percent rise in Mexico-US trade to the detriment 
of exchanges with the EU (Fazio 2001: 91) served as a 'wake-up call' to the EU of the 
dangers of not adopting a Latin American strategy, especially in the light of potential 
Chilean membership of NAFrA and plans for the creation of a FTAA (Barahona de Brito: 
5). EU motivation in signing an agreement with Chile was thus through a mixture of 
internal dynamics in using an existing mandate and economic bandwagoning, albeit of a 
slightly pre-emptive nature. 
For Chile the signing of an Agreement with the EU was an opportunity to establish a 
preferential agreement with its main trading partner and leading foreign investor 
(Interview 15), which fitted with Chile's open and liberal approach to global insertion. 
Signing an agreement with such a global political and economic heavyweight was an 
important economic and political lock-in tool. It also offered Chile an advantageous 
position towards the EU vis-A-vis the rest of Latin America. In political terms the 
Agreement offered important security for Chile through the 'democracy clause', which 
for a country that only exited military rule in 1990, was an essential element of stability. 
Overall the Agreement with Chile, with its sections on economic, political and co- 
operation issues created the primary conduit for relations. From a trade perspective 
Chile's imports to the EU have been diversified and no longer rely as much on copper, 
and EU exports to Chile have also risen, with new business opportunities being created as 
a result (Interviews 3& 4). The Commission reports satisfaction amongst its Business 
stakeholders with the Agreement, although many complain that it should be better 
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publicized and that Business should be given more Int'Orniation about tile possibilities It 
creates (Interviews 3& 4). The trade section is indeed very Innovative and ambitious as It 
involves the progressive and reciprocal liberalisation of' trade in goods over 11 lilaxiiIIIIIII 
ten year period. The Agreement also provides I'Or a free trade area in services and I'Or the 
fiberalisation of investment. Government procurement is to be reciprocally opened and 
there is provision for intellectual property right protection. Despite the bulk of' the 
provisions being econormc, the political aspects are very important as they encourage 
coordination of positions in the UN and other international f*ora. The Agreement 
-ply)I-itles. for strengthening qfthe political tlialogue between the Ell antl Chile through 
increasetl coorclinatioll of'Positions ... cooperation in thefight against terrorism ... (110 the 
dicilogue is enhancetl bY increasetl consultation wO involvenielit of (-il, il sociely" 
(Commission 2005d: 52). The Commission goes oil to cite the topics that have been high L- 
on the joint political agenda in the last few years; -politic(il, economic (II0 social 
sitlitition in Latin America, Chile's role in the UN SecuritY Council anil SecuritY Council 
I-efol-in, an(I Chile's involvement in a number qf pe(we keeping missions mWer the 
auspices of the United Nations and the EU" (idem. ). Despite this being a desired 
outcome there is little concrete evidence of increased coordination actually having takell 
place (Interview 13). 
In the cooperation field the Agreement is a crucial cornerstone of support tor Chile, and 
its drive for sustainable development. Since 2000 twenty two projects have been 
committed, at a total cost of F7.8m. The bulk of this (87%) has been committed to NGO 
projects and the majority of the rest to the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (Dominguez 2006: 8). Of the F34.4rn that the 2002-2006 Country Strategy Paper 
allocated to cooperation, practically all has now been allotted 
accessed 31 July 2007). 
Whilst it is too early to assess with any certainty the benefits of the EU-Chile Agreement, 
it is clear that given the depth of trade and investment liberalisation and the overall wide 
coverage, there should be solid gains for both parties. The Agreement has already started 
to help Chile in its attempts to diversify away from primary product exports. Testimony 
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to the success and depth of the relationship is the fact that the F11 and Chile have 
embarked oil auxiliary dialogue in diverse areas as they seek 10 1111-thCr enhance their 
relations. In March 2005 the partners met to start discussions Oil education policy. ill 
September 2005 they met to discuss social policies and employment, and ill Oc(ober 2005 
they signed an air transport agreement for the first timc. This shows how an Association 
Agreement with a flexible institutional structure and solid economic and political 
provisions call provide a springboard for a solid and dynamic relationship. 
EU - Brazil 
Whereas it was noted that both Chile and Mexico chose the FLA path towards insertion 
in the global econorny, Brazil chose a quite different path. Brazil chose the regional 
integration option, through Mercosur, to try and insert itself in the world economy, a 
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fundamentally different choice from that of its two fellow Latin American countries . 
This drive towards regional integration has meant that Brazil's relations with the ELI have 
been split between bilateralism and interregionalisni. 
The relationship between the EU and Brazil is very important for both partners. The EU 
is Brazil's largest trading, investment and cooperation partner and Brazil is the ELI's 
largest partner in Latin America 73 in trade and political terms 
(http: //ti-ade. ec. curopa. eLi/doclib/(Ioc. s/2006/septeiiibei-/tt-zidoc II 3359. pd . accessed 31 
July 2007). Both partners thus have a strong vested interest in their relationship. 
Institutionalised relations between the two countries started with a Cooperation 
Agreement in 1982, which was replaced by a new agreement in 1992. In addition to these 
agreements there have been important auxiliary agreements concluded on manioc imports 
in 1982 and 1986, trade in textiles in 1986, oilseeds in 1994 and science and technology 
in 2003. Other agreements nearing conclusion concern the nuclear sector and the areas of 
veterinary medicine and plant health which have an impact on trade (Interview 16). The 
EU moved to strengthen political relations with Brazil by proposing a Strategic 
For a short comparison of this differcm choicc scc Guedes de Oliveira 2006a 
Brazil is the EU's I I"' most important partner in global tcrms 
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Partnership in 2007, although this has yet to he finalised and signed. Bilateral rclations 
currently resemble the following: 
Figure 3- 6 Structure of EU - Brazil Relations 
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The figure above immediately reveals a sharp contrast to those for Mexico and Chile. The 
majority of relations, certainly the most important parts, are dealt with under the auspices 
of the Mercosur negotiations, reducing bilateral relations, in the main, to co-operation 
issues. Whilst the new Strategic Partnership, once signed and implemented will increase 
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political relations it will still leave trade relations with Brazil to he dealt with through 
Mercosur. The 2007 Strategic Partnership, which airns to enhance political relations, i I is all 
interesting development because previously political issues were exclusively dealt with 
through Mercosur. This potential Failing of' Mercosur, and of' Ell political dialogue With 
Mercosur, will be discussed in the Mercosur section of' this chapter an(] in the next 
chapter in more detail. The core of bilateral activity revolves around dCVClOl)InCI1t and co- 
operation issues, as well as the auxiliary dialogues. 
The main conduit for EU-Brazil relations is the 1992 Framework Co-opcration 
Agreement. This agreement enhanced the 1982 Cooperation Agreement and retained the 
structure for relations. The Joint Committee is the core decision making body that illeets 
on an ad-hoc basis at ministerial level. There are two key sub-coninlittees, one oil Science 
and Technology and one on Industrial Cooperation. At the 8"' Joint Committee meeting 
in 2002 both sides "enil)hasizetl theit- wish to consolltlate the Joint Committee (is the 
inain institutional inechanisin. loi- dialogue an(I co-opel-ati . Oil Oil topics Ofinittlial intel-est 1. 
(h tt p: //ec -eu ropax Li/e x tern al re 
I ati on. s/brazi 1/1 ntro/i ndex. ht in, accessed 31 July 2007). 
The 1992 Agreement contains little more than vague references to ways in which the two 
parties wish to enhance econornic cooperation through meetings, dialogue and other such 
events. At the 91h Joint Committee meeting, held in Brussels in April 2005, there were 
discussions on a wide range of topics concerning bilateral relations. The meeting 
identified the priorities for future dialogue as social issues, air transport, maritime 
transport and nuclear cooperation. The main output of relations is indeed sectoral or 
specific bilateral agreements, such as the ones listed earlier. There is a strong bilateral 
focus on co-operation, where the EU provides significant support. There is currently 
E180m invested by the EU in ongoing projects, with the environment representing the 
single largest sector recipient. The Brazil Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 sets two key 
priorities for cooperation; enhancing bilateral relations and the environmental dimension 
of sustainable development, for which it has al lotted C61 m 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/external relations/brazil/iiitro/iiidex. htiii, accessed 31 July 2007). 
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The main vehicle for economic relations with Brazil is Mercosur, whereas sectoral issues 
and cooperation aid are pure bilateral matters for relations with Brazil. The only grey area 
concerns political relations, which will now be discussed with both Mercosur and Brazil. 
In the 2007 document the Commission acknowledged that "the rapidly expanding Eu- 
Brazil relationship is currently based on the 1992 Framework Co-operation agreement, 
and the 1995 EU-Mercosur Framework Co-operation Agreement. nis inevitably 
restricts the scope and depth of our dialogue" (2007: 14). The Commission also goes to 
great length to stress that the EU - Brazil dialogue will not detract from EU - Mercosur 
relations, so at the rhetorical level there is clear deference to the interregional level of 
relations. It is likely that once signed and implemented the reality of political relations 
will be very heavily weighted towards the bilateral EU - Brazil relationship. 
From a political and trading perspective the fact that the EU has signed bilateral trade 
agreements with Chile and Mexico, and not Brazil, is curious. European Business is more 
interested in trading with Brazil than with any other country in Latin America as it is the 
largest and most developed market in the region (Eurochambres 2002: 7). There are, 
however, two important mitigating circumstances, firstly Brazil has not signed an 
agreement with the US, nor is one imminent, and secondly trade negotiations are solely 
the remit of interregional relations with Mercosur. The EU has prioritised the regional 
level of relations above trade considerations in this case, where no balancing or 
bandwagoning needs have arisen. 
The weak bilateral relationship with Brazil had become somewhat of an oddity before the 
recent attempt to upgrade political relations, given the importance the EU attaches to it. 
in a speech in Brazil, in September 2006, Commissioner Mandelson made direct 
comparisons between India, China and Brazil, alluding to the importance that the EU 
attaches to Brazil as a developing economy partner: "we look to Brazil, like China and 
India, to meet us, if not half way, then at least somewhere down the path to shared 
responsibility for, and shared contribution to, the global system we all need to sustain" 
(2006g: 7). In the same speech he outlined the key changes in the role of Brazil in world 
affairs, "openness, engagement, self-confidence and interdependence have been the 
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ewernal expression of this change. The creation of Afercosur and its ambitious 
liberalisation negotiations with the EU testify to this at a regional level; as does Brazil's 
leading role in the G20 Group in the WTO Doha negotiation at the global level" (2006g: 
3). These quotes highlight an important forum in which the EU and Brazil do have a 
crucial bilateral relationship; the WTO. The EU and Brazil are two of the key players in 
the current round of WTO negotiations, ensuring their close contacts on trade issues. The 
NVTO forum is the most important one for their bilateral trade relations given that it is 
attempting to address the issue of agriculture which is crucial for both partners. Aside 
from the auspices of the WTO the EU attaches importance to Brazil through Mercosur, as 
the Commission's Brazil Country Strategy Paper 2001-06 outlines very succinctly; 
"Brazil is a very special partnerfor the European Union, reflected by the on-going EU- 
Afercosur association negotiations aimed at establishing a strategic partnership between 
the two regions" (2002c: 3). All of these quotes show that the EU attaches great 
importance to Brazil, but principally through Mercosur. 
After little progress in interregional relations in recent years, the EU had started to 
indicate that their bilateral relations were not quite robust enough, something confirmed 
in the regional strategy document for Latin America of 2005, 'A Stronger Partnership 
between the European Union and Latin America', in which a section is entitled 
'Reflecting the specific role of certain actors in the region' (2005c: 17). Within this 
section it states "this is particularly the case for Brazil, with which the EU has only the 
bare bones of bilateral dialogue with no political dimension. This situation is no longer 
it, keeping with Brazil's rapid development as a global economic and political player. 
Brazil call take a lead role in regional integration: this remains the prime objective of the 
EU's strategy towards Mercosur" (2005c: 17-18). The EU recognised that its bilateral 
relationship with Brazil was weak given the preference for relations with Mercosur, and 
that this situation needed to change. In light of the role that the EU attributes to Brazil, 
and of the perceived weaknesses in bilateral relations, the Commission issued its 
Strategic Partnership Communication in May 2007. The Commission noted that "until 
recently EU-Brazil dialogue has not been sufficiently exploited and carried out mainly 
through EU-Mercosur dialogue ... The time has come to look at Brazil as a strategic 
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partner" (Commission 2007: 2). Whilst the Commission is careful to try and place this 
development within the EU-Mercosur environment, and stress that it is "committed to 
consolidating a solid political and econoinic relation with Afercosur as a block" (idem. ) 
there is no concealing the significance of the Communication. The Commission then sets 
out a series of areas for further consolidated cooperation between the 'strategic' partners 
such as strengthening multilateralism in the WTO and UN, promoting Millennium 
Development Goals, protecting the environment, cooperating on energy, enhancing 
stability and prosperity in Latin America and reinforcing their trade and economic 
relations (Commission 2007). Through this document the EU foresees a much more 
robust bilateral relationship with Brazil, elevating it to the level of the bilateral relations it 
has with Chile and Mexico in both political and developmental areas. 
Bilateralism - Conclusions 
Latin American countries followed very diverse paths to insertion in the global economy. 
Mexico and Chile both chose the bilateral option which has involved signing FTAs with 
all their major trading and political partners. Both countries are bilaterally linked to their 
regional partners through FrAs as well as to extra-regional partners such as the EU and 
US, amongst others. Both countries distinctive positions in the region, with such 
widespread economic and political links, put them at the cutting edge of bilateral FTAs. It 
is this strategic choice that has led, in both cases, to their signing extensive bilateral 
Agreements with the EU. The Agreements are not testimony to an EU strategic choice, 
but to the specific circumstances that have confronted the EU in each case, both of which 
have been related, to varying degrees, to the US. 
Brazil, on the other hand, chose a regional integration path to global insertion which the 
EU, given its strong support for regional integration, chose to prioritise. Whilst the 2007 
Communication from the Commission on upgrading bilateral relations with Brazil reveals 
a shift in EU priorities it does not broach the 
important trade negotiations pillar which 
remains interregional. The EU is finally addressing the anomalous situation of its main 
trade, political and cooperation partner in the region having one of the weakest bilateral 
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relationships, albeit simultaneouslY damaging its commitment to interi-c-ionalism. ELJ 
bilateral relations with Brazil will be it robust political. development and cooperation 
mechanism that will match, even supersede, the equivalent relations it has with Chile and 
Mexico, given Brazil's dominant position in the region. Importantly, however, as long its 
the interregional level does not deliver on trade negotiations, relations with Brazil will 
continue to lag those of' Chile and Mexico, who find themselves in it relatively 
advantageous position vis-a-vis their neighbour. 
The analysis ofbilateral relations has revealed the following points: 
Figure 3- 7 EU Bilateralism in Latin America 
agreements. The economic pillar is the most important pillar 
2. The EU uses the same institutional structure for bilateral relations: EU-Partner 
Summit (Heads of State, 2-years), Council (Ministers, ad-hoc), Committee 
(Senior Civil Servants, I -year), Sub-Committees, Parliamentary Forum (ad-hoc) 
3. The EU's desire to promote regionalism around the globe is so strong that it has 
deferred trade relations with its most important partner in the region to the 
interregional level 
4. If the country is a member of a regional grouping then bilateral relations will 
only concern cooperation, political and development issues 
The main motivation for the EU, and partners, has been economic balancing and 
bandwagoning 
6. The May 2007 decision from the Commission to form a 'strategic' bilateral 
relationship with Brazil whilst a logical upgrade to the outdated 1992 bilateral 
agreement is a simultaneous blow to EU relations with Mercosur and EU 
interregional strategy 
Source: own Creation 
The first two points relate to the comprehensive nature, content and structure of the 
Agreements that the EU has signed with Mexico and Chile. Both arc ambitious and 
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advanced three-pillar Agreements with similar structures. The structure, whilst 
institutionalised, retains a certain degree of flexibility as to when to meet, at what level, 
what to discuss and how to move forward. The most important body at an 
implementation and oversight level is the Committee level of Senior Civil Servants. 
Whilst they only officially meet once a year their level of contact is much higher, as they 
deal with issues on an informal ad-hoc basis (Interview 13). Chile has the most advanced 
and proactive institutional structure with the EU, which encompasses a wider remit of 
issues and actors. It is an example of how the flexible EU structure can be used positively. 
It is also interesting to note that this structure is the same as the ones outlined for 
interregionalism in the last chapter, showing that the EU employs the same structure at 
bilateral and interregional levels. 
The EU desire to promote regional integration around the world has led to their bilateral 
relationship with Brazil being very weak. This weakness coupled with slow, or stalled, 
Mercosur negotiations revealed a large inadequacy in EU strategy towards the region as 
EU-Brazil relations only dealt with cooperation issues. For this reason the EU, in May 
2007, decided to upgrade its bilateral relations with Brazil. This logical move now poses 
some important questions of interregionalism and of EU relations with Mercosur. 
The EU has had strategic choices to make with regard to bilateral relations in Latin 
America. The motivations for signing agreements with Chile and Mexico were strong 
relative economic positioning ones, both in relation to the US. Mexico was a case of 
economic bandwagoning in relation to NAFrA, and Chile was slightly different in that 
negotiations had commenced in the framework of relations with Mercosur, and were 
relatively easy to complete, albeit under in the shadow of US-Chile negotiations. 
Dominguez in his conclusion to his analysis of the two most advanced bilateral relations 
that the EU has with Latin America suggests that "the fact that both agreements portray 
an unquestionable relevance for Latin America 
does not mean that they represent a 
solution for Latin America. Instead .. they complement the political and economic 
reforms ... and their 
impacts are moderate" (2006: 1). EU support for Latin American 
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regional integration is also put into question by the bilateral agreements with Mexico and 
Chile, as Freres and Sanahuja note; 
"The signing of the agreements with Chile and Mexico has also added to the confusion. It 
is perceived that the European Union has awarded the most advantageous Association 
Agreements, which includefree trade, to the countries that reject integration and which 
have instead optedfor the United States hemispherical project. This perception may be 
either incorrect or biased, as it does not take into account that the signing of agreements 
with those countries is easier as it does not pose the technical problems raised in 
biregional agreements such as the one being negotiated between the EU and Afercosur. 
However, this perception exists and it leads to the idea that the European Union's 
strategy in Latin America is "reactive" vis-a-vis US initiatives, and that its primary 
, notivation is the defence of EU economic operators' interests. In the end, this affects the 
credibility of the EUs integrationist discourse" (2005: 46-7). 
The idea of the EU's regional integration rhetoric being called into question by perceived 
economic balancing motivations is an important issue. This section has shown that 
bilateralism is a very important, predominantly economic balancing and bandwagoning, 
strategic tool for the EU, albeit one that runs counter to supposedly overarching EU 
regional integration strategy. Whilst the EU favours dealing with regional groups, and 
will do so if possible, the recent move to strengthen bilateral relations with Brazil signals 
a shift towards bilateralism in the EU's relations with Latin America. It appears that if the 
interregional approach is not proving fruitful then the EU will consider a bilateral 
approach, although the EU will only consider the bilateral option when there are pressing 
relative economic concerns, such as the countries in question signing agreements with the 
EU's competitors. As Sanahuja and Freres suggest (2005: 46-7), this gives the EU the tag 
of being both inconsistent and reactive to US policy. 
Bilateralism, plays an important part in complex interregionalism, by completing relations 
with countries in a region that do not belong to regional groups. Bilateralism with 
countries in a region that belong to regional groups is usually weak and deals only with 
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cooperation, sectoral and mutual interest issues. In this sense bilateralism has deferred to 
the interregional level in complex interregionalism, although recent developments with 
Brazil show that bilateralism is the lowest common denominator in EU external relations. 
It has also become clear that EU motivations behind, objectives for and the structure to 
implement bilateral relations are very similar to those identified for interregionalism in 
the last chapter. EU developments with Brazil have been perceived as an inconsistency, 
or failure, of the EU to see through its interregional ambitions with Mercosur. Such a 
move by the EU to upgrade its bilateral relations with Brazil would conform to the 
pattern of relations noted in both Asia and Africa where the key countries are all singled 
out bilaterally. The EU still has open trade negotiations with Mercosur, which remain 
vitally important for both partners, something the next section will address. 
Interregionalism 
The second level of complex interregional relations to be analysed is that of 
interregionalism, the lynchpin of complex interregionalism and the level into which the 
EU invests the most effort and time. This section will analyse the role that 
interregionalism plays within complex interregionalism, having already noted that 
bilateralism, where possible defers to interregionalism. 
In Latin America a number of regional integration developments have come to the fore in 
the 1990s, some new and some rejuvenated 1960s vehicles. As the last section identified, 
the majority of Latin American countries embraced regionalism as a means to global 
insertion. The second wave brought to the fore a number of regional initiatives in Latin 
America, the key ones of which are outlined below: 
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Figure 3- 8 Key Regional Integration Vehicles in Latin America 
REGIONAL DATE, AGREENIENT TYPE 
AGREEMENT 
Central American 1960 - reformed 1991 Customs Union 
Common Market 
(CACM) 
Andean Community 1969 - reformed 1996 Customs Union 
(AC) 
Mercosur 1991 Customs Union 
Source: Own Creation from www. cc. curopa. cu (accessed I Deceinhcr 2(X)7) 
This table shows the three main regional groups that exist in LA today, each of' which 
will be addressed in turn in this section. From the EU's perspective the very emergence 
of these regional groups created a series of challenges and opportunities, to which 
interregionalism has been the main response. As was noted in the last section, the 
countries that are involved in these regional groups do not have comprehensive bilateral 
relations with the EU as their relations are dealt with at the regional leve 174 . All three 
Latin American groups are CUs 75 therefore they have the potential to have solid 
partnerships with the EU. 
The European Commission reiterated its support for regional integration in Latin 
America in its 2005 Latin America strategy docurnent, noting that "the EU supports the 
subregional integration processes with the abn qfconcluding association andfil-ee-trade 
agreements with Mercosiu- and opening negotiations on such agi-eements with the 
Andean Community and Centi-til Americii " (2005c: 15). The role of the EU as an 
74 Ref'crence to Figure 3-3 clarifies (he principal level at which the EU deals with Latin American countries 
" All three are CUs in theory and on paper. Reality is oltcii somewhat rnorc complicated 
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'external federator' was investigated ill the last chapter, but is reinforced ill reladon to 
Latin America as Freres and Sanahu. 1a quote all unnamed Commission source as saying. 
"oil sevet-al occasions we place(I big hopes oil the sti-ong emergence in the worhlwidc 
scene ofwhat coulil be terme(I a 'Distant West'" (2005: 54). it is this attempt by tile 1.1i 
to create a 'Distant West' that will be the focus of this section. it will allalyse tile 
relations of each of the three regional groups with the EU, to assess their structures, 
content and output. This exercise will allow comparisons with the bilateral level, which 
as already noted in the last section, appears in certain cases to undermine the EU's stated 
support for regional integration and hence i nterregional i sill. 
EU - Central American Common Market (CACM )76 
CACM became the first regional initiative in Latin America when the General Treaty oil 
Central American Economic Integration was signed in 1960. This initial treaty aimed for 
the creation of a common market, to be achieved within five years of' signing 
rade/caniertoc. asp, accessed 31 July 2007). Whilst this was not 
achieved and the project lapsed, CACM was the most creditworthy of the regional 
integration initiatives in Latin America in the 1960s. CACM ainis to reunite the isthmus 
of Central America under one structure, and as such laqguage. geography. culture and 
history favour such a manoeuvre given the region's close ties. 
The project was revived in 1991 and 1993 through the Tegucigalpa Protocol and the 
Guatemala Protocol. These protocols revised the project and laid the new foundations for 
the creation of a common market through the Central American Integration System, 
based on gradualism, progressivity and flexibility (Inter-American Development Bank 
2002: 28). Importantly the Tegucigalpa Protocol created a new judicial and institutional 
framework for the integration process. Following from this the Guatemala Protocol 
restated the aims, goals and objectives of the integration process. The main new objective 
to arise from this exercise was the stated aim of attaining an economic union, albeit at 
different speeds. 
76 For basic statistics on CACM see Appendix 6 
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77 CACM is currently a customs union with most intra-regional trade larit'l' I'l-cc . 
1'. 1 
Salvador. Guatemala and Honduras have joint custonis I'acilities and there has heel) 
significant progress in NTB con(rol and elimination to make trade easier and smoother. 
The common external tariff is a I'our tier taril'I' schedu IC71h. Intra_I. Cg lonal trade I'lows 
relatively freely under the agreements through a variety of' mcchanisms. although sonle 
barriers persist. Costa Rica. due to its own open economic policies 11, I(I stood alool- oI, tile 
custorns union until it decided to join In 2002 through the Grenada Declaration. hence 
creating a custorns union with the other members. Once the dispute wttlellient 
mechanism and the Trade and Investments Agreement are ratified (lie custorns union "-III 
be largely complete. 
The meeting of the Central American Presidents is the main organ of' the Integration 
System. There is one annual fixed meeting and the capacity for unlimited extraordinary 
meetings. There Is a six-month rotating presidency III and the ri conjunction with SICA 
integration system is run via the Council of Ministers whereby decisions on the running 
and implementation of Presidential Meetings are ensured. There is also a Central 
American Parliament and a Central American Court of' Justice which is a perniancrit 
institution that guarantees the judicial security of the integration process. The daily task 
of running the integration system falls to the General Secretariat of the Central American 
Integration System (SICA) and also to the Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty of' 
the Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) 
(http: //www. sice. oas. or, -, /Ti-iicle/siczL/PDý-/Te, _,. ProtODECA91-e. pdt, accessed 27 July 
2007). 
The renewed vigor and determination shown by CACM in the 1990s and the renovation 
of the existing architecture spread to the neighbouring countries in 1997 as Panarna and C- 
Belize signed framework agreements. CACM has signed FrAs with the Dominican 
-- With the notable exceptions of wheat flour, roasted Coffee. sugar. ethyl alcohol and disfillcd alcoholic 
beverages OADB: 28. NkAvv.. -, icc. org. oas. orL,, accessed 27 July 2007) 
1, Och on capital goods and raw materials, 5cl( on raw materials produced in Central America. 10('/( on 
intermediate goods produced in the sub region and 15(1( on goods for final consunip(ion. with the 
exceptions of clothing, 
footwear. lyres and agricultural products with sonic sectoral and national exceptions 
allowed (IADB: 28) 
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Republic, in 1998, Chile in 1999 and Panama In 2002 
(http: //www. sice. oýi,,. oi-ý,,, /a(, lrreeiiiciit, s-e. ýis , accessed 
27 July 2007). It is inip()1-tant to 
note that with the membership of Panarna and Belize the entire iSth111US is now covered 
by CAM an important regional milestone. With the isthinus covered by CACM and tile 
Andean Community and Mercosur covering the rest of' Latin America, except Chile. the 
EU was faced with a neat tri-polar region. 
The EU has a long-standing dialogue with the Central Americans through the Sall iosý 
dialogue that was set up in 1984. The dialogue was set up to address the severe political 
crisis that was threatening the region, and has subsequently been used as a high-level 
dialogue to address political stability, democracy and economic Issues. Oll the basis of 
the success of the dialogue and establishment of' peace and security ill the region the EU 
, signed a cooperation agreement with 
Central America in 1993, which it replaced with a 
political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement in 2003. The EU announced, in December 
2006, that it would open Association Agreement negotiations with Central America in 
2007. Relations with the region thus currently resemble the following figure. L_ 
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Figure 3- 9 Structure of ELJ - CACNI Relations 
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This figure shows that the EU and CACM enjoy a comprehensive relationship. especially 
in the political field, as well as a favourable trade regime. The current trade regime is a 
GSP regime and not a FTA, although this could change through negotiations for all 
Association Agreement. In the political dialogue pillar the regional level Is the most 
important one for all members of CACM, and this is governed by the 2003 Agreement. III 
this area the relationship is structured in much the sarne way as bilateral relations 
between the EU and Mexico and Chile, with ad-hoc Heads of State ineefings. annual 
Ministerial meetings and a Joint Committee of Senior Civil Servants overseeing relations 
through rotating annual meetings. The Ministerial level is of' particular interest because it 
is the longest standing relationship between the EU and Latin America, institutionalised 
from the San Jos6 dialogue in 1984 (Interview 2). The EU is the main provider ofODA 
to the region, although as noted in the last section, this is mostly done on a bilateral basis 
to address local projects. The EU does, however, provide significant aid to CACM as an 
entity. to fund regional projects 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/external relatioils/ca/rsp/07-1 3-en. pdf, accessed 27 July -1007). 
The original EU motivation for relations with CACM was political. as Santander 
observes: "the arnied con icts in Central America ... encouraged the EU to I)Iav a major 
fl 
political role as an international broker" (2005: 290). Through this the EU established 
regular and institutionalised dialogue, mostly at ministerial level. The relationship, from 
this political beginning, evolved into one principally based on cooperation, as 
Grabendorff notes "the tIrivingjorce behind the dialogue remaineil roote(I in the I)olitical 
dimension of coolmration - as eniphasise(I bY the EC - while its economic asI)ect - (? /' 
greater interest to the Central Americans - clearlY canie only secon(I" (1990: 85). 
Coupled to this is the fact that the EU has always preferred promoting regional solutions 
for Central America, providing aid to this end. As the Commission website notes "the 
sub-region has traditionallY received the largest share in both absolute an(I per calfita 
tetwis of European Commission co-operation with the Latin American region. An average 
of iF145 Inillion I)er annum has been granted over the I)eriod . 
11-oin 1995-2001 
(http: //ec. europa. cu/exteriial relations/ca/index. htm, accessed 27 July 2007). Indeed the 
2002-2006 Regional Strategy Paper from the Commission allocated F655m for 
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cooperation programmes in the region. although this was mostly attrihmed on an 
individual country basis (idern. ). Strict cooperation aid for CACM itself was only a 
fraction of the figure above, but remained an important stim. The cooperation and 
political aspects of' the relationship are very closely conriccled as the Ell has tried to 
ensure stability in the region. 
From a trade perspective the EU is Central America's second most important trade and 
investment partner after the US, with 12% and 46% trade respectively. whereas central 
America represents a mere 0.4% of FU external trade 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/external relations/ca/index. ht-ni, accessed 27 July 2007). This is all 
important reason why, for the EU, the political and cooperation nicchall I sills between 
CACM and the EU are so strong and that trade relations are not a priority. It is interesting 
to note that Grabendorff, in analysing why the EU was so heavily engaged in such a 
distant region of the world, concluded that "menibers with a sj)ecial interest 1.11 11 M0111 
ititlependent Eurolman role in world affairs were the most enthusiastic a(li-ocates (? f 
eiigagenient in Central Anierica" and that "the European Commission ... 
has p1aYe(I a 
prominent role throughout the thalogue not only with regar(I to its economic (lintension, 
bilt also as a participant with a clear cut political stant1poilit (I 99o: 89). Both of these 
themes, EU global identity and the drive of the Commission will he addressed in more 
detail in the conclusions to both this section and the chapter. 
Overall this section has demonstrated that the EU has a longstanding, structured and 
institutionalised relationship with Central America that reflects the needs of the realon. 
The relationship was borne out of political crisis and hence political relations are now a 
cornerstone of relations with the EU. From this a strong EU commitment to help stabilise 
the region in the aftermath of their crisis has arisen, hence strong cooperation funding and 
channels. There has been notably less incentive frorn an EU perspective for enhancing 
trade relations, although after pressure from the Central Americans the EU has proposed 
negotiations for a full Association Agreement which would encompass a FrA. In terms 
of substance there have been concrete achievements in both the political and cooperation 
fields, although more recent relations have tended to yield much more in terms of 
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cooperation. Whilst this section has painted a generally positive picture of CACM 
regional integration it must be noted that there are a multitude of outstanding issues 
surrounding the process, which has been far from linear. The importance of Presidential 
will and political drive remains the motor of integration at all levels, making the process 
inherently unstable. The EU has attempted to address this through aid, training, finances, 
the mere act of deepening relations and political support, but CACM's problems remain 
and it is far from being a coherent counterpart region. 
FU - Andean Community (AQ79 
Europe's first relations with a sub-regional group in Latin America came with the 
Cooperation agreement with the Andean Group in 1983. The Andean Community is itself 
the most institutionalised regional project in LA, with internal free trade applied to all 
products in all sectors, supranational institutions and developed external links and 
relationships. It is now the second biggest regional grouping in Latin America, covering 
the north-western corner of the sub-continent and it is economically interlinked, 
politically cooperative and institutionally rich. 
The Andean Pact was created by the Cartagena Agreement in May 1969, as an import 
substitution vehicle envisaging a customs union as a step towards a Latin American 
common market. Despite early promise and enthusiasm the Andean project lapsed, like 
many Latin American regional initiatives in the 1970s/80s. Rejuvenation started through 
the Quito Protocol of 1987 as the Andeans injected flexibility by loosening some of the 
obligations and commitments that threatened the very essence of integration (Inter- 
American Development Bank 2002: 28). This process of integration gathered pace in the 
1990s through the creation of the Andean Presidential Council, which held meetings 
every six months, adding political will and energy. A free trade area was created in 1992 
from the 1991 Barchona Act, and in 1996 the Andean Community was borne of the 
Trujillo Protocol, which founded a new institutional structure and aimed at a common 
79 For basic statistics on the AC see Appendix 6 
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market by 2005 Onter-Anierican Development Bank 2002: 28). The struclure is as 
follows: 
Figure 3- 10 Andean Integration System 
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Source: www. communid-adandina-org, (accessed I Dccember 2(X)7) 
The internal changes made in the 1990s created stronger, more flexible institutions, based 
on an EU type system where hierarchies were defined, all agencies were coordinated as 
well as the Andean Presidential Council being incorporated into the institutional structure. 
The structure created is the most ambitious LA has seen to date. It is a system whereby 
the highest political authority is the member state which is in turn incorporated into the 
Andean System of Integration, Andean Presidential Council and the Andean Council of 
Foreign Affairs. The hierarchical schema is as follows: Andean Presidential Council, 
Andean Council of Ministers of External Affairs, Andean Community Commission and 
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Secretary General of Andean Community, Tribunal 01' JLIStICe and Andean Parliamcnt. 
The similarities with the EU are clear in this all encompassing structure. 
The most distinguishing feature of the Andean Community is its supranat-onal- ity, 
. something no other 
Latin American regional initiative is even close to attai i, 111g. I ts 
supranationality cornes through "Direct Applicahillty- in that procedures do not need to 
be ratified at the national level as they bccorne valid once officially published 
(htti): //cii-c. sice. oas. oi-,,, /Aiidcaii/hk, -i-d e. as , accessed 29 July 2007). Through 
supranational law the Community possesses an effective lelgal systern of' admin'strative 
and Judicial courts. 
Whilst in theory a very robust structure the AC remains subject to integration worries. 
The theory of the AC has not been entirely translated into reality and national political 
will, usually presidential, still retains heavy influence over the process, making it subject 
to domestic political change in the member states. The customs union is also not I(X)% 
functional and internal dispute settlement is not optimal. The flawed customs union is a 
very important Achilles heel to further development, and to the AC defining itself as a 
single coherent actor. Peru is consistently an exception in trade matters. all of which has 
spawned a complicated maze of tariffs between members and their exception lists 
(Interview 7). Andean external relations are a further area of complication as members 
continue to negotiate bilaterally. Whilst the Andean Community speaks as a bloc in WTO, 
FIFAA and EU negotiations, members have negotiated bilaterally, for example Bolivia - 
Mexico in 1994, Peru-Mexico which is on-going, Peru-Chile in 1998 and Colombia- 
CARICOM in 1994. A final important development to address is that Bolivia and Peru 
are associate members of Mercosur and Venezuela formally left the AC to join Mercosur 
in 2006. This links to recent developments in South America concerning the idea of a 
South American Community of Nations (SACN), which would essentially involve the 
fusion of Mercosur and the AC into one entity. 
The EU has maintained regular contact with Andean countries since 1969, although it 
was not until 1983 that it first concluded a cooperation agreement. This remains the legal 
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basis for relations between the two partners, supplemented by the Regional Framework 
Agreement for Cooperation signed in 1993. The 1993 agreement expanded cooperation to 
economic, trade and development areas. It was also in the 1990s that the EU and the 
Andeans increased their political dialogue, cemented by the 1996 Declaration of Rome, 
which provides for ad-hoc presidential and ministerial meetings. The political and 
cooperation aspects of the relationship were institutional ised into one structure in 2003 
when the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the Andean 
Community was signed. Relations between the EU and the Andean Community currently 
resemble the following figure: 
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Figure 3- 11 Structure of EU - Andean Community Relations 
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Whilst this picture appears slightly more complex than that of relations with CACM, the 
institutional structure is very similar. The EU and AC have very strong political and 
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cooperation mechanisms and a faVOUrahle trade regime. Like CACM tile current GS11 
trade regime could become a IFTA through the Association Agreement negotiations 
started in 2007. In the political pillar the regional level is the most important and is 
structured in exactly the sarne way as relations with Mexico. Chile and CACM. with ad- 
hoc Heads of State meetings, annual Ministerial meetings and a Joint Coninlitice of 
Senior Civil Servants overseeing relations through rotating annual mcclings. The 
cooperation pillar, as with CACM, concentrates on development Coopcration with the 
AC as an entity, and in helping regional integration and projects. This also results in the 
bulk of the aid channeled to the AC going through bilateral relations. 
A key aspect of relations that needs to be highlighted is the role of the fight against drugs. 
AC is already on a GSP Drugs regime, granting them preferential access to the EU, as 
well as benefiting from intensified political dialogue on this issue, as indicated by the 
presence of a tailored EU-AC High Level Specialised Dialogue on Drugs, created ill 1995. 
This is an annual meeting where both partners address practical issues and discuss how 
they can jointly tackle them. In the cooperation pillar the EU devotes all important 
portion of its resources into tackling drugs related issues. all of' which makcs dril"s all 
integral, and idiosyncratic, element of the relationship. 
in trade terms the Andeans represent 0.817c of EU external trade, while the EU represents 
15.517c of Andean external trade, making it the AC's second most important partner after 
the US (http: //ec. europa. eu/cxtei-iiiil relýitioiis/aiideaii/intro/index-litiii. accessed 28 July 
2007). Trade has not been a priority issue for the EU. except in relation to drugs. The 
potential Association Agreement would alter the trade pillar of relations, although under t, 
the current GSP Drugs regime the Andeans already have duty free access to over 9017c of 
the EU market (idem. ). 
In terms of cooperation the EU is the region's main development assistance provider. For 
the period 2000-2006 the EU pledged C408m to the Andean region and it has adopted 
programming for a further F713rn III the 2007-2013 period 
(http: //ec. curopa. eu/externalrelations/aiidean/iiitro/iiidex. htiii, accessed 28 July 2007). 
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Of the 2000-2006 figure only E27m was attributed directly to the Andean Community as 
an organisation, with the remaining amount dealt with on a bilateral basis. The 
cooperation pillar of interregional relations only deals with strictly interregional issues. 
Overall the conclusion for EU-Andean Community relations is very similar to that for the 
EU's relations with CACM, in that there is a longstanding, institutionaliscd and 
structured relationship. The specific focus of relations has been on the political and 
cooperation pillars, notably surrounding the issue of drugs. The prospect of an 
Association Agreement will bring the trade pillar into line with the other two pillars, and 
offer a single Agreement to house all relations between the two partners. As with CACM 
a major EU worry is related to AC regional integration, notably the essential counterpart 
quality of having a solid customs union (Interview 5). 
F, U - Mercosur 
80 
The final EU-Latin American interregional relationship to be analysed is the last one that 
the EU initiated within the region, and the one that is now the most advanced and 
prominent, EU-Mercosur. Mercosur is the single most important and powerful Latin 
American regional initiative, representing the world's third largest regional integration 
agreement area and acting as the economic and political hub for the entire region. 
Through its negotiations with the Andean Community and their vision of a SACN, and its 
own geo-political positioning, Mercosur has become an important global player. 
Mercosur has important regional historical precedent, dating back to a 1940 Customs 
Union between Argentina and Brazil. This idea was reinitiated in 1985 through the 
Programa de Integracdo e Cooperacdo Brazil-Argentina (PICAB), which was a large step 
towards regional reconciliation and peace. In 1988 further consolidation took place with 
the Tratado de Integracdo Brazil-Argentina, creating the concrete foundations of 
Mercosur (de Oliveira 1998: 10-14). The importance of these precedents is not without 
- ----------- 
" For basic statistics on Mercosur see Appendix 6 
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significance in establishing harmony between two previously hostile neighhours, 
allowing peaceful and constructive dialogue to be built. 
Mercosur was created in March 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay with 
the signing of the Treaty of Asunci6n. It had a very ambitious initial prograinnic borne of' 
political desire that included the creation of a free trade area by 1994, a customs union by 
1995, and eventually a Common market 
(littp: //www. sice. oas. oi-,,, /ti-ade/iiii-csi-/iiii-csi-toc. asp, accessed 12 December 2005). Whilst 
Mercosur has still not achieved the status of a common market it has made significant 
progress over its short life-span. In 1994 the Treaty of Ouro, Preto created the institutional 
structure that Mercosur still uses, providing a frarnework for the expansion of the 
enterprise (http: //www. sice. oýts. oru/trýide/iiii-csi-/oui-oLi/iiidex. itsi), accessed 12 December 
2005). On I January 1995 a custorns union was formally put into place, and in 1996 
Association Agreements were signed with Chile and Bolivia establishing free trade areas. 
In 1998 'Political Mercosur' was created as a formal mechanism for political consultation, 
in an attempt to address the political necessities that Mercosur's advancement required. 
The potential for the expansion of Mercosur to become what its name suggests, the 
Common Market of the South, has always been an underlying objective, as Article 20 of 
the Asunci6n Treaty provides for the adhesion of other countries, principally members of 
ALADI, in a system based on open regionalism. This underlying theme of unifying South 
America has recently taken the shape of SACN discussions. 
The two main institutions within Mercosur are inter-governmental, the Common Market 
Council (CMC) and the Common Market Group (CMG). The Council is composed of 
Ministers for Foreign and Economic Affairs. The Common Market Group is the same 
members plus representatives of central banks. They meet whenever necessary but at 
least once a year, with a six-month rotating presidency system. The Common Market 
Group has the task of enforcing the treaty and monitoring compliance, making it in effect 
the executive organ. Aside from the basic inter-governmental structure, there are two 
collegiate consultative bodies, the 
Joint Parliamentary Commission and the Economic 
and Social Consultative Forum. 
The former is a representative organ of the parliaments of 
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member countries which is composed of an equal IlUmber of represcmatives from each 
Mercosur country designated by their respective parliaments. Me I-COSUr has no notion of 
supranationality, and the highest body, the CMC, makes its decisions by consensus with 
all four partners present (littp: //www. sice. ozis. org/trýi(Ic/iiii-csi-/oiii-oi)/()tii-oi) e. asp, 
accessed 12 December 2005). 
Mercosur functions on an intergovernmental basis with an administrative secretariat 
based in Montevideo which is entrusted a purely documentation and coordinating 
function. Strictly speaking the secretariat is the only permanent common body of' 
Mercosur. This manner of driving the Mercosur enterprise implies that there is strong 
leadership by Heads of State and that dornestic political will is a pre-requisite to advance. 
This issue, of 'Presidential Mercosur, as analysed in detail by Malarnud (2001,2003b 
and 2005a), will be addressed in the next chapter. 
The EU has been a strong supporter of Mercosur frorn the very outset, signing an 
Interinstitutional Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur to provide technical and 
institutional support just one year after its inception. The EU then signed an Interregional 
Framework Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur on the 15 December 1995. which 
came into force on I July 1999. In 1999 the EU and Mercosur agreed to start negotiations 
for an Association Agreement. Meeting in Portugal in February 2000 it was agreed that 
these negotiations should be global and cover all the areas of' their political, econornic 
and trade relations and all the areas of cooperation 
ro/index. hini. accessed 28 July 2007). 
In the space of only eight years relations between the EU and Mercosur had advanced at a 
very rapid pace, to the point of signing an Association Agreement. Such an Agreement 
would create the world's largest FTA and the most comprehensive example of 
interregionalism to date, hence the widespread interest in the negotiations. As Peter 
Mandelson recently noted, "the EU-Mei-cosw- negotiations ai-e about mot-e than cl-elitilig 
thefirstfi-ee ti-ade agreement in the wot-W connecting two i-egions. Obviously, we suppoi-t 
the (ýOjjsojitjation of Met-cositij'Oi- its own sake, because ive believe i-egional intep-ation 
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is goodfor economic development - and a trade deal would reinforce this. " (2006g: 6). 
Specific negotiations have been taking place since 2000 to establish such an Association 
Agreement, but talks have been deadlocked since late in 2004. EU - Mercosur relations 
currently resemble the following; 
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Figure 3- 12 Structure of EU - Nlercosur Relations 
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This figure paints a more complex and intense picture than any of the other bilateral or 
interregional relationships, although the core structures remain the same given the 
presence of the three pillar structure. The only major difference is in relation to Political 
relations, where there is notably no institutionalised Heads of State level of relations. The 
EU-Mercosur Summit is not the same as it is for other relationships, in that it is not 
uniquely for Heads of State. At the EU-Mercosur Summit held in Austria on the 13 May 
2006 there were no Heads of State present, indeed it was more like a Ministerial. This 
apparent confusion of who meets in which forum is a common feature of EU - Mercosur 
relations. The presence of lengthy ongoing Association Agreement negotiations has 
meant that there have been a large number of meetings between ministers and officials, 
many of which have served double purposes given that the participants are often the same 
people who look after different areas of the relationship (Interviews 2& 7). 
Relations are currently governed by the 1995 Interregional Framework Cooperation 
Agreement with the Joint Committee being the entity with responsibility for overseeing 
interaction. The Joint Committee has met formally on fourteen occasions (Interview 16). 
The main thrust and activity in relations since 1999 has, however, been in the negotiation 
of the Association Agreement, and specifically in the negotiation of the trade and 
economic pillar of this agreement. There have been thirteen formal negotiation rounds 
between 2000 and 2004 which have not led to an agreement being formalised, and the 
bulk of these have been concerned with the economic and trade pillar. Interviews with 
DG External Relations have revealed that both the cooperation and political pillars are 
based on the EU-Chile Association Agreement, and whilst there is some disagreement on 
certain issues both pillars were essentially 90% agreed very quickly in negotiations 
(Interview 1). Within the current structure it is important to note that the political pillar 
was particularly important as the EU had insisted on only dealing with Mercosur at the 
regional level. This situation changed in 2007 with the publication by the Commission of 
its intention to create a 'Strategic Partnership' with Brazil, mainly to address their lack of 
political relations. 
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In trade terms 81 the EU is Mercosur's main trading partner with almost 2314 of' Its 
external trade, as well as being its main investor. MercoSLir represents 2.8(Z( of' total FII 
imports and 1.8% of total EU exports, making it an important developing market l'or the 
EU (http: //ec. eiiropa. cLi/cxteriial rel ations/niercosur/i 11 tro/I ndc x. lit in. accessed 29 July 
2007). These trade statistics provide one reason why the Ell has been l'aster to engage 
Mercosur in Association Agreement negotiations than either CACM or the AC. As it 
currently stands, until Association Agreement negotiations are complete, the Ell grants 
Mercosur countries GSP status, which is far less advantageous than the status both Chile 
and Mexico enjoy. 
The cooperation pillar of the relationship is very strong as the EU and N4crcosLir have 
many common areas in which to cooperate, as defined by the 1995 Interinstitutional 
Agreement. For cooperation projects financial assistance only pertains to Mercosur and 
not the individual countries, as cooperation aid is dealt with on a hilateral basis. The E[I 
attributed IF48m in the period 2000-2006 to Mercosur as a regional project, which 
compares to the IF64m it attributed to Brazil bilaterally for the same period 
(http: //ec. europa. eulexteriial-rel, itioils/iiiercosur/iiiti-o/iiidex. litiii, accessed 29 July 2007). 
The C48m was pledged to support Mercosur's institutions. to help Mercosur complete its 
internal market and also to stimulate civil society participation in the Mercosur project. It 
is worthy of note that EU cooperation aid to Mercosur is almost the same as that to 
Mercosur members in the 2000-2006 period: Argentina F65.7rn, Paraguay C51.7rn and 
Uruguay FI8.6m (idern. ). The EU is the largest single provider of aid to Mercosur as an 
entity in its own right. 
politically the EU and Mercosur have established regular dialogue which airns, as stated 
in the 1995 Interinstitutional Agreement, to "consolidate closet- i-elations between the EU 
and Mei-cosw"' (1995: 3). The importance of political dialogue has increased given the 
role that Mercosur is currently playing in other global fora such as the UN and WTO. The 
EU and Mercosur have many common issues in global political terms although it is not 
clear to what extent their increased dialogue has facilitated any agenda-setting through 
" Statistics for 2003 
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joint actions or positions. Joint Communiquds from EU-Mercosur meetings, be they 
senior officials or ministers, highlight many issues that both partners have a vested 
interest in, but proffer little evidence of joint action. 
Overall the EU and Mercosur have a close and active relationship which has progressed 
quickly since Mercosur was created in 1991. They have a formal institutional structure 
that allows regular contact at all levels, and they interact even more on an informal basis 
(Interview 1). The structure is flexible, allowing for the ebbs and flows that the 
relationship have endured. The EU has supported Mercosur as a regional integration 
project from its very inception, and regional integration remains high on the agenda of all 
meetings between the two partners. In political terms the main dialogue that the EU had 
with all Mercosur members was through the interregional level, which added greater 
importance and weight to the Mercosur project. This position is now somewhat unclear in 
the light of bilateral developments between the EU and Brazil. The main thrust of 
relations at the moment is on negotiations for a free trade area, which have been 
underway since 2000. By choosing to prioritise the interregional level for trade 
negotiations the EU again placed special significance in Mercosur as a regional 
integration partner, something that could be in jeopardy if negotiations do not bear fruit 
in the future. Relations have in effect been gridlocked since 2004 due to stalled trade 
negotiations within the overall Association Agreement negotiation, something that the 
next chapter will address in detail. 
interregionalism - Conclusions 
11is section has shown that the EU has advanced relations with the three main regional 
groupings in Latin America, covering almost the entire region at an interregional level. 
As of 1999 for Mercosur, and 2007, for the Andean Community and CACM, the EU has 
been negotiating Association Agreements. The accomplishment of these three 
negotiations would bring interregional relations to the same level as the bilateral relations 
with Mexico and Chile. As it currently stands, however, the following conclusions can be 
drawn from the analysis for interregionalism: 
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Figure 3- 13 EU Interregionalism in Latin America 
1. Interregional relations are comprehensive EU designed 3-pillar agreements. The 
strongest pillar is that of political dialogue, and the weakest pillar the trade one 
2. The EU uses the same structure for all interregional relations: EU-Partner 
Summit (Heads of State, 2-years), Council (Ministers, ad-hoc), Joint Committee 
(Senior Civil Servants, I -year) and Sub-Committees. This structure is the same 
as that for bilateral relations 
The EU directly promotes regional integration by pledging important levels of 
financial, technical and educational support. The EU also indirectly promotes 
regional integration by interacting with regional groups 
4. The main motivations for the EU are promoting regional integration, and in the 
case of Mercosur, economic and trade related 
The main motivations for the three Latin American regional groups are a mix of 
political, economic and cooperation factors 
Source: Own Creation 
This table highlights that the structure and content of relations at the interregional level is 
the same as that of the two advanced bilateral relationships. There are three pillars and a 
hierarchy of institutionalised and ad-hoc meetings. It must be noted that the meetings that 
are represented in the figures, as much for interregional as for bilateral, are only the tip of 
an iceberg. For instance the negotiating rounds associated with the EU-Mercosur 
Association Agreement are all preceded by negotiating coordinators meetings and other 
senior level meetings, none of which are covered in the figures (Interview L, 1 16). Add to 
this the informal contacts that occur weekly, if not daily and this shows that institutional 
contact is denser than it appears. Frorn a structural and content basis the relationships are 
formed in the same ways, to discuss a similar spectrum of issues. 
Within the interregional level the strongest pillar is the political one, although for 
differing reasons. In the case of CACM the political pillar was the foundation of the 
relationship as it was created as a channel for the EU to act as a Political broker "I 
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helping address the pressing needs of the region. In this sense the importance of the 
political pillar addresses the specific needs of the relationship. It is the case that strong 
political dialogue is needed in all three relationships as all three regional groups are 
fledgling political entities, so strong dialogue with the EU legitimises and strengthens 
them. In this sense the political dimension of interregional relations is different from the 
needs at a bilateral level. The structure of political relations at the interregional level is 
the same as for advanced bilateral relations, and allows for regular dialogue and 
discussion. 
The thrust of the cooperation pillar is tilted towards regional integration and the regional 
body, given that specific country cooperation is dealt with at the bilateral level. This 
regional integration cooperation aspect is important, as the EU, through the Commission, 
has given all three regional groups a great deal of technical assistance related to regional 
integration. It has offered, and given, help with training, information technology, 
documentation and networks (Interview 1). From this very basic level of infrastructure 
the Commýission has also pledged support and funds to help more theoretical levels of 
regional integration through seminars, exchanges and conferences. The EU has also sent 
missions to Latin America to help with specific issues, one such example being the EU 
mission sent to Mercosur to help train customs officers in their dealings with a common 
customs system (Interview 16). As Santander suggests, all of this has "enabled the EU to 
erport its regional governance model and increase its reputation as an international 
actor" (2005: 292). The importance of this technical assistance should not be understated, 
and when added to the political and institutional support already given by the EU, it 
forms a powerful set of regional backing. 
In stark contrast to the two most advanced bilateral relationships that the EU has in Latin 
America the weakest pillar of all three interregional relations is the economic/trade pillar. 
All three groups only benefit from GSP regimes in their trade relations with the EU. This 
is due to a combination of factors that are slightly different in the case of the AC and 
CACM from that of Mercosur. The major difference is that the first two groups are not 
major trading partners of the EU and thus the incentive from an EU perspective for trade 
194 
relations has been relatively small. In the case of Mercosur the motivation for trade 
relations has been evident from the inception of relations, but a solution to negotiations 
has proved elusive. A further complication has arisen from the levels of regional 
integration needed to negotiate a FrA with the EU. Whilst all three regional groups arc at 
different levels of integration, and all have the formal aim of constituting common 
markets, none are as yet solid customs unions. All three are currently at the theoretical 
stage of a customs union, but in reality all three are far from perfect customs unions. 
Their common external tariffs are either in development (CACM), reformulation (AC) or 
have serious perforations and exceptions (Mercosur) (Interview 16). For the three groups 
to represent solid, coherent and equal partners for the EU to negotiate with both their 
overall integration and their economic integration need to be advanced. The trade pillar, 
despite being the strongest pillar in the strategy, is in all cases the weakest Pillar in action, 
which is a reflection of both the economic motivations and the implications of regional 
integration on trade negotiations. Regional integration also explains why the political 
pillar is the strongest pillar and that the cooperation pillar is primarily concerned with 
helping the regional initiative. 
These three groups have all taken the regional route to global insertion, but not as it 
would be understood in the EU. Freres and Sanahuja call it "light and selective 
regionalism" that they suggest "does not have the necessary social support and is not 
very effective in terms of ensuring an agreed upon strategy" (2005: 8). They continue 
their criticism adding that "government agendas and trade negotiations pursue different 
goals which on occasion belie the declared commitment to regional 
integration ... perceptions on thefuture of 
integration are very different" (idem). This 
relates to the fact that the EU and the three regional groups in Latin America are 
inherently different, as Malamud expresses in relation to Mercosur "the reality of 
Afercosur is stillfarfrom that of the European Union " (2005b: 64). This is a key reason 
why interregional relations lag bilateral relations, especially in the trade domain. This 
issue of the divergence in regional integration between the EU and Latin America will be 
taken up in greater detail in the next chapter. The lack of progress in interregional 
relations in recent years, especially in negotiations between the EU and Mercosur, 
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coupled with the issues that surround their respective levels of regional integration, has 
led Freres and Sanahuja to summarise that: 
"Tilis situation has led to some players pointing out that the European Union ought to 
change its strategy: once and for all it should certify the "end" of Latin American 
integration, leaving the regional institutions to their own devices, and back a new policy 
where trade is concerned referring to the IVTO framework; and on the political front, it 
should be committed to a bilateral relationship in which the "anchor countries" are 
given priority, privileging them with a more favourable treatment in tenns of policy 
dialogue, and giving legitimacy to their respective subregional leaderships. This strategy, 
however, does not solve the problem and would have considerable costs, ill view of the 
fact that it delegitimises the previous actions of the European Community in this field, 
causing the other countries to reject it, and it has been explicitly rejected by such players 
as the European Parliament " (2005: 47). 
ibis quote is symptomatic of a wider questioning of the effectiveness, and value-added, 
of interregionalism, based on the criticism of regional integration. This leads to questions 
as to whether the recent 'Strategic Partnership' with Brazil is not a move towards a more 
Asia/Africa model in Latin America, promoting key strategic bilateral relations with the 
region's leading country. Institutionally and structurally interregional relations resemble 
advanced bilateral relations hence they have an adequate framework. The key issue does 
riot appear to be the strategy, nor the mechanism for implementation, but the nature of the 
local 'partners' for the EU, or their ability to live up to this status. Analysis of their 
founding treaties and aims suggests that they are coherent 'partners' for the EU, but in 
reality their ability to formulate agreed actions and implement them causes problems in 
all three pillars of relations. Many of the summaries of interregional meetings between 
the EU and their three partners only provide statements such as 'reaffirmed cooperation', 
'highlighting the importance', 'reiterating support', 'underlining the importance of, none 
of which adds anything concrete to relations. Bland and vague Joint Communiquds point 
towards partners either not willing, or not able, to bind themselves into any new concrete 
commitments, something the next chapter will look at in more detail. 
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Transrel, l, ionalism 
The third and final level ofcomplex intcri-q-, lonallsin is that oftransi-q-, lonall, II le Ijos 
recent level of' relations to inatenalise between the Ell and Latin America. 
Transregionalisin is not as well documented as In terregi onal 1 sill, leading Ridand to 
observe that, "similarli, unclear is the I-Ole Of recentiv convene(I SIIIIIIIIII. V such (I. V ... IIIv 
EU-Liitin America Summit- (2002a: I ). As noted it, tile last chapter EU transreglonal I Sill 
is an umbrella mechanism that the EU operates Ill three world regions. Africa. Asia and 
Latin America. This level of relations was first created in Asia 111 1994 before then being 
exported to relations with Latin America in 1999. As already noted in the first two 
chapters the transregional level of relations is in no way comparable to bilateral aild 
interregional relations. It is important to reiterate that transregionalisin is a summit driven 
relationship that deals only in dialogue, making it fundamentally different from the 
previous two levels. Nonetheless it is important to analyse the role of' this umbrella 
relationship In Latin America, and this section will address tile two principal 
transregional fora that exist in EU - Latin American relations: 
Figure 3- 14 EU - Latin America Transregionalism 
EU - Rio Group (1990) 
Europe - Latin America & Carribean Heads of State Summit (1999) 
Source: Own Creation from ýk " ýý. cc. curopa. CLI (accessed I December 2(X)7) 
The EU - Rio Group relationship does not belong to the later wave of transregionalisni 
mentioned in the last paragraph, as it was a precursor transrergional forurn that existed 
between the EU and Latin America since 1990. It will be considered alonor with the EU- 
LAC Summit that was initiated in 1999 that has now been held four t"Illes. most recently 
in 2006 in Vienna, Austria. 
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The analysis of hilateralism and interreponalism in Latin Aillcricýl L- I has revealed it 
relatively complete framework of relations across the threc pillars of' trý, (Jc. 1)()Iitic. s j, 11(l 
cooperation. It is now important to analyse the coniplemcntary role that transregi 11011 
plays in the overall picture of complex interregionalism. 
EU - Rio Group 
The first of the two transregional fora to be analysed is the Rio Group as it was tile first to 
come into being. The Rio Group was created in 1986 by the fusion of' the Conladora 
Group and the Support Group, which equated to a membership of' Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil. Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venczuela. Uruguay 
and Caricom 
(http: //www. iiii-e. c, rov. br/c. dbrasil/itiiiiiýti-ýity/ýý, eb/iii(, iles/relext/iiii-e/oi-, -, re,,, 
/gi-uporio/iil)[-e. ', cll 
t. htill. accessed I August 2007). The group was created to act as a cou nterwel gilt to tile 
Organisation of Arnerican States (OAS). given OAS dominance by tile [IS Ontervic%v 5). t- 
In 2000 Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua all 
joined. It became the principal mechanism for political consultation at the regional level. 
The Group participates actively in discussions of an international nature hence it is 
recognized as a legitimate entity by other actors. including Canada, Japan and India who 
all have relations with the Rio Group. 
The original name of the group was that of 'Permanent Mechanism of' Political 
Consultation and Coordination' 
t. htrn, accessed I August 2007). The Group discusses regional political issues and 
international issues that concern the Latin American region, providing a unique forurn for 
Latin America to meet, consult, discuss and draw up common positions and actions. The 
major objectives of the Rio Group were established in the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro 
in 1986, and were wide-ranging in their scope, expand and systematize political 
cooperation, coordinate common positions, present appropriate solutions to the issues and 
conflicts affecting the region and provide momentum, through dialogue and cooperation, 
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to the initiatives and actions undertaken to improve inter-American relations (idem. ). It is 
a loosely structured Group with no permanent institutional structure, having only a 
rotating pro-tempore secretariat that passes to the country presiding over the group on a 
six-monthly basis. Each NIS has permanent representatives to the Group and there arc 
regular ministerial meetings. Overall the Group relies heavily on the annual summits of 
Heads of State to provide input and direction. As Matthews concludes: "GRIO is 
composed of 19 member countries front across Latin America and the Caribbean and, 
although it is not an institutionalised body, its annual sunintits provide a productive 
regional politicalforunt " (2006: 2). 
Relations between the EU and the Rio Group were institutionalised by a declaration made 
in Rome on 20 December 1990. The two sides met for the first time in Luxembourg on 
26 and 27 April 1991, and since then meetings have been held annually in Europe or 
Latin America. Relations resemble the following: 
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Figure 3- 15 Structure of ELJ - Rio Group Relations 
EU - Rio Group 
[-Týýrade/Economic I 
Political 
I 
Rome Declaration 
1990 
13"'2006 
12 Ih May 2005 
11 th Mar 2003 
1 ()Ih Mar 2001 
9111-2000 
811,1999 
7"' 1998 
6"' 1997 
5"' 1996 
4"' 1995 
3`1 1994 
2"" 1993 
1 "Apr 1991 
Source: Own Creation frorn www. ec. curopa. cu (accessed I December 2(X)7) 
Co-operation 
The Rio Group was used by the EU as a forurn to interact politically with Latin America 
as it was the only regional forurn already available. This was made clear by the 
Commission in its 1995 publication 'The European Community and Latin America: The 
Present Situation and Prospects for Closer Partnership 1996-21000' when it noted that 
relations with Latin America took place at three key levels ( 1995d: 3): Sub-continental - 
Rio Group as of 1990, Sub-regional - San Josý since 1984 and Bilateral. These three 
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levels refer clearly to the three levels under investigation in this chapter on complex 
interregionalism. The reference to the Rio Group being the key sub-continental group 
was an accurate reflection at the time of its being the only sub-continental political forum. 
The Commission document went on to note that "Needless to say a Union strategy 
ainied at strengthening relations with Mercosur, Alexico and other Latin American 
regions cannot be seen as an alternative to the dialogue with the Rio Group. It should 
instead be considered as a means of deepening and extending that dialogue, within which 
the Community's interests deniand that it recognise and take account of regional 
specificities" (1995d: 4). At this specific point in time the EU was focusing on the Rio 
Group as the primary conduit for relations with Latin America. 
Despite this stated focus on the Rio Group it was relations at the sub-regional level that 
were increasingly active and important in the mid-1990s. Existing integration 
mechanisms were updated and institutionalised and new channels for political dialogue 
were created. The San Josd Dialogue, the oldest political forum, was renewed in Florence 
in 1996, with a Common Solemn Declaration that outlined an agreement to ministerial 
meetings every two years with intermediate meetings between SICA and the EU Council 
troika. AC - EU political dialogue was formally initiated in 1994 following a Framework 
Agreement of the same year. This was followed shortly afterwards, in 1995, by the 
Interinstitutional Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur, which also updated its political 
pillar. 
Despite all these sub-regional initiatives the Rio Group retained relevance as the only 
sub-continental forum for discussion. Throughout the 1990s a series of problems struck 
the EU - Rio Group relationship, the main one of which was that it was intended to be a 
platform for EU-LA relations encompassing the whole continent, but not all Latin 
American countries were members of the Rio Group (Interview 2). The Group also had a 
wide set of aims and objectives which led to little concrete action in real terms, reducing 
its usefulness as a forum for action. The Group's desire to tackle and solve problems and 
coordinate positions, be that for regional issues or international fora, proved illusive, a 
further failure to capitalise on potential agenda setting abilities. As a forum for discussion 
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it remains an invaluable strategic option for meeting and forging relations, as well as for 
the formation of a regional consciousness. These reasons have effectively ensured that 
the EU - Rio Group relationship continues to exist, but the EU had a growing incentive 
to create another forum, as the next section will show. 
FIJ - LAC Heads of State Summit 
The EU - LAC Summit links the thirty three Latin American and Caribbean states with 
the twenty seven Member States of the EU in one single transregional relationship. The 
Summit forms an umbrella relationship with the entire sub-continent, making it a wider 
forum than relations with the Rio Group. The Caribbean region is involved in the EU- 
LAC Summit, although it has its own individual relationships with the EU. In many 
senses the EU-LAC Summit is more Latin America orientated and was constructed more 
with this in mind (Interview 2). The event came about due to a French-Spanish initiative 
- President Aznar 
having suggested the idea at the 4 1h Ibero-American Summit in 1996, 
an idea that President Chirac took up in 1997 when in the Latin American region 
(interview 1). He stated that Latin America - EU relations should not take place within 
the narrow framework of north-south relations, but that they should form a closer 
partnership. The first Summit was thus hosted in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, after which 
there have been three further Summits as the figure below shows: 
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Figure 3- 16 Structure of EU - LAC Summits 
Etl - Latin America and Caribbean Ifeads of State Summil 
EU-LAC Summits -I leads ot'S(ate -2 years 
Bi-Regional Nlinisterials - ad-hoc 
Bi-Regional Group of High Officials - ad-hoc 
I" June 1999 - Rio de Janeiro 
2"d May 2002 - Madrid 
Yd May 2004 - Guadalajara 
4 Ih May 2006 - Vienna 
-To strengthen I-KAilical, 
economic and cultural 
understanding 
- Encourage strategic 
partnerslup 
Assess progress from Rio 
Discuss three key pillars: 
political. economic co- 
operation 
- Proposals to strengthen 
relations 
- Attempt to find common 
lvlicy line,, for all 
participanus 
- Concrete commitments in 
three key areas: social 
cohesion. multilateralism. 
regional integration 
- Assess progress in 
strategic relationship 
- Launch negotiations for 
Association Agreement with 
CACM 
Source: own Creation from www. cc. curopa. eu (accessed I December 2(X)7) 
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Summits take place every two years on a rotating basis and aim to hold dialogue and 
discussion on the key issues of mutual interest between the two I-CgIO11S. The figure above 
highlights the basic structure and the main activities ofeach ofthe four Summits to datc. 
The first Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1999 adopted it Declaration that expressed the 
aspiration to strengthen relations of all kinds between the two regions in order to help 
redress the balance of prosperity and power in the world. The aini was to Implement it 
, strategic partnership' entailing in particular a Political dialogue to streng(lien democracy. 
the rule of law and to protect hurnan rights, a balanced liberalisation of' economic and 
financial trade and cooperation in the areas Of Culture. Science Mid CLILICatiOn 
(http: //ec. europýi. eu/world/lac/docs/rio/rio-1999. pdl', accessed 31 July 2007). 
These three core aims respond to the three pillars of the Agreements that the ELI has 
I ed III t and is negotiating, with Latin American entities, all of which were c ud i he 
Rio Action Plan. The Rio Surninit also established the institutional structurc of' the 
transregional relationship, of which the key driving force was the two-year rotating 
Summits, after which there was an EU-LAC Ministerial level which rneets on an ad-hoc 
basis to discuss specific issues such as cooperation, higher education and science and 
technology. The EU-LAC Ministerial forum addresses cooperation issues in the main. 
although its mandate does not specify that this has to be the case. Finally there is a Bi- 
Regional Group of senior officials who meet on an ad-hoc basis to ensure both follow up 
from past Surnmits and the content of future Summits. For example the Bi-Reglonal 
Group met later in 1999, after the Rio Summit, in Tuusula Finland, to address the 
priorities that had been formulated (Interviews I& 2). It is very interesting to note the 
fact that 'strategic partnership' was mentioned several times in the Rio Declaration. 
testimony to the overriding obýjective of the EU. The Rio Action Plan and Summit 
Conclusions set out the structure for future relations as well as identifying the objectives 
and parameters of dialogue. 
The second Summit, in Madrid, assessed progress in the EU-LAC relationship in the 
three years since Rio, noting advances in relations with Mexico, Chile, Mercosur, the 
Andeans and CACM. In many senses it echoed the sentiments and desires of the first 
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Summit in terms of the subýjects that were discussed. The first Summit having laid the 
groundwork for the relationship. the second Summit was able to go into more detailed 
discussion. The outcornes of the second Summit wcrc it Political Declaration, summit 
Conclusions, an Assessment report and an EU-LAC Common Values and Posjtj()jjs 
Declaration. This latter docurnent is of particular interest, given that it lists eighty three 
points that relate to areas and fora in which the two regions are cooperating and 
coordinating. It states that "out- bi-i-egional strategic jwi-tnevvhijý i. v being i-vinforceil b. v 
deel)enin, q antl witlening ow- tlialogue in intenuitional. 10ra, 1)(11-fit-1111114.1,1111-oligh I)Olitical 
(-oll. vilitations in the Unitetl NatiollS fiffIl " (WWW. CC. CL1roi)a. eu, accessed 12 Dcccrnher 
2006). It goes on to list the two regions' common values, principally democracy. the rule 
of law and the primacy of multilateralism. It then states the shared common positions in 
fora such as UN bodies on terrorism, fundamental rights, racism, arms control. drugs and 
the WTO (idem). 
The Assessment report issued in Madrid lists the concrete actions that have taken place 
between the EU and LAC since the Rio Summit. noting all the discussions. conferences 
and meetings that have taken relations forward in specific areas. In its final comincrits it 
makes the following conclusions; "one ai-ea with enoi-nious potential is thesti-engthening 
(ýf the political elialogite in intei-nationalftwa ", and -j)1-()jects jwesenletl in i-elation to the 
priot'ities dýfined in Rio and Tititsula sholdcl have a pi-eki-ential bi-i-egional natiti-e (is 
deflijecl in pai-agi-aph 12. Such pi-()je(-ts shoithl, in a(Wition, have a i-eal impact on the 
ecolloinic antl social situation in Latin Ainei-ica antl in the Cafibbean. Piis shouhl not, 
illoreovet-, 1wevent pi-ogi-ess fi-oin being achieve(I in sub-i-egional oi- even bil"tel-(11 
projects " (www. ec. curopa. eu, accessed 12 December 2006). These conclusions show that 
there is a clear focus on demonstrating the value-added of the transregional level of' 
relations, whilst simultaneously helping sub-regional relations and providing the EU with 
more partners for coordination in international fora. 
The third Summit in Guadalajara moved on from the three pillar approach, which was by 
then well anchored in EU-LAC relations. The third Summit addressed, as priorities, the 
areas of social cohesion, multilateralism and regional integration, with the aim of 
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providing concrete commitments and common policies (www. ec. CUropa. cu, accessed 12 
December 2006). The outcome ofGuadala. jara was it single Declaration that drew out the 
key messages in the three priority areas of discussion. none of which were stibstailtive in 
nature. The Declaration was a far cry from the Conclusions Issued ill Madrid. all(] Was 
much less tangible in every sense. The fourth, and latest, Summit was held ill Vienna ill 
2006 and it continued work oil the three priorities outlined In Guadalajara as well as 
advancing discussions on the envi roil ment, addressing the latest EU-LAC Strategy Paper 
and launching Association Agreement negotiations with CACM. The fourth Summit was 
very much in the same vein as the third in Mexico in terms of' content and Outcome 
(http: //ec. cui-opa. eu/world/lac/index. htiii, accessed 27 July 2007). 
The EU-LAC Summit process has become a regular feature on the international agenda 
of the two regions and the next Summit is scheduled to take place in Peru in 2008. A very 
important feature of the Summits is that they provide a meeting place for a plethora of 
other EU-LA meetings, ministerial meetings. Heads of State Summits and joint activities. 
The EU-LAC Summits are almost as important for these 'fringe' activities as they are for 
their actual discussions. The Surnmits are now also the principal forum for political 
discussion at the bi-regional level, and as such they perform an important role. Overall 
the summits are a discussion forum, sounding board for new ideas, launch pad for new 
projects, and gathering point for many other relationships that exist between the two 
regions - confirmation of the umbrella status for EU-LAC relations. 
Transiregionallism - Conclusions 
In the 1990s the EU was looking for a new forurn through which to engage Latin 
America as a region, having becorne frustrated with the framework of its relations with 
the Rio Group (Interview 2). At this time Latin Arnerica was reacting to dynamic global 
changes as well as undergoing severe internal reorgam as it tried to insert 
politically and economically into the -. 
Iobalisin,,, world. The EU-LAC Summit was 
created to address the needs of the two partners and is the relationship through which the 
EU offers LA a solid and balanced counter-weiLght to US dominance In the region, by 
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increasing the region's global prestige, credibility and weight. It is very important to 
highlight that fact that the EU-LAC Summit is by far the most visible meeting between 
the two regions. 
Transregionalism. is primarily a forum for political dialogue, but it deals increasingly with 
other issues that are of joint interest to the two partner regions, mostly cooperation in 
areas of mutual interest. The main objectives of the Summits are to strengthen bi-regional 
relations, to foster common action on global political and economic issues and to allow 
for an institutionalised bi-regional dialogue on all issues of mutual interest. As IRELA 
stated after the first Summit in 1999; 
"Essentially the Rio Summit was a form of demonstrative diplomacy, a public display of 
alliance-building at the highest political level, driven by the needjelt by the two regions 
to respond to world-wide political and economic trends. The main point was to 
demonstrate the basic coincidence of their political and economic interests and concerns, 
as a means of reinforcing their own position in the international system " (I 999a: 3). 
The process operates using the same three tier structure as the EU uses for all its relations 
in Latin America, Summit-Ministerial-Senior Official. The Summits are institutionalised 
and take place every two years, but the two lower levels are ad-hoc. The Ministerial level 
has become increasingly used in recent years, addressing specific areas of mutual interest 
such as education and social equality (Interview 1). Through this process there has been 
much greater information sharing, cooperation, discussion and common ground building. 
The relationship represents a common attempt to better equip and position both regions in 
the emerging global system, through joint cooperation. The relationship has shown the 
ability to state common goals and aims as well as standards whilst simultaneously 
differentiating by sub-region according to differing needs. Activity around Summits has 
also increased greatly such that in the wings of the main event there are a plethora of 
conferences and workshops discussing 
issues of crucial interest to the relationship. In 
Vienna in 2006 there was the first EU-LAC Business Summit which was warmly 
welcomed (Interview 17). Also of importance, 
in relation to the activity around Summits, 
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is the fact that they are used to host a series of bilateral and sub-regional Summits and 
Ministerials. A large number of sub-regional and bilateral relationships advance in tile 
wings of the EU-LAC Summit, because it provides a convenient opportunity to meet. It is 
also the case that Summits are used as launch pads for advances in bilateral and sub- 
regional relations. In the past announcements have been made in relation to all of the 
EU's relations in Latin America. In this sense the Summits really have developed into a 
focal point of the overall EU-LAC relationship. 
The main area of contention and criticism surrounding the Summits concerns their 
follow-up and impact. An EPC paper on the 2006 Vienna Summit highlights this main 
criticism of the Summit process when it quotes Pablo Garrido Arauz, the Panamanian 
Ambassador to the EU, as being "cautious about whether it would bring tangible benefits 
to the Latin American people, stressing the importance of follow-up mechanisms to 
ensure it brought long-term benefits" (Matthews: 1). Freres further outlines a criticism of 
the process when he notes that the Rio Summit of 1999 set out a strong commitment by 
ficial level" (2000: 81). He notes the EU towards Latin America, but only on a "super 
that this was seen in 2000 at the first post-Rio meeting, an EU-Rio Group meeting, where 
only a handful of European foreign ministers showed up. This was a "signal that the 
EU .. 
does not have much special to offer .. confirming the view that the EU is not a 
serious power at all, but more of a mirage " (idem. ). This calls into question the notion of 
&strategic partnership' at the transregional level, or at least begs questions about what 
type of 'strategic partnership' is being sought. 
The forum with the most potential to ensure Summit follow-up, the Bi-Regional Group of 
High officials that met to address follow-up to the Rio Summit, has fallen into disuse, 
which is something of a statement in itself (Interview 0. A further issue with the EU- 
LAC Summits is that whilst the aim is to highlight, emphasise and build on the bi- 
regional partnership, it actually reveals that the regions are not equal partners. For LA the 
Summits are an opportunity to get an indication from the EU as to what its future 
intentions for relations are. This has created an expectations problem from the very outset 
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of the Summit process, and reveals the relative strength of the 'partners', and the power 
dynamic of their relationship. 
The Summit process is criticised for a lack of concrete action and impact. There is no 
doubting that as a forum for dialogue the Summit provides an excellent opportunity for 
the two regions to discuss their mutual bi-regional interests. The Summit also provides 
the opportunity, in the fringes, for the two partners to engage in their bilateral and sub- 
regional relations. Overall the Summit operates as an umbrella mechanism for EU-LAC 
relations, performing two-yearly health checks. The main, and grounded, criticism is that 
all of these meetings and discussions do not lead to concrete impacts or outcomes - they 
do not tangibly contribute to relations. As Freres and Sanahuja conclude, "the series of 
Summits and the 'Strategic Association' project ... are not being backed by the necessary 
resources, which in turn undermines the EU's credibility and its political commitment to 
this project" (2005: 5 1). 
irrespective of these criticisms transregionalism is firmly embedded in complex 
interregionalism with an oversight and strategic coordinating function. It has been seen to 
not overlap or clash with either interregionalism or bilateralism, as it complements them 
both. In this sense transregionalism is very different from interregionalism and 
bilateralism as it is not a competing framework for relations, rather a simple adjunct to 
both or either. 
Conclusio 
Commissioner Patten stated that "Latin America is a crucial trading partner and political 
allyfor all of Europe. Every single EU state would count Latin America arnong its closest 
international partners " (2000: 1). If this quote from Commissioner Patten were accurate 
then this chapter would have revealed a coherent interregional strategy smoothly 
implemented and fully operational in action. This chapter, through addressing the key 
research questions set in the last chapter, 
has revealed a much more nuanced picture of 
complex interregionalism. An analysis of the three key levels at which the EU interacts 
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directly with Latin America, has revealed the intricacy of complex interregionalism and 
that interregional strategy is not being translated into action. The result is a complex 
relationship that is unique in the world today, an interesting development in the global 
system with such a broad agenda encompassing economic, political, cultural, social, 
security and cooperation issues. To respond to the research questions posed of complex 
interregionalism in the last chapter this conclusion will follow the structure developed in 
this thesis. It will thus evaluate the motivations of both the EU and its Latin American 
partners in formulating a common interregional strategy, before then looking at the 
mechanisms for implementation and finally the impacts of the attempts to put the strategy 
into action. This will lead to a clear set of conclusions on complex interregionalism and 
simultaneously develop a set of key questions to take forward to an analysis of EU- 
Mercosur relations. 
As Commissioner Patten suggests Latin America is in many senses a natural partner for 
the EU, sharing a historical, cultural and linguistic heritage that has led to a convergence 
of views on key issues such as multilateralism and regionalism. On this basis it is quite 
normal that the EU and LA should share a close relationship, but as Klom succinctly 
states, "Latin America drew the attention of the EC quite late in the day" (2000: 5). 
Klorn explains this as being due to the EC having other issues to focus on from the 1950s 
to the 1980s. He specifically highlights the incorporation of Spain and Portugal into the 
EC as the key turning point for EC policy towards the region. In effect the entry of Spain 
and Portugal into the EC in 1986 elevated the interest in Latin America for the EC as a 
whole. The Spanish EC Commissioner Marin was instrumental in developing relations 
with Latin America during his tenure (Interview 13). The 1995 Communication from the 
EU on Latin America came under the Spanish Presidency of the EU, the EU-LAC 
Summits were a Spanish initiative and Madrid hosted the second Summit, a year later 
than the two-year rotation would have dictated. The role of Spain is also hidden by the 
fact that this chapter has concentrated on EU relations with the region, as in many cases 
Spain makes up the bulk of the EU statistics on trade, aid and finance to the region. 
Spanish firms have been the most active in the region of all EU member states and the 
political support given by Spain is crucial. Grugel calls the relationship between Spain 
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and Latin America the "special relationship" which he feels ldsen, es as a cententfor the 
relationship between Europe, as a whole, and Latin Anterica " (2002a: 1). A key 
motivation behind the EU formulation of an interregional strategy is the drive of Spain. 
Aside from this internal motivation the EU has been motivated by economic balancing 
and bandwagoning considerations in both its strategy formulation and implementation. 
The EU has used interregionalism predominantly as a flexible strategy framework to 
respond to US activity in the region. EU relations with Latin America are frequently seen 
to be based on a reactive strategy vis-ý-vis US economic relations in the region, 
witnessed most clearly by the Association Agreement with Mexico, but also present in 
relation to the pressure that FTAA talks have exerted on both Chile and Mcrcosur 
negotiations (Interview 13). The US prefers to deal bilaterally with Latin American states, 
often to the detriment of regional groupings, which it is happy to split in negotiations 
(Interview 13). This chapter has also noted that for most Latin American states, or 
regions, the main motivation in advancing relations with the EU is to counterbalance 
those with the US, so the US is a prime motivation for both partners. The EU is a natural 
alternative to the US, as in most cases it is the second largest trading and investment 
partner. As Whitehead has remarked, Latin America's rapprochement to the EU reflects 
these countries' "tradition of seeking sonte e-xternal counterweight to the overwhelming 
presence of their northern neighbour" (1999: 54). It is without question that the US has 
the policy and strategy lead in Latin America, and that the EU operates predominantly in 
its wake. 
Whilst the EU reacts to US activity in the region it frequently claims that it offers a 
different partnership from the one offered by the US, as Barahona de Brito notes when 
she says that "the EU has always claimed .. that it tempers its pursuit offree trade by a 
concern with social equity and solidarity" (2000: 3). Given the predominance of the trade 
pillar in Association Agreements and the fact that negotiations for these agreements are 
more than 95% trade related, the EU's claim can be questioned. Indeed Freres and 
Sanahuja observe that their Latin American interviewees find that "the idea that the 
agreements with the EU are 
different in their design and contents to those proposed by 
the US is not widely accepted" (2005: 55). The EU offers a three pillar approach 
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incorporating cooperation and political dialogue as well as a number of normative EU 
values. The main difference between EU and US strategy in Latin America has been the 
EU support for regional integration. The importance of regional integration in EU 
interregional strategy, and in complex interregionalism in action, has come to the fore in 
this chapter, and merits special attention in the conclusion. EU incorporation of regional 
integration in interregional strategy has been clear and consistent. EU support for 
regional integration has occurred at many different levels, principally through; EU-LAC 
Summits, Sub-regional developments with all three regional integration vehicles, 
financial aid for institutions, customs unions, technical aid for institutions, training and 
education for customs unions, by the EU interacting with partners and finally by the EU 
using the incentive of Association Agreements. The EU has made regional integration a 
central plank of its interregional strategy through a desire to increase the coherence and 
cohesion of its counterparts. 
Alechanisms 
EU complex interregional strategy towards LA has been a reflection of the motivations of 
both the EU and its LA partners. The first interesting mechanism to deliver a more 
targeted strategy was the notion of differentiation that was developed by the EU in the 
1990s to address more specific countries and regions within the macro-region of LA. 
Differentiation effectively developed into complex interregionalism in Latin America 
when economic circumstances drove the EU to sign Association Agreements with both 
Mexico and Chile, despite its interregional rhetoric. The strategy of complex 
interregionalism was recognition, as this chapter has revealed, that LA needs to be treated 
in a differentiated manner. Whilst making the interregional level of relations the lynchpin 
of relations with the region the EU proved willing to negotiate bilaterally with non- 
regionally aligned countries when circumstances necessitated. The strategy for complex 
interregionalism, or the mechanism through which the EU wanted to put its motivations 
into action, is a result of a mixture of a defined strategy for regional integration and a 
form of pragmatic realism on behalf of the EU. The first point to note about this is that it 
does not always generate coherence and consistency in strategy or action. Complex 
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TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
interregional strategy has revealed several inconsistencies over time. most rccently with 
the move towards a Strategic Partnership with Brazil that poses important questions for 
the I'Liture of interregionalism if tracle negotiations cannot succeed with Mcrcosur. Whilst 
the EU might have clear motivations and a cohei-elit Interregional strategy, this has not L- 
always been translated into coherent complcx interregionalism in action because the EU 
is subject to economic and political pragmatism. The mechanism to obtain complex 
interregionalism in action has resulted in the table below that hlL, -, 
Iil'L, 
-, 
hts key aspects ofall 
the relationships to have been considered in this chapter. 
Figure 3- 17 Comparative Analysi of EU Relations with Latin America 
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tion 
Yes Yes GSP Yes Yes Yes No No 
I 
e 
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Source: own Creation front ýk ýý xk. ec. curopa. CLI (accessed I December 2(X)7) 
The table above deals with the three principal pillars and two key functions of all 
relationships that the EU has within LA. It shows clear and significant differences L- 
between the three levels of relations. The bilateral level of relations splits into two 
Once the Strategic Partnership has been signed and implemented the EU and Brazil will have bilateral 
political dialogue 
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categories, firstly for countries in Latin America not belonging to a regional integration 
group, and secondly for those within a group. In the former category the Association 
Agreements with Chile and Mexico are the most advanced that the EU has with any 
entity in Latin America, covering all three pillars as well as the two functions, and 
additionally enjoying a three-tier institutional structure with Parliamentary and other joint 
fora. For Brazil it is quite different, although in reality once the Strategic Partnership is 
implemented the only differences will relate to the trade and institutional aspects of the 
relationship. All three interregional relationships are at the same stage of development, 
based on the same structures, and with the same aims. Finally the transregional level is an 
overarching political umbrella for relations with the region as a whole. 
The manner in which these three levels interact is quite distinct, with only the case of 
Brazil as a slight exception. Due to EU insistence the interaction between the three levels 
is also quite rigid, something that has led to the anomalous situation of Brazil not having 
the strongest relations with the EU within the region. Complex interregional strategy in 
Latin America can be resumed in the table below: 
214 
Figure 3- 18 Overview of EU Complex Interregionalisill 
Complex Interregionalism 
Transregional Political Dialogue and Horizontal Issues 
Interregional Association Agreements Under Negotiation 
Trade and Political Pillars 
Cooperation Pillar only for 'regional' level 
Not Regionally Aligned Regionally Aligned 
Bilateral Association Agreement Cooperation Agreement 
Trade[Pol iti cal/Cooperat ion Cooperation & Mutual Interest 
Source: Own Creation from www. ec. curopa. cu (accessed I December 2(X)7) 
The previous figure shows that complex interregional strategy generates patterns of 
interaction that can be summarised very simply. If a country is not regionally aligned, and 
there are pressing econornic reasons to do so, the EU has proved willing to negotiate a 
comprehensive bilateral three pillar agreement. If the country is regionally aligned then 
the EU will defer political, in all cases except Brazil, and trade relations to the regional 
level leaving just cooperation relations and aid at the bilateral level. The picture for 
cooperation aid is complex at the bilateral level, and this thesis has only considered the 
aid given by the EU as an entity to its Latin Arnerican partners. Cooperation aid at the 
bilateral level is a completely separate issue that bears no relevance to interregionalism, 
because, as Freres and Sanahuja conclude, "in spite of a lot oJ' Metoric (III(/ sonle 
i-elativell' intei-mittent Initiatives the Eurol)ean Union (loes not exist as such in 
coopei-ation With this region, thei-e ai-e 26 donot-s with vei-v little lwactice in vvoi-king 
togethet- III Latin Amei-ica " (2005: 27). Finally the transregional level operates as a forum 
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for dialogue on region to region political issues, as well as on horizontal and sectoral 
issues of mutual interest. The EU strategy is seen to be relatively straightforward, based 
on the circumstances of the region and its own motivations. It is also the same structured 
strategy that the EU uses in bilateral relations, the only genuine difference being 
counterpart coherence. 
Impacts 
Complex interregional strategy and the mechanism to deliver it are relatively coherent 
and straight-forward. But despite the clear-cut strategy and the investment that the EU 
has made in its complex interregional strategy in Latin America Matthews still feels that 
"the Union appears to lack the political will to go fiirther. Although Latin America is a 
top priority for some EU Member States (most notably Portugal and Spain), it hardly 
features at all on the foreign policy agendas of many others. As a result there is 
insuffi'cient interest in developing adequate policies that could deliver concrete results " 
(2006: 4). From this Matthews notes that; "questions remain over whether all the 
rhetoric about creating a stronger partnership can be matched with adequate deeds" 
(idem. ). Matthews is effectively questioning whether the EU has been willing to 
implement its own strategy in the region, something that this chapter has noted. The fact 
that the Commission elaborates the strategy and the Council oversees its implementation 
is a potential point of friction in the system - something that the next chapter will address 
in more detail. 
The EU and Latin America share many common values such as human rights, support for 
an open multilateral economic system, the protection of individual rights, regional 
integration, democracy and social solidarity. Add to this the elements of shared culture, 
history and language and it becomes clear that the two regions do share much in common 
on which to base their relations. This is one reason why the EU puts such emphasis on a 
strategic partnership, something that Crawley emphasises when he notes that the "EUs 
stress on interdependence and mutual benefit in its relations with Latin America 
contrasts with what has been perceived as Washington's exclusive pursuit of national 
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I. wei-est" (2000: 13). The importance of this potential partnership should not be 
underestimated as the Working Group on European Union - Mercosur Negofiatiolls ill 
Paris eniphasises, "there is no othet- pai-tnei- Hum Latin Anwi-ica that hiis sitch a high 
clegi-ee o' I)o1itical convergence with the EU- (w%k, ýk,. cliitirciiiei-costii-.. ý, cleiiccs-1)(). I'i, 
accessed 12 January 2007). Despite the constantly stated common values in(] positions 
there has been little visible coordination between the partners in multilateral f0ra, a fact 
that casts some doubt on the extent of their synergy. Whilst both partners seem to aspire 
to elements of their common strategy it has not been overtly visible in complex 
interregionalism in action, he that at the bilateral or interregional level. 
EU complex interregionalism in action in Latin America has come in for strong criticism, 
predominantly because for all the rhetoric and good will there is marked lack of concrete 
initiatives, something that has made Latin America sceptical about EU commitment to 
the region (Interview 0. Quite simply EU interregional strategy ill the region has not 
been translated into action through a mixture of EU Inability (Council versus 
Commission), lack of pressing economic or political circumstances, and counterpart 
coherence. It has been seen that Latin American entities have more interest in economic 
and commercial ties than the EU does, which creates expectations gaps. As noted in the 
section on transregionalism, in relation to the Summits of Rio, Madrid. Guadala. jara and 
Vienna, the EU needs to move beyond rhetoric to substance to convince Latin America. 
This relates to a wider criticism of the EU and its global role that it has, at times, been 
reluctant to assume. 
it is also possible to consider closer cooperation as an attempt by the EU to reinforce its 
commercial presence by developing a more stable regulatory environment. Global 
Europe 2020 Seminar concluded that "the EU must live tip to its (leclai-ations. Ifit ivants 
to titi-n Latin Atnefica into a sti-ategic pannei- on a global level, it must pay the phce - 
(2004: 3). Freres and Sanahuja agree with this analysis when they note that "the 
Eiii-opean Union has to tlefine an enlat-geil integi-ation sti-ategy, which is able to 
l-ecognise the multidimensional natiti-e (? I'Latin Aniet-ican i-egionalisin anil the tli. * -e t *1 it 
plaYers involved, and one that is not tlependent upon antl sitlýject to the waY in which the 
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commercial commitments evolve in each subregional scheme. That strategy ought to 
envisage both the regional and subregional level, through a frank dialogue with Latin 
American goveniments and through being more demanding Ivith regard to the scope of 
the Union's commitments" (2005: 47). 
The presence of the Andean Community, the Central American Common Market and 
Mercosur in the region made the pursuit of pure interregionalism a central clement of 
relations, especially as both regions share the overall ideology that regional integration is 
the best means to global insertion and global governance. Regional integration has been 
the main long-term strategic element of EU complex interregional ism with Latin America 
and also the key element that differentiates the EU approach from the US approach. It has 
been the subject of discussion at all four EU-LAC Summits and is at the heart of all three 
regional Association Agreement negotiations that the EU is currently involved in with 
Latin America. Overall, in terms of the number of countries involved as well as in terms 
of resources, time and energy, the most significant interaction that the EU has with Latin 
America is at the interregional level. Grabendorff concluded his analysis of relations 
between the EU and Latin America in the 1990s by saying that they "may drift together 
for the simple reason that they have chosen similar paths to economic and political 
integration" (1992: 2). The EU has provided constant support, at every level from 
technical to financial, for all Latin American regional projects. The Global Europe 2020 
Seminar concluded that "one thing seems clear already: if the EU intends to develop a 
strong and sustainable relation with Latin America, based namely oil the reinforcement 
of its regional integration serving its own vision of a global architecture founded on 
regional unities, it should on the one hand take care of diversifying its range of 
interlocutors (beyond elites of European origin, towards partnerships with populations of 
native origin in particular), and on the other hand it should set lip processes (policies 
and programmes) aimed at including Latin-American elites in the partnership with 
Europe, as well as in the good-governance of their countries" (2004: 2). To improve its 
interregional offering the "the EU must prove the utility of the partnership it offers 
(beyond the immediate cultural attraction) and the specific added-value that it call bring 
(in comparison to the United States for instance) " (idem. ) because as Freres and 
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Sanahuja conclude "the European Union has neither the weight nor the influence it could 
have in Latin America. For many observers, this is due to: the EU's lack of a clear and 
coherent strategy; the perception, except in trade issues, that the EU does not speak with 
a single voice" (2005: 50). This relates to the comment made at the start of the 
conclusions about complex interregionalism, as an outcome of differentiation, being a 
mixture of an overall strategy that is overridden by pragmatic realism when economic 
circumstances require it. The strategy of complex interregionalism has simply not 
delivered, despite the Commission's persistent and consistent support. 
The pursuit of pure interregionalism is critical to the EU's strategic policy in Latin 
America, as it is the central plank around which all other relations hang, and one in which 
the EU has invested significant money, time and effort. Looking in greater detail at the 
role of regional integration in the EU's relations with Latin America it is clearly 
important for complex interregionalism in action. This role of regional integration in 
action in Latin America can be addressed by looking in more detail at EU - Mercosur 
relations, given that the EU has advanced furthest with Mercosur as a regional partner. 
Not only are they the most important interregional relations that the EU has in the region, 
but they have also been negotiating an Association Agreement for over seven years. A 
deeper analysis of their relationship and of the reasons why the Association Agreement 
remains unsigned are crucial to the overall analysis of EU complex interregionalism in 
action. 
From these conclusions and criticisms it is worth remembering the comments of Mower 
in the context and history section of this chapter. Writing in 1982 about EC-LA relations 
Mower concluded that they were not institutionalised, had agriculture as an Achilles heel 
and that they were made difficult by the constantly changing nature of the Latin 
American region. The conclusions to this chapter make Mower appear prescient as the 
same criticisms exist some twenty five years on. Further on in the history and context 
section reference was made to changes in LA offering the EU an opportunity to capitalise 
on the situation, reflected in the 1994 strategy document which prioritised diversified 
relations with Mexico, Chile and Mercosur. Since that was written, fourteen years ago, 
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relations with Mexico and Chile have advanced to Association Agreement status, but 
those with Mercosur have not. This fact alone underscores the importance of Latin 
American regional integration. 
The main criticisms that have been levelled at complex interregionalism pertain to all 
levels, but especially interregionalism and transregionalism. This chapter has revealed 
that the EU has used the same structure for bilateral relations and interregional relations. 
This fact becomes particularly interesting when considering the negotiation of 
Association Agreements because the only difference in negotiations has been the nature 
of the EU partner: a region or a country. The fact that Mexico and Chile have both signed 
their Agreements and that EU-Mercosur negotiations have stalled is something that needs 
further investigation in the next chapter. The EU continues to engage in relations with 
Latin America's three regional integration vehicles, testimony in part to circumstances 
which have allowed the EU to continue this path without external (US) pressure, and also 
to the EU pursuit of pure interregionalism. EU support for regional integration and its 
continued strategy of dealing only with the three regions has remained a constant of its 
strategy. The 2007 admission that political relations with Brazil would have to be 
conducted on a bilateral basis is the only slight to this record, albeit an important one. 
The most important interregional relationship that the EU has in Latin America is the one 
with Mercosur, and to further an understanding of complex interregionalism it will form 
the subject of investigation of the next chapter. On the basis of the analysis in this chapter 
the following key questions will need to be addressed: 
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Figure 3- 19 Key Questions for EU-Niercosur Relations 
1. How has the EU pursued pure interregionalism? 
2. To what extent does pure interregionalism depend on counterpart coherence? 
3. Why have the EU and Mercosur not concluded Association Agreement 
negotiations, and what does this tell us about pure interregionalism? 
4. How does EU-Mercosur pure interregionalism relate to other parts of complex 
interregionalism, notably bilateralism, with Brazil? 
5. To what extent is the pursuit of pure interregionalism hindered by internal EU 
divisions and external forces? 
This chapter has highlighted that the EU has strategically pursued a policy aiming at pure 
interregional relations with all three regional vehicles in Latin America, but notably with 
Mercosur. To fully understand complex interregionalism in action It %vIII be necessary to 
answer the key questions above about the reasons why EU-Mercosur negotiations have 
stalled where bilateral negotiations succeeded and whether this is down to counterpart 
coherence or EU internal inability to execute its own strategy. Finally it is Important to 
understand how pure interregionalism copes with the presence of the most important 
country in the region; Brazil. 
This chapter has looked at the phenomenon of complex interregionalisin in detail across 
the Latin American region, identifying certain tensions inherent in its transmission from 
strategy to action. Answers to the key questions outlined above are essential for a 
complete understanding of complex interregional isin in Latin America, as well as for the 
future of interregionalism within and outside of the region. These are the questions that 
will be addressed in the next chapter on EU - Mercosur relations. 
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Chapter 4: EU - Mercosur: Complex Interrepional Stratejiv in 
Action 
Introduction 
The EU relationship with Mercosur is very much the lynchpin of EU interregional 
strategy in Latin America as well as the closest relationship in the world to a pure 
interregional one. The last chapter highlighted the importance of the EU-Mercosur 
relationship, an importance which means that it represents a litmus test of not only EU 
interregional strategy, but also for complex interregionalism in action. It is for these 
reasons that the EU-Mercosur relationship has been seen as a blueprint for the future of 
interregionalism and why this chapter will deal with it in detail. This chapter will address 
interregionalism through a deeper analysis of EU-Mercosur relations, as a case-study of 
complex interregionalism in action to analyse the latent tensions that the last chapter 
highlighted between interregionalism as a strategy and interregional ism in action. 
Aggarwal & Fogarty note that the EU-Mercosur relationship "is the only instance in 
which two relatively coherent, setf-defined and highly institutionalised regional blocs 
have been negotiating a commercial agreement on a one-to-one basis" (2004: 211). This 
agreement is the first proposed between two customs unions, the EU being a customs 
union since 1965, and Mercosur since 1995, which is the very basis for its special status 
in international relations. Of all the relationships that the EU has with Latin America it is 
the one with Mercosur in which it has invested the most. 
The last chapter sketched out the basic details of Mercosur, as well as the structure of 
current relations with the EU. This chapter will take this foundation and deepen the 
analysis of the relationship, with a focus on understanding the differences between EU 
strategy and interregionalism in action. As Faust notes "shedding some light oil the 
political economy of relations 
between two, of the most ambitious integration inechanisins 
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of the 1990s should deepen our understanding of the forces shaping the grolving 
importance of transregional and interregional trade relations" (2002: 1), a sentiment 
that echoes the objectives of this chapter. A further drive of the chapter is to address the 
specific research question posed in the Introduction, 'Are there any tensions betweell the 
EU interregional strategyfor Mercosur and EU - Mercosur interregionalisin ill action? ' 
In addition the chapter will also seek to address the set of questions that arose from 
chapter three, outlined in Figure 3-19. Behind the research question and these questions 
there remains the underlying tripartite structure of this thesis, based on motivations, 
mechanisms and impacts, which will again be used in this chapter. Further important 
elements to be carried over from chapter three also include the multi-level, multi-causal 
approach that will be necessary to answer the questions this chapter seeks to clarify. 
The EU-Mercosur interregional relationship is very much a model for how the EU has 
intended to interact with Latin America, and indeed other regions and entities around the 
world (Interview 5). Whilst it is important to emphasise the idiosyncratic nature of the 
relationship, as Faust notes, "the development of institutional link-ages with Afercosur has 
led to a uniqueform of interregional institutionalisation" (2004: 44), it is not only the 
specifics of EU-Mercosur interregionalism that this chapter will address, as it hopes to 
derive pertinent conclusions for interregionalism in general. This idea is encapsulated in 
the words of Giordano, who says; "the Inter-regional Association Agreement is art 
instrument suitedfor the worldwide diffusion of a model of deep regional integration that 
may Jay the foundations of a multipolar global governance systein - (2002: 7). This is 
indeed a position echoed in the words of the European Commission itself. "Tile 
European Union encourages the countries of the world to forge strong ties with their 
neighbours and to organise themselves it? regional organisations with 
institutions ... because of its own 
history and it integration process, the EU has real added 
value to contribute. It wishes to help its partners to benefitfroin the substantial benefits 
of regional integration: facilitating economic growth and investment, providing a solid 
base for political stability and conflict prevention; strengthening their influence on the 
international scene" (2005d: 27). As the last chapter identified, the issue of regional 
integration needs to be examined in more detail as it is a fundamental part of EU- 
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Mercosur interregionalism and of any pursuit of pure interregionalism. "Arguably, the 
Coninion Market of the South (Mercosur) is the regional integration project that has 
reached the greatest level of accomplishment after the EU" (Malamud and Schmitter 
2006: 1), making it the most suited partner to analysc in terms of regional integration and 
how effective the EU interregional and regional integration strategy has been. 
This chapter will thus not be limited to a simple analysis of EU-Mercosur 
interregionalism as an isolated relationship, but will broaden its scope to take into 
account the wider implications and strategic objectives of this level of international 
relations. In doing this the chapter will have to address one major issue in detail, that of 
why the EU and Mercosur have not yet managed to sign their Association Agreement. 
Whilst the short answer to this question would be that the impasse in relations is due to 
the trade negotiations, which have proved to be very difficult to finalise, it needs more 
investigation. By analysing the negotiations in more detail the chapter will have to deal 
with the difficult issues of the EU-Mercosur trade relationship, agriculture, the WTO and 
relations with the US, all of which have had, and continue to have, an important bearing 
on progress. As EU Trade Commissioner Lamy commented in 2004, the EU-Mercosur 
agreement is not contrary to multilateral aims, nor is it an attempt to split the G-20, but it 
is 6'a perfect example of our trade policy strategy ... building on the multilateral trading 
system, we seek a WTO+ agreement characterised by a high level of ambition " (2004: 3). 
The interactions between the US, the EU and the WTO have implications for relations 
with Mercosur and interregionalism. that will be important to understand. A further issue 
that will arise from an analysis of trade relations will be the state of Mercosur regional 
integration, especially their customs union. This issue relates back to one of the stated 
objectives of the EU in its relations with Mercosur; to advance its regional integration. 
This chapter will be structured into distinct sections to address the different elements that 
this introduction has highlighted. The first section will define the context of EU- 
Mercosur interregionalism and the build up of relations between the EU and Mercosur 
from the inception of Mercosur in 1991. This will cover EU technical assistance, the 
EMIFCA process and EU internal discussions to obtain a negotiating mandate. This 
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corresponds to the first three, of five, stages of EU-Mercosur relations as highlighted by 
Faust (2002: 8)83 . The next section will be dedicated to the actual negotiations of the 
interregional agreement as of September 1999, which corresponds to the final two stages 
of Faust's schema of relations (idem. ). A key element of this section will be to isolate the 
factors that have led to an Association Agreement remaining unsigned, which will allow 
an analysis of not only the functioning of the negotiation mechanisms foreseen by the EU 
and Mercosur in their Framework Agreement, but also of the key issues in the on-going 
negotiations. This separation into two sections of the build-up of relations and the 
subsequent negotiation of an agreement is to clearly delineate the difference between the 
EU's interregional strategy as defined in discussions with Mercosur, and laid down in the 
Framework Interregional Agreement, and the ensuing negotiation of these aims. The third 
section in the chapter will be an analysis of the main elements that have held negotiations 
between the EU and Mercosur back and ultimately to addressing the question of why the 
EU and Mercosur have still not signed an interregional agreement. The conclusion will 
analyse the impacts that the EU interregional strategy has had, allowing for an assessment 
of the EU pursuit of pure interregionalism in the context of complex interregionalism 
which will lead into the general conclusions to the thesis. 
EU-Mercosur: Towards Pure Interregionalism? 
To better situate and understand the current state of the EU-Mercosur interregional 
relationship it is necessary to shed light on the context and history of the relationship. 
Chapter three gave a detailed history of EU-Mercosur relations, both within the context 
of Latin America, and also in its own right, but this section will go into further detail. It 
will concentrate on the first three phases of the EU-Mercosur relationship as identified by 
Faust (2002: 8), from the early technical assistance the EU provided to Mercosur from 
1992 onwards, through the signing of the EMIFCA, to the internal discussions in the EU 
to obtain a negotiating mandate for the Commission. This section will proceed through 
83 Doctor stresses four key stages; 1995-1999 political bargaining in EU for negotiating mandate, 1999. 
2001 formal launch of interregional negotiations, 2001-2004 substantive bargaining and 2004- ongoing 
efforts to conclude an agreement (2007: 283) 
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the phases in relations in chronological order, thus setting up the negotiations section that 
follows. 
EU-Mercosur: Interinstitutional Agreement 
Mercosur has had support from the EU since its inception in 1991, as witnessed by the 
Inter-institutional Agreement signed merely a year after it was created. This first 
agreement was only to provide Mercosur with technical and institutional support, but it 
was the beginning of a long relationship of cooperation and interaction. Santander 
contends that "the EU capitalized on the interest expressed by Mercosurnienibers to sign 
at? agreementfor inter-institutional cooperation" (2005: 291), going on to explain that 
the main aim of this agreement was for "Mercosur to benefitfiront European experience 
in regional integration, so Mercosur could eventually become the Community's inain 
partner" (idem). The early focus on regional integration is something that the Chaire 
Mercosur also picked up, suggesting that "perhaps the inost striking feature of the trans- 
Atlantic relations during the 1990s was the marked European preference for supporting 
regional integration" (2002: 10). It is from these regional integration motivated 
beginnings that the EU-Mercosur relationship started to take shape, as Faust notes from 
this inconspicuous beginning there has since been a "process that has been progressive 
in the sense that an evolution front non-trade cooperation to serious and fornialized 
bargaining is observable" (2002: 8). The EU had moved swiftly to enhance is relations 
with Mercosur, and offer regional integration assistance because it was quick to 
understand that a deeper relationship with Mercosur depended on its level of regional 
integration. This early help is summarised by Sanchez-Bajo who highlights three main 
aspects; the EU as a roadmap for Mercosur, the EU recognizing and supporting Mercosur 
as an international entity and the emergence of a commercial network between the two 
partners (1999: 938). 
These three elements cover the initial drive of cooperation, given that the Inter- 
Institutional Agreement was only a basic institutional support mechanism, a fact that 
should not be overlooked at such a crucial time in Mercosur's formation. Mercosur 
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needed the support, recognition and incentive to move forward with its anihitious agenda. II 
and the EU was well placed to give this help. This sentiment is confirmed hy the 
Commission. who noted that: "since Mei-coslo. was lailliched ill /99/, ille EU has been 
sljlýl)oi-ting the i-egional intep-ation lwocess, and it continues to do so today with Illegoill 
of establishilw a close and deel)-i-ooted Init-tnei-shil) " (Commission 2005d: 29). The 1992 
agreement set in motion a process of EU support for Mercosur regional Integration that is 
ongoing to this very day. Commenting on this aspect of regional integration Santander is 
somewhat more explicit in his analysis as he notes that "the Em-olwan olyective is, of' 
cout'se, to conquet- new mat-kets, but also to e. vl)oi-t the EU's model of' i-egional 
I . 11tegnition and govei-nance antl to ci-eate new alliances ill oi-dei- to shal)e 11 less 
(Isvinmeti-ic woi, ld" (2002: 495). It is in this light that Santander remarks that the EU sees 
Mercosur as a pillar of this new world order, one that will develop along EU lines 
providing the EU a solid counterpart with whom to shape the multilateral environment. It 
is to this end that the EU has always heen on hand to provide political, technical. 
logistical and financial support for regional integration in Mercosur. EU strategy towards 
Mercosur was a clear reflection of these early motivations, all of which depended on 
Mercosur regional integration advancing. 
From 1992 onwards the EU provided technical, financial and rhetorical support to the 
nascent Mercosur project. The Inter-Institutional Cooperation Agreement had pledged 
ECU200 million for assistance on technical norms, agriculture. social cohesion and 
support for the fledgling Administrative Secretariat and the rotating Presidency of the 
Mercosur Council (Sanchez-Bajo 1999: 933). In 1993 the EU established the Centro de 
Formacion para la Integracion Regional (CEFIR) in Montevideo (Sanchez-Ba 
. 
Jo 1999: 
94 
935). The centre is still operatin g as a specialised training centre for regional integration 
in Latin America. Santander also describes how the EU provided the Secretariat with 
assistance in training, computer networks, documentation and archives, as well as 
supporting conferences, seminars and networking (Santander -1005: 291). All of these 
activities of support from the Commission have continued since inception, indeed they 
have been increased. The EU subsequently helped with the Mercosur customs code by 
.,. uy For more information see www. ccl'ir. org 
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sending European experts on missions to Mercosur countries, and gave help from the 
European Standardisation Committee (CEN) in technical and quality standards issues 
(interview 3). 
With all of this EU help, and in its attempts to keep to its original ambitious timetable 
Mercosur progressed from 1991 onwards. As already noted the original Mercosur treaty 
does not deal with institutions and social actors, but only with economic and commercial 
issues. To advance it thus became necessary to have a major treaty revision, an event that 
heralded a new phase in relations with the EU, towards the signing of the EMIFCA. 
FU-Mercosur: EMIFCA 
The idea of a free trade area, or Association Agreement of sorts, was first discussed by 
ministers of foreign affairs in April 1994 in Sdo Paulo, prompted by an EU suggestion 
(Sanchez-Bajo 1999: 933). From this date onwards the relationship moved from being 
predominantly technical and political towards being more economic. It is also from about 
this time that the EU started to make its preference to deal only with Mercosur as a group 
increasingly explicit. The EU wanted Mercosur to act with one voice, in essence to be 
one partner for the EU, a reflection of the support the EU had given to its regional 
integration. 
The Mercosur Presidential Summit of August 1994 decided to go ahead with the Customs 
Union project, even on the basis of there being derogations and imperfections (Sanchez- 
BaJO 1999: 934). This was the beginning of the necessary changes that Mercosur needed 
to undertake to become a more coherent EU partner and allow progress in their 
relationship. On the EU side, at the EU Heads of State Summit in Essen in December 
1994 it was declared that the aim was "to establish a new, comprehensive partnership 
between the two regions. It urges the Council and the Commission, working on the basis 
of the Council report, to create as quickly as possible the conditionsfor all early opening 
of negotiations with the Mercosur" (Council 1994c: 10). The 'conditions' to which the 
EU Council conclusions refer are clearly those of greater institutionalisation of Mercosur 
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and also that their partner implement a customs union, something it had just recently 
agreed to start. Mercosur's reply was almost immediate, as it signed the Treaty of Ouro 
Preto on the 17 December 1994, which essentially fulfilled the EU's two key 'conditions' 
of institutionalisation and a customs union. Whilst not claiming that Mercosur signed the 
Ouro Preto protocol in direct response to the EU, there is clear linkage, as expressed by 
Sanchez-BaJo; "the exogenous variable of the EU-Mercosur relationship interacted with 
endogenous Mercosur variables in an open, non-predetennined outcoine " (1999: 934). 
The Protocol of Ouro Preto, signed in 1994, put an end to Mercosur's transitional phase 
by adding an institutional structure to the process. It also gave Mercosur an international 
legal personality and established a concrete plan for a customs union (Malamud and 
Schmitter 2006: 15). Indeed the Protocol of Ouro Preto was signed to give Mercosur the 
necessary institutional structure with which it could flourish. It was effectively the date of 
a new type of relationship between the members and also the starting point for the 
important transition towards a common market, which was to be phased in between 1995 
and 2001. 
In accordance with the Treaty of Asunci6n, on I January 1995, a customs union was 
formally put into place. Also on this date Mercosur officially gained legal personality, 
enabling it to negotiate international treaties as one single coherent legal entity. The 
Cannes European Council of June 1995 gave the Commission the mandate to complete 
negotiations for an Interregional Framework Agreement (Santander 2005: 293). On the 
Mercosur side the Presidents met in Asuncion in August 1995 to confirm their mandate 
for negotiations with EU. Progress between the EU and Mercosur was relatively quick, 
only requiring two negotiating rounds, and in December 1995 at the Madrid European 
Council the two partners signed their Interregional Framework Agreement, known as 
EMIFCA. All the preconditions had been dealt with by Mercosur in a very short and 
encouraging period of time, enabling relations to advance at a rapid pace. Santander 
observes that these facts presented "confirmation of the theory that the EU has a role as 
an external federatorfor new regional experiences, through 
its interregionalist projects" 
(2005: 294). Again the speed with which the EU acted is important to note, as the 
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signature of the Interregional Framework Agreement. signed in Madrid oil the 15 
December 1995, came on the very day that the Ouro Preto Protocol came into force. 
Sanchez-Ba jo feels that the speed oil behalf of the EU was to lock in "Afercosur's olm . oil 
jol- tj (. ustonis union -( 1999: 93 1 ). EMIFCA was not without criticism. although more in 
the sense that it did not go far enough, as the Committee on External Economic Relations 
of the European Parliament commented specifically oil the lack ofa precise timetable for 
progress, saying; "ifthe EU wishes to maintain its lealling role ill the tratle Imlicies of 
t1lis region, antl to pi-event the entire South Anterictin colitill(q1t I(II/IlIg ,, to 1/1(' 
political anel econoinicsIViet-es ofitifluence ofthe US, then the necessitY ofestablishing 11 
jilieldle-terin strategy towar(Is the Mercosur is un(lenitible" (Muller-Brandeck-Bocquet 
2000: 569). 
Because EMIFCA was such a wide frarnework, covering [lot only trade ill goods but also 
investment, services, property rights and several politl isions, it had to be ratified ical provi 
by the European Parliament as well as Member State Parliaments. It was not until July 
1999 that this formal process came to an end. It was through EMIFCA that the EU 
introduced the structure for the relationship and the 3-pillar approach-, institutionalised 
regular political dialogue for bi-regional consultation and coordination of positions for 
international bodies; cooperation in areas such as war oil drugs. culture, information, 
communication and regional integration; economic and commercial cooperation 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/externalrelations/iiiercosur/bac,,, rouiiddoc/t'ca96. htiii, accessed 12 
January 2007). EMIFCA led Grugel to comment that "the EU has singled out the 
Southei-n Cone j6i- a novel foi-in (? f coopei-ation, initiallY outlined in Fi-anieivoi-k 
Coopet-ation tlocitnients in 1995 and /996" (2002a: 1). EMIFCA signified the end of the 
disinterested and benevolent EU providing regional integration help, its the main 
motivation in the new Framework was the trade aspect. This, in itself, was the first 
official manifestation of EU intent in this area, and as such marked the start of a new 
period in relations between the two partners. The economic and investment nature of the 
Framework Agreement was self-evident, and quite a change from the past. "In(lee(l it is 
an exaggei-ation to say that the ol)poi-timit), to exl)(in(l investment in the Solithel-11 
Cone i-el)i-esents the pi-incipal economic th-ait-ft)i- the EU" (Grugel 2002a: 4). EMIFCA 
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effectively added to pre-existing technical and financial cooperation all(] polincal 
dialogue by stating intent to liberalise trade as well. III this sense it was also a far- 
reaching and ambitious docurnent as it cinbraced more than trade In goods, covering 
services. IPR and property as well as sorne aspects ol'purely poll itical cooperation. Such a 
wide-reaching agenda led Giordano to believe that "the j'jl. vtj'tjjjj'Ojl(jj 
EU-Mei-cosiii- Agi-eement that bleluls i-ecilwoctilfi-ce tra&, ti-it/l pojiti(. (j1 j. O()j)(, j-(1tiOll 
elialogife vv, oiil(/ i-esj)ect WTO obligations, 1-ationtilize tilu/ simplift the 11(hilill istrati, VC 
management of jw(jei-ential politictil an(I econoinic i-elations an(I jwomote regional 
integi-atioll ivoi-ltlwitle" (2002: 8) -a quote that encapsulates EU strategic motivations. 
EMIFCA did indeed present such a high level of potential for both partners individually, 
and collectively, as well as for global governance. EMIFCA laid an Important foundation. 
but until negotiations are concluded it remains merely a foundation, an incomplete EU 
stratcay. L_ 
Frorn the Protocol of Ouro Preto in 1994 and EMIFCA in 1995 Mercosur started to 
become more active in its own right. In 1996 Mercosur signed Association Agreements 
with Chile and Bolivia, thereby establishing free trade areas with both countries. The 
potential for expansion of Mercosur, to become what its name suggests, the southern 
common market, was under way. Article 20 of the Asunc16n Treaty provides for the 
adhesion of other countries, principally members of ALALC. and is an Article that 
Mercosur has always explicitly expounded, as it is very much a pro. ject based on open 
regionalism (http: //w\k, w. sice. oas. org/trýi(le/i-nrcsr/iiircsrtoc. asP, accessed 12 January 
2007). It was also within this time period that EU-Mercosur relations entered their next 
stage, that of preparing to open Association Agreement negotiations. This principally 
involved the Commission obtaining a mandate, as the next section will relate. 
EU- lercosur: EU Negotiating Mandate 
The Interregional Framework Agreement of 1995 set off a round of intense contacts in 
the period 1996-1999 between the EU and Mercosur (Klorn 2000: 8& Interview 7). Most 
of this time was spent preparing future negotiations for an Association Agreement. The 
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period was also very active in other ways as they held annual Heads of State Summits 
and met every September in the wings of the UN General Assembly. Commercial issues 
were advanced in meetings in Belo Horizonte 1996, Brussels and Punta del Este in 1997 
and Brussels in 1998. Cooperation issues were discussed in the Joint Committee in 
Brussels in 1996 and in Punta del Este 1997 (Interview 7). This time period also saw the 
launching of a myriad of joint projects in areas such as customs cooperation, veterinary 
and phytosanitary rules and competition, as well as the EU giving institutional support to 
the Joint Parliamentary Commission and Mercosur Secretariat. The European Parliament 
signed a Cooperation Agreement with the Joint Parliamentary Commission of Mercosur 
in June 1996, which served as the basis for a series of visits and meetings in subsequent 
years. Support for the Mercosur Secretariat was ongoing and intense during the period, 
and towards the end of 1999 plans for the EU to provide institutional support for 
Mercosur's Economic and Social Consultative Forum were started (Interview 7). 
The specific work triggered by EMIFCA was helped by the creation of three working 
parties to produce three snapshots of the relationship between the two parties; trade in 
goods, trade in services and trade disciplines and standards. The EU and Mercosur started 
work on this initiative after their 1996 meeting in Belo Horizonte and in the period 1997- 
1998 the three working parties created 22 different sectoral studies covering many areas 
of EU-Mercosur trading relations (Klom 2000: 8). Once all this was completed the first 
half of 1998 was spent analysing this mass of studies, the fruit of which was the 1998 
publication, a so-called 'Joint Photography'. After publication of the 'Joint Photography' 
there was "a period of internal reflection" (idem. ) in both regions as they sought to 
digest the information presented in the study. Having analysed the studies the 
Commission started to draft a negotiating mandate for an Association Agreement for the 
Council to approve, a first draft of which it put forward in mid-1998 (Interview 7). The 
Commission summarised this period as follows: 
"After three years of preparatory work- between the Commission and the Afercosur 
governments, involving the preparation of a series of over 20 trade studies, three joint 
working groups, four rounds of meetings, a marathon session of ineetings in Punta del 
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Este III November /997 and in vestment turc III 
research and analYsis the ('01"MiSSiOll W(IS (Ible to mIt Joni -(I rd III -hi/V /99S to the Ell 
Member States it proposal. lor 11 negotiating Inandate, accompanted bY a stild. l. anall-sing 
the possible consequences of (I liberalt, -. ation ot' trade svith Afercosill. 
(w, A, %%,. ec. europii. eLi/coiiiiii/externaI rclations/mercostir/intro, accessed 12 January 2007). 
Between September 1998 and July 1999 the Commission and tile CoulIcIl engaged III 
dialogue and debate over the draft negotiating mandate. Negotiations were I'ar 1'roni easy, 
reflecting a split in Council and a number ot'differences between the two institutions. The 
Council had severe reservations over the Mercosur negotiating mandate, as certain 
Member States felt that a full mandate would seriously harm European a0riCLI1(ure 
(Interview 13). Santander says that "the inaJol-ltY of the millistel-S of Indlisti-l" ecollo/nICS 
I-eigil tij -sfi-oin the EU inembei- states al)I)e(ii-ed tosul)poa the negotititions ... 
but (lilt/ 0 
the Fi-ench, 11-ish and Dutch ininistei-s ofap-icultm-e... wel-e opposed to this inall(latt", 
(2005: 296). This split in Council was also mirrored, to a certain extent, in the 
Commission at the time. with Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler. supported by the 
French Commissioners, de SlIguy and Cresson and the Irish Commissioner Flynn. all 
opposing the mandate (idem. ). In July 1998 the EU Agriculture ministers requested a 
delay in agreeing a negotiating mandate, arguing that an even longer delay would be 
feasible as the same issues would be dealt with by the WTO, a position led by France 
(Sanchez-Bajo 1999: 932). Within the Council only the UK. Sweden and Denmark were 
openly in favour. Commissioner Marm was the main proponent within the Commission 
for an agreement, and he found the majority of his support from the German Presidency 
in 1999. Finally, within the Council, other strong proponents made themselves heard and 
with backing from the Spanish, Italian and Portuguese delegations a mandate was agreed 
in the face of opposition, although France did threaten to veto the mandate to the very 
end (Interview 13). To reach this compromise on the negotiating mandate many changes 
were required by Council, the main ones of which are worth noting here given their 
implications for subsequent negotiations and interregionalism. There were three main 
compromises needed to reach agreement, the first of which was to only allow immediate 
negotiation of non-tariff barriers. This led to the second condition which was to delay 
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discussions on customs duties until after July 200 1, and finally that any agreement would 
not be possible until after the WTO Round, the purpose of which was to allow EU 
agricultural domestic support to stay off the table. 
Faust, in his analysis (2002: 7), notes that there were five major deviations from the 
Commission's original proposal, including the three mentioned above. lie also notes that 
the term 'free trade area' was deleted from the final text on request of the Council. With 
all of these conditions taken on board the Council reached its compromise position in 
time for the June 1999 Rio Summit, and subsequently formally approved the negotiating 
mandateS85 in September 1999. This allowed actual negotiations to be launched during 
the first meeting of the Biregional Cooperation Council (BCC) in November 1999, the 
start of the process towards an Association Agreement, which the next section of this 
chapter will address. 
It is worth briefly looking in more detail at the changes that the Council deemed 
necessary for the Commission to be granted a negotiating mandate, as they have had 
crucial implications for negotiations and also for complex interregional ism. The Council 
voiced concern over the issue of agriculture very early in relations with Mercosur, 
something that pointed towards future resistance in this area once negotiations opened. It 
is worth remembering that the bulk of Mercosur exports to the EU are agricultural 
produCtS86 . Also 
in the agricultural field the EU managed to remove the negotiation of 
domestic subsidies, leaving them purely to the WTO arena for discussion. These factors 
were not something that encouraged Mercosur, and indeed they saw their acceptance of 
them as great concessions to the EU. These early exchanges all suggested that the road 
from a negotiating mandate to an Association Agreement would be arduous. European 
Commission officials stated quite clearly that major Mercosur exports such as beef, sugar 
and cereals were a major concern to Council and Commission alike, and that even in 
1999 optimism at accommodating them in a satisfactory manner was low (Interviews 12 
& 13). The division between the Council and Commission reveals that once economic 
85 The Negotiating Mandates were approved in the form of Directives - one for Mercosur and one for Chile 
"For rnore detail see Appendix 5 
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interests are involved the Council is the dominant EU institution and that it will not 
necessarily pursue EU strategy, which is a potential explanation of' %%, by I-A I Interregional 
strategy has not translated into complex intcri-egionalism in action. The Commission was 
the main supporter of Mercosur regional integration, but once MercOSUr was sulTiciently 
coherent to negotiate with EU interregionalism was at the whim of* the Council. 
Nel! otiatinp, EU-Mercosur Interrepionalism 
This section will analyse the concrete negotiations for an ELI-Mercosur Associanon 
Agreement. The analysis will trace the negotiations, round by round. with tile alin of' 
drawing out the main issues that have arisen as negotiations have proceeded to ascertain 
why EU interregional strategy has not been implemented after nearly eight years. It is 
important to discover the reasons why EU-Mercosur interregionalism has faltered for so 
long and to be able to assess whether they are idiosyncratic to the relationship or 
generally applicable to interregional ism. 
At the Rio Summit in 1999 the EU and Mercosur decided to launch Association 
Agreement negotiations which came with high expectations and ambitions: "this is the Z_ 
fil*. vt tillie tiltit two tratle blocs have ever negotiate(l an Association Agreement ... the 
I-esillting Association Agreement it-ill be thefirst between two regions (in(l the inostjar- 
reachin, q firee tratle agi-eement in the it-orN, covei-ing 683 million I)eople" 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/external relatiotis/i-nercostii-/Iiitro/index. htiii. accessed 12 December 
2006). Such enthusiasm, however, was not shared by everyone close to proceedings, 
something that Bulmer-Thomas summarised by saying "it seenis fini-IN, certain that 
negotiations will be lengthy" (2000: 3). To qualify this comment Bulmer-Thomas cited 
the example of EU-South Africa negotiations that were negotiated between 1995 and 
1999, and which were constantly bedeviled by difficulties over sensitive products. In this 
case the EU was dealing with a country and not a customs union 
97 
. The EU and Mexico 
took little over a year to reach total agreement, but agriculture was not an issue and the 
K7 Although South Africa does have a customs union in effect with Lesotho. Swaziland and Namibia 
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EU had lost substantial market share to the US since the introduction of NAM and was 
thus pressed by circumstances. 
The negotiating Directives were formally approved by the Council on 13 September 1999, 
based on the political compromise reached in Luxembourg on 21 June 1999. According 
to this compromise, as noted in the last section, negotiations on non-tariff elements could 
start immediately; thus the EU and Mercosur set to work on these and the cooperation 
and political pillars. Also of importance, due to the changed mandate and its conditions, 
EU-Mercosur negotiations were never given a specific end-date, rather that they should 
be "concluded at the earliest possible date" (Interview 1). This was a deliberate tactic to 
leave the negotiations open to influence from other exogenous factors as opposed to 
being subject to its own strict timetable. This refers very specifically to the WTO 
negotiations, and in particular the sub-section of those concerning agricultural subsidies 
that the EU had insisted not be dealt with at the regional level. As Klom noted at the time 
-it is clear that the parties want to conclude the negotiations at the earliest possible time, 
though for the EU the results are related to the results of the next 1VTO round, while for 
Afercosur the FTAA timetable is a deternzinantfor its planning of ineetings with the EU" 
(2000: 12). In a certain sense it appears that the lack of a strict timetable suited both 
parties for different reasons. 
Commission officials have expressed an interesting sentiment that was prevalent in the 
EU before opening negotiations, when everyone knew agriculture would be difficult, that 
they hoped a successful WTO round would relieve the situation in the near future 
(Interviews 12 & 13). Given the changed mandate, open-ended timeline and also 
negotiator's expectations, it is clear that the pace of EU-Mercosur negotiations was 
always going to be dictated by WTO negotiations to some extent. Within this backdrop 
official negotiations between the two blocs began in earnest in Brussels in November 
1999, with discussions on the modalities and the structure. At this meeting the core 
principles of the subsequent negotiations were agreed upon, thus allowing negotiators to 
start work on more concrete discussions. 
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Practical negotiations opened with EU and Mercosur negotiators presenting to Ministers 
their plans for the structure, methodology and timelmes for tile negotiations (Klom 2000: 
9). The Cooperation Council created the ELJ-Mercosur Biregional Ncgotiations 
Committee (BNC) within which negotiations were to take place. The BNC hit(] tile right 
to create technical working groups to discuss detailed and specific areas. Also created 
were a sub-committee on cooperation (SCC) for senior officials from both partners and 
three Subgroups on specific co-operation areas. The section \vill now proceed to describe 
the main events that occurred at each negotiating round that has met to date (unless 
otherwise stated the detail for the negotiating rounds conles froill 
http: //ec. europa. eu/exteriial relations/mercosur/ass neg-text/blicl-8.1-lun, accessed 12 
January 2007). 
Negotiations started in Buenos Aires in April 2000 and at an early stage there was 
agreement on not only the general principles but also on political dialogue, co-operation 
and some trade matters (Interview 1). Much of what was agreed were formalities such as 
the general principles related to free trade and "no exclusion (ýI'any sectot-, coilloi-inity 
ji-itil WTO i-itles, single untlei-taking princilVe, conclusion tit the em-liest possible time, 
inteiition to ahn tit comprehensive negotiations an(I balance(l i-esults. an(I the 
I-einfoi-cenient Qf, consultations 0/1 WTO inaltei-s" 
(httl2: //ec. europa. cLi/exteriiaI relations/rnercosur/ass-neýz text/bricl-8.1-itni. accessed 12 
January 2007). The trade chapter was touched on in the sense that the ambitious 
objectives of the two partners were outlined as being "libei-alizatioll (? fti-alle ill goo(Is 
and sei-vices, but ... also with govei-nnient pi-ociii-entent, investment, intellectual 1wolwaY 
riglits, competition policies, ti-atle (lefence instiwinents an(I a dislmte settlement 
, liechanisin" (idem. ). Finally the meeting set in motion a work plan with activities that 
were required to supplement the work of the BNC. Overall the results of this negotiators 
meeting brought what Klom describes as "a set of*conchisions that a&lt-ess the general 
pl-illcil)les (ýf the negotiations, its political tlialogue, coopet-ation an(I ti-atle elenielits .. 
(2000: 9). Klom continues by noting that the meeting also created three Technical Groups 
to deal with market access, services and horizontal matters. Finally it created three 
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subgroups to deal with specific aspects of negotiations on cooperation, economic 
cooperation, financial and technical cooperation and social MR] CUltural cooperation. 
The parties next met in Brussels a rnere two months later in June 2000, to focus oil: I) the 
exchange of information 2) the identification of non-tariff obstacles 3) the definition of' 
specific objectives for each area of' the negotiation 
(http: //ec. europa. eu/external relations/rnercosur/ass nc,, text/bricl-S. Min, accessed 12 
January 2007). The Commission website notes that they presented to Mercosur a list of' 
non-tariff impediments to trade that they felt needed addressing. During this round a lot 
of information was exchanged with regard to each others regional integration so as to 
enhance better mutual understanding. This point is particularly interesting with rcFerence 
to the Commission becoming fully aware of the partner with whom they were dealing. 
political dialogue and cooperation were both discussed during this round, mostly setting 
the parameters for future work. This round, coming so soon after the first, sought to 
continue the previous momentum (Interview 9). 
The parties met for a third time in six months in November 2000, keeping up good 
momentum. In this round, priority was given to the technical groups where trade experts 
and negotiators were able to discuss and exchange initial data. In many senses this was 
the start of serious negotiations, although the issues touched on at this stage were 
somewhat periphery. The third round also saw satisfactory progress in negotiations oil t- 
both the economic co-operation and the political dialogue pillars. highlighting that they 
would not be impediments to agreement. Negotiators also managed to agree the future 
institutional shape of the Association Agreement. The first three rounds gave an 
impression of solid momentum and accomplishment, which whilst in part correct, does 
not take into account the fact that the issues that have been highlighted as controversial 
had yet to be touched upon. 
Negotiators met four months later in March 2001, in Brussels, to address texts on non- 
tariff barriers to trade between the two partners. Within this context the EU addressed 
Business Facilitation as an issue worthy of more discussion. It was becorning clear that 
outside of the trade pillar, which it was not yet possible to discuss, there was no 
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disagreement on any issues (Interview 9). The fifth round ofnegotiations. in July 2()()1, is 
where the 'real' negotiations began in earnest. as the EU's self-imposed deadline oil 
negotiating tariffs was no longer applicable. ()it the basis of' this the EU unila(erally 
offered a concrete negotiating proposal, which was immediately re. 1ccted by Mercosur oil L_ 
the grounds of insufficient benefits for their agri-business sector. Despite tills, tile 
commission still noted that "Mei-cosul- N1011.1. this I)O1111cal ges/111-c bY the 
EU iii a delicate moment qftlze 1e, ýiollal integi-ation alul con. vitleretl it (I. V a Wrong 
. Vlll)l)ol, t Of 
the Em-ol)ean unioll 10 the Mel-coslo- 
(http: //CC. CLli-opýi. eu/extcriial-rciiitioiis/iilei-costii-/ýi,, s net,, text/bnc 1-8.11till. accessed 12 
January 2007). In this proposal the EU had offered a staggered tariff' reduction ill five 
stages: immediate, 4.7,10 and undetermined years. Part of this offer wits that inally 
goods were to remain subject to quotas, mainly those of all agricultural nature. The EU 
simultaneously felt it necessary to reaffirm that discussions over the fibcralisation of' ELI 
agricultural markets would only take place ill the Multilateral framework of the WTO, 
confirming their oriainal stance (interview 13). As the ELI was established ill Mercosur 
and under no external pressure at the time from the US, it was not obliged to offer 
asymmetrical tariff reciprocity which it had done with both Mexico and South Africa. 
The EU offer gave Mercosur little incentive to accept, or make all Interesting counter- 
offer (Grugel 2002a: 4). Despite the derision that Mercosur showed the ELI offer, Faust 
notes that "inany obsel-vei-s i-emained scej)tical that the EU wouhl 1wesent a concl-ete 
pl-opostil in July 2001. Much to the sut-I)i-ise oj*thesesceInical voices, on thefifth rotoul of 
tiegoti tition in July 2001, the ECjoi*nially qffýi-ed a cmici*ete negotiation Iwol)osal on how 
to i-educe ti-atle bat-i-iet-s with t*egai-tl to sectom oj'tliffýi-ent sensitivitv " (2(X)2: 8). The fact 
that the EU had laid an offer on the table was all important opening gambit ill 
negotiations, and as such marked an important point in relations, although it 
simultaneously showed that once agricultural trade was broached difficulties loorned. 
As the EU had made an offer in the last round of negotiations Mercosur presented its own 
tariff offer and services and public procurement negotiation texts at the sixth round ill 
October 2001, all of which the EU promptly rejected. Despite the fact that the ELJ and 
Mercosur had rejected each others proposals a nqgotiation process had been kick-started, 
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and a basis for further discussions established. Mercosur had deemed the EU's offer to be 
unacceptable because it offered little, if anything, for the agro-industrial complex. This 
dissatisfaction was reflected in Mercosur's counter-proposal. The EU, in turn, deemed 
Mercosur's offer unacceptable as it included less than 40% traded goods (Faust 2002: 8). 
it was at this time that Argentina was undergoing a financial crisis so there were some 
questions over the future timetable and negotiation possibilities, but plans were made 
regardless. 
The seventh meeting came six months after the last meeting, in April 2002, marking the 
first slow down in the pace of negotiations. It is perhaps no surprise that there was a 
slowdown seeing that there were such wide differences in negotiating positions between 
the two partners in recent rounds. As a result not only did this round represent a 
slowdown in negotiations, it was also only concerned with political and cooperation 
issues, which greatly disappointed Mercosur who had hoped to progress with trade 
negotiations. It was becoming very clear that agricultural negotiations, and their links to 
the WTO, would be difficult to solve. It was also apparent that there were links with the 
US led FTAA process, which Mercosur was negotiating simultaneously, as the slowdown 
that this round marked coincided with a slowdown in FrAA negotiations. 
A further seven months passed before the eighth round of EU-Mercosur negotiations in 
Brasilia in November 2002. In the meantime informal contacts had been trying to revive 
the trade negotiations from the two original failed offers, though with little success 
(interview 12). This was reflected in this round, which focused mostly on technical issues 
and on market access for goods, a continuation of the pattern started in the last round. 
Both the FrAA and WTO negotiations were simultaneously making no progress. 
An exchange of substantive tariff offers on 5 March 2003 created a sound basis for 
discussions at the ninth round of negotiations in March 2003. This was the second round 
of offers made by both regions. In reference to these offers the Chaire Mercosur 2002-3 
Annual Report defines the crux of the trade negotiation stalemate when it notes, 
"Afercosur vulnerabilities are concentrated in manufactured goods alld European 
competitive fragilities are concentrated on the agricultural sector" (2004: 15). This led 
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to both areas being defined as 'sensitive' or 'special' by each region. Such all asVIIIIIIelry 
of trade was proving too difficult to resolve without any external pressure (o force 
agreement. At this meeting the Commission drew up tile 'Brussels Programme' which set 
an ambitious work plan for negotiators to achieve an agreement bet' )re ( )ctobcr 2004. 
through five negotiating sessions and two ministerial meetings (Santander 2005: 301 
The Commission reports that "both sitles conclutletl th(it this rounil was (I signqicant slep 
in the imlVementation of the Rio ivork-Imogr(unine, Iniving the waY. 1or the next ones " 
(htti): //ec. eL'I'opýI. CLI/extei, iiýil-i, elýitioiis/iiiei, cosLii*/ýiss-iicg texUbnc I -8.1itin, accessed 12 
January 2007). Despite the optimistic timetable EU-Mercosur agricultural negotiations 
were simply not progressing, reflecting the lack of progress in the wro and a lack of' 
progress in the FTAA. 
The tenth round took place in Asunc16n. in June 2003, with an important agenda, 
covering goods, investments, services, intellectual property rights, dispute settlement, 
competition and the cooperation chapter. The core sensitive issues were left to the side as 
both partners tried to wrap up other areas of the agreement first, such as wines and spirits 
Agreements, SPS Agreements and Business Facilitation. Both sides were working on the 
assumption that, by finding agreement on as many areas as possible before the sensitive 
ones would allow the 'single undertaking' principle to be decisive in tempting the other 
to make concessions (Interview I ). It Is interestina to note that this round occurred JUSt 
after the Mercosur Summit of 18 June, at which Mercosur had tabled a new initiative for 
consolidating its custorns union and internal market, marking the first direct link with 
Mercosur regional integration in negotiations. Whilst not mentioned explicitly as part of' 
the negotiating summaries, the state of Mercosur regional integration was mentioned by 
all Commission officials interviewed as being an important part of discussions. The FU 
was finding that Mercosur was not one voice with one position, and that Its perfect 
customs union would pose major problems for EU exports, all of which would have to be 
sorted out in negotiations. At this time EU negotiators started to talk of Mercosur as a 
-1, il-tIltil I-egion" (Interview 5). It is no coincidence that as negotiations pressed forward 
Mercosur's regional integration came increasingly into question. 
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The eleventh round, in December 2003, was mainly concerncd with tile (1clalls ()I' tile 
political dialogue and cooperation pillars, as well as with the final provisions of' (lie 
Association Agreement. The Commission notes that there was -(I 
views (//I(/ clal-ifie(l 1)ositiolls oil Ilew issiles lablvill M. 111(, 1.1,11 si(h, - 
(http: //ec. europýi. eu/exteriiýil i-elýitiotis/iiiei-co. sui-/ýi. ss neg text/bncl-8.1inn, accessed 12 
January 2007), although this should not mask the I*act that trade negotiations did not 
make any significant progress. Despite this round's lack ot'progrcss Chaire Mcrcosur still 
noted that -both sitles ai-e cautiouslY anticil)(Ifing (I successfill CMIC111sion bv the ('10 of 
2004. But even ýfthe well known agi-icultw-e stitnibling bloc (-, 111 17(, t(q. Ill(, 
negotiatol-s still have (ill ovei-it-helining aniount of ivoi-k oil othei- ci-ticial coi-c issiles" 
(2004: 7). The twelfth Round, in March 2004, was a continuation ot'the eleventh round In 
many senses, as witnessed by the Commission conclusions oil it, "(I vei?, Iwothictive week 
cif'negotiatiolls oil both the POlitical (110 COOPel-atioll chaptei-s (ýftlie Agi-eenient, itwh 
at-oillicl haýfqfthe bi-ackets Iýftetl anil only. few intijoi, I. Sslies still Open, It-hile several OfIler 
Inillol, issues it-ill i-equit-e neit, (11-afting 
(httl2: //ec. eui-opa. eu/externa1 relations/inercosur/ass neg text/hiic accessed 12 
January 2007). Again little substantive progress was made oil trade Issues. although the 
two parties did make a promise to exchange a third round ol'offers by nild-April 2(X)4, as 
a basis for the next meeting. 
The thirteenth Round of negotiations took place in May 2(X)4. and continued in the 
manner of the previous few rounds, unable to unlock the trade pillar. Serious debate on 
tariff barriers had only begun in 2001 but it had quickly become mired in the issues of' 
agricultural protection. Once it was made clear by the EU that agricultural protection 
would only be dealt with in the confines of the WTO, then the WTO timetable became a 
key issue to follow. Despite the uncertainty over the future of the WTO neg-otiations and 
their own specific negotiating problems, at the May 2004 ELI-LAC Summit the 
Commission announced officially that an agreement would be signed by October 31 2(X)4. 
An agreement was not reached by this date due to the continued inability to iron out trade 
difficulties. Since the thirteenth round there has been no formal negotiating round, for a 
plethora of reasons that will be analysed in the next section. The ELI and Mercosur have 
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continued to meet and strengthen their relations, but not in the trade sphcre. There have 
been informal negotiators meetings but these have been more 'contact maintenance' 
(Interview 5) than solid foundation meetings. 
The overview of the thirteen negotiating rounds has shown clearly how the process of 
negotiation slowed down once the EU's self imposed date on which tariffs could be 
discussed expired. From this point onwards trade negotiations began in earnest and a 
number of major difficulties were encountered, notably with regard to agriculture and 
Mercosur's state of regional integration. It is interesting that of the three pillars under 
negotiation the cooperation and political pillars were agreed very early by the 
Commission, but the trade pillar as a competence of the Council, has been left unsolved. 
The next section will address in detail the factors that have prevented an EU-Mercosur 
Association Agreement being signed. 
EU-Mercosur Interregionalism - Unrinished Business 
Looking at the primary EU-Mercosur sources and the narrative of the thirteen official 
negotiating rounds, there was a continual optimism that the next meeting would be the 
one at which a deal would be brokered, dating back to 2002. Grugel provides an example 
when he notes that "Rodrigo Rato, Spain's Minister of the Economy, claimed in the early 
months of the Presidency that a free trade deal could be signed in 2002 " (2002a: 10). 
Expectations of an EU-Mercosur deal have always been high, despite the difficult 
circumstances and the myriad of obstacles precluding agreement. These expectations 
have pervaded all official literature and discourse, which has been unfailingly optimistic 
about a future agreement. Obviously all this optimism now seems rather ill founded and 
the enthusiasm seems to have waned after a series of near deals and agreements. It is 
possible with this relevant hindsight, to extract pertinent inferences as to why an 
agreement has not been signed and what the implications of this are for the 
implementation of the EU's interregional strategy. Chapters two and three outlined the 
aims and objectives of the EU in relations with Mercosur, whereas this chapter has 
detailed the implementation and results of this strategy. The simple fact is that despite the 
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EU strategy and support for Mercosur, and all the expectation and optimism, an 
Association Agreement cementing a pure interregional relationship has not been signed, 
and does not look likely to be signed in the near future. 
interest from both the EU and Mercosur in signing an agreement appears to have 
remained both genuine and constant, but the obstacles seem to have simply proved too 
many and too important. The most obvious, and most often cited, reason for the stalled 
relationship is that of trade relations, and agriculture in particular. Santander believes that 
"although there is a common interest to sign a free trade agreement, the negotiations 
face a number of obstacles, such as the CAP of the EU" (2002: 491). There is no surprise 
in agriculture being cited as a main reason, as it was raised by EU Member States before 
negotiations even started through the Council. Despite the likelihood that agriculture 
would prove difficult to handle the EU has tried to incorporate it in a variety of ways, 
firstly in July 2001 through an innovative quota system. It then created the theory of a 
Gsingle pocket' to apply to these quotas, which would ensure that Mercosur exports 
increased (Interview 5). This idea would have liberalized 50% of export quotas 
immediately, with the remaining 50% dependent on the WTO conclusions (Santander 
2005: 301). Whilst trade between the EU and Mercosur is blighted by the structure of 
international specialization, whereby Mercosur exports low value-added agricultural 
products to the EU, and imports high technology goods from the EU, it is not the only 
factor at play in why negotiations have been stuck (Chaire Mercosur 2002: 12). 
Ile Chaire Mercosur is explicit in detailing the specific trade problems that have 
hampered negotiations (2004: 14-16). The first issue that they highlight is that of reverse 
conditionality by the EU on the subject of CAP. Secondly they identify phytosanitary 
measures as a major problem where the EU insists on strong measures of traceability and 
on the predictability of its imported products. The next issue is that of the trade 
asymmetry whereby Mercosur is fragile in the trade of manufactured goods and the EU in 
agriculture goods, making for an irreconcilable situation. Chaire Mercosur (idem. ) 
specifically notes that Mercosur is weak in five key areas; machinery and electrical 
equipment, chemicals, base metals, plastics and rubbers as well as textiles, all of which 
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have posed a problem for EU market access demands in these areas. Interestingly Chaire 
Mercosur identifies Rules of Origin (RoO) as also being an issue, not in itself, but 
because of the Mercosur customs union and its lack of robustness. Finally the Chaire 
Mercosur cites what it feels is perhaps the single most important factor in the demise of 
negotiations, that EU tariff peaks are highest in the exact products where Mcrcosur has its 
greatest comparative advantage; meat, sugar, dairy products and cereals. 
Whilst trade negotiations have clearly provoked an impasse, they alone do not explain the 
failure to sign an interregional agreement. Trade statistics show that for the EU, Mercosur 
,, is only a relatively minor trading partner" (Chaire Mercosur 2002: 12) hence opening 
the door to other factors to influence the relationship. If Mercosur does not have 
sufficient trading pull in negotiations then other factors could slow or stop relations. A 
slowdown is less desirable from a Mercosur perspective, as their incentive is clear given 
88 
that the EU is their main trading partner . Various authors have identified what they 
perceived as the key reasons for the EU-Mercosur negotiations stand-still, and it is worth 
assessing the most prominent amongst them. 
one of the principal factors affecting EU-Mercosur negotiations, outside of agricultural 
trade, is the link to progress in other international negotiations, notably the FrAA and the 
Wro. Santander, whilst noting the problems with agriculture, points out that just after 
genuine trade negotiations started, a series of other factors intervened to slow relations 
down, of which he highlights the role of the US. He also notes that once negotiations 
started, Argentina fell into a financial crisis and Brazil had to devalue its currency, all of 
which placed enormous pressure on Mercosur regional integration (2005: 297). Santander 
focuses heavily on the state of regional integration in Mercosur through the negotiation 
process, especially due to crises within the region. Grugel adds fuel to this line of thought 
when he also states that negotiations were not made easy by the divergent interests within 
Mercosur, meaning that common positions were almost impossible to find (2002a: 5). 
This tallies with the views of various Commission officials that Mercosur is a "Virtual 
" For more details see Appendix 5 
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Region" (Interview 5), something supported by other non-Commission interviewees who 
echoed similar sentiments (Interviews 4& 6). 
Faust (2002) outlines five contributory factors to the stagnation of EU-Mercosur 
relations, which correspond to five of the explanatory hypotheses determining EU 
interregional relations espoused by Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004: 7-16). The first of these 
is interest group conflict within the EU, whereby agricultural interests have predominated. 
The next contributory factor is that of the interplay between the Council and Commission, 
an interplay over agreeing a negotiating mandate which revealed how much more liberal 
the Commission was with regard to agriculture than the Council. In essence these first 
two factors relate to the EU's inability firstly to formulate a solid negotiating mandate, 
and then subsequently to make an acceptable offer on agriculture due to internal interest 
group factors, namely the strength of the agricultural lobby. The next factor is the 
competition between the EU and the US, something that has been evoked in this chapter 
with specific reference to the FFAA process. The penultimate factor is the process of 
talks within the WTO, to which EU-Mercosur negotiations were tied from the outset. The 
final contributory factor is the state of Mercosur's regional integration, which has also 
been noted to have been problematic. 
To fully contextualise the explanations of the EU-Mercosur interregional slowdown, it is 
important to restate the motivations of both partners. Faust succinctly highlights the main 
motivations of both parties in the relationship (2002: 12). His assessment of Mercosur 
interests in an agreement with the EU revolves around getting secure market access with 
its main trade partner, notably to balance its trade with the EU through an increase in 
agricultural exports. Corollary to this is a Mercosur desire to lock-in existing FDI and 
attract increased EU funds. By taking such trade steps Mercosur would be able to balance 
its relations with the US, and simultaneously increase its bargaining power in FTAA talks. 
Mercosur also has a lot to gain politically from relations with the EU, involving its 
credibility and international visibility. 
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From the perspective of the EU, Faust (2002: 12) outlines a desire to consolidate its 
presence in a dynamic market as part of its global positioning drive. Through this the EU 
would seek to ensure a stable regulatory framework and open new business opportunities. 
Closely linked to these trade considerations are an EU desire to gain, or at least not lose, 
market share from the US. Implicit in this last aim is the desire, or need, to keep pace 
with FTAA negotiations, bettering them if possible so as not to repeat the 'Mexico 
experience'89. Finally Faust identifies an EU desire to spread regional integration and use 
EU-Mercosur relations as a showcase for a customs union - customs union FTA, or pure 
interregionalism. This latter element is supported by Commission officials who all agreed 
that support for regional integration was important (Interviews 1,2,5 & 7). 
From all the above analysis, and the factors cited by Faust (2002), Grugel (2002a), 
Santander (2005) and Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004) three key explanations emerge for 
the interregional impasse. The first is the asymmetrical trade relationship and the role of 
agriculture, as clearly witnessed by its being a priority offensive interest for Mercosur 
and defensive interest for the EU. This agricultural explanation has two important sub- 
sets, both of which will be dealt with along side it. The first of these is the interest-group 
factor and the role it has played in slowing down negotiations and the second, the internal 
politics of the EU and their bearing on interregionalism. The second explanation is the 
impact and pressure from external forces, notably from the US through the FTAA and 
also from the negotiations within the WTO. The third explanation is counterpart 
coherence and regional integration, both the EU's desire to encourage them and 
Mercosur's adaptations of them. The remainder of this section will be dedicated to a 
deeper assessment of each of these explanations, with a view to understanding how and 
why interregional strategy has not been translated into action. 
89 The 'Mexico Experience' refers to when Mexico joined NAFrA and the EU lost substantial market share 
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Asymmetrical Trade and Agriculture: Multi-level, Multi-causa]90 
The first, and most prominent, explanation for the impasse in negotiations to arise from 
the last section was in the trade pillar, especially in relation to non-negotiable sensitivities. 
In all negotiations there are sensitive issues under discussion, which it is hoped will be 
diluted by the single undertaking approach (interview 5). The EU and Mercosur appear to 
have reached irreconcilable sensitivities in their trade negotiations, with agriculture the 
main culprit. It is worth remembering at this stage that one of the main purported 
potential functions of interregionalism is to unravel issues that the multilateral arena is 
unable to solve, of which agriculture should be a prime example. It is thus of interest to 
see how the two partners, the EU and Mercosur, as completely opposed parties in the 
WTO negotiations attempted to solve agriculture bilaterally. The EU's interregional 
strategy towards Mercosur has placed heavy emphasis on concluding an Association 
Agreement, notably for trade. 
From an EU perspective agriculture is by far the single most sensitive trade issue, 
something that explains its minimal inclusion in all EU FTAs to date (Interview 5). In 
negotiations with Mercosur, however, this situation would be untenable. Agriculture was 
already flagged before negotiations began as the Council held up the negotiating mandate, 
so it is little surprise that it featured as a constant thorn. Even earlier, as Sanchez-Bajo 
notes, agriculture was being identified because "in 1995 the Directorate General of 
Agriculture of the EU Commission expressed its objections to a free trade agreement" 
(1999: 932). In response to these early objections in the Commission the Brazilian 
Ambassador to the EU in 1996 retorted that "if the issue of agriculture does not have a 
priority there will be no negotiation" (idem. ). The agricultural issue came to prominence 
again in the Commission study of trade relations, part of the Joint Photography of 1998, 
which revealed that agricultural products represented 57% of EU imports from Mercosur, 
of which 16% could be classified as sensitive (Muller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000: 570). 
Sanchez-Bajo echoed this point when she noted that "particularly sensitivefor the EU 
are agricultural products, which totaled 55% of all Mercosur exports to the EU in 1994 " 
90 For an up-to-date analysis of EU-Mercosur trade and investment relations see Doctor (2007: 297-307) 
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(1999: 932). Mercosur not only has a very important rural population, for whom 
agriculture is the main source of employment and poverty reduction, but it has also based 
its economic model on export growth, mostly the export of agricultural products. Writing 
in 2003 the British Ambassador, who had witnessed much of the Mercosur agriculture 
discussion in Council, stated that; 'fiarming may prove the biggest difficulty in these 
negotiations. The British, of course, as the perennialfoes of the CAP, are well aware that 
the European desire to maintain agricultural protection will create difficulties in 
Mercosur countries" (Grant 2003: 57). The two partners were, it seems, destined to clash 
in this area. Despite the omens there was optimism on both sides that a way around the 
agricultural issue could be found. 
At the opening of negotiations it was frequently cited that Mercosur and the EU had trade 
compatibility, as expressed by Santander when he noted that "there is a strong North- 
South component to EU-Mercosur trade relations -a complementarity that could result 
in a closer EU-Mercosur relationship" (2002: 498). Tbrough this complementarity 
Santander saw the possibility of a closer relationship, as both partners would have been 
able to give free reign to their comparative advantage and benefit accordingly. In reality 
EU-Mercosur trade structure is typical of North-South trade, not only in terms of 
products but in terms of protection, as Faust underlines; "the existing trade structure is 
closely linked to the protectionist measures of both mechanisms, which have revealed a 
clear divide with regard to each region's comparative advantages" (2002: 10). Sanchez- 
Bajo feels that "the classic North-South divide, shown by the interregional trade 
structure, has been the main source of conflict in EU-Mercosur relations" (1999: 932). 
Each partner, through regional integration, has sought to protect the areas in which it does 
not have a comparative advantage 91 . 
91 This equates to Mercosur facing tariffs and quotas for agricultural and semi-finished manufactured goods 
as well as antidumping measures and phytosanitary measures for agricultural products. The EU faces 
Mercosur sensitivities, notably tariff barriers in manufacturing and non-tariff barriers in services and 
govemment procurcment (Intcrview 5) 
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The crux of the agricultural issue is that the most competitive Mercosur exports face the 
largest barriers to entry in the EU, which can be anything from preferences given to other 
countries, high tariffs, tariff rate quotas, minimum entry prices, special safeguards and 
sanitary measures (ICONE 2004: 8). Chaire Mercosur, in its analysis of the EU's tariffs 
on agricultural products finds that, "the average level is much higher (about 19%) and is 
extremely distortive, because of inter-sector dispersion and trade discrimination among 
potential exporters. Protection variesfrom 0% to 297%" (2004: 20). The tariff peaks are 
on meat, sugar, dairy products and cereals, all of which are key Mercosur exports. Chaire 
Mercosur concludes that "this fact could be the main reason why negotiations are not 
easy" (2004: 20). The last chapter noted that Mercosur gets GSP access, but this is of 
little interest to Mercosur in relation to the tariff peaks and competitor advantages that it 
faces. ICONE follows on from these statistics by saying that "agriculture market access 
negotiation brings a list of sensitive products that may deadlock the overall discussions 
due to their importance in the EU-Mercosur interregional trade flows and the current 
market access restrictions they face in exporting markets" (2004: 4). They then proceed 
even further in their analysis by noting that the two most opposed positions, in 
agricultural negotiations, belong to France and Brazil and that "there is almost no point 
of consensus between the stances expressed by these two countries" (2004: 5). Such is 
the force of these two countries' respective positions that ICONE has been led to label 
the pained agricultural negotiations as a "dialogue des sourds" (2004: 45) given the lack 
of progress and perspectives. A further important element of agricultural negotiations is 
that the EU insisted on negotiating domestic support within the confines of the WrO, 
hence establishing a strong link to the progress of the Doha round. Despite this 
concession the two remaining pillars of agricultural negotiations remained open for 
discussion; market access and export competition. Within both the WTO and Mercosur 
discussions the EU has underlined the concern of the multi functi onali ty of agriculture, 
which has proved to be a disputed concept. This leads ICONE to conclude their analysis 
by saying that "the EU is pursuingfreer non-agricultural trade and services and is trying 
to avoid the liberalisation of its highly protected agricultural market" (2004: 10). Such a 
vision does not correspond with stated EU interregional strategy, but certainly helps 
explain the difference between strategy and reality. 
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Clearly the EU and Mercosur have diametrically opposed interests in agriculture, but this 
alone is not enough to account for why negotiations have stalled. The most important 
factor for this thesis is why the Commission has not been able to negotiate a solution to 
the agricultural impasse in accordance with its interregional strategy. There are reasons 
why it has found its hands tied, making it incapable of tabling an acceptable offer. The 
main reason for this has been the position of the Council, which has been the principal 
interest group blocking further relations. This was studied in detail by Faust (2002), for 
whom the interest group theory was an important determinant of relations between the 
two partners. The interest group explanation is at its most powerful when treated in 
alliance with agricultural trade, as that is where it is felt the most within the EU. This 
explanation also evokes another of Faust's explanations for the EU-Mercosur impasse, 
that of inter-institutional bargaining, which again ties most closely into the agricultural 
question. By definition a trade negotiation implies that there will be winners and losers, 
and negotiations are pressured accordingly by the groups concerned. For the EU, from 
well before the negotiations were even started, back in 1995, this meant that the agro- 
industrial sector had been actively against negotiations. From an EU point of view 
increased agricultural trade liberalisation with Mercosur would entail heavy penalties for 
the agri-business sector in the face of Brazil and Argentina's comparative advantage. 
Agri-business is an extremely well organised lobbying group within the EU, given its 
constant experience with the CAP, something it has extended to the EU-Mercosur 
negotiations with little effort (Interview 5). The Brussels based agriculture lobby is also 
in the throes of fighting off liberalisation through the WTO round, so it is not a surprise 
that Mercosur finds itself in a similar situation interregionally. Faust feels that "a first 
causal mechanism, explaining the EU's trade strategy towards Mercosur should be 
related to the interplay among economic actors" (2002: 13). Faust relates how the 
European Farmers Federation (COPA) was already active in influencing the Council back 
in 1994 against EU-Mercosur interregionalism (2002: 14), lobbying which has ebbed and 
flowed with the pace and intensity of negotiations. Doctor concludes that "confronted 
with clashing societal interests, where losers were organised in a more concentrated and 
assertive manner than the winners from free trade, EU negotiators found it difficult to 
yield to Mercosur demands " (2007: 302). 
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The lobby against an agreement is to some extent mirrored by a pro EU-Mercosur camp, 
although they are nowhere near as well established and organised. Export orientated 
manufacturing industries as well as services industries would be the principal 
beneficiaries of an EU-Mercosur agreement (Interview 3). In an attempt to counter the 
influence of the agriculture lobby the Commission wanted to find a single forum through 
which these positive voices could be channeled, and as a result created the Mercosur 
Europe Business Forum (MEBF) in 1999 (Interview 7). The main aim was for it to act as 
a counter-weight by grouping all those interest groups with a positive view of 
negotiations. The German influence in the MEBF has been a decisive factor, especially in 
the Council granting a negotiating mandate to the Commission (Faust 2002: 15). The 
more advanced interregional negotiations became the more MEBF reverted towards 
sectoral interests, hence losing coherence and power, unlike its agricultural counterpart 
which remained rigidly in place around a single issue (Interview 7). It is through these 
two lobbying organisations that the influence of civil society has most pervaded the EU- 
Mercosur negotiations, and in this sense played a pivotal role. The interest group 
explanation, the first hypothesis of Aggarwal and Fogarty in their analysis of EU 
interregionalism, suggests that "EU trade strategies, interregional or otherwise, are 
determined by the relative influence of specific interest groups within Europe " (2004: 7). 
After analysis of this hypothesis they conclude that "there is no doubt that highly 
influential, highly protected industries such as agriculture have been successful in 
shaping the EU's commercial treatment of counterparts" (2004: 226). They go further in 
their conclusions, saying that industries will be more successful in influencing the agenda 
if they have "preference intensity and mobilization" (2004: 226), both of which clearly 
apply to the agricultural lobby. For the EU-Mercosur negotiations the agricultural lobby 
has manifestly shaped the EU commercial treatment of its counterpart, a primary reason 
why negotiations have been unable to conclude. Outside of these two lobby groups the 
EU has attempted to take into account wider civil society concerns, and actually held two 
meetings between the Commission and civil society representatives in October 2000 and 
February 2002. Grugel roundly criticized these on the basis of their format, numbers and 
content, suggesting they were more "an exercise in information sharing by the 
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Commission" (2002a: 11) than anything else. Organised lobby groups have more 
informal channels of influence than through public meetings such as these (Interview 13). 
Within this analysis of the interplay of economic interest groups the relationship between 
the Commission and Council has come to the fore. The Comtnission has been seen to be 
more positive in its approach to dealings with Mercosur, especially on trade issues, 
whereas the Council has been more protectionist. This simply mirrors the interplay that 
the EU institutions undertake during any trade negotiation, most notably within the WTO, 
so relations with Mercosur are little different in that sense. Faust pushes this analysis 
further suggesting that the Commission wants to extend its influence through agreements 
such as EU-Mercosur, and also knows that an EU-Mercosur agreement would pressure 
the Council into reforming the CAP. The Council is however more receptive to 
protectionist influences, and against Commission power expansion (2002: 15). This 
corresponds to the second hypothesis of Aggarwal and Fogarty in their examination of 
EU interregionalism, that inteffegionalism is to an extent "determined by EU 
bureaucracies' attempts to maximize their own influence" (2004: 11). In their 
conclusions they find that this hypothesis is valid, but not in ways they had anticipated. 
They note that the Council has the power over the strategic agenda and as such maintains 
sway in trade negotiations, and that the Commission is not likely to wrestle this away 
from Council. Where they did find inter-institutional bargaining was intra-Commission, 
i. e. between DGs (2004: 226). This again is supported by the findings of this chapter and 
explains why the Commission has been consistently more supportive, and pro-Mercosur, 
than the Council who have defended their agricultural interests above any potential 
strategic interests of the Commission and the EU. 
This section has taken a more detailed look behind the headline statement that 
asymmetrical trade and agricultural trade has been the stumbling block for EU-Mercosur 
negotiations. As Grugel, echoing the thoughts of many other commentators, noted, 
it agreement was always going to be difficult in view of the agricultural protectionism 
embedded within the EU" (2002a: 1). The trade asymmetry has not in itself been the 
main problem but merely the tip of the iceberg in the EU, as the attempt to negotiate in a 
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bastion of protectionism has mobilized strong interest group forces. Not only this, but it 
has highlighted a core difference between the Commission and the Council, and their two 
very divergent views on this subject. This poses the question of whether the EU strategic 
drive towards interregionalism, pioneered by the Commission, faltered solely on the 
Council objections to agriculture. This explanation suggests that the tension that exists 
between interregional strategy and interregionalism in action is based on differences 
between the Council and Commission, brought about by interest group interplay within 
the EU. The Commission sets, and the Council agrees, the strategy but when it comes to 
implementation the Council is much more hamstrung, especially on agriculture. 
Agriculture was a sore point even before the Council issued a negotiating mandate, and it 
has remained one ever since, overriding any other considerations in relations and 
negotiations. 
If the Council were serious about interregional strategy, regional integration, pure 
interregionalism for global governance reasons, cementing Mercosur as a regional partner 
and reinforcing its relations ahead of those Mercosur has with US, then it would have 
taken the number of opportunities to sign an agreement and make a compromise on 
agriculture. There are sufficient formulae, and means, to have dealt with agriculture in 
some way, forming part of a wider compromise to EU interests, not just agricultural 
interests (Interview 5). Such factors raise questions about the Council's driving 
motivations, and suggest that the agricultural lobbying has been too effective to allow the 
Commission strategy to take root. Jank felt that an agreement could have been found in 
2004, at which point he said that the overall result will "depend on the level of ambition 
of the trade-off with other areas under negotiation. If the proposed trade-off is ambitious, 
significant quotas and tariff preferences may be offered to Mercosur exports" (Valladdo 
2004: 76). Vaillant, based on his analysis of economic trade policy models, came to the 
conclusion that "the non agreement between the EU and Mercosur is the consequence of 
an insufficient offer by the EU" (2007: 4), which reflects a combination of the influence 
of the Council and the EU agricultural protection lobby. Vaillant continued, saying that; 
"The idiosyncratic characteristics of Mercosur patterns of trade implies that a 
Preferential liberalisation by EU means a reduction in the protection of markets where 
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there is a strong domestic resistance in the EU to such liberalisation, so that the offer by 
the EU is not attractive enough in the South to induce export-lobby groups to become 
very active" (2007: 4). 
From the preceding analysis it appears that the trade situation between the EU and 
Mercosur is very much an idiosyncratic one that mirrors the very difficulties submerging 
the WTO. Whilst considered idiosyncratic to Mercosur, it should be noted that were the 
EU to consider purely bilateral trade relations with Brazil, as it did with Mexico and 
Chile, then the same agricultural problems would surface. The agricultural economic 
interest group explanation is clearly a key detern-dnant of the impasse in EU-Mercosur 
trade negotiations, and one that explains the difference in interregional strategy and 
action. This section has also highlighted the fact that interregional relations may be ill 
suited to fill the function of filters for multilateral problems. It is not, however, the only 
explanation of the problems encountered between the two partners. The next section will 
address the influence of the external environment on the relationship, notably from the 
WTO and FrAA negotiations that have paralleled EU-Mercosur. 
International Context: FTAA and WTO 
This section will address the external dimension of the relationship, elements of which 
have been evoked in the preceding pages. The role of the WTO, in particular, has been 
mentioned on several occasions, especially in relation to how the EU tied negotiations to 
the current VY70 round. The WTO is the EU arena of preference in which to deal with 
agricultural issues, the very issues that have been so problematic at the interregional level. 
The second important external element to consider is the role of the US and the FrAA 
project, and how this has interacted with EU-Mercosur negotiations. Both the WTO 
round and relations with the US are crucially important for Mercosur. The WTO round 
bears much promise for Mercosur members on their priority issue of agricultural trade. 
Relations with the US are also crucial to Mercosur members as the US is their second 
most important trading and investment partner after the EU. In both the VY70 and 
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negotiations for the FrAA Mercosur has been an engaged partner pursuing its key 
interests, notably agricultural export expansion. 
Extra-regional relations and the multilateral arena have been major priorities for 
Mercosur in its drive to enhance its global positioning and trading capabilities. Such 
multiple activities give Mercosur additional leverage across all its negotiations, be they 
with the EU, US or WTO. It is quite clear that there are links between these three arenas, 
and that Mercosur has sought to find, and use them. Unlike Mexico, Mercosur is pursuing 
simultaneous negotiations, something that has the potential to generate positive 
externalities. Thorstensen undertook an innovative analysis of all three negotiations, in 
2003, to assess the commonalities and issues holding all three negotiations back. 
Unsurprisingly agriculture figured as the most complex issue. In her conclusions 
Thorstensen suggested that "any analysis on trade negotiations must be made 
considering the three negotiations simultaneously. Since the trade issues in examination 
are almost the same for each forum of negotiation, the results to be obtained in one 
negotiation will depend on the outcome of the other negotiations" (2003: 73). This 
underscores that fact that EU-Mercosur interregional negotiations are explicitly linked to 
the WTO, from not only a procedural perspective but from also from a negotiating 
perspective. This fact again raises the question of whether the EU-Mercosur level of 
interaction can achieve results when the multilateral arena is unable to do so, as 
interregional theory suggests it might. The main area in which this would be of benefit 
would be agriculture, but as Thorstensen notes "regional negotiations such as the FTAA 
and EUIMercosul may solve the issue of market access, but solutions to the problems of 
domestic support and export subsidies are more complex" (2003: 23). This chapter has 
already outlined that the EU refused to tackle domestic support outside of the WTO arena, 
through which it tied the two negotiations together. From a negotiating perspective it 
appears clear that until the W170 has dealt with domestic support in agriculture other 
negotiations that involve a high level of agricultural trade, such as the FrAA and EU- 
Mercosur, will struggle to advance. 
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Since the Council tied negotiations to the VVTO the EU and Mercosur have been 
negotiating in their shadow. As Sanchez-Bajo contends, "the diversification of trade 
flows supports the notion that Mercosur is a global trader, thanks to Argentina and 
Brazil", which she believes "explains both Mercosur's interest in both open regionalism 
and a multilateral system under the surveillance of the WTO" (1999: 930). With this 
status Mercosur has been playing a major role in global negotiations, staunchly 
demanding agricultural trade liberalisation. 
At this juncture it is worth remembering that agriculture has always been subject to 
distinct status in the international arena, remaining insulated from all GATT rounds of 
trade liberalisation. It was not until the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, in 
1994, that agriculture actually moved under the multilateral roof for liberalisation. This 
move into mainstream trade liberalisation came with very important provisos and caveats, 
namely such instruments as the Peace Clause, and despite inclusion in the final agreement 
agriculture remained heavily protected and subject to an array of trade distorting 
measures. Agriculture is a thoroughly divisive and complicated issue, which has led 
Gaisford and Kerr to suggest that "agricultural trade negotiations have in the past been 
some of the most difficult and acrimonious. This is a trend that is set to continue. Difficult 
negotiations in agriculture have the potential to threaten the very existence of the 
international institutions that regulate international trade " (2001: 2). The EU and 
Mercosur are on opposite sides of this acrimonious WTO negotiation. 
The last section made reference to the strong EU agricultural lobby playing a decisive 
role in EU-Mercosur negotiations, the very same lobby that is opposed to Mercosur 
positions in the WTO. The EU lobby has also been a crucial influence on negotiations in 
the WTO, especially when coupled with the equally strong US agricultural lobby. When 
EU-Mercosur negotiations began they were very much in the shadow of WTO 
negotiations on agriculture, which took precedence for both partners. It was assumed, at 
the time, that a successful WTO round would solve the domestic support issue and allow 
the EU and Mercosur to address market access. It is of interest that the Council agreed to 
the Commission negotiating mandate before the Seattle WTO Ministerial, at which it was 
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expected that the WTO would take large strides forward, not backwards (Interview 5). In 
these circumstances it is understandable that the WrO would take precedence, as the 
interregional agreement would be merely complementary. As Faust says "neither the EU 
nor Mercosur members were keen on committing themselves to an interregional 
agreement without knowing the outcome of the Seattle results, which would have hadjar- 
reaching consequences for their overall strategies" (2002: 18-19). Seattle did not 
produce the results expected and since then WTO negotiations have stalled and slowed. 
Even though the partners would not be able to involve domestic support in their 
agreement they could nonetheless have tackled market access and placed clauses in the 
text to take into account the outcome of the VVTO round. Clearly as the VVTO round has 
been prolonged there has been an increasing incentive to opt for an interregional solution, 
albeit an interim one, yet even this has proved elusive for the EU and Mercosur. This 
provides further evidence of interregionalism only ever acting as a multilateral 'enhancer' 
and not as a 'distracter' (Dent 2001). 
The second major external influence to consider is that of the US and the FrAA. The first 
context within which the US was cited in this thesis was the development of NAFrA and 
the impact that it had on EU-Mexico trade. This led to the EU quickly signing an FrA 
with Mexico to try and recoup lost market share, which was a clear reactive measure to 
US policy in the region. This was a precursor to the EU-US-Mercosur triangle that was to 
emerge as a result of simultaneous negotiations between Mercosur and the EU, and 
between Mercosur and the US through the FrAA. 
In terms of Mercosur's relationship with the US, it is a very different one from that with 
the EU. In essence Mercosur does not directly interact with the US, as the FTAA is the 
main vehicle for negotiations between the two. There have been so-called '4+1' talks, 
created by the 1991 Rose Garden Agreement between Mercosur and the US, but these 
have proved sporadic and very light in content (Interview 5). This forum has been 
reconvened, most recently in 2002, to try and deepen trade relations, but it has continued 
to be second-best to FrAA talks. The fact that the US has never engaged Mercosur as a 
single entity is an interesting point to develop. EU support for Mercosur regional 
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integration is in sharp contrast to the model of relations proposed by the US, who has a 
rigid preference for hub and spoke integration through the FTAA. These two differing 
visions have created the issue of two rival regionalisms in Latin America, as described by 
Briceno Ruiz (2006) and Van Scherpenberg & Thiel (2000). This is brought into focus by 
Santander when he suggests that; "to understand the evolution of this interregional 
relationship (EU-Mercosur) it is also important to take into account the USA's 
project ... is there competition between Europe and the USA in the Southern Cone? " 
(2002: 491). 
Competition between the EU and US became apparent in December 1994 when the first 
FrAA meeting acted as a major spur to EU activity with Mercosur. The same month the 
European Council met in Essen, Germany, and agreed to deepen cooperation with all 
Latin American entities, including Mercosur. From this point onwards the two 
negotiations moved in parallel, with the EU trailing the US. The EU was fearful of the 
FTAA having a Mexico effect and hence losing large market shares in the region. In 
order to avoid the US creating a dominant trade bloc that would establish rules and norms 
that would compete with European ones the world over, the EU needed to keep a 
foothold in the region, and an ideal foothold was through relations with Mercosur. 
Santander suggests that it is in this vein that the words 'strategic partnership' should be 
understood (2002: 496-7). The alignment between negotiations was seen most notably in 
the late 1990s, when the US failed to get TPA, which meant that it could not advance the 
FTAA. At the very same time, between 2000 and 2001, the Council put EU-Mercosur 
negotiations firmly onto a back-burner, as reference to the negotiations section will 
testify, much to the vexation of the Commission who wished to advance negotiations. 
Santander says that "the EU has often justified delays in negotiations with Mercosur by 
claiming that there is no hurry, since the White House is unable to put the US scheme on 
the fast track" (2002: 497). However once the US increased the pace of FrAA 
negotiations in 2001 the EU was quick to respond, and at the fifth meeting of the 
negotiators in July 2001, made a unilateral offer to Mercosur. Clearly "peaks in EU 
negotiating seriousness tended to coincide with peaks in perceived US influence in the 
region" (Doctor 2007: 290). 
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The US has never treated Mercosur as an equal, as stated by Santander, quoting Bergsten, 
when he said that "contrary to the European vision, the US authorities consider that 
Latin American regional spaces are merely temporary and must eventually be absorbed 
in to the broader spaces proposed by the US" (2005: 292). This highlights how the US 
has insisted on dealing bilaterally with all Mercosur members and not engaging them as 
an entity in their own right. The US assumed that the FrAA project would subsume all 
regional integration projects in Latin America, creating one space as Santander noted. 
Thorstensen felt that "in the FTAA the US is trying to merge and dissolve the sub- 
regional arrangements inside one free trade area" (2003: 7). Not only has the US 
refused to recognise and interact with Mercosur, but it has actively tried to destabilize it, 
seeking to dissect Mercosur very early on in its development. In 1992-3 Brazil was 
undergoing a severe economic and political crisis, at which point Argentina started to 
distance itself from Brazil and Mercosur. At this point the US invited Argentina to join 
the group of countries negotiating NAFrA (Santander 2005: 292). This pattern has been 
repeated several times since, as the US has approached Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina 
in turn. The US approached Argentina again in 2000 to try and interest them in signing a 
bilateral agreement, at the height of the repercussions of a Brazilian currency crisis. The 
US has also attempted to isolate Mercosur in Latin America by trying to bypass it 
through signing a myriad of bilateral agreements with other groups and countries in the 
region. The US has agreements with Mexico, Chile, CAFrA, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru 
and Bolivia, which leaves Mercosur alone in not having signed an agreement. Santander 
highlights the 2001 Argentine crisis as a key juncture in relations with the US, stating that 
before that Argentina was the most pro-US member of Mercosur, and the most interested 
in a bilateral free trade agreement. He asserts that the 2001 crisis was a turning point in 
this situation as the US failed to come to the help of Argentina, whereas the EU cemented 
its links with the regional group (2002: 491-2). He notes that; "the USA has tried to 
benefitfrom this alliance (with Argentina) by destabilizing Argentine-Brazilian relations 
developed within theframework of Mercosur" (2002: 494). In response to the US attempt 
to lure Argentina into a bilateral deal the EU, as Santander notes, "tried to re-launch the 
interregional process by setting up a 48-million euro package to deepen Mercosur" 
(Santander 2005: 298). The nature of the EU's response is in itself a curious one, as 
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instead of trying to speed up Association Agreement negotiations it preferred to offer 
money to strengthen Mercosur regional integration. This is a further endorsement of the 
findings of the last section on the differences between the Commission strategy and 
Council implementation. The EU did actually make a more significant trade offer at the 
fifth meeting of the BNC in July 2001, which was made on the strict insistence that the 
EU would deal only with Mercosur and not bilaterally with its members. This EU 
response is a further confirmation of the fact that the EU, through the Commission can 
deliver a solid and consistent strategy, but that Council is unwilling to back-up this 
strategy with action. In this case the Commission has backed up its strategy with action, 
but only for regional integration and not for an Association Agreement. 
The FrAA is the most important forum for Mercosur-US trade negotiations, and also 
interestingly an arena where Mercosur is able to act and talk as one with the US. An 
analysis of the implications of the US and FrAA in relation to EU-Mercosur should not 
lose sight of Mercosur's specific motivations. This is summed up by Bulmer-Tbomas 
when he says "Mercosur countries, particularly Brazil, see negotiations with the EU as 
one of their strongest weapons in extracting concessions from the United States" (2000: 
3). He goes on to say that "Mercosur countries have been quite explicit about the need 
for parallel negotiations" (2000: 6). This highlights the important interplay between the 
two sets of negotiations, and their competitive nature. The EU and the US are competing, 
and Mercosur is using this competition to better its own circumstances by playing one off 
against the other. This competitive element to relations with Latin America harks back to 
Hettne's notions of the triad and their competition for periphery regions (2003: 5). Given 
the fact that Mercosur can not fully negotiate agriculture in the EU-Mercosur arena, one 
of its strongest negotiating chips, it is perhaps no surprise that it has sought to use the 
FrAA card to such an extent, strengthening its own hand in any way it can. 
EU reaction to US activity in Latin America suggests that the region is not sufficiently 
high on the EU external relations priority list, as Santander notes when he says that ': for 
the South American bloc relations with Europe are a priority. But the bloc does not 
occupy a significant place in Europe's hierarchy of priorities" (2002: 504). Without 
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pressing circumstances in the region, such as F7AA talks or US intervention, the EU has 
not been proactive. This would suggest that the principal EU motivation behind an 
agreement with Mercosur has only been a fear of trade diversion from a successful FrAA, 
a hypothesis stated clearly by Santander when he noted that "instead of adopting a 
proactive stance to trade relations with Mercosur and taking a leading role, Europe's 
attitude to Mercosur is apparently more dependent on the progress of the FTAA " (2002: 
505). Chapter three brought EU balancing and bandwagoning motivations for 
interregionalism to the fore, and this analysis of EU-Mercosur relations has revealed that 
this is in effect Council balancing and bandwagoning. 
A very interesting detail of the stalled FFAA talks is that they also struggled over 
agriculture, given that the US, like the EU, would not deal with domestic support outside 
of the WTO. As the US demanded to negotiate agriculture in the WTO, Brazil as 
compensation, or in retaliation, demanded to negotiate investment protection, services 
liberalisation, intellectual property and government procurement only in the WI70 as well. 
Leaving so many important topics of negotiation to the WTO it became clear that the 
FFAA project would not advance until after the WTO round (Santander 2005: 301). Like 
EU-Mercosur negotiations the FTAA process was itself also tied to the WTO process. In 
this sense neither the US nor the EU found Mercosur tempting enough to alter their 
strategies on agricultural issues, even in the face of the WTO slowdown. As a 
consequence of the WTO slowdown the US increased its bilateral negotiations with a 
plethora of countries, many in South America. As part of this drive it approached 
Argentina and Uruguay, but never Mercosur or Brazil. 
This section has analysed the impact of the two principal external factors, the WTO and 
the US led FrAA, on the EU-Mercosur negotiations. EU interregionalism in action 
appears to have been heavily related to US activity, notably through the FrAA. Faust 
concludes that the EU has been responsive to current US power in the region as well as 
trying to anticipate future US policy. He feels that the EU has tried to contest US 
commercial power in the region by creating a partner through which it can gain more 
than just market share (2002: 4). In this sense it is not possible to evaluate EU 
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interregionalism with Mercosur without contending with US activities in the region. This 
section has showed that the EU has been highly reactive to US commercial and political 
activities, and has not seized the initiative when it has been handed it, suggesting a 
merely defensive and reactive motivation. This pattern of reactive behaviour, or 
economic balancing and bandwagoning, started with NAF1rA and followed with the 
FIFAA. Whilst it is possible to counter-argue that the FTAA, as with the WTO and EU- 
Mercosur, has slowed because of agriculture, hence making agricultural negotiations the 
main determinant, it is not possible to ignore the strong connections that EU activity has 
had with that of the US. As US momentum in the Americas has waned, so too has EU 
activity in pushing ahead with EU-Mercosur negotiations. 
The presence of agriculture as the stalling factor in all three negotiations is also an 
important fact and is where the role of the WTO as an external influence takes a pivotal 
role. Whilst the agricultural stakes remain so high and multifaceted it is clearly not 
possible to advance interregional agreements between partners with a high proportion of 
agricultural trade. Both the US and the WTO have had a direct impact on EU-Mercosur 
negotiations, but what stands out the most is that the EU has been unable, or unwilling, to 
take the initiative in relations with Mercosur in the face of both FrAA and WTO 
slowdowns. The findings of this section highlight key factors that have influenced 
negotiations but they also affirm the findings of the previous section that the Commission 
has outlined and pursued a coherent strategy, but the Council has operated on a balancing 
and bandwagoning basis. The final key issue to investigate is that of regional integration 
and "counterpart coherence" (Aggarwal & Fogarty 2004: 17) in EU-Mercosur 
interregionalism. 
Regional Integration - Towards Counterpart Coherence 
Aggarwal and Fogarty clarify that "to satisfactorily account for international regime 
outcomes it is of course essential to consider the characteristics of the counterpart 
regions with which the EU engages" (2004: 16). Nowhere is this more necessary than 
between the EU and Mercosur given that it is the first proposed pure interregional 
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agreement and also in light of the high importance the EU has attached to promoting 
regional integration. Regional integration is also a key interregional feature that the 
Chaire Mercosur feels "constitutes one of the most important expressions of the cultural 
affinity that link our continents" (2002: 1). Ex-Commission official Klorn stresses the 
importance that the Commission has always attached to Mercosur's integration when he 
says that "the EU wants to make an impact on the regional integration process of 
Mercosur, on the Southern Cone and on Latin America in general" (2000: 10). For these 
reasons the issue of regional integration is a central one to analyse in EU-Mercosur 
relations. Regional integration was identified as a major plank of the EU's interregional 
strategy, in which it has invested heavily. The previous section, however, revealed that 
Mercosur regional integration has been a problematic issue in negotiations, with EU 
officials resorting to labeling Mercosur a "Virtual Region" (Interview 5). Whilst the 
main reasons for the slowdown in EU-Mercosur interregional negotiations have been 
documented in the previous sections, an analysis of regional integration is no less 
important. It is essential to analyse the continuous support the EU has poured into 
Mercosur's regional integration over the years to assess the effectiveness of EU 
interregional strategy in such a key area. Both chapters two and three have highlighted 
the importance that the EU has attached to promoting regional integration around the 
world with a view to creating the conditions for pure interregionalism. With this in mind, 
two closely linked aspects of regional integration will be crucial in this section, firstly the 
impact of EU support on the state of Mercosur's integration and secondly the EU and its 
international position as a regional integration model and leader. 
With the creation of Mercosur in 1991 the four member countries were embarking on an 
ambitious regional integration scheme, one of the most ambitious in the world in the 
1990s, as they aimed not only for a free trade area but also for a common market. From 
the very outset, as noted earlier in this chapter, the EU provided support for Mercosur, 
and the influence of the EU on its regional integration is evident. The Protocol of Ouro 
Preto in 1994, which laid the institutional foundations of Mercosur, was inspired by the 
example of the EU, which should come as no surprise given that the EU was the only 
viable, functioning and successful regional integration model available and that the EU 
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had been providing assistance to Mercosur since 1992 (Interview 5). Whilst the EU 
influence is evident, the details of Mercosur regional integration do not copy those of the 
EU, nor do they replicate areas that the EU would have been keen to see replicated. The 
main difference is Mercosur's total rejection of any notion of supranationality or of 
autonomous central institutions. Although the smaller countries of Mercosur would prefer 
a larger degree of supranational governance in Mercosur, this is opposed by the larger 
members, who have always stalled or rejected initiatives in this direction. A good 
example is given by the arbitration mechanism in Mercosur, based on the 1994 Protocol 
of Brasilia, which does not lead to an easily binding mechanism for solving disputes, at 
times even necessitating the intervention of the Presidents of the four countries to solve 
disputes of a technical character (Interview 5). Mercosur thus functions on an entirely 
intergovernmental basis, even though it aims to achieve objectives very similar to those 
of the EU through its two main decision making bodies, the Council and the Common 
Market Group. It is interesting that the institutional choices that Mercosur made in 1994 
reflected their vision of regional integration, one that it did not share with the EU, despite 
the EU support and influence towards a more binding regional integration. Mercosur 
from the onset did not form coherent internal decision making procedures or any 
mechanism to maintain and enforce decisions, notably with regard to the customs union. 
The issue of Mercosur's customs union is of obvious importance to its regional 
integration and also to negotiations with the EU. Mercosur implemented its CET in 1995, 
which has proved to be imperfect in conception and application ever since, leading to a 
number of serious problems over the years. At the core of this matter are divergent trade 
policies and macroeconomic differences that have led to many disputes. In 1995 there 
was a large automobile conflict in CET discussions, something that remains an issue of 
division between Argentina and Brazil, and hence an issue in negotiations with the EU 
(interview 3). 
A combination of external and internal factors played an important role in slowing down 
Mercosur integration, such that a distinct gap between theory and reality started to appear. 
Interestingly, despite all these difficulties, and notwithstanding its own domestic agenda, 
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the EU maintained a high level of support for Mercosur. Whilst Mcrcosur has perhaps 
flattered to deceive, or at least not lived up to its own high ambitions, it has "tripled 
intraregional trade flows and has become a consistent target of foreign investment " 
(Malamud 2005a: 141). In contemporary literature Mercosur is often cited as the second 
most advanced regional integration vehicle after the EU, to which it is frequently 
compared and contrasted. Despite these comparisons, that flatter by proximity, Mercosur 
was an inherently different entity to the EU when negotiations were opened, as reference 
to the Protocol of Ouro Preto reveals. Decisions are taken intergovernmcntally on a 
unanimity basis, the results of which have to be ratified in all Member States. For 
Malamud the fact that Mercosur is not institutionalised is not a surprise as it "replicates a 
rooted Latin American tradition of lip-servicing " (2003: 4). Malamud def"i nes the state of 
Mercosur when he says that it "is presently an incomplete customs union that aims to 
become a common market" (2005a: 141). He goes further than this when he states that 
Mercosur is different things to different people, and that it is perceived within the region 
as offering a viable left wing alternative to neoliberal regional integration. In this final 
analysis Malamud concludes that Wercosur has made limited progress towards the 
originally stated aims ... is not a Customs Union, not even an incomplete one. According 
to GA7T definitions it has not even become a fully fledgedfree trade area " (2005c: 426). 
it is not only Malamud who is so critical of the Mercosur project as, on the base of 
evidence, Cammack, quoted in Mecham, has also concluded that Mercosur is a flawed 
and failing regional enterprise, saying that "Afercosur is all ineffective regional 
association with little remaining capacity to contribute to regional and global integration, 
and little capacity to promote other goals " (Mecham 2003: 378). 
Despite the plethora of problems, crises and setbacks to the integration timetable which 
all generated a wealth of negative press, Mercosur as an entity has endured. Almeida 
suggested that "the key to understanding not only Afercosur's place in the political and 
economic structure of Latin American 
Southern Cone politics, but also its role in the 
international relations of the region, is to realize that it is a result of a political decision 
made at the highest level, which is 
dependent more upon political will than economic 
realities" (2000: 5). Mercosur 
has also constantly been beset by a form of identity crisis, 
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which has manifested itself predominantly in the desires of the most powerful member 
state Brazil, and what they want to do with Mercosur. Brazil has oscillated bctwccn 
creating a 'political Mercosur' and a 'trading Mercosur. In essence this argument over 
Mercosur's vocation goes back to the original intentions of Brazil-Argcntina cooperation 
in the 1980s, which was more political than economic. As Malamud relates (2005: 424) 
there is a movement to restore this original intention, and hence bring politics to the fore, 
creating a social regional integration as opposed to a neoliberal trade orientated 
integration. Malamud makes a further fundamental point about the current political 
versus economic debate that surrounds Mercosur, that "those who clefend Afercosur 
(hence political Mercosur) are supporting something that does not exist and is different 
from thefounding treaties" (Malamud 2005: 424). 
A Commission Official (Interview 7), in citing their views on the main reasons why an 
agreement had not been reached between the EU and Mercosur, noted that they felt there 
were four key factors. The first was agriculture and the second was links to the WTO. 
The third reason cited was Mercosur's state of regional integration and the fourth was the 
lack of trust between the two partners. On this last point the official was somewhat more 
direct in their analysis, questioning why the EU should trust Mercosur as a partner when 
the member states of Mercosur do not trust each other. Mercosur members have a history 
of torrid internal disputes and do not hesitate to apply countervailing duties and sanctions 
on each other, as well as applying to various international tribunals to solve their disputes. 
This is not the basis for a trustworthy and dependable counterpart with whom to negotiate. 
A further Commission official (Interview 5) echoed this idea of trust as a key variable by 
noting that the lack of trust between Mercosur members incited a lack of trust between 
the EU and Mercosur. On a more important note the official remarked that the lack of 
trust was even more present between negotiators, given Mercosur's negotiating tactics. 
Whilst this latter point is less an issue of regional integration, and more an element of 
negotiating strategy, it does nonetheless come back to the question of Mercosur as a 
coherent regional partner. 
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As a further issue in negotiations the Commission Official (interview 5) cited 
personalities as a major stumbling block, saying that Brazilian Minister of External 
Relations Celso Amorim's personal objectives often got in the way of negotiations. The 
official goes on to say that the relationship between lead negotiators is very important for 
negotiation dynamics. The official noted that relations between Celso Amorim and Pascal 
Lamy were not very good, but that between Peter Mandelson and Celso Amorim they are 
even worse. This theme is not one that the Commission alone has propounded, with 
numerous other commentators sharing the same reservations about Mercosur's 
counterpart coherence. Having identified, with some clarity, the problems posed by the 
trade aspects of an agreement between the EU and Mercosur, Vaillant also identifies 
regional integration as an obstacle, when he says that Mercosur is "not mature enough to 
develop an agreement" (2007: 4). Trust and maturity are closely linked concepts in terms 
of regional integration, and on the evidence of this section it seems Mercosur has lacked 
both. 
it is clear that the state of Mercosur's regional integration has had a direct impact on 
negotiations, not only from the perspective of trust emphasised by Commission officials, 
but also in terms of its stability. As Mercosur has fallen into crises there have been 
impacts on negotiations with the EU. Ever since the Brazilian currency crisis of 1998 
Mercosur's coherence has repeatedly come under pressure, notably during the 
Argentinean recession and financial crisis in 2001. With each episode there have been 
increased intra-regional tensions and question marks over regional integration. The last 
section noted how the US has tried to use these moments to divide Mercosur. Obviously 
during such trying times the climate was not ripe for Mercosur to present a strong and 
unified external position. The EU, through all these hard times, has stood by Mercosur in 
resolute fashion, continually providing the support needed to keep the regional 
integration process afloat; "one of the positive outcomes of the long process of trade 
negotiations between the EU and Mercosur was the proinotion of a prograin to transfonn 
Afercosur's intraregional trade rules, with a gradual adoption of free practice rules " 
(Vaillant 2007: 4). Vaillant proceeds to temper his argument when he suggests that "it is 
not viable to think of a trade agreement 
between the two trade blocs with Afercosur's 
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current level of development of comynon policies and institutions" (2007: 4). These 
quotes from Vaillant illustrate the need to address EU support for regional integration in 
more detail as the EU strategy to create a coherent partner does not seem to have worked 
as the EU would have wanted. Regional integration appears to have been a further area of 
EU interregional strategy that has not had the desired impacts, although in this case it is 
not only internal differences between the Commission and the Council that have created 
the situation, but the aims and ambitions of Mercosur for its own regional integration. 
Klorn explains the EU position on regional integration in Latin America very clearly by 
saying that; "most of the EU's cooperation during the past decade has ainied at 
reinforcing the Mercosur integration process, with similar initiatives for the Andean 
Community and Central America" (2000: 11). This he justifies on the basis that it is 
beneficial for the participating countries, 'Just as it has beenfor Europe" (idem). On this 
basis the EU has provided every form of support conceivable to Mercosur, from technical 
support at the outset, training in regional integration, financial support for regional 
integration, interaction with Mercosur to boost its coherence and reputation, verbal 
support and finally negotiations for an Association Agreement. All of this, as Klorn has 
suggested, is not simply altruistic benevolence from the larger regional integration 
partner to its fledgling associate. As Santander notes this cooperation "enabled the EU to 
export its regional governance model and to increase its reputation as an international 
actor" (2005: 292). This idea is expressed in more detail by Faust when he suggests that 
"the political interest of the European Union in building a deeply institutionalised 
relationship with Mercosur and helping Afercosur to augment its coherency is closely 
connected to the EU's normative ideas of how a new world order should be constructed" 
(2002: 4). The strength, depth, coverage and continuity of support for Mercosur regional 
integration has been the one outstanding feature of EU interregional strategy, and one 
area in which the EU has lived up to its promises, as through every Mercosur crisis the 
EU has stood firm. It is clear that the EU has been supporting Mercosur regional 
integration as a mechanism to spread EU norms and rules around the world, to export its 
model of regionalism, to drive forward regionalist global governance and also to counter 
the US in the region. 
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For an analysis of EU interregional strategy it is important to assess the result of over 
fifteen years of EU support for Mercosur, to discern to what extent the EU has achieved 
its aim of developing a more coherent counterpart. Sanchez-Bajo notes that "givell the 
EU's longer existence and niore solid institutionalisation inally important actors in 
Afercosur tend to view it as a desirable niodel" (1999: 933). Mercosur has certainly taken 
the EU model into account in its own institutional development, although notably not 
accepting supranationality. Klom, after his experience of negotiating with Mercosur 
found that it "is not copying EU policies and structures and is clearly setting-111) its own, 
autonomous, process of integration" (2000: 5). The fact that Mercosur has developed its 
own form of regional integration, and the way in which it has done it has led Malamud 
and Schmitter to suggest that Mercosur has been guilty of a "misunderstanding of the 
relevance of the European experience with integration" (2006: 1). The EU had a clear 
and defined strategy that the Commission formulated and implemented with coherence 
and perseverance, but despite this continuity of EU support Mercosur has simply decided 
to take its own course of regional integration according to its realist power needs and 
desires. 
This section has taken a critical look at Mercosur regional integration as a contributory 
factor to the deadlock in EU-Mercosur negotiations. The findings have not been as the 
EU would have hoped, showing that its strategy to create a coherent partner, not only for 
negotiations, but for wider global governance reasons, has not been a success despite it 
being the only element of EU strategy to be rigorously implemented. The most poignant 
indictments of the failings in EU strategy have come from their own officials, who have 
cited Mercosur to be a "virtual region" (Interview 5). Whilst Mercosur regional 
integration has not lived up to EU standards or expectations EU support of regional 
integration has had some positive impacts for Mercosur, as Malamud concludes; 
"European persistence in recognizing and supporting regional groups as international 
actors in their own right has, therefore, contributed to the strengthening of their internal 
structures and the reinforcement of their negotiations power 
internationally " (2005: 298). 
The EU, through the Commission, has been able to implement its strategy on regional 
integration but perhaps the main support for this strategy would have been the signing of 
270 
an Association Agreement to lock-in Mercosur regional integration. This is an idea that 
various Commission officials have speculated on, suggesting that for all its problems 
Mercosur regional integration was not an insurmountable one (Interview 5). The EU 
could have strategically signed an Association Agreement with Mercosur for the benefits 
it would bring its strategy of global governance and regional integration, but its inability 
to do so again shows Council balancing and bandwagoning. Without the internal will to 
drive forward its own integration and without a lock-in Agreement, Mercosur internal 
structures remain limited at best and it has evolved as an entirely different type of 
regional integration project with little in common with the EU. 
In light of this section not only has the appellation of Mercosur as a customs union been 
brought into question, but so too that of Mercosur as a coherent regional integration 
entity. This questioning of Mercosur's ability to fulfill basic criteria in relation to its CET 
and regional integration severely undermines the identification of EU-Mercosur relations 
as pure interregional as well as casting important shadows over EU strategy to enhance 
Mercosur actorness. Regional integration has underpinned all aspects of the relationship 
between the two partners, and the failure of EU interregional strategy to have the desired 
impacts on Mercosur's regional integration has manifested themselves in negotiations 
and moves to strengthen bilateral relations with Brazil. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the EU-Mercosur pursuit of pure interregionalism as the 
most important element of EU-LA complex interregionalism, to answer the research 
question; 'Are there any tensions 
between the EU interregional strategy for Afercosur 
and EU - Mercosur interregionalism 
in action? 'The chapter has covered all facets of the 
EU-Mercosur relationship, and analysed in detail the most important factors with a view 
to understanding whether the differences in strategy and action in EU-Mercosur relations 
can be taken as a precursor for the future of interregionalism in general. 
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An analysis of the history of relations prior to Association Agreement negotiations 
showed the main motivations for Mercosur and the EU to pursue interregionalism to be 
quite mixed in nature. As Bulmer-Thomas (2000: 3-6) noted the main EU motivation was 
to capture increased shares of growing foreign markets, of which Mercosur was a prime 
example. It was the EU's key market in Latin America and was growing as an EU export 
market throughout the 1990s (Interview 1). A secondary EU motivation was to export its 
model of regional integration that would serve manifold purposes, such as promoting its 
own international position and supporting the creation of a regional approach to global 
governance. The early period, 1990-1995, of EU-Mercosur relations was directly related 
to Mercosur and its state of integration, during which the EU offered unconditional 
support. After this, in 1995, negotiations for an Association Agreement started and have 
yet to be concluded. From a Mercosur perspective the EU was its main external trading 
and investment partner, making relations an obvious option and an important 
counterweight to US influence. Mercosur was able to count upon EU help with its 
regional integration, use the EUs recognition to enhance its international standing and 
reputation and also use the EU negotiations as a card in its FTAA dealings. To build on 
these motivations the EU put forward an ambitious interregional strategy that combined 
increased relations in political, cooperation and trade fields. It was a strategy that 
reflected, indeed confirmed, all the elements and aspirations of interregional theory, 
highlighting, for example, the potential for agenda-setting, rationalising and 
institutionalisation. It was also a strategy that depended heavily on Mercosur becoming 
an effective and coherent counterpart, hence the heavy EU support for regional 
integration. 
once the EU started to put its strategy into action problems accumulated. Despite the 
original motivations and ambitions the EU agricultural lobby, and its influence on the 
Council, WTO negotiations and US policy, especially with regard to the FrAA, proved 
to be the main determinant of EU interaction with Mercosur. EU-Mercosur negotiations 
ebbed and flowed in tight relation to advances and slowdowns in both FrAA and WFO 
negotiations, and the EU agricultural lobby made the EU position in negotiations 
unappealing to Mercosur, all of which became clear from an analysis of the actual 
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negotiations. This failure of interregional strategy to have the desired impacts is 
testimony to the fact that the EU has seemingly wanted a win-win situation in Latin 
America and with Mercosur. As Mercosur has stood its ground in negotiations the EU 
has stalled and eventually moved to reinforce bilateral relations with Brazil, a pattern 
already noted in Asia. The EU had been offered the opportunity to take the initiative from 
the US and reinforce Mercosur regional integration through an Association Agreement 
but reticence, and hostility, from the Council made this not possible. Without external 
circumstances against which the EU has to balance or bandwagon, it appears that 
Mercosur is of insufficient strategic importance to the Council. 
Examining the unfinished negotiations for an Association Agreement, and the main 
issues to arise, proved to be highly instructive. Three principal factors were isolated as 
being fundamental to the fact that an EU-Mercosur agreement remains unsigned. The 
over-riding conclusion to the section was that agricultural economic interests in the EU 
had been responsible for slowing, if not stopping negotiations. Through this lobby group 
the EU-Mercosur negotiation was tied to the VVTO negotiations, as the EU refused to 
discuss domestic support in the interregional arena, which at first stalled negotiations as 
both parties waited for a successful WTO outcome. The issue of the corresponding 
timeline with the WTO, and the fact that important elements of agricultural negotiations 
can only be dealt with at this multilateral level, has generated questions as to whether the 
EU should simply deal with Latin America, for trade issues, within the YVTO alone. 
Agricultural negotiations are effectively dependent on the YY70 for progress, and the 
pursuit of pure interregionalism has not been able to contribute, or act as a filter. as 
interregional theory would suggest. Obviously dealing with Mercosur solely within the 
confines of the WTO "does not solve the problem and would have considerable costs, ill 
view of the fact that it delegitimises the previous actions of the European Community ill 
this field, causing the other countries to reject it, and it has been explicitly rejected by 
such players as the European Parliament " (Freres & Sanahuja 2005: 38). 
The second factor discovered was that EU-Mercosur negotiations were reactive to 
progress in the FrAA negotiations, hence when the latter moved forward so did the 
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former. In both circumstances, stalled WTO and FTAA negotiations, the EU would have 
been ideally placed to cement its relations with Mercosur, yet declined to do so. This 
gives credence to the hypothesis that EU-Mercosur interregional relations are principally 
intended for economic balancing and bandwagoning. Mercosur itself had assumed that 
negotiating agriculture as a bloc would be one of its main advantages, both with the EU 
and within the WTO, but this has not proved to be as successful as they would have 
hoped. In the case of the WTO this has led to Brazil and Mercosur taking a lead position 
in the G20 group and increasing their international visibility and reputation. Thorstenscn 
has stated that "the three discussions are inter-related" (Thorstensen 2003: 3), and this 
chapter has shown how detrimental this linkage has been to EU-Mercosur negotiations. 
This fact, that the EU has been reactive to US policy with regard to Mercosur has raised 
questions of rival regionalism, exemplified by the different approaches that the EU and 
the US have employed towards Mercosur. The EU was found to have supported 
Mercosur as a group through all circumstances, whereas the US has tried to take 
advantage of circumstances to disrupt Mercosur. Santander feels that "the group to group 
strategy of the EU towards Mercosur represents a response to the transregional strategy 
of the US towards the Americas" (2005: 302), making the US a direct motivation of EU- 
Mercosur interregionalism. It is certainly viable as a hypothesis for a key determinant, 
given that EU-Mercosur negotiations mimicked the FrAA process to such an extent. 
Grant asserts that "the US appears to have little in the way of a policy towards Afercosur. 
Thus, there is a real opportunity for the EU to develop a close political and economic 
alliance with the cone of Latin America" (2003: 58). Ille EU has not seized this 
opportunity, but has simply tried to differentiate its approach to Mercosur and offer 
increased support for regional integration. The three-pillar approach is much vaunted, but 
in reality questions have to be asked over its legitimate claim to be much more than an 
economic agreement. As Grugel questions "can the conitnitinent to social justice and 
development adequately be balanced in an agreement that also pushes forward a 
development model of marketisation and reflects a search for investment terrain and new 
markets? " (2002a: 6). The clear 
dominance of trade and the fact that negotiations are 
stalled due to trade problems makes 
it clear that only one of the three pillars is genuinely 
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important. This fact simultaneously highlights the roles within the EU of the Commission 
and Council. The Commission has been able to drive and influence interregional strategy 
and implement it for regional integration, but trade negotiations and Association 
Agreements are the remit of the Council, which has not been willing to back Commission 
strategy by translating it into action. 
In analysing regional integration and counterpart coherence, the chapter revealed some 
differing views. The EU supported Mercosur regional integration by every means 
possible in an attempt to increase Mercosur counterpart coherence. Regional integration 
was a lynchpin of the EU complex interregional strategy, the one solid, coherent and 
unchanging aspect of the strategy, and the one that the EU consistently delivered on. 
Through this the EU acted as an explicit external federator for Mercosur. All of this has 
led to an increase in the visibility, prestige and reputation of Mercosur as an international 
actor (Santander 2005: 302). In spite of EU strategic intentions, and support, Mercosur 
regional integration has, however, in no way replicated EU regional integration, taking a 
hybrid route of its own. The state of regional integration in Mercosur is such that the 
appellations of customs union and regional integration have actually been called into 
question. Mercosur's distinct model of 'Presidential diplomacy' (Malamud 2005a) with 
no supranational institutions and an imperfect customs union has been seen to not 
represent an effective counterpart regional organisation. Sanchez-Bajo says that "since 
1995 Mercosur's low level of institutionalisation has been more of a liability than all 
asset" (1999: 936) and this has had an impact on negotiations, such that the EU 
discovered that it was not negotiating with a coherent partner. This has all raised the 
question of whether Mercosur was, and is, actually a viable counterpart for FTA 
negotiations and a pure interregional relationship that represents the pinnacle of EU 
complex interregionalism. in LA. Freres and Sanahuja address this very question: "From 
the perspective prevailing in the EU, the negotiation with Afercosur has shown that a bi- 
regional integration agreement such as the one pursued involves a minimum set of pre- 
requisites regarding freedom of movement that only a real customs union canfidfill. But 
at the same time it has been established that neither Afercosur nor the other groups of 
countries will achieve such a goal in the nearfuture, although Central America might be 
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the sub-region that could come the closest to such end. This is due to both internal 
difficulties and external conditioning factors, such as the FTA that the US is lwonioting in 
the Andean area" (2005: 54). The fact that Mercosur does not reach the pre-requisite 
level of integration has become clear in negotiations, with Commission officials citing 
personality clashes, lack of trust and a feeling of negotiating with a "virtual region" 
(Interview 5). These are not the conditions in which to negotiate a pure interregional 
relationship. Above and beyond the implications for EU-Mercosur relations the question 
marks that hang over the failure of EU interregional strategy to form a coherent 
counterpart are important for EU complex interregionalism, in LA and for its aspirations 
around the globe. 
As Malamud states "the EU is not yet a standard integration model but a unique 
phenomenon that can serve as a point of reference and inspiration but cannot be 
transplanted or replicated wholesale" (2005: 249), so on this basis the EU should not 
expect replication from a counterpart, and nor should it penalize it for not replicating. So 
whilst Grant might feel that "Europeans regard imitation of their own historical 
evolution as a sort offlattery" (2003: 57) they should not believe that Mercosur, or other 
regions, should or will imitate the European model. Whilst perhaps not what the EU was 
looking for in a regional counterpart, Mercosur is nonetheless still a regional integration 
project under construction, albeit a hybrid one of its own making. In the aftermath of the 
Argentine crisis of 2001 the then minister of economic affairs Domingo Cavallo 
unilaterally made changes to the already 
imperfect customs union, and looked to be on 
the verge of pulling Argentina out of Mercosur altogether. At this point the EU made it 
clear that it would not sign 
individual free trade agreements with member states. So 
whilst the EU interregional strategy 
has not had the desired impacts with regard to 
Mercosur regional integration, it has nonetheless provided timely support and incentives 
for Mercosur to continue as a group, a fact that should not be overlooked. 
In spite of Mercosur's indifferent record in terms of regional integration Faust feels that 
the appellation of 'pure interregional' remains apt for EU-Mercosur "even if Afercosur's 
customs union is stillfarfrom 
beingfully implemented" (2002: 12). Indeed he is of the 
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view that "the successful conclusion of an interregional free trade agreement could el-en 
foster the full implementation of a custoins union " (idem. ). It is, however, hard to see 
how a regional integration scheme that ex-President of Brazil Cardoso recently claimed 
"is today but an illusion, a caricature of integration" (Mercopress 2007: 1) could 
represent a serious partner either for negotiating or implementing an interregional 
Association Agreement. Having noted that the EU can not form a model, nor export its 
processes to a different region there are nonetheless fundamental criteria that a region has 
to respect to claim to have functional regional integration. Mercosur regional integration 
may be very different from EU regional integration, but this in itself is not the cause for 
concern, it is its inability to live up to certain basic criteria of regional integration theory. 
This makes it highly doubtful whether the signing of an agreement with the EU would in 
any way consolidate Mercosur regional integration. The EU's attempts to act as an 
external federator have been selectively accepted or declined by Mercosur, and it appears 
that the role of external federator has limitations. Perhaps the signing of an Association 
Agreement with Mercosur, as Faust suggests, would act as a lock-in mechanism for its 
CET and customs union, at least vis-ý-vis the EU, making it a more coherent partner, but 
it would appear, on the evidence of this chapter, that problems of negotiation would 
simply become problems of implementation. 
On the basis of this if the EU were truly serious about its global positioning, and regional 
integration, with respect to global governance then it would have sought to take 
advantage of the opportunities to sign an agreement with Mercosur. Vasconcelos 
concedes this same point when he notes that if the EU were serious about its international 
civil power status then it "should let its own ambition in terms of the international order 
override purely domestic considerations" (2003: 3). By this the author refers to the 
domestic agricultural lobby, which should be superseded by the strategic ambitions that 
the EU has for regional integration, as set out in its complex interregional strategy. This 
conclusion, that strategic support for regional integration comes second to the Council 
defense of domestic agricultural markets has been encountered several times in this 
chapter. This fact simultaneously explains the continuous and unwavering EU support for 
Mercosur regional integration, as the Commission and the EU had nothing to lose in 
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doing so. Supporting Mercosur regional integration represents a no lose situation for the 
EU which is why the Commission has done so strategically and constantly. Talk of the 
EU exporting its regional integration model has been quashed by the realization of the 
type, form, state and aims of Mercosur integration, but the EU has continued to support 
this hybrid regional integration regardless. Whilst the EU would clearly prefer more 
mimetism. from Mercosur it still has little to lose from supporting Mercosur as it is, 
because any form of Mercosur regional integration is better than no regional integration. 
This combination of Commission strategy and the Council failure to implement it reveals 
the core tension inherent in interregionalism. The strategy, as proposed by the 
Commission, replicating interregional theory, has simply remained rhetorical and based 
in theory as Council intervention on behalf of agricultural lobbies has derided all attempts 
to put into action this strategic long-term vision. Of particular disappointment to the 
Commission, and interregional theorists, has been the result of the EU's interregional 
strategy in relation to Mercosur's regional integration. This was the only facet of the 
strategy that the Commission was been able to pursue with a free hand. 
overall it is clear that there has not been one simple variable to explain EU-Mercosur 
relations. The reality of EU-Mercosur in action lags the strategic objectives and rhetoric 
that the EU had set, because the EU was itself unable, or unwilling, to achieve them and 
because Mercosur was not able to form a coherent counterpart. Writing in 2002, after his 
analysis of the 2001 crisis in the Latin American region and how it strengthened 
Mercosur, Santander opined that "it remains to be seen if Europe will be able to take 
advantage of the situation and will see this as an opportunity to fiirther develop strong 
ties with Mercosur" (2002: 504). The resounding answer to Santander's question is that 
the EU has only taken advantage of the situation rhetorically. In concrete terms it has not 
seized on this, or other opportunities afforded 
it, underlining the fact that defensive 
agricultural interests supported 
by the Council in the EU have been more powerful than 
EU pro-Mercosur lobbies and the Commission strategic goal of promoting regional 
integration and interregionalism. Despite the power of the agricultural lobby and the 
linkages to the WTO and FTAA negotiations, the fact remains that had the EU been 
genuinely interested in the geo-political 
implications of the agreement and in regional 
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integration then an agreement could have been signed. Santander concludes that ': for the 
EU, the relation with Mercosur is strategic" (2005: 295), and strategic in the sense of 
economic balancing and bandwagoning with the US. Clearly the EU has not achieved its 
stated objectives by matter of its own choice, something that could come to represent a 
missed opportunity, as Vaillant clarifies when he says, "the EU needs to understand that 
Mercosur, which is one of the few trade agreements in the world aniong developing 
countries within the class of deep economic integration, offers an excellent opportunity to 
influence the developing world with a proved successful fonnula of economic 
integration" (Vaillant 2007: 5). The EU could, for once, have taken the front foot and 
advanced with Mercosur, a move that would have put more positive pressure on 
Mercosur regional integration. Such a conclusion highlights that the pursuit of pure 
interregionalism, as the crux of complex interregionalism in LA, is subject to short-term 
economic balancing and bandwagoning considerations, which explains why the EU has 
started to look towards increased bilateral relations with Brazil. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis has explored and analysed the rising international relations phenomenon of 
interregionalism, from its theoretical basis, through its strategic formulation, export and 
implementation by the EU, to the impacts it has had for the EU, its partners and the 
global system. Above and beyond this exploration and analysis the thesis has provided a 
more detailed framework for the analysis of interregional ism; complex interregional ism. 
This new framework allows for a better understanding of both the strategic use and the 
concrete functioning of interregionalism, as well as the interplay between different levels 
of international relations. 
The fundamentals of the thesis are founded in the IPE debates on regional integration and 
of the interaction between regionalism and multilateralism, and in a multilevel and multi- 
causal approach. The theoretical overview of interregionalism drew particular inspiration 
from the works of Hettne, Hdnggi and Rifland, the three scholars who have most 
espoused the theoretical virtues, and vices, of this newest level of interaction in 
international relations. From this basis, and with the main elements of interregional ism's 
potential in mind, the thesis moved on to analyse EU interregional strategy, given that the 
EU is the single most important interregional exponent. The main drive of this 
investigation was to understand if the EU had a coherent interregional strategy that it 
employed across world regions, which was discovered to be complex interregionalism. 
This new framework seeks to consider EU interregional strategy within the regional 
context it is employed, and also its interactions with other levels of relations, notably 
transregionalism and bilateralism. It is also a framework that tries to understand the 
tension between strategy and action inherent in interregionalism. From this point onwards 
the thesis engaged in the activity of analysing the chain of the most pertinent 
interregional relationships in an attempt to assess the EU's complex interregional strategy 
in action, and evaluate how this new framework functioned. In concrete terms this meant 
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firstly taking the region of the world with which the EU has the clearcst complex 
interregional relationship, Latin America, and then in turn looking at the single most 
important interregional relationship within EU-LA complex interrcgionalism, the pursuit 
of pure interregionalism. with Mercosur. 
The investigation was driven by a set of research questions that were established at the 
outset of the work: 
Firstly, what exactly is interregionalism, and what does it offer international relations that 
other levels of relations do not? 
Secondly, how has the EU's strategy of interregionalism manifested itself across the 
globe? 
'Ibirdly, how does the EU's strategic interregional approach to Latin America work in 
practice? 
Finally, are there any tensions between the EU interregional strategy for Niercosur and 
EU - Mercosur interregionalism in action and what are the links to the broader EU-LA 
complex interregional ism? 
This conclusion will, therefore, assess the results extracted from the four research 
questions above and relate the implications to interregionalism in a more general sense. It 
will simultaneously evaluate the utility of the complex interregional framework 
developed in this thesis, and also reflect on the tension between strategy and action that 
the framework highlighted in both EU-LAC and EU-Mercosur interregionalism. To 
achieve this, the conclusions will be divided into four sections. The first section will 
review the findings related to the four research questions posed at the start of the thesis, 
as well as the findings of the additional research questions that arose throughout the work. 
The second section will focus specifically on EU-LAC complex interregionalism and 
EU-Mercosur interregionalism as a two-level laboratory for the testing of the key 
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questions about interregional ism, as both a strategy and also in action. The third section 
will reflect on the four principal areas of investigation that this thesis developed in 
chapter one and employed thereafter; context, types, motivations and impacts. I'lic final 
section will consider the future of EU complex interregional ism, the pursuit of pure 
interregionalism and of interregionalism in general. 
F. mpirical Evidence: Research Questions 
The first task of this conclusion is to provide clear answers to the four research questions 
that structured this thesis. The most suitable method for achieving this is to relate the 
findings of the chapters in sequence, hence answering the key research questions in the 
order they were set. 
The first chapter addressed the issue of what exactly interregionalism is and what it offers 
international relations that other levels of relations do not. To answer this question the 
chapter developed a structure that was replicated in subsequent chapters, that of context, 
typology, motivations and impacts. Using this structure the chapter highlighted the birth 
and expansion of interregionalism as being related to the processes of globalisation and 
regionalism. Regionalism, as a reaction to globalization, has created a number of regional 
groups around the world and it 
is the interaction of these groups that produces the 
phenomenon of interregionalism. Given the proliferation of regional entities around the 
globe the theory of interregionalism offers 
international relations a framework for 
analyzing a potentially large-scale phenomenon. 
Aside from its theoretical novelty and 
salience the chapter also highlighted that 
interregionalism had the potential to fulfill a 
large number of functions for global governance, such as agenda-setting, 
institutionalization, collective-identity building and coordination of multilateral positions. 
Interregional theory suggested that interregionalism had significant theoretical value- 
added in relation to existing 
levels of international relations, but it was noted that there 
was a clear need to validate these theoretical claims. 
Chapter one also related how 
interregionalisM was as much a strategy as it was a state of affairs, something that has 
proved to be the very tension at the 
heart of the phenomenon. The chapter concluded that 
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interregionalism in action was essentially a balancing and bandwagoning phenomenon, as 
outlined by Wand who said that; "EU involventent in inter- and Iransregionalfora is 
marked by balancing" (2002c: 9). 
In the course of chapter one it became clear that the EU was the most active interregional 
proponent, prompting the question of how the EU's strategy of interrcgionalism 
manifested itself across the globe. Chapter two, in answering this question, identified 
interregionalism as a key strategic element of EU external relations that the EU had 
chosen to employ in its interaction with Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was found that 
the EU had replicated the theory of interregionalism in its strategy and that it had created 
mechanisms to try and capture all the potential of the theory; agenda-setting, rationalising 
and institutionalisation, all of which had been identified in Chapter one. Whilst the 
relationships in action that the EU has with the three world regions were found to be 
different in a variety of ways the EU used the same strategy in all regions. Not only were 
the strategy and the mechanisms to implement it similar, but so too were the impacts 
noted in all three regions. Figure 2-11 outlined the key characteristics of EU 
interregionalisin as discovered in the three regions, all of which were found to hold in the 
cases of EU-LA and EU-Mercosur; it promotes regional integration, is based on low 
institutionalisation, is subject mostly to economic balancing and bandwagoning, it 
expands to cover diverse areas, is based on three pillars, it uses the same structures and 
finally that the EU has pursued pure interregionalism where possible. Chapter two sought 
to further the investigation of interregionalism by including new elements for analysis, 
notably in attempting to explain the friction between strategy and action and the interplay 
between interregionalism and other levels of international relations in a new framework - 
complex interregional ism. 
Chapter three analysed EU complex interregional strategy in Latin America to answer the 
question of how the EU's strategic interregional approach to Latin America works in 
practice. This analysis confirmed that the very clear and defined EU complex 
interregional strategy was coherent and consistent for all three regional groupings in LA, 
and also for bilateral and transregional relations. A clear objective of the EU was to 
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pursue pure interregionalism. and for this it was found to be using the same aims, the 
same channels, the same methods and the same support structures with all three LA 
regional groups. Whilst each relationship had idiosyncrasies that differentiated it 
somewhat from its neighbours, the EU strategy was the same. Doctor dcfined this 
strategic approach, with reference to EU-Mercosur relations, as being one that "provided 
substance to EU claims of a distinctive approach to its relations with less developed 
countries with priority placed on globally projecting European values enIphasising 
democracy, human rights, citizenship and regional integration based on equity and co- 
operation rather than power inequalities" (2007: 284). This is a succinct reading of EU 
complex interregional strategy, whereby the EU was seeking to use three pillar 
agreements to engage with the regional entities whilst simultaneously supporting their 
regional integration to help create stronger and more credible regional partners. Analysis 
of complex interregional strategy in Latin America also revealed that once an 
interregional relationship existed the EU would try to conduct all its political and 
economic relations with the group, and not bilaterally. Bilateral relations were reserved 
exclusively for non-regionally aligned countries Mexico and Chile. The only interaction 
that was found between bilateralism. and interregionalism occurred in 2007 when the EU 
approached Brazil to enhance political relations, which was very much the first break 
from the consistent interregional strategy the EU had pursued with Mercosur for over 
fifteen years. EU complex interregionalism. was broadly coherent across partners and 
across levels of relations, and the pursuit of pure interregionalism, was the lynchpin of the 
system to which other levels of relations deferred. Chapter three also further highlighted 
the fact that there was an important tension between interregional strategy and 
interregionalism. in action, and whilst it offered some explanations of this phenomenon it 
was through a deeper analysis of one specific relationship that the tension would be more 
apparent. 
Chapter four sought to assess the tensions between the EU interregional strategy for 
Mercosur and EU-Mercosur interregionalism in action, and if these link to the broader 
EU-LA complex interregional relationship. Analysis of relations with Mercosur 
highlighted the EU pursuit of pure interregionalism, and revealed that the picture of EU 
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interregional strategy, and its impacts discovered in chapter two was validated. The EU 
had made the pursuit of pure interregionalism a cornerstone of its complex interregional 
strategy with LA. In its most important and advanced relationship, with Mercosur, it had 
proved unable to put its strategy into action and there were important tensions between 
the two, tensions that extend to EU complex interregionalism and interregionalism in 
general. The reasons for the inability to sign an Association Agreement were discovered 
to be related to two key areas; firstly the internal dynamics of the EU were found to 
hamper the transition from strategy to action because the Council was using 
interregionalism as an economic balancing and bandwagoning tool, and secondly the 
chapter raised question marks about the possibility of having a pure interregional 
relationship with Mercosur due to its level of regional integration. These findings 
explained clearly why interregional strategy had not been translated into action and posed 
a serious question as to whether interregional strategy for all its coherence and stability 
had actually achieved any of its initial goals. 
F, U- A Complex Interregionalism and EU-I%Iercosur Interregionalism 
The empirical analysis in Chapters three and four confirmed much of the theoretical 
conclusions generated by Chapters one and two, but with some novel findings through 
the framework of complex interregionalism. Overall the EU interregional strategy and the 
mechanisms to implement it were found to 
be coherent, consistent and harmonised across 
and within regions, reflecting a strong 
long-term strategic view from the EU. This 
consistency is encapsulated in the three-level model that the EU has employed in all 
regions. In all cases the EU 
has sought to make the interregional level, and the pursuit of 
pure inteffegionalism, the most 
important level, although it has proved willing to use the 
bilateral level when circumstances have required it. The EU has obviously had to 
differentiate its complex interregional strategy according to the region, notably according 
to its ability to influence its partners through regional integration. The fact that in the case 
of Mercosur EU strategy has not translated 
into successful pure interregionalism in action 
will have an impact on all 
interregional relations, whether they are in Latin America, 
Africa or Asia. 
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The model of complex interregionalism that was proposed at the end of Chapter two was 
aimed at assessing both EU interregional strategy and EU interregional i sill in action 
alongside other levels of relations such as transregionalism and bilateralism. It proved to 
be a very useful model in analysing EU relations with Latin America and Nlcrcosur, 
highlighting the key differences between EU interregionalism as a strategy and in action. 
In reality it has brought to the fore the fact that strategy and action are two different 
levels of interregionalism and also that EU interregional strategy has not been successful 
in achieving its aims in Latin America. This section will assess to what extent the 
findings of the empirical analysis of EU-Mercosur relations are of relevance to other 
complex interregional relations and the pursuit of pure interregionalism. It will also be 
useful to reflect on the functioning of the complex interregional model in light of the 
empirical findings. 
The most pertinent finding from the chapter on EU-Nlercosur relations relates to 
Mercosur's regional integration, a finding that puts Klom's words into question, as he 
had suggested that regional integration ': fonns the distinguishing characteristic of the 
EU-Mercosur relationship, which makes it differentfiroin all other ties that Afercosur has, 
or can have, with either the US, FTAA, Andean Coniniunity, Chile or the 1VTO inenibers " 
(2000: 14). Although Klom qualifies this statement with an important caveat, that "this 
factor is only influential to the extent that .. the Afercosur process is continued " (idem) it 
would still appear to be wide of the mark. Mercosur has quite simply not evolved into the 
regional partner that EU strategy was hoping for, which genuinely begs the question of 
whether the EU interregional strategy has actually achieved anything that it expected over 
the decades. If the EU is unable to strategically influence and create a solid regional 
partner with a pre-existing regional group that has consistently accepted and solicited the 
EU's intervention then the consequences for interregionalism are serious. Despite 
consistent implementation EU support for regional integration did not have the desired 
effect as an external federator, although the EU did play an important role in Nlercosur's 
history. EU assistance has been selectively taken as and when needed, and whilst it could 
be the case that it Will simply need longer to become a coherent regional integration 
partner, Mercosur does not seem to want that 'type' of regional integration. In Chapter 
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two it was identified that interregionalism was partly espoused by the EU to increase its 
own international identity and activity, as Santander notes; "Interregionalisin is, thus, 
closely linked to the European Union's intention to play a greater role internationally. 
The enzergence of interregionalist relational arrangements should be seen in the light of 
this intention ... the EU has developed external relations that enable it to promote its 
interests, policies and internal values, while having recourse to cooperative ineans rather 
than military might" (Santander 2005: 303). Chapter three cemented this view by 
highlighting that EU interregional strategy across Latin America placed important 
emphasis on regional integration through which the EU was seeking to export its ideas, 
values and norms. The inability of the EU to influence Mercosur regional integration cuts 
to the heart of not only EU-LA complex interregionalism but also intcrregionalism in 
general because it relies, by definition, on coherent counterparts. 
The other main issue that arose from EU-Mercosur interregionalism was that both 
partners were unable to resolve trade negotiations despite several years of trying. ne 
main reason for this was found to be due to Council unwillingness to offer agricultural 
concessions, a factor that has severely undermined EU interregional strategy towards 
Mercosur. The main pressure on Council was found to be a very strong agricultural lobby, 
which has no coherent counterweight, the MEBF being too weak to play this role. This 
asymmetry of trade is particularly idiosyncratic to EU-Mercosur relations, as is the fact 
that Mercosur is willing and able to stand its ground in negotiations on this subject, 
unlike African groupings in the EPAs for example. This situation would perhaps be 
alleviated if there were a successful conclusion to the WTO Doha Round, a conclusion 
that tackles domestic support and levels the playing field for future agricultural trade. In 
the absence of any WTO agreement it is difficult to see how negotiations over agriculture 
can be solved between two such partners. 
This agricultural trade issue revealed clearly that interregional strategy, as designed by 
the Commission, was not implemented due to the pressure exerted through Council. This 
precedence of Council positions has led to the EU not being able to deliver its 
interregional strategy, and confirmed the findings of Chapter one which suggested that 
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the main motivations of interregionalism were balancing and bandwagoning. EU 
interregionalism in action has proved to have realist groundings as the EU has simply 
used interregionalism to balance and bandwagon US activity in LA. 
Overall the result of the empirical findings on interregionalism in action was that tile EU- 
Mercosur relationship, despite its massive promise and potential, as outlined in EU 
complex interregional strategy, has remained a lightly institutional i sed process subject to 
the whims of the EU Council of Ministers, their negotiations within the WTO, worries 
about the FFAA process and Mercosur's turbulent record of regional integration. These 
findings do not paint the optimistic picture that is often related to EU-Mercosur relations. 
For EU-Mercosur relations to be a blueprint for the future of intcrregionalism there need 
to be some serious alterations, or a serious rethink by the EU about its global priorities 
and what sacrifices it would be willing to make to ensure its complex interregional 
strategy could have the desired impacts. The EU strategy for pure interregionalism with 
Mercosur responds to the blueprint of an interregional future, but EU interregionalism in 
action with Mercosur does not. To what extent the perceived lack of success EU 
interregional strategy has had in relations with Mercosur is attributable to its inability to 
sign an Association Agreement is difficult to assess, but such an agreement would surely 
have had important lock-in effects. 
The failings of the EU-Mercosur pursuit of pure interregionalism were starkly revealed in 
niid-2007, when the EU felt obliged to move towards a strategic partnership with Brazil 
because, as the Commission stated, the EU-Mercosur relationship "inevitably restricts the 
scope and depth of our dialogue" (2007: 14). ibis fact, combined with the persistent 
questions over the direction of Mercosur and its actual state of regional integration, hence 
its aptitude to be a coherent pure interregional partner, places serious question marks over 
its suitability as the EU's flagship interregional relationship. Whilst it is not likely that 
the EU will alter its complex interregional strategy in LA, or its pursuit of pure 
interregionalism. with Mercosur in the near future, the longer the EU and Mercosur are 
unable to seal their relations the greater will be the shadow cast over interregionalism in 
general. 
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The model of complex interregionalism developed in this thesis has helped highlight tile 
differences between interregional strategy and intcrregionalisin in action, as well as 
situating the pursuit of pure interregionalism, within a wider context of transrcgionalism 
and bilateralism. Through this framework it has become apparent to what extent tile inter- 
institutional tensions between Commission and Council arc important, which is perhaps 
something that could be further built into the complex interregional framework. The 
empirical evidence also brought to the fore further factors that would be good to build 
more strongly into the framework. These relate to Commission officials (Interviews 5& 
7) who highlighted a lack of trust between partners and negotiators, as well as personality 
issues. These factors will obviously come to bear on any interregional negotiation, but to 
what extent the complex interregional framework can accommodate them remains to be 
seen. The complex interregional framework has proved to be flexible, as witnessed by the 
2007 decision by the Commission towards greater bilateral relations with Brazil, which 
the framework is able to accommodate. Having employed the complex interregional 
framework to analyse relations with Latin America it would be very useful, for an even 
deeper understanding of complex interregionalism, to use it to analyse relations with 
other world regions. The most logical choice as the next region to which this would be 
most suited would be Africa, in light of the imminent deadline for EPA negotiations. 
Such an analysis would provide a further test of the complex interregional framework in 
very different circumstances. 
Context/Tvpes/Motivationstimpacts 
The structure employed in the first chapter - con text/type s/moti vation S/i mpacts - was 
replicated throughout the thesis and merits concluding comments. 'Mese four areas were 
devised at the beginning of the thesis to best capture the different elcmcnts of 
interregionalism, both in terms of strategy and action, and as the thesis devcloped they 
were the basis for analysis and exploration. In Chapter one the four arcas were 
theoretically outlined setting a basis for what should be expected, then related to the EU 
in Chapter two before Chapters three and four added empirical analysis. It is thus now 
possible to revisit the four headings individually and draw conclusions. 
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The context of interregionalism is perhaps the area of interregionalisin least directly 
addressed in this thesis, but nonetheless a vitally important one. In Chapter one it was 
outlined that interregionalism was born out of the expansion of regional integration and 
the interaction between regional entities. In this sense the context of intcrrcgionalism is 
underpinned by regional integration, something this thesis has consistently highlighted, 
and something that the failings of EU strategy in LA suggest might become a problem. 
Chapter two related the context of EU interregionalism, as being one of many strategic 
options for its external relations. In their analysis of interregionalism, in action Chapters 
three and four both found that the level of regional integration is crucial to the success of 
interregionalism. In addition it was seen that in Asia there has been a rebuttal of EU 
regional integration advances, which effectively halted the pursuit of pure 
interregionalism. in its tracks. In Africa the EU has imposed regional integration, although 
this will not in itself guarantee any success, as regional integration needs to work in 
practice for interregionalism. to hold. In this sense this thesis has highlighted that whilst 
the expansion of regional integration might point towards an active future for 
interregionalism. it is in fact the level and type of regional integration that is important for 
the future of interregionalism. The thesis has highlighted this difference between the 
context of interregionalism. in theory and in action, and the context of interregionalism in 
action is much less certain than that of interregional theory. 
The second area of analysis was that of the types of interregionalism, as outlined in 
Chapter one. Chapter one outlined the three types of interregionalism that had been 
identified in interregional theory. The first of these was transregionalism, a level of 
relations identified as having a diffuse membership from two broadly defined regions that 
was used as an over-arching structure to relations between these two regions. 7be second 
type was hybrid inteffegionalism that was described as being relations between a regional 
group that is a customs union and one in another world region that is not. Tile final type 
outlined was pure inteffegionalism that is the interaction of two regional groups, both 
customs unions, in two different world regions. In the theory there was a very clear 
distinction between the three types in terms of membership, aims and structures. T'he 
empirical work of this thesis supports the original typology of transregionalism, which it 
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found to be as described in Chapter one as a very distinct type of interregionalism. In 
relation to hybrid and pure interregionalism this thesis found the typologies to be much 
less distinct and much more complex that the theory suggested. This was particularly the 
case with pure interregionalism which proved to be much more elusive than theory would 
suggest. The typologies of hybrid and pure interregional ism need to be revised to more 
accurately reflect the realities of regional integration for EU partner regions. Currently 
Mercosur stands as a pure interregional partner, but in reality it is a form of hybrid 
interregional relationship. There is a need to take this reality into account and reflect it in 
interregional theory because the hybrid interregional typology is the most important and 
widely used. It would be possible to refine this definition into sub-categories, which 
would represent an important advance in interregional theory, especially considering the 
different types of EPA partners that now exist in Africa. 
A major area of study in this thesis was related to the third category of research, that of 
motivations. Chapter one differed from existing interregionalism literature by making a 
clear differentiation between motivations and impacts in an attempt to separate the 
already existing so-called 'functions' of interregionalism. The main motivations that 
interregional theory suggests are balancing and bandwagoning, both commercial and 
institutional, institutionalization, rationalisation, agenda-setting and collective identity 
formation. Interregional literature also placed important emphasis on triadization, 
particularly with regard to EU-Asian relations. This thesis has been able to add further 
empirical evidence to the study of these main motivations behind interregionalism. 
Chapter one suggested that interregionalism. had a clear balancing and bandwagoning 
rationale with some element of collective identity motivation, a conclusion that this thesis 
has supported, albeit with some nuances. It is also possible to confirm that 
interregionalism occurs between a triad member, the EU, and periphery regions such as 
Latin America. it is possible to subsequently conclude that interregionalism is more of a 
multilateral 'enhancer' phenomenon than it is a 'distracter' one given the dominance of 
balancing as a motivation. 
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EU-Mercosur relations were found to be subject to important balancing and 
bandwagoning considerations, at the instigation of the Council. A relatively clear split 
was found between the Commission as an instigator of EU interregional strategy, 
especially in relation to regional integration, and the Council as the overseer of 
interregionalism. in action. EU-Mercosur interrcgionalism in action floundered partly duc 
to agricultural issues, principally domestic support, which whilst perhaps idiosyncratic to 
EU-Mercosur relations highlights an important trend. If interregional trade has no major 
obstacles then it is less likely that the Council will hold up relations and interfere with 
commission strategy, although the Council will always be subject to protectionist and 
realist interests, and hence prone to balancing and bandwagoning. By its very nature the 
Council is the more reactive institution and through this fact it will always be the source 
of instability and change not only in interregionalism in action, but also for complex 
interregional strategy. The EU strategy of differentiation that was noted in its complex 
interregionalism. is a manifestation of Council driven interests, adjusting in a structured 
way to changes within a region. The recent move towards bilateral relations with Brazil is 
an example of a trend set in Asia and Africa, and is something that the complex 
interregional framework is able to capture. This reinforces the view of interregional 
theory that balancing and bandwagoning are the dominant motivations of 
interregionalism, albeit with the more detailed specification that it is linked to the Council. 
The second key motivation, in interregional theory, was identified as collective identity 
formation through regional integration. The analysis of EU complex interregional 
strategy showed how the Commission made regional integration, and the pursuit of pure 
interregionalism, a central plank of its overall strategy. The EU was clearly motivated by 
helping consolidate and create regional integration bodies in the three world regions 
studied in this thesis, and created a consistent and coherent strategy to implement this 
motivation across the regions. The drive of the EU to influence regional integration was 
greater than interregional theory would have suggested and is clearly a very important 
motivation behind EU interregionalism. 
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A further finding of this thesis was that EU complex interregional strategy also accorded 
importance to the motivations of agenda-setting and rationalising, as it sought to capture 
all the perceived benefits of interregional theory. To some extent there was also evidence 
of an EU motivation to create and operate institutions, again giving credence to the 
interregional theory of Chapter one. Overall the empirical work of this thesis validated 
the theoretical motivations of interregional ism, but with slight changes of importance 
such that EU desire to influence regional integration was perhaps the most overt and 
identifiable motivation and that balancing and bandwagoning were more subtle and 
indirect motivations. 
The final area of study was that of the impacts of interregional ism, on the EU, its partner 
regions and the global system. The three main areas of impacts analysed in this thesis 
correspond to three main motivations; balancing and bandwagoning, institutionalization 
and collective identity building. The first chapter noted the lack of solid empirical 
evidence to back up the impacts of interregional ism, which it concluded would be mostly 
influenced by the balancing and bandwagoning motivation leading to weak 
institutionalization with corollary low levels of rationalization and agcnda-setting. I'lle 
impacts of interregionalism were so theoretically deduced that it led to questioning of its 
stability and solidity as a level of international relations, leading Roland to label 
interregionalism "sunshine cooperation" and a ': fair weather" phenomenon (Roland 
2002a: 
The empirical work of this thesis has provided support to some aspects of the theory of 
interregionalism, but not to all of them. The findings of this work certainly suggest that 
agenda-setting is a purely theoretically 
deduced impact because chapters three and four, 
despite some rhetorical statements, found little evidence to support its existence. Another 
impact described in the theory of interregional ism was rationalisation but this too was 
found to have little genuine weight as an impact, although it exists as a de-facto impact of 
interacting with a group as opposed to a series of individual countries. The lack of 
rationalisation as an impact 
is highlighted starkly in chapters three and four by the co- 
existence of bilateral and 
interregional relations, and was further underlined by the EU 
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decision in 2007 to enhance bilateral political relations with Brazil. Simultaneously 
developing bilateral relations with Brazil highlights the lack of stability inhercnt in 
current interregionalism and suggests that it is best described as a fluid phenomenon apt 
to change as circumstances dictate. The empirical work of this thesis also confirmed the 
findings of Chapter one which suggested that institutionalisation would be weak and light, 
although Chapters three and four have found the institutions of interregional ism to be 
functional and adequate to serve their purposes. 
Whilst all the impacts of EU complex interregional strategy are important, it is perhaps 
those on regional integration that are the most important for the future of interregionalism. 
EU complex interregionalism, and interregional ism in general has much to learn from the 
EU-Mercosur experience given the vast and rich exchanges the two partners have had. 
The EU has learnt various lessons in this area, notably that a suitable regional partner 
must observe strict criteria with respect to their level of regional integration, and not only 
in theory but in practice. A second key finding has been that support for regional 
integration does not guarantee any form of mimetism, of the EU, or indeed any specific 
advances in the real level of regional 
integration. Malamud, describing the three Latin 
American regional integration groups that were analysed in some detail in Chapter three, 
ventured that "all three have something in coninion: nonefits easily into the theories of 
regional integration that were 
developedfroni the European case" (2003: 1), and this 
despite extensive assistance from the EU in all areas of regional integration from 
technical, political to economic. Nowhere more so than Latin America, across all of the 
EUIs interregional relations, has any region been more receptive to EU assistance with 
regional integration, so to see the strategy 
having so little impact is disconcerting for the 
EU. 
The impact of the EUs inability to influence Mercosur regional integration is a 
disappointment specifically for the Commission who was able to deliver a coherent long 
term strategy. Despite this consistent support the state of Mercosur regional integration 
remains far from that of a coherent regional partner, with 
Malamud and Schmitter's view 
being that the term regional integration might in itself be too strong for Mercosur noting 
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that they, "think this is a misleading overewension of the definition of regional 
integration" (2006: 19). The authors feel that there is a need to distinguish between 
regional integration and forms of simple regional cooperation. This fact is important for 
general EU interregionalism, as support for regional integration underpins the EU's 
strategy across the three regions studied. The fact that the EU has felt it necessary to 
address Brazil bilaterally on the political level is indicative of its interregional failings 
and shows the fluidity of the complex interregional framework. The EU has simply 
realigned its political relations with Brazil from the interregional to the bilateral level, as 
it had previously done in Asia due to resistance to regional integration. In two world 
regions, one due to resistance and one due to a difference of method and objective, pure 
interregionalism has been relegated behind bilateralism. due to balancing and 
bandwagoning motivations. The EU would clearly prefer not to have to resort to 
bilateralism with Brazil, but circumstances have forced its hand in what is a worrying 
portent for pure interregionalism and other interregional relationships. This specific 
development gives rise to a potential new phenomenon, that of balancing and 
bandwagoning within complex interregionalism. 
Despite the fact that the EU strategy for regional integration has been consistently 
delivered to a region that welcomed such a strategy, regional integration in Nlercosur and 
Latin America has proved to be nothing near what the EU was aiming for. It is "a "light" 
regionalism, which rejects the construction of strong regional institutions and the idea of 
supranationality on the basis of traditional notions of national sovereignty and the 
supposedly greater efficiency of intergovernmental schemes, which would be difficult to 
sustain empirically" (Freres & Sanahuja 2005: 35). This notion of a different form of 
regional integration can easily be expanded to Asia, where as Chapter two noted, many 
countries rebelled from prescriptive EU regional integration to express their own 'Asian 
Values' (ROland 2002c: 8). From the perspective of EU complex interregional strategy it 
is worrying that other world regions are taking even more divergent regional integration 
routes than those seen in Latin America, something that Freres and Sanahuja highlight 
when they say that "in spite of the weakwesses that are inherent in Latin Americas 
integration schemes, it is still the only region in the world, together with the European 
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Union, which actively encourages 'regionalism" (2005: 2). It has become clear that 
there are different understandings of regional integration in Latin America, Asia, Africa 
and Europe. What is even clearer is that these types of regional integration arc not similar 
to the EU, despite EU attempts to shape them towards its own experience. This single 
fact, that EU interregional strategy to strengthen regional integration has not translated 
into action as desired, is perhaps the most important element derived from tile empirical 
work of this thesis that can be related to other complex interregional relationships. Freres 
and Sanahuja, in relation to Latin America, suggest that-, 
"As far as the European Union is concerned, it is beyond doubt that it is committed to 
integration, and most expect that the European Union will continue to support both 
regional and subregional integration as well as the regional institutions. If the European 
Union ceases to do so, what other external player will do so? In critical periods, the 
support given by the European Union to integration has been decisive and it is a major 
asset. However, it is also the case that the European Union does not have a global and 
strategic policY to back up Latin American integration, and there is a widespread sense 
of disinterest and disorientation where this support is concerned" (2005: 37). 
it is clear that as complex interregionalism evolves it will increasingly involve the EU 
interacting with imperfect partners and negotiating with partners with imperfect customs 
unions, as they are the only regional partners 
in the world. The EU model of regional 
integration will remain the exception and not the rule, and the EU will have to decide 
how to best interact with these partners. EU reluctance or inability to do so would put 
into jeopardy its entire complex interregional strategy around the world, because in its 
absence there will be no other support. 
The EU will have to ask itself if a coherent 
counterpart is more important than 
its entire interregional strategy. 
The impact of collective identity building has not been of the order interregional theory 
would have suggested, nor of the type that the 
EU would have liked. Whilst there have 
been important impacts of the EU sustaining and helping a significant number of regional 
groups around the world, there 
have been important examples of contradictory impacts of 
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collective identity building support such as 'Asian values' in Asia and Mercosur 
presidential type regionalism in Latin America. 
Future of Complex Interreptionalism 
Interregional theory painted a phenomenon with much promise and a bright future, 
through a series of theoretical 'functions' that were additions to international relations. 
EU complex interregional strategy corresponds to this vision, as it incorporates all of the 
theoretical and potential advantages that interregionalism could offer. This thesis has 
highlighted how EU strategy has not been translated into action and not achieved the 
results that it set out to attain. Having highlighted this failure by no means sounds a death 
knell for interregionalism, but it points very clearly towards what needs to be done to 
attain more concrete results and success. The Chaire Mercosur 2002-3 Annual Report 
listed what it considered should be the main strategic elements to be translated into action, 
and on top of that list is "promotion of pro-active multilateral agenda ill order to bolster 
the UNII (2004: 12), something that was not found to have been the case in EU-Niercosur. 
or EU-LA relations. Translating this element of EU strategy into action is not out of reach 
of both partners, and would represent a solid sign for their interregional future. 
Importantly this step could be made irrespective of whether the relationship is hybrid or 
pure interregionalism. Irrespective of which element of complex interregional strategy is 
prioritised it is clear that the future of EU complex interregionalism will depend on a 
number of them being consistently translated into action. Whilst this will depend, to a 
certain degree, on the coherence and state of regional integration of the EU's partner 
regions, it is not entirely contingent on it. 
On the basis of difficulties in the EU-Mercosur pursuit of pure interregional ism Doctor 
entitled a 2007 article 'Why bother with Interregional ismT in which the drive was to 
investigate why the EU should continue with interregional ism. The main finding was that 
"abandoning talks was not on the cards, partly as a hedge against the (increasingly 
likely) possiblefailure of the Doha Round" (2007: 291). Ibis highlights that despite its 
past failings and current weaknesses complex 
interregionalism is firmly entrenched as an 
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EU strategic balancing and bandwagoning option for its external relations. Complex 
interregionalism is a flexible model that allows the EU to pursue simultaneous airns in 
three world regions. The key variable that is outside of the EU's control is what type of 
counterparts will be involved, but this should not alter the EU's pursuit of complex 
interregionalism. Clearly the EU needs to be able to translate more strategy into action, 
and so whilst the exact form that complex interregionalism in action will take still 
remains unclear, it is clear that it will take an important form in EU external relations. 
This ability to translate strategy into action is the most important element for the EU to 
take forward. Whilst EU support for complex interregionalism appears to be waning due 
to its own internal dynamics, it remains a vital strategic option that will increase in 
importance as more regional entities enhance their actorness, and also if the W70 talks 
do not bear results. Grugel conveys this fact in relation to Latin America, but it would 
hold for any EU complex interregional relationship, when he says that Latin America 
matters for the EU "because it acts as a lodestonefor debates about European identity 
and Europe's place in the world. It reveals both the strength, and the limitations, of 
identity as a basis for international politics" (2002: 12). Chapter one identified, and 
Chapter two advanced, the notion of complex interregionalism acting to enhance the 
identity of the EU and this is something that will remain very important for the EU. 
Complex interregionalism will remain a very important vehicle for the transfer of EU 
values, norms, ideas, practices and standards. 
To ensure that there is more consistency of implementation across all the types and levels 
of dialogue that it holds with counterpart regions the EU needs to find better ways of 
getting stakeholder buy-in to complex interregional ism. The Council and Nlember States 
will need to try and take a more combined, longer-term and consistent approach to 
implementing interregional strategy, although realist theory and history suggest this will 
prove difficult. Secondly, from a stakeholder perspective, civil society participation will 
need to increase and improve in the EU and counterpart regions, which will in turn allow 
for more balanced participation in interregionalism. All EU counterparts need to ensure a 
greater participation of social stakeholders and civil society, principally by assisting in 
strengthening regional integration. A more active civil society is fundamental to a fully 
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functioning regional integration system and also to a stable and consistent complex 
interregional relationship because, as Doctor, quoting from Gratius, outlines, flat some 
future date, citizens and civil society actors will undenvrite the ultimate political and 
social legitimacy ofatiyAssociatiottAgreeiiietit" (2007: 296). Such participation will also 
help address questions such as whether it is possible to have balanced socially 
responsible complex interregionalism, which is likely to become an increasingly 
important issue. 
On the basis of the analysis of regional integration in Latin America it looks likely, at 
least in the medium-term that pure interregional ism is not likely to appear outside of EU. 
Africa complex interregionalism. Attempts at pure interregionalism floundered in Asia in 
the face of resistance over regional integration and now look set to follow suit in Latin 
America due to differing forms of regional integration. The EU has such power 
asymmetry in its relations with African EPA regions that it has been able to force 
regional integration on its partners, and due to less trade friction has been willing to lock 
these in via Association Agreements. The true test with EU-Africa complex 
interregionalism will not be in the signing of the agreements but in their implementation 
and in their ability to deliver what the agreements promise. The recent admission by the 
Commission that it needed to upgrade its bilateral relations with Brazil reinforces the 
importance of other world regions for the study of complex interregionalism, as the EU 
already has key bilateral relationships in relations with Asia and Africa. The EU had 
already developed a pattern of complex interregionalism around the world, in which it 
has key strategic relations with anchor countries in a region. Viewed in this way it will be 
important to assess how complex interregionalism in Latin America develops with 
relations between Brazil and Mercosur, as this will be a likely precursor for developments 
in Asia as regional integration initiatives advance. This also emphasises the point that EU 
complex interregionalism is able to learn from itself, as the three complex interregional 
relationships, with Asia, Africa and Latin America, all contribute to advance complex 
interregionalism in general. 
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Whilst this thesis has focused its detailed and empirical analysis on Latin America and 
Mercosur, complex interregionalism, as just noted, is in operation in Africa and Asia. It 
will be important to follow the development of complex intcrregionalism in these two 
regions, as it will likely evolve in different ways to those observed in Latin America. This 
is especially the case in Africa where the signing of the EPAs will be an important 
phenomenon to analyse in the framework of complex interregional ism, taking note of 
how the EU attempts to translate strategy into action. Asia should also not be forgotten, 
as complex interregionalism will also be able to serve as a valuable concept for the 
analysis of the emergence of relations between the EU and key strategic countries 
alongside the EU's strengthening of relations with regional groups such as ASEAN and 
SAARC. 
This thesis makes various contributions not only to the flourishing academic debate 
around interregionalism, but also to the policy debates that concern the use of 
interregionalism in Latin America and other world regions, notably in Africa and Asia. 
From the perspective of the academic debate the thesis has provided a detailed overview 
and an empirical examination of the main findings of the existing literature. The thesis 
has put forward empirical evidence that furthers the study of interregional ism, as well as 
advancing a new framework for analysis; complex interregionalism. In this way the thesis 
contributes to the ongoing research on the theory and reality of interregionalism around 
the world. The thesis provides a valuable reference point not only for an academic study 
of interregionalism, but also for policy makers as they attempt to understand the 
complexities of this new level of international relations. By illustrating the exact aims and 
motivations of EU-Mercosur interregionalism, the mechanisms that have been used to 
implement them and most importantly the impacts that have resulted, this thesis has 
contributed to policy makers' understanding of interregionalism. The foremost findings 
of the empirical analysis of relations with Mercosur also provide policy makers and 
academics alike with strong 
indicators of the main factors on which the future of 
interregionalism will rely. The conclusions on regional integration, and the implications 
of these for interregionalism, are expected to 
be of interest, and most likely the subject of 
further investigation. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Regional Integration in the World 93 
EUROPE 
Baltic Free Trade Area (BFFA) ( 1997) 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
Aim: Customs Union 
Benelux (1947) 
Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands 
Aim: Customs Union 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme (BSECS) (1992) 
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan. Georgia, Moldova. 
Ukraine, Russian Federation 
Aim: Cooperation, Development 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFFA) ( 1992) 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland. Romania. Slovak Republic. Slovenia 
Aim: Preparation for EU Membership 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (199 1) 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation. 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic 
Aim: Cooperation and Economic Union 
0 This is not a coniprchctisivc list ol'all rcgional integration iniliat'N, cs in thc world. rather those that the 
author has complied for the purposes ofthis rcscarch 
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Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) (1995) 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation, Tajikistan 
Aim: Customs Union and Cooperation 
European Communities (EQ - (1957) (became European Union in 1993) 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Aim: Monetary Union 
Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) (1985) 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Aim: Regional development 
European Economic Area (EEA) (1992) 
EC, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
Aim: Integration in EU Single Market and Cooperation 
European Free Trade Association (EFrA) 0 960) 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland 
Aim: Free Trade 
Free Trade A%zreement of Central Europe (1992) (Formerly Visegrad from 1991) 
Czech Rep, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
Aim: Free Trade Area 
MIDDLE EAST 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (1981) 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
Airn: Coordination, Integration and Inter-connection 
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Arab Common Market (1964) 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, UAE, Yemen 
Aim: Development, Cooperation 
Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) 0 989) 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Yemen 
Aim: Cooperation, 
NORTH AMERICA 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFrA) (1994) 
Canada, Mexico, USA 
Aim: Free Trade Area 
SOUTH AMERICA 
Andean Community (CAN) (1969) 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 
Aim: Customs Union, Integration, Cooperation 
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) (1973) 
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, Trinidad & Tobago, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines, Surinam 
Aim: Customs Union. Integration, Cooperation 
Central American Common Market (CACM) (1960) 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
Aim: Common Market, Integration, Cooperation 
Grupo de les Tres (G-3) (1989) 
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 
Aim: Free Trade Area, Customs Union 
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Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) (1980) 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela 
Aim: Preferential Trade Agreements, Cooperation 
Latin American Economic System (SELA) 0 975) 
Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Uruguay, Venezuela 
Aim: Regional cooperation and development 
OrRanisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) (1981) 
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Aim: Cooperation 
Rio Group (1986) 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela 
Aim: Political development, External Relations 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) (1991) 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
Aim: Customs Union, Integration, Cooperation 
ASIA 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967) 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
Aim: Integration, Cooperation, Free Trade Area 
333 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (1992) 
Brunei, Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
Aim: Free Trade Area 
Bangkok Agreement 0 975) 
Bangladesh, China, India, Republic of Korea, Laos, Sri Lanka 
Aim: Preferential Trade, Cooperation 
Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) (1994) 
Kazakhstan, Kyrghistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
Aim: Integration, Cooperation 
South Asian Association for Regional 
-Cooperation 
(SAARC) (1985) 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
Aim: Free Trade Area, Cooperation, Integration 
AFRICA 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (1989) 
Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania 
Aim: Single Market, Cooperation, Integration 
Economic and- Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAQ (1964) 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial, Guinea, Gabon 
Aim: Economic Union, Cooperation, Integration 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (1993) 
Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Aim: Economic Union, Integration 
334 
Customs Union of Southern Africa (CUSA) (1969) 
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland 
Aim: Customs Union 
East African Cooperation (1993) (Formerly Eastern African Community of 1967) 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 
Aim: Cooperation, Integration 
Economic Community of Central African States (1983) 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep, Chad, Congo, Dem Rep Congo, Gabon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda 
Aim: Customs Union 
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (1976) 
Burundi, Dem Rep Congo, Rwanda 
Aim: Customs Union, Regional Development 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 0 975) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Green Cape, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
Aim: Common Market, Cooperation and Development 
Mano River Union (1973) 
Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone 
Aim: Customs Union, Development and Cooperation 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) (1992) 
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Aim: Poverty Eradication, Cooperation 
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Western African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 0 994) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, COte d1voire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
Aim: Common Market, Cooperation, Integration 
AUSTRALASIA 
Closer Trade Relations Trade Agreement (CER) 0 983) 
Australia, New Zealand 
Aim: Cooperation 
Melanesian Spearhead Grout) (MSG) (1996) 
Fiji, Papa New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 
Aim: Free Trade Area, Cooperation 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (1971) 
Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa, Niue, 
Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 
Aim: Cooperation 
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) 
LL9 80 
Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru 
Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa 
Aim: Cooperation, Integration 
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Appendix 2: Classifications of Transregionalism and Intermionalisni94 
Transregionalism (Biregionalism) (Region - Region) 
Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) (1994) 
Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) (1989) 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (1994) 
Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) (1995) 
Europe - Latin America Summit (1999) 
EU - Africa Summit (2000) 
East Asia - Latin America Forum (EALAF) (2001) 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (1994) 
Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) (Idea suggested 1996 - no actual agreement to date) 
Hvbrid Interregionalism (Group - Group) 
EU - ACP Cotonou (Lomd) (1975) 
EU - ASEAN (1980) 
ASEAN - Mercosur (1996) 
EU - SAARC (1994) 
Mercosur - CER (1995) 
EU - GCC (1989) 
EU - SADC (1994) 
EU - MED (Barcelona Process) (1995) 
ASEAN - GCC (1995) 
94 Sources: Aggarwal & Fogarty (2001: 6,222), Hdnggi (2000: 3-8) 
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EU - Rio Group (1990) 
ASEAN - CER (2001) 
Pure Interregionalism (Customs Union - Customs Union) 
EU - Mercosur - EMIFCA (1995) 
EU - CAN (1996) 
EU - CACM (1993) 
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Avvendix 3: Interregional Flo%% Chart 
1. Globalisalion Search lot new strucluiesol global go vemirice and neA ek of interi 
Global Political Ecori 
2. New Regionalism Rise of New Regionalism in 1%, as parl of wider rewse to advance of 
Conteg 
Academic Liteiatuie 
2. Liberal InsliVionalist Cooperation crudi achieved ltiro# norms and ruies in inmons; 
3. Consiruclivisl Primacnibeliels lbýaoow and ideas x- in, I-r-, rj 
L 
Delined bý 1. Wmbershp - raw&gional most recenti 
2. InsfiVionalisalion High ýS LN Nol pgraphically oonstraried membetsip, can be more l1w 2 TWis 
3. Rules Binding vs Non-londq Mostly economic. some mMmlisation needed Ocirmav aldr*W, ý, v! s 
Wide vs Narroýý Hp6d Interregonal post preveianti 
4. Scope Regional Actor - Nafonal AdDr 0 5. Type of Region Core Economic focus, regular meetings. more compVqve reiav4s 
6. Balance Inlermediary Pure Inlerregonal 
7. Symmelry Counterparl Penpheý Customs Union - Cusloms Una 
8. Inclusivenes s Nol excluMy econow. regular meetings comprehnsve relaiWnsh(s 0 9. Type of Captalism Unregulaled 
Adminslered 
Social 
Related to 1. Context RealiýMercanla]d kancrgandBMaMN 3E -1r 
2. TpForm 
4namics 3. IndiAual Actors , ýral 1ý I'l Ira 
4, Academic Literature 
PAýaled to 1. conlext Realist lkrýanlalis! Ba! n: 1% afýl 
2. Tp Fon 
lmpxts 3. Indidal Aclors bberal Insbuilixidist InMAixidisabon and RM6'" Vim, weak unieýllel 
4, AcAmic Literature 
Clem-e Iderl, ý , rjrjC 31JI 
SOLII'CC: ()\\ 11 O'"tit"I 
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Appendix 4: Indicative list of Regional Trade AgreementS in Latin America 
Apireement Year 
1997 
1985 
1989 
Chile 1996 
Chile 2003 
Chile 1996 
Chile Mexico 1998 
Chile Peru 1998 
Chile Venezeula 1997 
Chile J, 1993 
Chile 1994 
Chile 2002 
Bolivia Mexico 1994 
Bolivia 1996 
EFTA Mexico 2000 
w/w/aw/0"N' Mexico 2000 
2001 
1991 
CARICOM Dominican Republic 1998 
CARICOM Venezuela 1992 
CARICOM 1994 
CACM Chile 1999 
CACM Dominican Republic 1998 
CACM 2002 
Mexico 1994 
Mexico 2000 
Mexico 1997 
Mexico 2000 
Caribbean Basin Initiative 1984 
1999 
1999 
Chile South Korea 2003 
Chile 2002 
Source: ()wii Creation 
Activated Tvpe 
1997 FTA 
1985 
FTA 
1997 Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
1995 Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
2001 Free Trade Area 
2000 Free Trade Area 
Free Trade Area 
Preferential Trade Arrangement 
Free Trade Agreement 
Preferential Trade Agreement 
Preferential Trade Agreement 
Free Trade Agreement 
Free Trade Agreement 
Free Trade Agreement 
1995 Free Trade Agreement 
2000 Free Trade Agreement 
1998 Free Trade Agreement 
2001 Free Trade Agreement 
Preferential Trade Arrangement 
Preferential Trade Agreement 
Preferential Trade Agreement 
Preferential Trading Agreement 
Preferential Trading Agreement 
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Appendix 5: EU - Latin America Trade Statistics 
EU Trade with Main Partners 2005 
The major imports partners The major export partners The major trade partners 
World 1 176 ý155 too 0 World I C6i 836 1M0 World 21,891 1 00 0 
1 jSA '63 057 13,9 1 USA 251 657 23 7 0 USA 414 71 ; is's 
2 China *58 098 04 2 Svtzeharid 11111980 7.7 2 China "09 89.; 9.4 
3 Russ'a ý06 766 91 3 Russia 56445 5ý3 3 Russia 16) I'll 73 
4 Japan 73 243 62 4 China 51 7% 49 4 5w, t., ei and 148 334 64 
5 'ivway 67 474 51 5 Japan 43663 4.1 5 Japan 116 qO6 5.2 
6 Switze,. and 66 354 56 6 Turkey 41849 39 6 Noway 101261 4ý5 
Turkey 33 4`11, 28 7 Norway . 
13787 32 7 Turkey 75 It4l 34 
a Korea 33 326 2.8 a United A, ab Emi,. 25 268 2.4 a Korea 53 4' 56 2.4 
9 Tarwan 23 835 2.0 9 Canada 23681 2.2 9 Canada 40855 1.8 
Ic Brazil 23 300 20 10 Romania 21875 21 10 India 43 0' 1 18 
II Saudi Arabýa 22 091' f9 11 Inctia "1 110 2.0 11 Irmo 39287 1.8 
12 A. jer-a 20735 f8 12 AUA, alla 20710 2ýO 12 Saudi kabia 37 535 1.7 
iI -ibya 
19 43 17 13 Hong Kong ' 20 434 19 13 Romania 37 110 1.7 
14 India to 911 16 14 Korea 20 130 V9 14 Taiwan 36653 1.6 
is S*Pgapo, e 18 219 15 15 South Africa 18077 1.7 is Singapore 35447 1.6 
16 Canada 17 174 15 16 Singapore 17227 16 16 United A, ab Enii,. 315097 1.6 
17 South Alrica 16 731 1.4 17 Mexko 1676, 1.6 17 South Africa 34 SM 1.6 
13 Matayfia, 15 905 14 is Brazil 15987 1.5 is Algeria 31 150 1.4 
19 Romania 15 . 
105 1.3 19 Saudi A, abia 15 443 15 It Hong Kong 31 109 V4 
21-1 WA_AO 13 761 12 
I 
20 
II 
WA_AC 13464 13 
I 
20 
II 
Australia 30 lei 1.3 
II 
EL) Imports from . 
EU Exports to ... Imports + Exports 
World 1 061 836 1000 World 2 237891 100,0 
NAFTA 189219 f6A NAFTA 292 100 27.5 NAFTA 491 319 21.5 
Latin America 64201 55 Latin America 54557 51 Latin Amerka 119758 5ý3 
EU Candidates 58061 4.9 EU Candidates 81 716 7.6 EU Candidates 139277 62 
EFTA 136648 It 6 EFTA 119 333 112 EFTA 255991 11.4 
medit. Countries' 54679 4ý6 Medit. Countries' 59822 5.6 Medit. Countries* 114502 5.1 
ASEAN 70809 1 
60 ASEAN -44966 142 
ASEAN 115 M 
1 
5.2 
SOUrce: hltp: //trade. cc. curopa. eu/doclib/docs/2(X)6/septeiiit-o-, r/tradoc II 3359. pdf (accessed 16 December 
2007) 
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EU Trade with Latin America and Caribbean 
500,0 448,6 399.1 401,3 
373.8 3g7.5 369,1 wo" 
400,0 
300,0 
200,0 Imam* 
100,0 
-49.5 -27,5 
0,0 
-100,0 200020022004 
CUR b1lon 
source rit"At. 
70,0 
50,2 
83.5 
50.4 
55,4 
60,0 
58.2 03.1 Imports 
50,0 Expolts 
40,0 
30,0 
20,0 
10,0 7.3 
0,0 
T2 
-10,0 
-7,7 
-20,0 2000 
Source: littp: //trade-info. cec. eu. int/doclib/docs/2006/aunc/tradoc I 17342. pdi (accessed 16 December 2(X)7) 
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EU Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 
ELOR bd*M 
Smffm Gurostat. 
35,0 
29.1 
30.0 - 
20.5 
25.0 - 
20,0 
15.0 
10.0 -- 
5,0 2.0 
0.0 
200 2002 
3.2 3.0 
0,2 11 
2003 
I lifflows 
F ow"la" 
I Salo" 
bo vion 
200,0 182.4 
150,0 
100,0 
50,0 
10.3 
0,0 
2 0-0 1 2002 2003a 
Inward stocks 
outward stocks 
Source: http: //trade-inf'o. ccc. cu. inUdoclib/docs/2006/ýtiiic/tradoc II 7342. pdl'(acccsscd 16 December 2007) 
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EU Trade with Mercosur 
! IM 
ýh euros) Imports 7 Exports Balance i Bfl euros) Imports : ]Exports [] Balance 
1200 350 
100 C 
95,9 98.5 93.6 300 '4 2 25.1 
K 185 ff 77 62.3 
312 
20 C26 
E3 10 0 -66 20 0 -114 i5ý 
1999 2001 2003 2000 2002 2004 
Source: IMF INrection of Trade Statistics excl intra EU Trade Source: Eurostat, statistical regime 4 
Imports 1.97 1.75 1.22 Imports 2.47 2.67 2.75 
Exports 1.80 1.94 1.97 Exports 2.83 2.06 1.91 
jMjo Euros) I Impons [7 Expons 7 Balance 
20 OF 
5,819 4,248 3.364 4.125 3 195 1571 1,658 1,706 930 486 234 -252 251 226 -26 
. 5000 
-10boo 
. 15.000 
-14.347 20000 
Agricultural products Energy Machinery Transport equipment Chemicals Textiles and clothing 
Source: Eurostat, stabstical regim 4 
Sourcc : httl2: //cc. curopa. eu/external-relations/iiicrcosur/intro/05 trade nicrc stat,,. xls (acccsscd 16 
Deccinber 2007) 
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EU Trade in Services and Foreigm Direct Investment %%ith Niercosur 
Impons Expons ' kance Li 
52 
43 4.3 43 
,'L 
-0 
ý 
-03 
2001 2002 2003 
Wce: Eurostat iexcWing government 5ekes I 
ýh Eurosý I lolows 7 oidlows 17 Mance 
Wce: Euro5tat 
673 
38 
IMINML-- 
200k 
2E estimatý MI ýtocý : 506 M- Rom M 
Sourcc : http: //cc. curopa. cu/cxtcriial-rclatioiis/incrcosur/intro/05 trade merc stals. xIs (acccssed 10 
Deccinba 2007) 
I ')O 
I /0 
5O8: 
$n Eurosl 
1K. 3 
679 
2.9 39 
sommols--i 
Al 2002 
Impoas+Expoas 
Aercosur 
USA 
Switzerland 
Japan 
Other 
inward Stocks 
Outward Stocks 
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Mercosur Trade with Main Partners 2003 
2 USA 
3 Argentina 
4 Brazil 
5 China 
6 Japan 
7 Nigeria 
8 Korea 
9 Switzerland 
10 Chile 
11 Algeria 
12 Saudi Arabia 
13 Russia 
14 Canada 
is Mexico 
16 Paraguay 
17 Uruguay 
18 India 
19 Bolivia 
20 Malaysia 
11,678 18.7 2 USA 
5,441 8.7 3 China 
5,157 8.3 4 Brazil 
3,032 4.9 5 Chile 
2,890 4.6 6 Argentina 
1,509 2.4 7 Mexico 
1,286 2.1 8 Japan 
1,150 1.8 9 Russia 
1,100 1.8 10 Korea 
1,084 1.7 11 Canada 
870 1.4 12 Paraguay 
865 1.4 13 Uruguay 
817 1.3 14 India 
757 1.2 15 South Africa 
732 1.2 16 Colombia 
726 1.2 17 Iran 
617 1.0 IS Peru 
529 0.8 19 Egypt 
516 0.8 20 Thailand 
Imports from 
29,650 19.0 
10,071 6.5 
9,669 6.2 
9,329 6.0 
5.963 3.8 
5,252 3.4 
3, %7 2.5 
2,757 1.8 
2,387 1.5 
1,996 1.3 
1,954 1.3 
1,793 1.1 
1,778 1.1 
1,609 10 
1,598 1.0 
1,547 1.0 
1,425 0.9 
1,207 0.8 
1,112 0.7 
Imports + Exports 
World 62,322 100.0 World 93,565 100.0 World 155,886 100.0 
NAFTA 13,252 21.3 NAFTA 22,319 23.9 NAFTA 35,571 22.8 
Latin America 15,233 24.4 Latin America 23,931 25.6 Latin America 39,165 25.1 
EU Candidates 129 0.2 EU Candidates 854 0.9 EU Candidates 983 0.6 
EFTA 1,421 2.3 EFTA 667 0.7 EFTA 2,088 1.3 
Medit. Countries' 1,748 2.8 Medit. Countries* 2,301 2.5 Medit. Countries' 4,049 2.6 
ASEAN 1,922 3.1 ASEAN 2,328 2.5 ASEAN 4,250 2.7 
17,972 19.2 2 USA 
6,297 6.7 3 Brazil 
4,914 5.3 4 Argentina 
4,863 5.2 5 China 
4,228 4.5 6 Chile 
3,210 3.4 7 Japan 
2,362 2.5 8 Mexico 
1,522 1.6 9 Korea 
1,471 1.6 10 Russia 
1,136 1.2 11 Nigeria 
1,061 1.1 12 Canada 
1,052 1.1 13 Paraguay 
992 1.1 14 Uruguay 
954 1.0 15 India 
875 0.9 16 Saudi Arabia 
823 0.9 17 Switzerland 
821 0.9 18 Algeria 
806 0.9 19 South Africa 
802 0.9 20 Thailand 
Exports to 
Source : llttp: //eC. CLirova. cu/extcrnal-rciatioiis/iiicrcosLir/iiitro/05 trade nicrc stats. xIs (accessed 16 
December 2007) 
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EU-Mercosur Trade by Ma*or Product Categorv 2004 
European Union, Imports from the World European Union, Imports from Mercosur 
TOTAL 1,027,893 100.0 TOTAL 28,264 100.0 2.7 
Machinery and transport equipment 350,587 34.1 Food and live animals 10,515 37.2 20.2 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and rel. Materials 180,960 17.6 Crude materials inedible, except fuels 7,255 25.7 17.1 
Miscell. unuf. Articles 153,496 14.9 Manuf goods classif. chiefly by material 3,242 11,5 3.0 
manuf goods classif. chiefly by material 107,589 10.5 Machinery and transport equipment 3,229 11.4 0.9 
Chemicals and related prod., n. e. s. 86,207 8.4 Miscell. manuf. Articles 977 3.5 0.6 
Food and live animals 52,003 5.1 Chemicals and related prod., ri. e. s. 930 3.3 1.1 
Crude materials inedible, except fuels 42,435 4.1 Beverages and tobacco 536 1.9 9.5 
Commodit. and transactions n. e. c. 29,846 2.9 Mineral fuels, lubricants and rel. Materials 486 1.7 0.3 
Beverages and tobacco 5,661 0.6 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 219 0.8 6.0 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 3,635 0.4 Commodit. and transactions ri. e. c. 156 0.6 0.5 
European Union, Exports to the World 
TOTAL 962,64 100.0 
Machinery and transport equipment 435,782 45.3 
Chemicals and related prod., n. e. s. 151,778 15.8 
manuf goods ctassif. chiefly by material 123,285 12.8 
Miscell. manuf. Articles 113,854 11.8 
Food and (ive animats 33,521 3.5 
Mineral fuets, lubricants and rel. Materials 27,753 2.9 
Commodit. and transactions ri. e. c. 22,615 2.3 
Crude materiats inedible, except fuets 16,682 1.7 
Beverages and tobacco 14,803 1.5 
Animal and vegetable A. fats and waxes 2,367 0.2 
European Union, Exports to ... Mercosur 
TOTAL 18,340 100.0 
Machinery and transport equipment 9,198 50.1 
Chemicals and related prod., n. e. s. 4,125 22.5 
Manuf goods ciassif. chiefly by material 1,818 9.9 
MiscelL manuf. Articles 1,293 7.0 
Commodit. and transactions n. e. c. 382 2.1 
Food and live animals 246 1.3 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and rel. Materials 234 U 
Crude materials inedible, except fuels 179 to 
Beverages and tobacco 159 0.9 
Animal and veget&e oils, fats and waxes 74 0.4 
Source : lltlp: HCC. CLII'OPI. CLI/CxtcriiýiI i-clatioii,, /iiiercOSLir/iiiii-o/05 tradc nicrc stats. xls (accessed 16 
December 2007) 
1.9 
2.1 
2.7 
1.5 
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Brazil 'rrade with Main Partners 2005 
The major import pArtners The major export partners The major trade partners 
World ,79 31 1000 World 9s 81 1 Poo 0 World -6 1 742 100 0 
lu 17610 )`1.9 1 EU 22 419 23.4 1 EU 40028 24.4 
USA 13568 2oo 2 USA IQ 160 20.0 2 LSA 32 728 20.0 
I ArWt, na 5 629 8.3 3 China 7294 7.6 3 Argentina 12 401 7.6 
4 Chma 4 270 63 4 Argenti-iii 6772 7.1 4 Ciina 11 564 7.1 
rl, geria, 4 209 F, 2 S Mexico 3 625 3.8 S Japan 5617 3.4 
6 Japan 2 3" 35 6 japar 3 218 3.4 6 Nigeria 4726 2.9 
- Algeria 2 327 34 7 Cl, *Ie 2 763 2.9 7 Mexico 4336 2.6 
5 Korea 2 131 31 a Canada 2 Oq2 1,2 a Clille 4292 2.6 
9 Chile 1 528 22 9 Korea 1 827 19 9 Korea 3959 2.4 
IC 5au& Arabia 1 482 2.2 10 Russia 1 712 1.8 '0 Car&da 2880 1.0 
II Horig KcAg 889 1.3 11 Venezue(a, 1 598 1.7 ,I Algeria 2684 1.6 
12 Switzei la*vd 809 1.2 12 Caribbean 1 183 1.2 12 Saudi Arab, a 2 327 1.4 
13 Canada 788 1.2 13 Iran 1 159 1.2 13 Russia 2 247 1.4 
14 Siolgapore 74q f1 14 Colombia 953 1.0 .4 Vere"a 1 838 111 
is Bolivia 7,11 fI is South Africa 951 vo Is Hong Kong 1 563 F. 0 
16 Mex, co 711 0 r) 16 Saudi Arabia 845 0.9 '6 Singapore 1 270 0.8 
17 raq 569 08 17 Thailand 788 0.8 7 Caribbean 1 266 0.8 
is Austral, a 568 0.8 is Peru 770 0.8 is Soutý Africa 1 222 0.7 
19 riva 562 o. 8 19 Paraguay 762 0.8 it Thailand I 1QO 0.7 
20 Russia 535 0,8 20 United Arab Emir. rN 0,8 20 S,. ýýtzerland 1 '86 0.7 
imports from Exports to . 
Imports - Exports 
Partner regions Mio euro % 
WoOd 67 91C IX 0 Wor(d 9s $I 1 100.0 Worid 163 742 100.0 
NAFTA 15067 22.2 NAFTA 24878 26.0 NAF TA 39945 24.4 
Latin America 10427 15 1 Latin Anx4lca 10982 20.9 Latin America 30409 18.6 
EU (andidates 167 02 EU Candidates 943 1.0 EU Candidates I Ito 0.7 
EFTA 1 187 17 EFTA 702 0.7 EFTA 1 990 r. 2 
Medit. (ountnt-s' 3 172 4.7 liedit. Countries* 1 817 1.9 M"t. Couritries* 4988 3.0 
ASEAN 2 127 1 3.1 1 ASEAN 2 101 1 2.2 11 ASEAN 4228 1 2.6 1 
Sourcc: littli: //tradc. eC. CLiropa. cii/doclib/docs/2(X)O/septciiiber/tradoc-I I 3359. pdl (accesscd 16 Dcccmbcr 
2007) 
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EU-Brazil Trade by Maeor Product Category 
E 
4L 
aM taW, eqirp"w,. 375 Q52 3',. 0 Cride materk iRmNe, excW hes 6785 29.1 4.8 
Yinerai U(s. Amits inc e(. hww! k 244695 21.2 Food and ive armals 6 126 26,3 11.1 
yke,.. mvd. A, *, Xle. ý 16647 14.2 Wiwi ano transpM eoLipfrent 3466 14.9 0.9 
Yaml goo& cx, (ý didly h matral 116 162 9.9 %NJ " dassif, c*-,, y b,,, rratent 2845 12 2 2.4 
NmicalsaWreWedxod. 93 872 8.0 'hemus arc relate, prod,, i. e. s. 980 4.2 L 1'0 
Food and tive wi-w 54653 4.6 Osceil. mand, Artus 968 4.2 0.6 
C, Amiwiv Wbe. eycem fieb 45851 J. 9 Oreal V(s, lubman arc re,, oaten& 720 3.1 0.3 
Cmyno*. and mww% n. e.,. B 720 2.2 fe--erars am tokco 393 17 8.2 
BeýMes anc tobicco 4778 0.4 Cvnoft aid trarsactms i, e, c. 251 11 1.0 
., inl ix eptahe d.:, fru andwixe. 41 N Animal and *ýeetabte A, 
fat A %ves 154 0.7 18 
Euiopgr vion, bxr. s to N ', c, d European Union, Exports to Brazi I 
TOTAL I D61 836 100.0 
Yactwy and traw, eqLrrff,. 478928 45.1 
ýC Nmkks and retited prod. n. e. s. 163 B9 15.4 
Vixf goods c4sse Nfly trv rna*, ea 133 539 12.6 
Yj, Ceý, Mffd. k", idLK Iq 52 1U 
Owral fA, &uits w eý. Me rats 38&47 3.7 
Food and am'ma, 35 '26 33 
lommok and t%mic" n. e. c. 28663 2.7 
CrArraUduWbt. elceptfAs 94 1.8 
Bf, njes inc tobacco 16111 1.5 
. 11-31 Ix - eptaKe 0i " fru a'd waxe,. " 210 0.2 
jr 
TOTAL 15987 100.0 
oachiwi ax WspDrt equpfrent 8476 53.0 
'"im arc relatM prod., i. e. s. 3 259 20.4 
OW loods cW, chiey b,,., rrateril 1 629 10.2 
Oscc, mvuf, kVcles 1 012 6.3 
'ow&, aid trrsacbors i, e, c, 244 1.5 
, 
Oral fuK lt&al: s anc rei, Menats 227 1.4 
Food and i,,, e animat 227 1.4 
We mater& mebie, e. xW fL6 166 1.0 
Beverages am tobacco 112 0.7 
4mmal and', jetb, e ot, faý aM nes 82 0.5 
WoM exckhng Inta-EU trii A EtMm Wion Z5 fforbm. 
1.5 
1.8 
1.0 
1.2 
0.8 
0.9 
0.6 
0.6 
0.9 
0.1 
3.4 
Source: http: //trade. ec. etiropi. cLi/(Ioclib/docs/2(X)6/scpteiiibcr/tradoc_l 13359. pdl'(accesscd 16 Dcccinhcr 
2007) 
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EU Imports from Brazil 
Eui opgan Ll ni or Impoi ts fit ým týg : ýý 
TOTA. 983 443 IM 940 347 1)0,1) 1176 055 1 00,0 
Pdrftari Products 284210 28.9 274641 A2 383 646 32.6 
0 1, tO: 
Apiculmi Rod. 81060 8,2 78 40A 8.3 80 932 6.9 
ErtTi '55 904 15.9 155 U6 16.6 244 6Q5 21.2 
hand. Products 667914 67,9 634832 67,5 728 5T7 62.0 
0 IAirft 
#aft, ery 1923 26,7 23,1724 24,9 277 Q6 23.6 
Tra%wý K#DM 89425 9,1 q2 8ý8 9,9 98526 8.4 
of whkh; 
Avtomýve ; fod. N 734 3.5 ý 579 4A 44010 3.7 
Chevais 76880 7.8 80360 85 9187' , 80 
Tmes aid ci*, 61210 6,8 66 1 ,11 
70 11 5 ý0 
EuroDear ýiýoi Imports l, o- Bra: lý 
1)10.1' 18 161 i LAO 
Primary Products 11495 64.9 12 372 65.9 14 713 63.2 
Of 'A'ý', 'Ch: 
AIncultural prod, 8985 46 6 8624 45.9 9121 40.0 
bergy 229 12 535 2's no 3.1 
Aanuf, Products 6 611 34.3 6 216 33,2 7 714 33.1 
of wý; 'Ch: 
Machinery 922 48 985 51 1 517 6.5 
Transport equipm 2 169 113 i 129 7.1 1 949 8.4 
0 hký: 
AetomoMe prod, 579 3.0 W 3.1 1 095 4.7 
Cherrick 668 35 805 4. J 980 4,2 
Texdles vd cioth. 176 1 09 195 1 1.0 171 1 0.7 
Structure of Imports 
from th@ World 
2001 2003 2005 
Ugncfluial prod 0 Energy Rachinery 
0 Tra nsport equi pm M mchemicals 
Q Textiles and cloth. 
from 
... Brazil 
1.98 
3, M 
11.52 
0.29 
1.06 
0.55 
1.98 
2.49 
1.04 
0.24 
Source: http: //tradc. ec. curopa. cu/doclib/docs/2(X)6/scptciiiber/tra(loc-I 13359. pdOacccsscd 16 December 
2007) 
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20011 2003 2005 
lAgncubial pfod, 0 Er*rgy 0 mj, -. h I fie, 
0 TranspW equipm E 'v fe GChe*6 
POs and cloth 
ELJ-Nlexico Trade and Investment 2005 
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Appendix 6: EU - Latin American Regional Integration Schemes: Key Details 
Central American Common Market 
Name: Central Arnerican Coninion Market 
(Mercado Connin Centromnericano - MCCA) 
Creation: 13 Decernber 1960, Managua (Nicaragua), Treaty of'Manapia L- L- 
Member Costa Rica(1962), El Salvador, Guaternala, Honduras and 
Countries: Nicaragua 
Associate Belize and Panarna (1997 -, joined political hody only) 
Members: 
Seat: City of Guaternala (Guaternala) 
Objectives: Creation of a Conu-non Market 
Population: 39,1 million 
(2006) 
GDP: (2005) IF74 billion 
Exports: (2005) IF21,8 billion 
Imports: (2005) C32.3 billion 
Source: Statistics from www. tradc. cc. curopa. cu/ (accessed 16 December 2007) 
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Andean Community 
Name: Aiidean Coimnuiiity AC (Conii(indadAiiiIiiia - CAN) 
Creation: 26 May 1969, Cartageiia dc hidias (Coloiiihia), Cirtageiw 
Agreeiiieiit 
Kiiowil as the Atideaii Pact witil the 1996 Ti-Lijillo Pi-olocol 
created the Andean Community 
Member Bolivia, Colombia. Ecuador. Peru, Venezuela (1969-2006), 
Countries: Chile (1969-1976) 
Observation Panama, AEC countries and Mercosur 
Status: 
Seat: Lima (Peru) 
Objectives: To promote the balanced and harmonious development of the 
member countries, in conditions of equality, through economic L- 
and social integration and cooperation. To facilitate participation 
in regional integration with the gradual airn of' f0rining a Latin 
American common market. To strenothen sub-reo'onal 
solidarity, reduce the differences in development that already 
exist and to accelerate the growth of the Andean countries. To 
promote the reduction of external vulnerability and better the 
position of rnernber states in the international economic arena. 
Harmonise economic and agricultural policies 
Population: 121.2 million 
(2006) 
GDP: (2005) C303 billion 
Exports: (2005) F41,4 billion 
Imports: (2005) IF36,3 billion 
Source: Statistics from w\Nw. Iradc. cc. curoVa. CLL/ (accessed 16 December 2007) 
For full details of the Andean Community see their comprehensive websitc at 
www. co ni mu n idad and i na. org 
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Mercosur 
Name: Mercosur (Mercatio ('on, 1111 (lei sit, -) 
Creation: 26 March 1991 with Treaty of Asunc16ri 
Member Argentina (1991). Brazil (1991), Paraguay (1991), Uruguay 
Countries: (1991) and Venezuela (2006) 
Associates: Bolivia (1996), Chile (1996-2006), Peru (2003) 
Seat: Montevideo (Uruguay) 
Objectives: To create a Common Market with the free circulation of goods. 
services and factors of production. To adopt it common foreign 
policy. To coordinate common positions in international fora and 
coordinate macroeconomic and sectoral policies. To harnionise 
national legislation with the view of better integration in South 
America. Econornic development with social, justice. 
Population: 226,1 nifflion 
(2006) 
GDP: (2005) C802 billion 
Exports: (2005) C 184,5 billion 
Imports: (2005) F1 15 billion 
Source: Statistics from w%A NN. Iradc. cc. curopa. cu/ (accessed 16 December 2007) 
For full details of Mercosur see their comprehensive websitc at wýN NN. mercOSUr. org. uN 
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